[Future Vision Series on ROK-Japan Cooperation] V. Alternatives to the Stalemate in ROK-Japan Security Cooperation: ROK-U.S.-Australia-Japan Cooperation and Participation in the U.S.-Led Indo-Pacific Information Network

I. Introduction

As stated in the Biden administration's first Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Biden administration, like the Trump administration, seeks to restore ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Despite U.S. hopes, relations between South Korea and Japan deteriorated due to domestic political issues, differing approaches to North Korea, and divergent perceptions of the Chinese threat under the previous Moon Jae-in administration, leading to a stalemate in ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Following the inauguration of the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration in May 2022, the U.S. has been further pushing for the restoration of ROK-Japan relations and the enhancement of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Above all, there is a high probability that the U.S. will pressure South Korea to join the U.S.-led missile defense (MD) system in Northeast Asia. Since the end of the Moon Jae-in administration, North Korea has resumed missile tests and is further advancing its nuclear delivery capabilities, making missile defense a good pretext for the U.S. to pursue the linkage of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the U.S.-Japan alliance. For instance, at a trilateral summit held on the sidelines of the ASEAN-related meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in November 2022, one of the agreed-upon points was the real-time sharing of early warning information on North Korean missiles. Given the negative sentiments between the South Korean and Japanese public, it is difficult to find a link to promote military cooperation between the ROK-U.S. alliance and the U.S.-Japan alliance beyond a joint response to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

The U.S. had refrained from pursuing trilateral missile defense cooperation, considering China's negative views and the strained ROK-Japan relations, but began to adopt a more proactive stance in the latter half of the Trump administration. In South Korea, the controversy over integration into the U.S. missile defense system reignited in June 2020 when then-Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeong-doo stated that the ROK and U.S. military authorities had conducted 'integrated linked training for missile defense systems.' At the time, the South Korean government argued that it was merely training to share missile information between the ROK and the U.S. in the event of a North Korean missile launch and was unrelated to integration into the U.S. missile defense system. However, the ROK and the U.S. share missile information through a linked system between the ROK military's Ballistic Missile Operational Center and the U.S. Forces Korea's missile defense operational center. Furthermore, the U.S. Forces Korea's operational center is linked to the U.S. Forces Japan's missile defense system through U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, leading to suggestions that it is effectively linked to the Japan Self-Defense Forces' missile defense system. Some argue that while the THAAD deployed on the Korean Peninsula is a response to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, there is a high probability that the U.S. will demand its repurposing for ROK-U.S.-Japan MD if military confrontation between the U.S. and China intensifies. In this case, serious friction with China would be inevitable.

In this context, the following presents considerations for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which faces a dilemma of making a strategic choice between the U.S. and China regarding the restoration of ROK-Japan relations and participation in the ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense system. To this end, it will first examine the U.S. emphasis on sharing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and providing information within its U.S.-led security network in the Indo-Pacific region. As the U.S. approaches ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation not just at the Northeast Asian level but from the perspective of building a U.S.-led information network in the Indo-Pacific region, it is expected to exert stronger pressure on South Korea's participation. In this situation, if the Yoon Suk-yeol administration finds it difficult to rapidly participate in the ROK-U.S.-Japan MD system, considering its relations with China and Japan, South Korea should, as an alternative, enhance security cooperation among the ROK, U.S., Australia, and Japan, and increase its security standing by contributing to the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific information network.

II. ISR Cooperation in the U.S.-Led Security Network

Reviewing various reports recently published by the U.S. administration and bills proposed by the U.S. Congress, it appears that the U.S. will highlight MD and the provision of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and information as operational mechanisms that permeate the U.S.-led security network (Lee Jeong-hoon & Park Jae-jeok 2020). In the case of MD, Japan and Australia are actively cooperating in building the U.S.-led missile defense system. If the U.S.-led missile defense linkage among the U.S., Japan, and Australia is pursued and further extends to cooperation with India and South Korea, it would practically mean the establishment of the foundation for a U.S.-led MD system in the Indo-Pacific region.

