The Ryukyu-Bashi Double Deterrence Structure and the Batanes Waters Incident: The Philippine Perspective and Implications for South Korea
Executive Summary
The October 1 incident in which the Philippine Coast Guard expelled the Chinese research vessel Jiahaike No. 7 from the waters off Batanes Province cannot be fully explained solely through the US-Japan-centric frame of the "southern flank in a Taiwan contingency." For the Philippines, this represents a phased lawfare campaign by China—linking sovereignty discourse, opposition to Japan-Philippines EEZ delimitation, and seabed surveys—and is fundamentally a matter of territorial sovereignty over its northernmost territory. Manila is employing a dual strategy: avoiding entanglement in the Taiwan issue by responding through the language of sovereignty, UNCLOS, and law enforcement, while deploying its coast guard rather than its navy to the front lines, thereby making a practical contribution to the Ryukyu-Bashi double deterrence structure. This approach demonstrates the operationalization of US-Japan-Philippines minilateral cooperation within the context of US-China strategic competition and Asia-Pacific maritime security, while also revealing China's pattern of gray-zone pressure using non-military means. Facing similar pressures in the West Sea and around Ieodo, South Korea should use the Philippine detection and response model and its "language of sovereignty" strategy as a comparative reference, while also evaluating the practical limitations of coast guard-centric responses.
I. Issue Analysis
US-Japan and US-Philippines Minilateral Cooperation: Establishing a Two-Way Deterrence Posture Against China in the Ryukyu and Bashi Straits
1. Background and Progress of the Issue
Batanes is the northernmost province of the Philippines, facing Gansui at the southern tip of Taiwan across the Bashi Channel. For a long time, these waters were treated as a periphery in Philippine security discourse. However, the situation changed after the inauguration of the Marcos administration in 2022. The Philippines adopted military modernization and the expansion of security partnerships as national policy priorities [8]. Around the 75th anniversary of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, the country has steadily increased the frequency of joint exercises and the number of accessible bases with extra-regional partners, including the United States and Japan [8].
Against this backdrop, the strategic location of Batanes has received renewed attention. *Foreign Affairs* analyzed that the US-Japan deployment in the Ryukyu Islands and US-Philippine cooperation in the Bashi Channel function complementarily, forming a structure that denies Chinese maritime dominance on both the northeastern and southern sides of Taiwan [1]. While this interpretation stems from a US- and Japan-centric perspective, from Manila's point of view, Batanes is not a secondary front for the defense of Taiwan. It is its northernmost border and a territory where its own sovereignty is at stake.
China's pressure first manifested at the discursive level. In May of this year, the Philippines and Japan announced the launch of official negotiations on the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves. China immediately criticized this. On June 30, during an academic conference at Jinan University in China, Chinese scholars defined Batanes as a "natural geographical extension" of Taiwan. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro refuted this as a "baseless" claim, adding that it was a "sign of pre-planned intent." Following these remarks, Secretary Teodoro ordered the patrol range to be expanded from the northern waters to the country's entire maritime domain.
A similar pattern was observed on the Japanese side. Kyodo News reported, based on an analysis of AIS data, that Chinese oceanographic research vessels repeatedly conducted surveys in Japan's EEZ near the Senkaku Islands from March to July. A Japanese Ministry of Defense source pointed out that this data collection could be aimed at mapping seabed topography with a Taiwan contingency in mind [7]. In effect, seabed survey pressure was applied simultaneously in both the Ryukyu and Bashi areas. This demonstrates a pattern in which China combines sovereignty discourse with seabed surveys to exert simultaneous pressure in both straits.
2. Current Situation
On October 1, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) expelled the Chinese research vessel *Jiahaike No. 7* from the waters northwest of Itbayat Island in Batanes Province. The PCG deployed its largest 97-meter vessel, the *BRP Teresa Magbanua*, along with aircraft. The Chinese vessel had remained in the waters where submarine cables pass since September 28, which the Philippines deemed an unauthorized seabed survey. The PCG stated that the vessel had intentionally spoofed its AIS location, emphasizing that detection would have been impossible without the Itbayat monitoring station. During the expulsion, a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel escorted the research ship. Given that the *Jiahaike No. 7* is nominally privately owned, the PCG raised questions regarding its links to the Chinese government and the intended use of the collected data.
