[EAI Special Report] Taiwan Special Series ④ The US-China-Japan Triangular Relations Surrounding Taiwan: The Mention of 'Taiwan' in the US-Japan Joint Statement from Japan's Perspective

[Editor's Note]

In this Special Report, Professor Yoshiyuki Ogasawara of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies explains how the US-China-Japan relationship has evolved since the US-China Joint Communiqué and the Japan-China Joint Communiqué, and Japan's stance in response to these changes. As Xi Jinping intensified military threats against Taiwan starting in 2019, the United States has strengthened its ties with Taiwan while containing China. The author emphasizes that Japan should not be intimidated by China's increasing pressure and presents the deterrence of China's military actions as a critical task. While Japan's physical capacity to deter China's military actions is limited, it can contribute partially, as evidenced by the recent mention of the Taiwan Strait in the US-Japan Joint Statement.

At the US-Japan summit on April 16, 2021, between Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and President Biden, a joint statement was issued that included the "importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait." The significance of this simple phrase is immense. While some commentators suggest it holds no special meaning as it reiterates statements previously made by the Japanese government, its joint declaration by the US and Japan in the context of opposing the threat of force against Taiwan by China is groundbreaking. Considering the preceding US-Japan 2+2 ministerial meeting and the US-China summit in Alaska, the context is clear.

The "1972 System" That Marginalized Taiwan

While the mention of the "Taiwan Strait" in the US-Japan joint statement is emphasized as occurring "after 52 years," the context and international environment in 2021 are entirely different from those of 1969. That era was the Cold War, both the US and Japan had diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan), and Taiwan was under the one-party rule of the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek, advocating for "One China." During US-Japan negotiations, the scope of the US-Japan Security Treaty following the reversion of Okinawa was discussed, and the "Taiwan Strait" was mentioned in that context.

Subsequently, the 1972 US-China Joint Communiqué and the Japan-China Joint Communiqué largely acknowledged the People's Republic of China's assertion of the "One China Principle," leading to Taiwan's exclusion from the international community. This is the "1972 System"⑴. This framework marginalized Taiwan in international politics. However, the fact that China did not govern Taiwan remained unchanged. Taiwan, within its limited space, developed its economy, achieved democratization, and survived. After democratization, the sense of being "part of China" faded in Taiwan, and a "Taiwanese identity" asserting that "Taiwan is separate from China" spread.

Meanwhile, China had long advocated for "reunification with Taiwan" but lacked the power to realize it. However, as China's power grew, the situation changed, and movements to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait intensified. Since taking office, President Xi Jinping has emphasized Chinese nationalism, pursuing a Taiwan policy that simultaneously threatens Taiwan militarily and absorbs it economically. Following the inauguration of the Tsai Ing-wen administration in Taiwan in 2016, China, viewing the Tsai administration as not accepting the "One China" principle, closed off dialogue channels with Taiwan. In January 2019, Xi Jinping delivered a significant speech on Taiwan, strongly urging the acceptance of "One Country, Two Systems" for unification and expressing his resolve not to postpone it to the next generation. Impatient with the Tsai Ing-wen administration's refusal to yield, China intensified its military threats against Taiwan.

Revisiting US and Japanese Policy Toward Taiwan

The United States grew increasingly concerned that Taiwan would be unified with China if left unchecked. It began to believe that the "1972 System" needed restructuring and started moving towards containing China by strengthening its relationship with Taiwan. This became evident in late 2020 under the Trump administration and has been continued by the Biden administration.

The Biden administration, while referencing the "One China Policy" and defining US-Taiwan relations as "unofficial," is pursuing a more robust Taiwan policy than the Trump administration, thereby avoiding a decisive backlash from China. The Biden administration's "One China Policy" serves as a kind of "amulet." As competition with China and the importance of Taiwan have become bipartisan policies in the US, this framework may come to be known as the "2021 System."

Japan, on the other hand, experienced a prolonged period of cold-shouldering Taiwan from 1972 through the 1980s. The Japanese government generally restricted contact with the Taiwanese government, and a practice existed where central government officials carefully refrained from engaging with their Taiwanese counterparts. Even exchange agreements between Japanese national universities and Taiwanese national universities were not permitted (they were finally permitted in 1997). This extreme coldness towards Taiwan began to gradually improve in the 1990s when Lee Teng-hui promoted democratization, but the "1972 System" remained firmly in place. When Lee Teng-hui, who had retired as president and become a civilian, wished to visit Japan in 2001, it was only grudgingly permitted after considerable debate.