Meanwhile, the U.S. seeks to build an information fusion and sharing network in the Indo-Pacific region. Maritime and air cooperation to respond to numerous non-traditional security issues and freedom of navigation issues in the region provides a rationale for ISR asset sharing. First, the U.S., along with other Quad (U.S., Japan, Australia, India security cooperation) countries, has contributed to enhancing 'maritime capacity building' and 'maritime situational awareness' in the Indo-Pacific region by providing used aircraft, ships, etc., to key hub countries in the region and offering training programs for their military, coast guard, and customs personnel. Recently, the quality of donations has expanded to include ISR assets such as unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and surveillance radars. The reason why ISR equipment donations and information provision are attracting attention is that many countries in the region lack the financial capacity to invest astronomical sums in purchasing cutting-edge equipment to counter China's assertive maritime activities or to secure cybersecurity technology. The U.S. and other Quad countries aim to ultimately draw these key hub countries into the U.S.-led security network by providing ISR equipment and information.

The U.S. is actively involved in enhancing the maritime information acquisition capabilities of key Southeast Asian countries. It has assisted in the installation of the 'Coastal Watch System' in the Philippines and 'Coastal Surveillance Radar Stations' in Malaysia, and has contributed to improving maritime reconnaissance and radar capabilities in Indonesia. Furthermore, the U.S. is pursuing the 'Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)' to build maritime capacity in Southeast Asian countries, providing $425 million over five years starting in 2016. In particular, the U.S. Department of Defense has launched a program to provide a total of 34 unmanned aerial vehicles through MSI, contributing to strengthening ISR assets in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. For example, Malaysia established an Air Force Squadron in March 2021 with drones received as donations. MSI is one of the various resources available to the U.S. for maritime capacity building. A certain amount is also allocated from 'Foreign Military Financing (FMF)' for the maritime capacity building of Southeast Asian countries. Additionally, the Department of State's 'International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' allocates funds to the 'Southeast Asia Maritime Security Law Enforcement Initiative (SEAMLEI).' The U.S. primarily supplies patrol aircraft, tanks, and armored vehicles to foreign countries through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, actively contributing to the maritime capacity building of key Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia (Choi Hyun-ho 2020). In November 2020, during the visit of former White House National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien to the Philippines, military supplies worth $18 million (approximately 20 billion won), including precision-guided missiles, were provided to the Philippines.

Second, the U.S. is actively engaged in establishing information fusion and sharing centers in the Indo-Pacific region. The main multilateral mechanisms for information fusion and sharing in the Indo-Pacific region are as follows. First, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) operates an 'Information Sharing Center (ISC).' This international organization, opened in 2006, currently shares information on piracy incidents occurring in their respective countries through ReCAAP-ISC with 20 countries, including Southeast Asian nations, as well as Europe, Australia, Japan, and the U.S. Second, Singapore has been operating an 'Information Fusion Center (IFC)' since 2009. Currently, 24 countries have dispatched naval attachés to the IFC to exchange information in various maritime security fields, such as illegal fishing and maritime terrorism. Singapore's IFC uses 'Open and Analysed Shipping Information System (OASIS)' as its software for information fusion, where attachés receive real-time information from each country and input it into OASIS. Additionally, the IFC fuses information collected from multiple commercial vessel tracking platforms. Third, information fusion and sharing also occur at the private level, with the 'Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC)' established in Malaysia in 1991 by the 'International Maritime Bureau (IMB)' being a prime example. Although the IMB-PRC receives some financial support from the governments of Taiwan and Cyprus, most of its funding comes from the shipping and transportation industry. Ships that have experienced piracy report to the IMB-PRC, which then transmits the relevant information to national security agencies and information sharing centers. The IMB-PRC also produces and distributes reports on piracy trends. Fourth, India has recently established and operates the 'Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC)' and the India IFC-IOR targeting the Indian Ocean region, and is pursuing cooperation with the ASEAN Regional Fusion Center. Fifth, Australia conducted a two-year trial operation of the Pacific Fusion Centre and relocated the center to Vanuatu in December 2021. Australia provides financial support, and it operates under the 'Pacific Forum'.