During the same period, tensions persisted in other areas of the South China Sea. The Chinese military conducted joint exercises near the disputed Scarborough Shoal, just two days after the Philippines accused China of obstructing its resupply mission. China's Southern Theater Command claimed this was a necessary response to the actions of a "certain country" disrupting regional peace [4]. Aside from the symbolic outcome of the September US-China summit extending the trade truce, an ADMM-Plus maritime security joint exercise—hosted by the Philippines and Japan and involving 11 vessels from eight countries—took place in the West Philippine Sea during the same week. China attended only the opening ceremony and avoided the maritime exercise phase. Meanwhile, standoffs with the Philippines continued at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal [8]. China's tactics consistently manifest as avoiding military conflict while maintaining pressure through civilian and paramilitary assets.
The multilateral cooperation framework is becoming more concrete. In February 2026, the United States, Japan, and the Philippines conducted their first Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity (MMCA) exercise near the Bashi Channel. Japan announced that it would continue to cooperate with allies and partners on South China Sea issues. During the Balikatan exercise in May of this year, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) conducted their first live-fire drill of the Type 12 surface-to-ship missile outside Japanese territory [8]. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) is also planning to conduct a launch drill of the Type 25 surface-to-ship guided missile, which has a range reaching the Chinese coast, during next month's US-Japan joint exercise Keen Sword [13]. This reflects a trend where the US ally and partner network is simultaneously accumulating firepower and surveillance assets in both the Ryukyu Islands and the Bashi Channel.
3. Key Actors and Positions
The Philippinesoccupies the most complex position in this framework. President Marcos has publicly cautioned against the possibility of the Philippines being unwillingly dragged into a war over Taiwan. At the same time, he stated that contingency planning is necessary due to the large number of Filipino workers in Taiwan. This dual stance reflects Manila's diplomatic calculus. Putting the Taiwan issue at the forefront would increase the political cost of conflict with China. Instead, the Philippines has chosen the language of law enforcement—focusing on sovereignty, the EEZ, UNCLOS, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Deploying the coast guard rather than the military to the front lines aligns with this approach. The *BRP Teresa Magbanua*, deployed in this expulsion operation, is a large patrol vessel built through Japanese ODA, serving as an example of Japan's practical contribution to law enforcement capabilities.
Chinais maintaining pressure below the threshold of military action by combining civilian research vessels and the coast guard. The AIS spoofing and civilian registration of the *Jiahaike No. 7* are typical of this tactic. The Taiwan Affairs Office has also strongly protested the transfer of coast guard vessels between Taiwan and the Philippines [15]. China is exhibiting a cumulative pattern of pressuring Batanes by sequentially combining sovereignty discourse (the Jinan University conference), opposition to boundary delimitation (criticism of the Japan-Philippines EEZ negotiations), and seabed surveys (the *Jiahaike No. 7*).
Japanis playing a dual role: securing the northeastern flank of Taiwan through its deployments in the Ryukyu Islands, and indirectly contributing to deterrence on the southern flank through cooperation with the Philippines. The Japan-Philippines negotiations on EEZ and continental shelf delimitation go beyond a simple bilateral issue, functioning as a legal link connecting the Ryukyu-Bashi deterrence line. China's raising of the Batanes sovereignty discourse immediately after these negotiations can be interpreted as an attempt to preemptively sever this connection.
The United Statesis maintaining its bilateral frameworks with Japan and the Philippines while expanding them into trilateral minilateral frameworks, as seen in the February 2026 MMCA exercise. This is an extension of a structural choice to distribute burdens among allies amid resource constraints [3][8]. The expansion of exercises along the US-Japan-Australia axis and the ADMM-Plus exercises led by the Philippines and Japan are all aligned with this burden-sharing posture.
4. Key Issues
The first issue is the entrenchment of a "military competition through non-military means" framework. China deploys civilian research vessels and its coast guard, while the Philippines puts its coast guard and monitoring stations at the forefront. Both sides accumulate practical maritime domain awareness (MDA) and access-denial capabilities while avoiding escalation into military conflict. This framework is characterized by maintaining constant tension without a clear threshold. A similar pattern was identified in the case of the Chinese Coast Guard shifting to regular patrols in the waters east of Taiwan [18].