Since then, with the growing sense of caution towards China, Japan's self-imposed restrictions on its Taiwan policy have been partially relaxed. Trade and investment between Japan and Taiwan have expanded smoothly. Furthermore, a sense of familiarity with Taiwan has gradually grown within Japanese society, leading to an increase in travelers between Japan and Taiwan and expanded exchanges between local governments and private organizations. This was significantly supported by the material and moral assistance from Taiwan following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011.

Within Japan, even those who had previously shown little interest in Taiwan began to develop a positive impression of the island. Survey data indicating that the Japanese public's favorability towards Taiwan significantly surpassed that towards China or South Korea garnered attention. Private exchanges between Japan and Taiwan became far more active after normalization than before. However, the government's Taiwan policy remained very cautious, and even during the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was perceived as pro-Taiwan, changes were very slow.

Taiwan Catches a Favorable Wind

Taiwan had been sounding the alarm about China's coercive actions, but many countries in the international community prioritized the economic benefits China offered. However, Taiwan, through democratic elections, expressed its will not to accept unification, and its voice gradually began to be heard. This was amplified in 2020 by the COVID-19 crisis, which significantly increased international attention and sympathy for Taiwan.

While the US-China confrontation has indeed benefited Taiwan, it is incorrect to view Taiwan as merely "in a state of suspended animation." Taiwan's significance has been recognized due to the sustained efforts and dedication to its democracy. A symbolic event was the visit of a Czech Senate delegation to Taiwan in 2020. From Taiwan's perspective, the recent US-Japan Joint Statement likely felt like a moment of finally being acknowledged.⑵Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan issued a press release stating, "We sincerely welcome and appreciate this," the Taiwanese media seemed to be in a state of considerable excitement.

A crucial factor in Taiwan catching a favorable wind is that the US and Japan have come to understand President Tsai Ing-wen's "status quo" approach. During the Chen Shui-bian administration, both the US and Japanese governments were wary of President Chen's nationalist rhetoric. However, President Tsai has implemented a pragmatic and sophisticated policy of sealing the Democratic Progressive Party's traditional stance of Taiwan independence while maintaining the framework of the Republic of China and solidifying "Taiwanese identity" from within.

This is a delicate path that avoids provoking military action from China. While China is clearly impatient, its criticism of the Tsai administration is that it engages in "hidden Taiwan independence," not "legal independence," which China would never tolerate.

The Tsai administration, while strengthening relations with the US, has also stated that it "does not seek the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan." Furthermore, it has strictly instructed the Taiwanese Air Force, which scrambles in response to incursions by Chinese military aircraft, "not to open fire without the permission of the Minister of National Defense." Taiwan is reading the international situation. By exercising restraint, Taiwan has eliminated US and Japanese concerns that "Taiwan might be the one to alter the status quo."

The Possibility of China Using Military Force

Although Xi Jinping upholds Deng Xiaoping's principle of "peaceful reunification," it is evident from a sober analysis that peaceful means will not lead to Taiwan's unification. Therefore, we must assume that threats of military force will intensify, and the possibility of some form of military action (gray zone) will increase.

There is a crucial point here. If China were to annex Taiwan at any cost, it would be unstoppable, but that is not the case. China's objective is to unify Taiwan with minimal sacrifice and cost, thereby showcasing the "greatness" of the Chinese Communist Party and justifying the continuation of its one-party rule.

Taiwan is strengthening its asymmetric tactics to preserve its ability to counter a Chinese amphibious assault, thus raising the barrier for a Chinese invasion. Turning Taiwan into ashes through missile attacks or conducting an amphibious operation that results in heavy losses for the Chinese military to occupy Taiwan is not desirable for the Communist Party. Furthermore, a unification achieved through a major war involving the US and Japan is inconsistent with the logic of the Chinese Communist Party.