Meanwhile, the choice of technological programs and software for maritime security information sharing networks is closely related to which country leads maritime information collection and fusion. The U.S. is actively involved in developing, distributing, and operating technological programs and software. This is to technically control information collection and ensure that information security is centered around the U.S. For classified information, the U.S. shares information with allies and partner nations using the 'CENTRIXS (Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System)' and provides the 'Common Situational Awareness Display.' For unclassified information, it utilizes the U.S. military's 'All Partners Access Network (APAN),' a web-based information sharing system that allows other countries to maintain communication channels or transmit information without accessing the U.S. Department of Defense's network or hardware. APAN is useful for sharing information with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in emergencies or during military exercises with allies or security-friendly nations. It was used during the relief efforts for Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013, and the U.S., South Korea, and Japan used it to share Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) information. The U.S. 7th Fleet primarily uses APAN during multinational military exercises. One of the reasons for China's participation in the 'Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC)' in 2014, hosted by the 7th Fleet, was access to this system. At the time, the U.S. allowed China access to APAN but not to CENTRIXS. Additionally, the U.S. has developed and supplies 'SeaVision,' which enables near real-time information access and exchange, and uses it during 'Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT)' and 'Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)' with Southeast Asian countries.

While the U.S. is investing considerable effort in missile defense, ISR provision, and information sharing networks in the Indo-Pacific region, there are limitations to Southeast Asian countries becoming key partners for the U.S. Most ASEAN countries have underdeveloped naval and air forces. Although they need to strengthen their military capabilities to defend their territorial sovereignty against China and respond to various maritime security issues, there are significant practical constraints. Above all, considering the national capabilities of ASEAN countries, it is difficult for them to purchase the latest military assets, which involve astronomical costs. Furthermore, the U.S. and the EU impose restrictions on defense exports to many authoritarian Southeast Asian countries due to human rights abuses. Consequently, there is a significant gap between the ISR assets that Southeast Asian countries wish to acquire to lead regional maritime security and those they actually possess, a so-called 'ISR gap.' In addition, deep-seated animosities among regional countries due to territorial disputes and Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing by some ASEAN nations lead to a reluctance among Southeast Asian countries to share essential information for maritime security (Jackson et al. 2016, 18). For example, Indonesia and Malaysia have not yet joined ReCAAP, with the location of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC) in Singapore being a major factor (Parameswaran 2016). That is, Indonesia and Malaysia hesitate to join ReCAAP, which already has about 20 member countries, because Singapore leads information fusion. In the case of the 'Malacca Strait Patrol,' formed by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore in 2004 to combat piracy, the three countries limit their scope of operation to the Malacca Strait and Singapore Strait and are hesitant to expand their scope to areas unrelated to the immediate issue of piracy. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian countries are discussing the activation of 'Our Eyes' for information sharing at the ASEAN level, but it is still in the preliminary discussion stage. 'Our Eyes' was officially proposed by Indonesia to counter terrorism and extremism, initially as a Three Eyes information sharing system among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, but it is gradually expanding. Although the ASEAN Secretariat and all 10 ASEAN member states participated in a workshop held in Indonesia in January 2019, and related meetings have been held since then, there have been no substantial results yet. Therefore, as examined below, while many Southeast Asian countries are accepting contributions from outside the region, Japan, Australia, and India, as Quad countries, are actively taking the lead. From the U.S. perspective, these Quad countries are the main nations that can assist the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region in terms of economic power, ISR asset possession, and willingness.