The second issue is the limitation of the Philippines' strategic ambiguity. While the Marcos administration maintains rhetoric that distances itself from the Taiwan issue, it practically serves as a pillar of the Ryukyu-Bashi double deterrence structure. China's definition of Batanes as a "geographical extension of Taiwan" can be seen as an attempt to neutralize this ambiguity. The key question is how sustainable this strategy of participating in deterrence through the language of sovereignty will be in the face of China's lawfare offensive.
The third issue is the implication of the Japan-Philippines boundary delimitation. These negotiations have the potential to function as a legal and physical link connecting the Ryukyu Islands and the Bashi Channel, moving beyond a simple bilateral maritime boundary issue. The fact that China launched a discursive offensive immediately after the negotiations were announced suggests that Beijing is highly sensitive to this connection.
The fourth issue is the comparative implication for South Korea. The Philippines chose a method of practically contributing to the deterrence structure through the logic of defending sovereignty while avoiding the political burden of the Taiwan issue. This serves as a reference model for South Korea, which faces similar gray-zone pressures in the West Sea and the waters around Ieodo. However, the Philippine case was made possible within a double-patronage structure of the US-Japan alliance, which differs from South Korea's condition of relying on the single axis of the ROK-US alliance.
II. In-Depth Analysis
In-Depth Analysis: Root Causes and Structural Context of the Ryukyu-Bashi Double Deterrence Structure
1. Root Causes: The Combination of Geographical Destiny and Legal Vacuum
The root cause of the Bashi Channel emerging as a key variable in a Taiwan contingency lies in geography itself. If the Taiwan Strait is blockaded or becomes a battlefield, the routes through which the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy can project power into the Pacific are limited. The northern route through the Ryukyu Islands and the southern route through the Bashi Channel are virtually the only options. As *Foreign Affairs* points out, the US-Japan deployment in the Ryukyus and US-Philippine cooperation in the Bashi Channel exploit this geographical constraint to create a structure that denies Chinese maritime dominance on both flanks of Taiwan [1]. Rather than being designed by a single actor, this structure is closer to a result of military responses being layered on top of pre-existing geographical bottlenecks.
However, from the Philippine perspective, the root cause lies at a different level. The flashpoint of tension surrounding Batanes was not military deployment, but rather a discursive competition over its legal status. The Chinese academic community's definition of Batanes as a "natural geographical extension" of Taiwan on June 30 was not a mere academic statement. It was a reaction that came immediately after the launch of the Philippines-Japan negotiations on EEZ and continental shelf delimitation. Given that it coincided with China's criticism of these negotiations, it can be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the legal legitimacy of the Japan-Philippines boundary delimitation itself by subordinating the status of Batanes to the Taiwan issue. In other words, the root cause is not military competition, but lawfare aimed at preempting jurisdictional boundaries within the UNCLOS framework, with the deployment of seabed research vessels serving as a means to physically support this lawfare.
The case of the Chinese Coast Guard shifting to regular patrols in the waters east of Taiwan demonstrates the repetitive nature of this lawfare approach. Rather than rejecting UNCLOS, China has chosen to assert its EEZ and continental shelf jurisdiction using the language of the convention. This shares the same legal structure as the nine-dash line logic in the South China Sea, making procedural refutation by third countries difficult [18]. The research vessel incident in the waters of Batanes follows the same grammar. Instead of directly claiming sovereignty, it accumulates grounds for effective control through the neutral act of "surveying."
2. Structural Context
Security Framework: Military Competition through Non-Military Means
The structural characteristic of this issue is that neither side puts military assets at the forefront. China chose to deploy the nominally privately owned *Jiahaike No. 7* under the escort of its coast guard. The Philippines placed its coast guard, rather than its navy, on the front lines. This is not an accidental choice but a rational strategy for both sides. For China, it is a means of exerting pressure without triggering the activation conditions of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty in the event of an escalation into military conflict. For the Philippines, it is a means of responding through the language of law enforcement—citing sovereignty and EEZ violations—without the political burden of being entangled in the Taiwan issue. In the Chinese Coast Guard's regular patrols in the eastern waters, tactics of silence and ambiguity were evaluated to have undermined the effectiveness of existing early warning indicators [18]. In the waters of Batanes, the same obfuscation tactic of AIS spoofing was repeated.