However, if Taiwan and the US and Japan do not prepare, China may one day use its overwhelming military power to subdue Taiwan and declare the realization of the "Chinese Dream." In this process, Chinese military action is entirely possible. In China, military action is considered part of diplomacy. This outcome is also possible if China obtains certainty that "the US and Japan will not intervene."

What Should Japan Do?

China's pressure on Japan will intensify in the near future. Japan must not be intimidated. It is necessary to re-evaluate what is important for Japan. If a war were to break out in the Taiwan Strait, it would be initiated by China's military attack on Taiwan. Therefore, preventing war, i.e., deterring China's military actions, becomes the most critical task. This should be a common concern for Japan's liberal and pacifist factions.

Doing what China dislikes serves as deterrence. It is necessary to persistently appeal to China for "peace and stability" through diplomacy, while simultaneously preparing to support the US military based on security legislation. Furthermore, it is essential to form a loose network of countries participating in the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific." The "Quad" comprising the US, Japan, India, and Australia is a prime example.

There are views that such a network is meaningless due to the differing interests of each country with China. However, China cannot ignore the fact that these countries' perspectives on China are becoming increasingly stringent. If China considers military action against Taiwan, it must calculate the cost of its national image and the propaganda strategies of Chinese companies being destroyed overnight. Even a loose network makes things difficult for China. It must be repeatedly conveyed to China that these containment efforts are not contradictory to cooperating with China in areas where dialogue or cooperation is possible.

Nevertheless, China may retaliate and impose various penalties on Japan. This will affect Japan, but it will also rebound on China. While Sino-Japanese relations may stagnate, failure to deter China by demonstrating the immense cost of its Taiwan invasion operation will not maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait. A policy of "not provoking China" or "not escalating tensions between Japan and China" actually increases the risk of war.

The Future of the Taiwan Strait

What will be the future state of the Taiwan Strait? In Taiwan, "Taiwanese identity" has taken root, and the possibility of a candidate advocating for unification winning an election is now nonexistent. A fierce competition will continue between China, which seeks opportunities by intensifying military threats, and the US, which strengthens its vigilance and supports Taiwan from behind the scenes. If the balance is maintained, China will be unable to launch a military invasion; however, if it collapses, the dangerous state of war will persist.

Meanwhile, there are factors that may prevent a decisive outcome. While Taiwan's international presence will increase to some extent, the pretext of "One China" will likely be maintained by both the US and Japan. Tensions will continue, but it is conceivable that economic relations with China will remain at a high level for Taiwan, Japan, and the US overall. In this scenario, will the "2021 System" become a state of "continued military tension without reaching war, while the US, Japan, and Taiwan maintain close economic ties with China"? If this continues for five, ten years, and beyond, it would be far better than war and align with Japan's national interests. Above all, it would protect the will of the Taiwanese people.

While Japan's capabilities are limited (especially militarily), it can make a certain contribution within those constraints. The recent joint statement was an important step in this regard. It is hoped that this will lead to broader discussions on conflict prevention in the Taiwan Strait. ■

⑴Refers to the international arrangement concerning Taiwan formed in 1972 (Masahiro Wakabayashi, "The Politics of Taiwan: Post-War History of the "Taiwanization" of the Republic of China" and Shin Kawashima, Rei Shimizu, Yasuhiro Matsuda, Yongming Yang, "History of Japan-Taiwan Relations 1945-2020"). Although it seemed like a provisional framework at the time, it has continued for 50 years.

⑵President Tsai Ing-wen expressed on Twitter in Japanese, "I appreciate the reaffirmation of the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait." (April 20, 2021,https://twitter.com/iingwen/status/1384448517498757128?s=20

■ Author: Yoshiyuki Ogasawara_Professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. He holds Master's and Doctoral degrees from Hitotsubashi University and has served as a lecturer and associate professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. He was a visiting researcher at the University of Sheffield in the UK and National Chengchi University in Taiwan. His research areas include Taiwan politics, China-Taiwan relations, East Asian politics, and comparative politics. His major works include "China-Taiwan Relations: Taiwanese Identity and 'One China Principle'" published in Presidential Elections in Taiwan (Koyoshobo) and China and its Neighbours (Pentagon Press).

■ Managed and Edited by: Jin-kyung Baek Director of EAI Research Center

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) j.baek@eai.or.kr