III. Contributions of Japan, Australia, and India

Japan has been providing patrol vessels to Southeast Asian countries in the form of loans due to domestic legal constraints. However, it has recently amended its laws to allow for gratuitous provision, enabling it to engage in the donation of military equipment (Kim Jeong-seon 2017). In 2014, Japan abolished its de facto arms export ban by establishing the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment, and in 2017, it amended the 'Fiscal Law' to allow the provision of used Self-Defense Forces equipment to foreign countries free of charge or at low cost. Since then, Japan has been providing patrol boats, maritime surveillance radars, etc., to Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia in the form of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and has dispatched support teams for their operation. In August 2020, Mitsubishi Electric Corp. of Japan signed a contract to sell four radar systems to the Philippines, with delivery starting in November 2022 and scheduled for completion by 2024. Meanwhile, Japan is assisting Vietnam in launching satellites, as Vietnam is highly interested in space-based maritime security. After launching its first communication satellite in 2008, Vietnam successfully placed a high-resolution 'Earth observation satellite' into orbit in 2013. Vietnam and Japan signed a satellite information exchange agreement in 2017, and numerous researchers from the 'Vietnam Space Center' are studying in Japan. With Japan's assistance, Vietnam also launched the MicroDragon, a small Earth observation satellite manufactured with Vietnamese technology, into orbit from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in January 2019. NEC Corporation is undertaking a $186 million project to export the Earth observation satellite LOTUSat-1 to Vietnam by 2023 and establish a ground station. This project is also the first time the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is providing ODA for satellite development. Furthermore, universities in Japan, such as Chiba University, are collaborating with the Indonesian National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN) on a project to launch a small satellite equipped with SAR (An Hyeong-jun 2020).

Australia conducted the 'Pacific Patrol Boat Program (PPBP)' for about 20 years from 1987 to 1997 in the South Pacific region and is currently operating the 'Pacific Maritime Security Program (PMSP).' Based on its experience in the South Pacific, Australia is actively leading the 'maritime capacity building' of regional countries in Southeast Asia as well.

In India's case, it is exporting defense equipment and transferring military technology to countries such as Singapore, Vietnam, Myanmar, and the Philippines. India is interested in enhancing 'maritime situational awareness' because the vastness of the Indian Ocean makes it crucial to have comprehensive ISR capabilities. In particular, to counter IUU fishing by Chinese fishing vessels in the region, enhancing 'maritime situational awareness' capabilities that can integrate fragmented information in complex maritime environments is important. India, with its 60-year-old space program, is accelerating space development and operates ground stations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Brunei, Biak in Eastern Indonesia, and Mauritius to track satellites in their early flight stages. In 2016, India installed a 'satellite tracking and imaging centre' in Vietnam, allowing Vietnam to directly receive image data from Indian satellites without India's permission (Reuters 2016). While Vietnam uses Earth observation satellite imagery for agriculture, science, and environmental purposes, enhanced imaging technology can also be used for military applications. In the declaration of the ASEAN-India Summit held in January 2018, Article 23 agreed to continue cooperation between ASEAN and India in outer space. India and Indonesia declared a 'Common Vision on Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific' in 2018.

In this manner, the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India are expanding ISR asset provision and information sharing at the individual country level or in small multilateral formats, under the pretext of enhancing maritime capabilities of Indo-Pacific countries. Through the 'Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement among the U.S., Australia, and Japan' signed in 2016, the three countries share sensitive military information at a high level. It is anticipated that in the future, these three countries will broaden their contributions by providing advanced ISR information to key hub countries in the Indo-Pacific region that lack ISR resources, thereby establishing early warning systems, maritime patrol and reconnaissance systems, and aerial reconnaissance systems for regional countries. The cooperation among Quad countries and their contributions to regional countries are essential for the U.S.-led security network to ultimately evolve into an information network targeting China.

IV. Implications for ROK-U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation

As examined above, the U.S. is promoting security cooperation, such as the ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense system, in Northeast Asia, and strengthening its U.S.-led Indo-Pacific security network through ISR asset sharing and information provision in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region. From this perspective, ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation should be approached as part of the U.S.-led security network, extending beyond the Northeast Asian dimension. If we do not participate, we risk being relegated to a 'second-class nation' within the U.S.-led security network.