This structure is directly linked to the military competition in the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific, which is a core axis of US-China strategic competition. At the same time, it overlaps with issues of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and freedom of navigation addressed in regional affairs and conflict domains. Given that the normalization of Chinese Coast Guard patrols is occurring simultaneously in the waters east of Taiwan, the Ryukyus, and the Bashi Channel, this should not be viewed as an isolated incident, but rather as a pathway through which gray-zone pressure is cumulatively normalized [18].
Alliance Structure: Asymmetric Expansion of Minilateral Cooperation
In terms of alliance and multilateral security, this issue shows a pattern where the US-Japan and US-Philippines bilateral alliances, which had been deepening separately, are practically linked through the Bashi Channel. The first MMCA exercise conducted by the United States, Japan, and the Philippines near the Bashi Channel in February 2026 demonstrates that this connection has moved beyond the bilateral level and entered the stage of institutionalization. This is in line with the trend of asymmetric reorganization, characterized by the expansion of exercises along the US-Japan-Australia axis—exemplified by the expansion of Orient Shield 26—and the relative reduction of exercises along the US-ROK axis [3]. The structural choice of the United States, facing resource constraints, to maintain its deterrence network through burden-sharing with allies manifests contrastingly: as stagnation along the US-ROK-Japan axis in Northeast Asia, and as deepening along the US-Japan-Philippines axis in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.
A similar pattern is observed in the ADMM-Plus maritime security joint exercise. While 11 vessels from eight countries participated, China attended only the opening ceremony and avoided the maritime exercise phase, while simultaneously maintaining standoffs with the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal [8]. This suggests that the ASEAN-centric multilateral framework is transforming into a venue for accumulating interoperability between regional countries and extra-regional partners while excluding China [8]. The Itbayat monitoring station in the waters of Batanes is also a physical hub for this accumulation of interoperability, and the deployment of the large patrol vessel built through Japanese ODA is an example of US-Japan-Philippines cooperation extending to the level of equipment and assets.
Domestic Political Structure: Asymmetric Burden Allocation in the Philippines
President Marcos's warning that the Philippines could be unwillingly dragged into a war over Taiwan, while simultaneously stating that contingency plans must be made in advance, reflects the dual constraints of Philippine domestic politics. Humanitarian considerations regarding the large number of Filipino workers in Taiwan and the burden of domestic public opinion against bringing the Taiwan issue to the forefront operate simultaneously. Consequently, the Philippines deploys its coast guard rather than its military and opts for a law enforcement frame instead of a security frame. While this compromise aims to contribute to deterrence against China while avoiding domestic political accountability, it also harbors limitations, as coast guard assets alone are insufficient to continuously counter the combined forces of the Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparison of Similar Cases
This is not the first time China has utilized research vessels in this pattern. The cases of repeated EEZ intrusions by Chinese oceanographic research vessels near the Senkaku Islands, as reported by Kyodo News, exhibit almost the exact same structure as the Batanes incident. The repeated surveys in Japan's EEZ from March to July were evaluated by a Japanese Ministry of Defense source as aiming to map seabed topography with a Taiwan contingency in mind [7]. In the waters of Batanes, the location in the waters where submarine cables pass and the method of raising questions about the purpose of the survey are identical. The fact that the same method is repeated in both the Ryukyus and the Bashi Channel suggests that this is not an isolated regional incident, but rather a consistent operational doctrine of China.
In terms of combining lawfare with physical pressure, the normalization of patrols in the waters east of Taiwan is the closest precedent. The fact that the number of vessels near the main island of Taiwan surged by 37.5% year-on-year, and the eastern waters where new patrols were initiated skyrocketed by 3,800% [18], demonstrates the speed with which jurisdictional claims at the discursive level translate into actual patrol density within a few months. The time interval in the Batanes waters from the academic conference remarks in June to the deployment of the research vessel in September being less than three months also aligns with this sense of speed.