The Biden administration is expected to strongly push for the restoration of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation and South Korea's integration into the U.S.-led missile defense system. However, even after the launch of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, it may be difficult for South Korea to rapidly restore ROK-Japan relations and consider China's security interests, making it challenging to quickly promote ROK-U.S.-Japan missile cooperation. This could lead to a significant decline in South Korea's standing within the U.S.-led security network. In this situation, South Korea has two main options. First, if ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation remains stagnant for a long period, it can utilize ROK-U.S.-Australia-(Japan) security cooperation as an alternative. Second, South Korea can contribute to strengthening the U.S.-led information network in the Indo-Pacific region beyond ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation. These will be examined in detail below.

First, if the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's efforts to improve relations, including the proposed solution for forced labor victims, do not lead to significant progress and the stalemate in ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation continues, South Korea could consider utilizing ROK-U.S.-Australia or ROK-U.S.-Japan-Australia security cooperation as an alternative. Media reports indicate that during President Trump's Asia tour in November 2017, the U.S. requested ROK-U.S.-Japan military exercises, but South Korea refused. Whether intentional or coincidental, the navies of South Korea, the U.S., and Australia conducted a joint maritime interdiction exercise to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the waters near Jeju Island on November 6-7, 2017. It is speculated that South Korea, while in the process of restoring relations with China following the THAAD dispute, was hesitant about ROK-U.S.-Japan military exercises due to considerations for China, and instead conducted ROK-U.S.-Australia military exercises to accommodate the U.S. position. In this context, it is necessary to position ROK-Australia security cooperation within the U.S.-led security network and enhance its role and status. Australian Prime Minister already declared in August 2017 that if North Korea attacked the U.S. with missiles, Australia would invoke its alliance treaty with the U.S. to defend it, indicating Australia's significant interest in Korean Peninsula security. Australia has also consistently deployed maritime patrol aircraft and frigates near Japanese waters since 2018 to monitor North Korean illicit transshipments. From this perspective, the emphasis on ROK-Australia security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Strategy released by the South Korean government in December 2022 is encouraging.

South Korea and Australia are enhancing security cooperation through diplomatic and defense ministerial 2+2 dialogues, regular military exercises, and defense industry cooperation. Various military exercises involving the U.S., Japan, Australia, and South Korea are being conducted in the region. ROK-Australia security cooperation can serve as an alternative to ROK-Japan security cooperation because Australia is rapidly advancing its security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan. Japan and Australia have enhanced their security cooperation to the point of a quasi-alliance, and both countries function as the northern and southern pillars of the U.S.-led security network. With the signing of the 'Reciprocal Access Agreement' between Japan and Australia in January 2022, large-scale Australian forces can conduct military exercises with Japan in Japanese territorial waters.

If North Korea strengthens its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capabilities with Sinpo-class or improved Gorae-class ballistic missile submarines (SSB) equipped with the Pukguksong-3 SLBM in the future, South Korea can enhance joint exercises with the U.S., Australia, and others in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula. Currently, seven countries, including the U.S., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the UK, France, and Canada, are deploying patrol aircraft and frigates to monitor North Korean vessels' illicit transshipments. If North Korean provocations resume, an environment will be created for multilateral military exercises led by the U.S. and Australia in the maritime domain of Northeast Asia. During the 6th Haedori-Wallaby exercise conducted by the ROK and Australian navies in the waters near Pohang in October 2019, Australia deployed Aegis-equipped destroyers for the first time, conducting joint exercises with South Korea to counter North Korean submarines and SLBMs. In November 2019, South Korea participated in the '2019 Pacific Reach Submarine Escape and Rescue Exercise' hosted by the Royal Australian Navy, along with the U.S., Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore. 'Pacific Reach' is an exercise for countries adjacent to a submarine distress area to jointly rescue crew members in case of a submarine accident. Furthermore, Australia has intermittently participated in the 'Ssangyong' combined marine corps exercise between the ROK and the U.S. While joint military exercises between South Korea and Japan in the East Sea are still not socially acceptable, military exercises with the U.S. and Australia do not evoke negative reactions. The U.S., Australia, and India operate the U.S. manned patrol aircraft P-8 Poseidon and the unmanned maritime patrol aircraft MQ-4 Triton. South Korea, which has introduced the P-8, can conduct joint training. Australia has advanced anti-submarine sonar system technology, which South Korea could consider adopting for its naval assets.