China's response to bloc-formation is also continuous with past cases. Just as the *Global Times* protested by defining Orient Shield 26 as a repackaging of "bloc politics" [3], China's response tends to target the very frame of the United States binding bilateral relations into a multilateral network, rather than the military substance of individual exercises. The fact that China conducted separate joint exercises at Scarborough Shoal after the Batanes incident [4] can be seen not as direct retaliation for a specific event, but as a pattern of demonstrating its presence in multiple waters simultaneously to counter the trend of bloc-formation itself.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is whether the Japan-Philippines negotiations on EEZ and continental shelf delimitation are finalized. If the negotiations lead to an official agreement, China is highly likely to make its discursive pressure regarding the legal status of Batanes more explicit. The claim of a "natural geographical extension" made at the Jinan University academic conference could function as a preemptive move to retroactively deny the legitimacy of the negotiations themselves.
The second variable is the speed of institutionalization of US-Japan-Philippines minilateral exercises. If MMCA exercises are regularized near the Bashi Channel, the Ryukyu-Bashi double deterrence structure will transition from an ad-hoc linkage to a permanent platform. This could serve as a factor that elevates the level of China's response. Conversely, if the United States' resource constraints persist, leading to a reduction in exercises along the US-Philippines axis similar to the US-ROK axis, the deterrence contribution of Batanes will face structural limitations [3].
The third variable is the trend of public opinion regarding Taiwan entanglement in Philippine domestic politics. If the political capital of the Marcos administration to maintain the law enforcement frame is exhausted, a transition from a coast guard-centric response to the deployment of military assets may become inevitable. In this case, China's strategy of responding through non-military means is also likely to be adjusted.
The fourth variable is the density of the deployment of Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia assets. If the pattern of regularized patrols observed in the waters east of Taiwan [18] is transplanted directly to the Bashi Channel, a threshold where the Philippines' surveillance and detection assets alone are insufficient to respond may arrive soon. Whether the successful detection by the Itbayat monitoring station was an exceptional achievement or a repeatable capability will be a watershed for future evaluations.
III. Recommended Responses
Recommended Responses
1. Comprehensive Assessment
The Batanes waters incident cannot be fully explained solely through the US-Japan-centric frame of the "southern flank in a Taiwan contingency." For the Philippines, the essence of this incident is lawfare over its sovereign territory. China has raised the level of pressure by sequentially combining sovereignty discourse, opposition to EEZ delimitation, and seabed surveys [1]. The same legal grammar is identified in the Chinese Coast Guard's shift to regular patrols in the waters east of Taiwan, where it asserts its jurisdiction using the language of UNCLOS, thereby making procedural refutations by third countries difficult [18]. It must be assessed that this grammar is being repeated in the Bashi Channel as well.
The crucial point for South Korea is the manner in which the Philippines participates in this structure. Manila does not put the Taiwan issue at the forefront. Instead, it responds through the language of law enforcement—focusing on sovereignty, the EEZ, UNCLOS, and the protection of critical infrastructure. It places its coast guard, rather than its military, on the front lines. This choice is a dual strategy that minimizes political burdens while practically contributing to the Ryukyu-Bashi deterrence line. For South Korea, which faces similar gray-zone pressures in the West Sea and the waters around Ieodo, this methodology itself serves as a comparative reference.
At the same time, the limitations of this approach are clear. While a coast guard-centric response secures legitimacy at the law enforcement level, it has limits in terms of effective deterrence when China increases the intensity of pressure below the threshold by combining coast guard and civilian vessels. The immediate escort provided by the Chinese Coast Guard during the expulsion of the *Jiahaike No. 7* is an example that demonstrates this limitation. South Korea must not romanticize the Philippine model, but rather evaluate its achievements and limitations separately.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plans
Short-term (3–6 months)
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense need to compile cases of responses to maritime research vessels among the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan following the Batan incident into an independent database. They should compare the AIS spoofing tactics of the Jiahaike 7, the recurring patterns of Chinese research vessels near the Senkaku Islands [7], and Chinese research and coast guard activities in the West Sea and Ieodo waters using the same analytical framework. This aims to identify patterns rather than respond to specific incidents. The Ministry of National Defense should explore securing channels for observation and information sharing regarding the US-Japan-Philippines MMCA drills near the Bashi Channel scheduled for February 2026. Rather than direct participation, an indirect learning path through observing regional multilateral exercises within ASEAN is more realistic [8].
Medium-term (6 months–2 years)
The maritime research and patrol system in the Ieodo waters needs to be compared and reviewed against the Itbayat monitoring station model. The key point emphasized by the PCG is that detection itself would have been impossible without the monitoring station. An examination is needed to determine whether the Korea Coast Guard's deployment of surveillance assets in the West Sea and Ieodo waters has similar detection gaps. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should refer to the "language of sovereignty" strategy adopted by the Philippines—specifically, responding through the framework of UNCLOS and EEZ infringements while avoiding involvement in the Taiwan issue—to inform South Korea's communication strategy in the West Sea. This is a path to securing legitimacy under international law while minimizing the burden of managing bilateral relations with China.
Long-term (2 years or more)
South Korea must establish an independent monitoring system to track whether the Ryukyu-Bashi dual deterrence structure is expanding. It must prepare for the possibility of this structure expanding to the west of Taiwan—namely, the Taiwan Strait itself—or the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, there is a need to reassess the implications of Japan's policy of continuing cooperation in the South China Sea for discussions on South Korea-Japan security cooperation. If Japan expands its cooperation with allies and partners to the South China Sea, discussions on the geographical scope of South Korea-Japan security cooperation will become inevitable [1][3].
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
First, whether AIS spoofing patterns of Chinese research and coast guard vessels are observed in the West Sea and Ieodo waters. This serves as a leading indicator to gauge whether the same tactics used in the Bashi Channel and Senkaku cases are spilling over [7].
Second, statements by Chinese academia and state-affiliated media framing South Korea's jurisdictional waters or Ieodo under specific sovereignty discourses. Considering that the statement regarding "natural geographical prolongation" in the Batan case came immediately after criticism of the EEZ negotiations, similar discourses should be interpreted as a precursor to actual action.
Third, the expansion of the geographical scope of US-Japan-Philippines minilateral exercises. Key subjects of observation include whether the MMCA drills near the Bashi Channel are regularized and whether participating countries are expanded. It is also necessary to track whether the asymmetry—where exercises along the US-Japan-Australia axis expand while those along the US-ROK axis are relatively scaled back, as seen in the expansion of Orient Shield 26—is repeated [3].
Fourth, whether the Chinese Coast Guard's routine patrol system spreads from east of Taiwan to other waters. Given that this transition in the patrol system has shown a path of becoming cumulatively routine even without specific incidents [18], the appearance of similar signs in the West Sea and Ieodo waters could function as an early warning indicator.
4. Summary and Conclusion
The research vessel incident in the Batan waters should be viewed not as a complement to the US-Japan-led deterrence structure, but as an independent case of China's legal warfare and grey-zone pressure carried out against Philippine sovereign territory. The Philippines chose a path of practically contributing to the Ryukyu-Bashi deterrence line using the language of defending sovereignty while distancing itself from the Taiwan issue. While this approach has the advantage of lowering political costs, it also reveals the limits of deterrence if China continues below-the-threshold pressure by combining civilian and coast guard assets. South Korea needs to compare and examine this case across three pillars: surveillance systems in the West Sea and Ieodo waters, response communication strategies, and the asymmetric reorganization of multilateral exercises centered on the US, Japan, and Australia. Rather than preparing for specific conflict scenarios, establishing an independent monitoring system predicated on constant grey-zone pressure is the primary task.
References
[1] [Foreign Affairs] Japan Is Giving the United States a Chance in Asia
[7] [Kyodo News] Repeated surveys by Chinese research ship raise security concerns in Japan
[9] [Nikkei Asia] Taiwan taps US tech for sea drones to fend off China's vast maritime fleet
[11] [The Diplomat] Iran War Highlights 2 Challenges for Japan in a Taiwan Contingency
[17] [Rappler] It’s an ADMM-Plus joint sail, but where were the Southeast Asians?
[24] [Island Times (PW)] Restoring trust: Taiwan’s rightful place in the free world
[25] [Sydney Morning Herald] How Trump’s grovelling emboldens China and imperils the Asia Pacific
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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