Second, if South Korea finds it difficult to rapidly pursue ROK-U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation in Northeast Asia, as an alternative, it should enhance its standing within the U.S.-led security network by contributing to the maritime capacity building and improvement of 'maritime situational awareness' for key Southeast Asian countries, along with the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India in the Indo-Pacific region. Quad countries are already cooperating with each other. For example, India signed the 'Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA)' with the U.S. during their first ministerial 2+2 dialogue in 2018, enabling India to connect to the U.S. military's information sharing network, 'Link-16.' In 2020, the U.S. and India signed the 'Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA)' for sharing military geographic information, allowing India to track targets for cruise and ballistic missiles using U.S. military geographic information. In the case of India and Japan, NEC Corporation is participating in the construction of an undersea cable connecting Port Blair, the capital of India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and Chennai. The 'Andaman and Nicobar Islands' are close to the Strait of Malacca, the main trade route and crude oil import route for China, South Korea, and Japan, and are in a strategically important location for 'maritime situational awareness' due to their maritime borders with Thailand, Malaysia, and Myanmar. As major Indian military forces are stationed there, smooth communication access is militarily crucial, and NEC is responsible for constructing sensitive military communication facilities.

Australia, which emphasizes the sharing of intelligence assets within the 'Five Eyes' and the U.S.-Australia alliance, is mobilizing its national capabilities to foster cyber cooperation linkages with Quad countries in the Indo-Pacific region. For instance, Australia is cooperating with the U.S. on infrastructure investment in the South Pacific to prevent security threats arising from China's infrastructure investments. The U.S. is providing funding to the Federated States of Micronesia, which rejected China's fiber optic cable construction proposal, and Australia is also procuring resources for telecommunications infrastructure development in the South Pacific along with the U.S. In June 2020, India and Japan adopted the 'Framework Arrangement on Cyber and Cyber-Enabled Critical Technology Cooperation' at their summit meeting. Since 2015, Australia and Japan have been holding the 'Australia-Japan Cyber Policy Dialogue' annually. In November 2021, Australia hosted 'The Sydney Dialogue' virtually, which brought together political leaders, industry experts, academics, and civil society representatives from the Indo-Pacific region in the fields of advanced technology and cyberspace.

There are both opportunities and burdens for South Korea to participate in providing ISR assets and information to Indo-Pacific countries, similar to Japan, Australia, and India. South Korea is simultaneously pursuing maritime cooperation between South Korea and ASEAN and maritime cooperation between South Korea and major extra-regional countries targeting ASEAN. Cooperating with Quad countries on maritime capacity building contributes to South Korea's regional security and peace. In fact, South Korea has been actively engaged in donating decommissioned vessels, thereby contributing to the maritime security of ASEAN countries on one hand, and securing economic benefits through the export of defense goods such as warships and aircraft to countries like the Philippines and Indonesia on the other. One of the links that the South Korean government presents as a connection between its regional policy and the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, in response to the U.S. demand to participate in its Indo-Pacific policy, is maritime security. If South Korea cooperates with Quad countries, including the U.S., beyond an individual level, it can enhance its standing in the U.S.-led security network.

On the other hand, the burden lies in the fact that China perceives the purpose of Quad countries contributing to the maritime capacity building of regional countries, while ostensibly responding to non-traditional security issues in the region, as having a hidden agenda to prepare for China's military rise, given the characteristics of the donor and recipient countries. The donors are the U.S. and its allies, and the main recipients are U.S. allies or countries in security confrontation with China. As security cooperation between regional countries and Quad countries rapidly increases and the quality and quantity of contributions provided by Quad countries to regional countries improve, China will also fully engage in enhancing the maritime capabilities of regional countries. Although China's current contributions are low in quality and quantity, it possesses large-scale shipbuilding capacity and numerous decommissioned vessels, raising questions about when China will actively begin making contributions.

However, as long as there is a pretext of contributing to non-traditional security, it is unlikely that China will openly criticize South Korea's participation. Therefore, South Korea should, on one hand, participate in maritime cooperation with Quad countries to gain the pretext of contributing to non-traditional security and the practical benefit of defense exports, and on the other hand, participate in small multilateral maritime cooperation where both the U.S. and China participate, or where the U.S. is excluded.

From this perspective, one area where South Korea needs to foster cooperation with Japan is the development of a satellite navigation system (GNSS). Satellite navigation systems are essential not only for new weapons but also for maritime security against non-traditional security threats. Currently, countries operating satellite navigation systems on a global scale include the U.S., China, Russia, and the European Union. With China completing its Beidou system in 2020, competition between the U.S. GPS and China's Beidou is expected to intensify in the region. Japan and India operate regional satellite navigation systems. South Korea is exploring the possibility of establishing a regional satellite navigation system. In the 'Third Basic Plan for Space Development Promotion' in 2018, it announced a plan to establish a 'Korea Positioning System (KPS)' and is currently undergoing a preliminary feasibility study for budget allocation with a target service launch in 2035. The Ministry of National Defense's 'Mid-term Defense Plan (2021-2025)' also expressed the pursuit of an independent GPS for the ROK military. In the future, it is necessary to actively pursue cooperation with the U.S., Japan, India, and others.

V. Conclusion

So far, we have examined the U.S.'s continuous pursuit of strengthening its self-led security network, emphasizing the establishment of missile defense systems and the sharing of ISR assets and information. In this context, if South Korea and Japan find it burdensome to rapidly advance security cooperation due to domestic political factors and considerations of China, South Korea should, on one hand, utilize Australia as an intermediary mediator, and on the other hand, strengthen ISR cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region to build trust and cooperative habits with Quad and regional countries.

However, when considering the short-term promotion of ROK-U.S.-Australia-(Japan) security cooperation as an alternative to ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, and the enhancement of ISR cooperation with Quad and regional countries in the Indo-Pacific region, it is important to note that the security standing of Japan and Australia has rapidly increased compared to South Korea. Both countries have already established themselves as the northern and southern pillars of the U.S.-led security network. Japan, in particular, is rapidly advancing security cooperation not only with Australia but also with European countries such as the UK and France. Australia, as symbolized by the 'AUKUS' security partnership signed in 2021, has positioned itself as a key player in the U.S.-led advanced technology alliance.

Therefore, there is a possibility that South Korea could be relegated to a subordinate node to Japan and Australia within the U.S.-led security network. South Korea's progress in bilateral security cooperation with the U.S., Australia, and India is slower compared to Japan. While trilateral security cooperation among the U.S.-Japan-Australia and U.S.-Japan-India is advancing, South Korea's participation in small multilateral security cooperation lags behind compared to the small multilateral security cooperation involving Australia and Japan. Therefore, to correct this asymmetry, it is necessary to accelerate bilateral security cooperation not only with Australia, ASEAN, and European countries but also with Japan.

Meanwhile, regarding information sharing in the Indo-Pacific region, it is noteworthy that the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 recommended the establishment of a regional information fusion center for the Indo-Pacific region at the U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. If such a center is established, its function in information fusion for the Northeast Asian region should be closely monitored.■

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■ Author:Park Jae-jeokProfessor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies and Underwood International College. He earned a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Australian National University. He has held positions as a visiting professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, and a professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies' Graduate School of International and Area Studies. His research areas include U.S.-led security networks in the Indo-Pacific region, regional security order, minilateral security cooperation, the U.S.-Australia alliance, and Australian security policy. Recent publications include "The US-led Security Network in the Indo-Pacific in International Order Transition" (2023) and "South Korea’s Investment for the U.S.-South Korea Alliance and Its Implications for Sino-South Korea Relations" (2022).

■ In charge and editing: Park Han-sooEAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr