[New Year Special Commentary Series] 8. Indo-Pacific Prospects for 2024 and Korea's Challenges

1. US-China Relations in the Indo-Pacific in 2023: Exploration and Adjustment

In 2023, the United States and China, which had competitively engaged in the Indo-Pacific (IP) region—including the East China Sea, South China Sea, and South Pacific—in an assertive manner in 2022, spent the year in exploration and adjustment (Ha Young-sun 2024). The US, in the IP region in 2023, first laid the groundwork for its security network, akin to constructing formwork before building. In Northeast Asia, it promoted security cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan, in line with the restoration of relations between South Korea and Japan. By enhancing the quantity and quality of Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets through maritime security, it further drew key nations in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean into the US security network. In the South Pacific, it specified the implementation plan for supplying nuclear submarines to Australia under the Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) security pact and began substantive discussions on the "second pillar" of AUKUS, focusing on alliances in advanced dual-use technologies. Furthermore, in May 2023, it signed a security agreement with Papua New Guinea, the most populous nation in the South Pacific, and in June, it hosted the second US-Pacific Island Country Summit. In the same month, it announced the commencement of a submarine cable project with strategic implications in the South Pacific, alongside Australia and Japan.

Military exercises led by the US in the IP region, which had been suspended or scaled down due to the COVID-19 pandemic over the past three years, were fully resumed in 2023, with a noticeable increase in the multilateralization and scale of bilateral exercises. Attempts to link the US-led alliances in the IP region with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe also continued. Following 2022, the summit of NATO's "Asia-Pacific Partners" (AP4: South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) was held again in 2023. The UK, a key NATO member, signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Japan in January 2023, and the UK and France participated in numerous military exercises in the IP region involving the Quad (in whole or in part) with regional countries, often referred to as "Quad-x+Alpha" exercises.

China, which does not embrace the concept of the IP space, is rhetorically pressuring the US. In 2023, it continued to advocate for the "Global Security Initiative (GSI)," proposed by President Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum in April 2022, by articulating concepts such as "pan-Asia" and "global Asia." In February 2023, it released the "GSI Concept Paper" to flesh out the GSI, and in October, it published "Outlook on China's Periphery Diplomacy in the New Era." It points to the strengthening of military alliances in some Asian countries, governance issues, and economic development imbalances, which are largely aimed at the US. While criticizing the US for building a security network that encircles China through the layered linkage of alliances and "exclusive" small multilateral security cooperation, it emphasizes multilateralism, the UN, and the "global" community in contrast.

Although the US and China engaged in exploration and adjustment in the IP region in 2023, China maintained a firm stance on its core interests of territorial sovereignty. Above all, China strongly opposed the military and economic entanglements between the US and Taiwan. Furthermore, in the South China Sea, it escalated tensions specifically with the Philippines among the countries involved in territorial disputes. Maritime clashes and verbal sparring between China and the Philippines have been an ongoing issue for decades. However, in 2023, the verbal exchanges between China and the Philippines intensified amidst the linkage of the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea issue. This was because, in addition to the existing five locations, the Philippines granted access to four additional military bases to the US in February 2023, three of which are located on the northern island of Luzon, close to Taiwan.

2. Indo-Pacific Prospects for 2024: US-China Management Phase and the Search for Roles by Regional Nations

1) US-led Security Network: Consolidating Blocs through Information Networks

The US-led security network in the IP region, whose framework was established in 2023, is expected to consolidate its blocs in earnest in 2024. The US prioritizes the establishment of information networks as an operational mechanism that permeates its led security network. Missile defense system construction, provision of ISR assets for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), and information sharing on advanced dual-use technologies are key intermediaries, as detailed below.

First, the US has focused on building a missile defense system in the IP region to counter the increasingly sophisticated missile threats from China and North Korea. If North Korea resumes nuclear tests or continues intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests in 2024, the US will pursue the linkage of the ROK-US alliance and the Japan-US alliance through missile defense in Northeast Asia. Based on the ROK-US-Japan Camp David Accords adopted in August 2023, the three countries began sharing real-time missile warning information in December 2023. Expanding beyond Northeast Asia, Japan and Australia, which have emerged as the northern and southern axes of the US-led security network, are actively involved in building the US-led missile defense system. In the future, the linkage of missile defense information among the US, Japan, and Australia is expected to be promoted, potentially extending to cooperation with South Korea and India.

Second, in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, Quad countries, including the US, have contributed to enhancing the "maritime capacity building" and MDA capabilities of regional nations, expanding the scope of aid to include ISR assets such as unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and surveillance radar. The provision of ISR equipment and information is noteworthy because many regional countries lack the financial capacity to invest astronomical sums in acquiring cutting-edge equipment to counter China's assertive maritime activities or secure cyber security technology. Meanwhile, the choice of which technological programs and software to use in the information-sharing network is closely related to which country will lead the collection and fusion of information. The US is actively involved in developing, deploying, and operating technological programs and software. This is to technically control information collection and ensure US-centric information security. For example, the US has developed and supplied "SeaVision," which enables near real-time information access and exchange, and its use in military exercises with regional countries is increasing. In other words, the US is luring regional countries into its led security network by providing ISR assets, information technology programs, and software to key strategic locations.

Notably, in 2024, Quad countries, including the US, are expected to actively pursue the "Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA)." The Quad launched IPMDA at its third summit in 2022. Since then, although various Quad-related meetings have pledged to establish a "working group" for IPMDA, nothing concrete has materialized by 2023. The declaration from the Quad Summit held in Japan in May 2023 mentioned that IPMDA was in the testing phase, suggesting its full operationalization is anticipated in 2024. IPMDA serves as a key means to attract regional countries into the US-led security network and also acts as a link with major European countries, as Europe contributes to Indian Ocean MDA through its "Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (CRIMARIO)" projects I (2015-2019) and II (2020-2025).

Third, with the advancement of technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, autonomous driving systems, and hypersonic technology, the impact of advanced technological development on US-China strategic relations and the overall international order is profound. The IP region is home to not only the US and China but also Japan, India, Australia, and South Korea, which are leading in advanced technology development, prompting the US to seek alliances with them to build its influence. Sensitive information sharing is crucial in advanced technology cooperation. The three AUKUS countries are strengthening cooperation in core advanced technologies. Meanwhile, Quad countries are also jointly developing early warning systems and maritime and aerial surveillance systems. For instance, as competition between the US and China intensifies in space and cyberspace, a Quad cyber alliance in space has also been launched. In 2024, there is a high probability that the Quad (Plus) and the second pillar of AUKUS will be linked.

The construction of a missile defense system in Northeast Asia, the provision of ISR assets for MDA in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, and the second pillar of AUKUS in the South Pacific share commonalities in information provision, sharing, fusion, and interpretation. In the long term, there is a high possibility of integration into an IP-level information network that transcends these sub-regions.

2) China: Maintaining a Firm Stance in the East and South China Seas and Building Chinese-style Alliances

China is facing internal challenges such as a real estate crisis, a sluggish domestic economy, and the need to legitimize President Xi Jinping's long-term rule. As the US Biden administration maintains a policy of "Cooperation, Competition, and Confrontation (3C)" on a case-by-case basis rather than full confrontation with China, China, facing a difficult domestic political situation, will also prefer a US-China management phase over full confrontation. Moreover, with the US presidential election scheduled for November 2024, China is likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach and prepare for post-election US-China relations.

However, with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which holds an anti-China stance, successfully retaining power in the Taiwanese presidential election in January 2024, China is expected to adopt an even firmer stance on the Taiwan issue than in 2023. At the US-China summit held in San Francisco in November 2023, although the two countries agreed on "five pillars" and specific cooperation tasks, they merely reiterated their respective positions on export controls of advanced technologies to China and the Taiwan issue. While Professor Lee Dong-ryul predicts that the US and China will not push the Taiwan issue to extremes in 2024 (Lee Dong-ryul 2024), the verbal sparring surrounding China's incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and US-China maritime exercises will likely intensify.

As mentioned earlier, China escalated maritime disputes with the Philippines in 2023, a country that granted access to three bases near Taiwan to the US. As if in return for granting base access, the US resumed joint maritime patrols with the Philippines in the South China Sea near Taiwan in November 2023 and January 2024 for the first time in six years. Japan and Australia, which are actively strengthening the US-led security network in the IP region, have also expressed their intention to participate in the maritime patrols conducted by the US and the Philippines. Joint maritime patrols by the US, Japan, and the Philippine Coast Guard in the waters off Luzon Island occurred in June 2023, followed by the first bilateral maritime exercise between Australia and the Philippines in the South China Sea in August, and maritime exercises between the US and Japan in the Philippine Sea and joint patrols by Australia and the Philippines in November. The Philippines has already signed defense agreements with the US and Australia and is negotiating an RAA with Japan and France in 2024.

China, which considers territorial sovereignty in the East and South China Seas as one of its "core interests," is keenly observing the developments in the waters around the Philippines. If military exercises or maritime patrols involving countries such as the US, Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and France are conducted near Luzon Island, close to Taiwan, in 2024, China is likely to strongly protest, further escalating disputes with Taiwan and the Philippines.

Meanwhile, China is expected to strengthen its own brand of (small) multilateral alliances. Although China criticizes US-led small multilateral security cooperation as a mechanism to contain it, it also recognizes the importance of alliance diplomacy. Continuing from 2023, in 2024, it will likely seek to strengthen and expand participation in multilateral and minilateral forums in which China is involved, such as the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral cooperation, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). However, in addition to maintaining its non-aligned stance, China has few "like-minded" countries to pursue (small) multilateral alliances due to historical issues and territorial disputes. Therefore, China will likely increase its alliances with "Global South" countries, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, which have experienced colonial rule and are developing countries. To this end, it is expected to place GSI, as well as the "Global Development Initiative (GDI)" and the "Global Civilization Initiative (GCI)," at the forefront of its foreign policy.

3) Role Exploration and Positioning of Major Regional Countries/Blocs

Japan

Japan is actively seeking its role amidst the US and China entering phases of exploration, adjustment, and management in the IP space. Strengthening cooperation with the "Global South" and enhancing the strategic nature of Japan's foreign aid policy appear to be among its key roles (Yoon Seok-jeong 2023). During his visit to India in March 2023, Prime Minister Kishida announced a "New Push for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" plan. In this plan, Japan, alongside India, emphasized cooperation with the "Global South" and pledged to provide approximately 98 trillion won by 2030, from both public and private sectors, to support infrastructure development in developing countries.

Furthermore, as one of the response measures for realizing FOIP, Japan proposed "expanding security from sea to sky." This is interpreted as reflecting Japan's commitment to contributing to maritime security in the region, as aerial cooperation, observing the sea from the sky, is crucial for maritime security cooperation, and manned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and satellites can be effectively utilized for MDA. Additionally, Japan has established a new aid program called "Official Security Assistance (OSA)" to provide assistance in the military and security sectors, distinct from traditional "Official Development Assistance (ODA)." Through OSA, Japan provided coastal surveillance radar to the Philippines in December 2023 and plans to provide patrol vessels and drones to Malaysia in early 2024.

India

India has been strengthening security cooperation with Quad countries such as the US, Australia, and Japan to counter China's "String of Pearls Strategy." Simultaneously, it is also enhancing security cooperation with regional countries beyond the Quad. In particular, it is expanding its engagement with island nations in the Indian Ocean, including Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and Seychelles. For India to play a leading role in the Indian Ocean, it must secure the capability to project military power into the Persian Gulf, Western India, and East Africa, which requires military facilities in Mauritius and Seychelles. As part of preparatory efforts, India held a summit with Mauritius in September 2023 and agreed to support the development of Mauritius's Earth observation satellite. To prevent China from turning the ports of Indian Ocean nations into military bases under the guise of debt repayment, as it did in Sri Lanka through aggressive port investments that trap recipient countries in a debt trap, India is also focusing on infrastructure investment in Indian Ocean countries.

A notable aspect of maritime security in 2024 is that India operates the "Information Fusion Center-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR)" and the "Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC)," which are the sole information fusion centers connecting the coastal radars of Indian Ocean countries such as the Maldives, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, and Seychelles. It remains to be seen whether India will connect its IFC-IOR and IMAC with other information sharing centers in the region as Quad countries fully launch IPMDA. Furthermore, the restoration of trilateral security cooperation among India, Australia, and France is also of interest. Initiated by France, trilateral dialogue emerged in 2020 and was elevated to the ministerial level in 2021. If military intelligence collected from French-controlled Réunion Island in the Indian Ocean, Australian-controlled Cocos Islands, and Indian-controlled Andaman and Nicobar Islands is shared, and mutual access for naval vessels is permitted, it would effectively control a significant portion of the vast Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia, leased by the US from the UK, is located among these three locations. Due to AUKUS, relations between Australia and France cooled, leading to stagnation in the trilateral cooperation among India, Australia, and France. However, the three countries resumed high-level official talks for restoration in June 2023. In December 2023, Australia and France held a foreign ministers' meeting and agreed on mutual use of military facilities in the Indo-Pacific and increased joint exercises. This increases the likelihood of a trilateral ministerial or summit meeting in 2024.

ASEAN

Southeast Asia is situated at the heart of the Indo-Pacific map, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Despite this geographical advantage, ASEAN countries are concerned that the centrality of ASEAN may be undermined by the US's pursuit of its Indo-Pacific strategy. In 2023, Indonesia held the ASEAN chairmanship. Although President Biden of the US valued his bilateral relationship with Indonesia, he did not participate in the multilateral ASEAN summit diplomacy chaired by Indonesia as the chair country. Laos is the ASEAN chair country in 2024. Given that Laos is a pro-China country, not as influential within ASEAN as Indonesia, and that it is an election year in the US, it is highly probable that President Biden will not attend the ASEAN multilateral diplomacy in 2024. Therefore, concerns that ASEAN centrality is being challenged in the US-led Indo-Pacific space are likely to spread.

ASEAN has traditionally emphasized "strategic autonomy." However, the traditional diplomatic line of ASEAN is being challenged by the competition between the US's Indo-Pacific strategy and China's Belt and Road Initiative. To minimize the pressure to choose between the two major powers, the US and China, ASEAN is pursuing regional policies focused on connectivity, economic cooperation, and non-traditional security, as outlined in the "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo–Pacific." Moving forward, whether ASEAN can secure strategic autonomy will likely depend less on ASEAN's cooperation with the US's Indo-Pacific strategy and more on how assertively China pursues its military policies in the region. In other words, most ASEAN countries, excluding pro-China nations like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, will likely approach security cooperation with the US to advance their Indo-Pacific [or regional] strategies, while considering economic benefits from China and maintaining strategic autonomy. These countries are expected to move flexibly in 2024 without establishing clear priorities among these three aspects.

Australia

Unlike ASEAN, Australia is actively cooperating with the US's Indo-Pacific strategy. As a Quad member, it advocates for "freedom of navigation and overflight" in the Indo-Pacific region along with the US, India, and Japan. This is because Australia perceives values such as freedom of navigation, the rule of law, and market economy, which are essential for maximizing its economic interests, as being reflected in the "liberal order" created and maintained by the US. Since China, Japan, South Korea, the US, and India are Australia's largest export markets, instability in the IP region would directly impact Australia's trade. Therefore, Australia is strengthening its alliance with the US as a means to safeguard regional stability and peace.

Australia is expected to continue to serve as a connector between the US-led security network in the IP region and key member states of NATO in 2024. Key platforms include the "Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)" maintained with the UK, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore since 1971, AUKUS established in 2021, the RAA with Japan in 2022, and the trilateral security cooperation among Australia, India, and France. The "Talisman Sabre" biennial military exercise between the US and Australia, held in August 2023, involved 13 countries, including South Korea, Japan, the UK, Canada, and Germany.

Australia and China experienced their worst relations since diplomatic ties were established in 1972 due to China's trade sanctions, which began in 2020. However, starting in the first half of 2023, the two countries initiated normalization of relations through trade ministerial meetings, foreign ministerial meetings, and summit meetings held on the sidelines of multilateral conferences. In November, Australian Prime Minister Albanese visited China and held a summit with President Xi Jinping, thereby resolving the trade dispute. Nevertheless, even though Australia and China have resolved their trade war, their relations are unlikely to recover rapidly in 2024. There are significant concerns in Australia that China may resume economic coercion against Australia at some point. Australia won this trade war as China could not find substitutes for Australian minerals, including iron ore. China is currently investing heavily in African mines, etc., to secure alternatives to Australian minerals. On the other hand, the Australian mining industry is expected to decline due to the restructuring of its industrial base towards eco-friendly practices to address climate change. In addition to these concerns about "economic security," China's continued assertive actions in the South China Sea and the South Pacific leave little room for Australia to shift its security orientation away from the US, even though the Australian Labor Party, the ruling party, tends to prioritize engagement with Asia.

South Pacific

In the South Pacific, the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) will seek to maximize their benefits amidst intensifying competition for influence among Australia, China, the US, and Japan. China is making large-scale investments in infrastructure capital in PICs under the Belt and Road Initiative and is promoting security cooperation with PICs based on this. For example, China signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands in April 2022 and dispatched police to support the strengthening of security in the Solomon Islands. In July 2023, the two countries signed a "Police Cooperation Agreement for 2023-2025." In fact, Australia had signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands in August 2017, allowing Australia to deploy police and defense forces to the Solomon Islands in case of natural disasters and security threats. Based on this, Australia dispatched approximately 300 police and defense personnel to the Solomon Islands during large-scale anti-government protests in November 2021. The two countries agreed in September 2023 that Australian police would be responsible for security in the Solomon Islands until the general election in June 2024. Australia has signed similar security agreements with Fiji (October 2022), Vanuatu (December 2022), Tuvalu (November 2023), and Papua New Guinea (December 2023). However, in Vanuatu's case, the Vanuatu parliament voted no confidence in the Prime Minister in September 2023, arguing that the security agreement with Australia undermined Vanuatu's neutrality, and elected a pro-China figure as the new Prime Minister. The US, which operates Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii, naval and air bases in Guam, and a ballistic missile testing range in the Marshall Islands, is concerned about increased security cooperation between PICs and China, which could heighten its strategic vulnerability. In response, the US signed a defense agreement with Papua New Guinea in May 2023, allowing US military access to six ports and airports in Papua New Guinea.

The complex web of security agreements in 2023 demonstrates the geopolitical importance of the South Pacific to China, Australia, and the US. In the past, the South Pacific garnered attention due to diplomatic breaks between PICs and Taiwan, and the voting power of the 14 PICs in international forums like the UN. More recently, the South Pacific has emerged as a strategic hub for air and sea traffic and undersea data transmission. Notably, while China's Huawei is building a mobile communication network in the Solomon Islands, Australia, Japan, and the US plan to construct a 2,250 km undersea cable connecting Kiribati, Nauru, and Micronesia by 2025.

As the competition for influence among China, the US, and Australia intensifies, PICs are expected to pursue pragmatic approaches to extract maximum benefits from these powers, but there are limitations. The 14 PICs are relatively small countries with limited national capacity, and their domestic political divisions—split between pro-Australia, pro-China, and pro-US factions—make it difficult to consolidate even their limited national capabilities. Furthermore, the regional organization, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), currently lacks the capacity to manage the recent surge in interest from extra-regional countries like the US and China.

3. Challenges for South Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea announced its Indo-Pacific strategy implementation plan on December 19, 2023. Following the announcement of the Indo-Pacific strategy document on December 28, 2022, the ministry analyzed the international political environment, its own capabilities, and the demands of regional countries over the past year, resulting in the release of 52 specific action plans. The ROK-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative, the Indo-Pacific strategy document, the ROK-Pacific Island Countries Summit, and the Indo-Pacific implementation plan, all pursued since the launch of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, have raised expectations for South Korea's role in the region. To meet these heightened expectations, the 52 implementation plans announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be diligently executed with ongoing improvements. The following points should be considered:

First, the US-led security network in the IP space is being strengthened. Therefore, South Korea must contribute to regional security issues beyond the Korean Peninsula to enhance its standing within the US-led security network. Among various comprehensive security domains, focusing on contributing to maritime security first appears advisable. This is because Quad countries, the UK, France, Germany, and the Netherlands are actively involved in enhancing the maritime capabilities and MDA capacity of key countries in the IP region. As outlined in the current implementation plan, South Korea needs to continue its individual contributions while also increasing cooperation and coordination with these countries.

Given that South Korea has already pledged on several occasions to actively contribute to regional maritime security issues, it is possible that it may be requested to participate in joint maritime patrols by the US or the Philippines. South Korea may also be invited to participate in the "Malacca Straits Patrol" conducted by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, or the "Sulu-Sulawesi Patrol" conducted by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. If such a situation arises, South Korea should positively consider participation to enhance its standing within the US-led security network and broaden the horizons of its diplomacy and security beyond the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia to the Indo-Pacific. While China may criticize South Korea's participation, South Korea has the justification of contributing to regional maritime security.

Second, South Korea must highlight the differentiation between its Indo-Pacific strategy and that of the US. As mentioned above, the active response of middle powers to non-traditional security issues in the region aligns with the direction of the US Indo-Pacific strategy. However, promoting bilateral and minilateral cooperation among regional middle powers, regardless of US participation, represents a strategy differentiated from that of the US. The current implementation plan makes a general statement: "We will establish and operate bilateral and minilateral consultative bodies to discuss various pending issues and specific cooperation measures in the Indo-Pacific region with other major countries, including the ROK-US-Japan Indo-Pacific Dialogue" (Government of the Republic of Korea 2023). Moving forward, detailed implementation plans related to the establishment of minilateral consultative bodies need to be presented during the revision and supplementation process of the 52 strategies.

To offer a few suggestions, first, South Korea should promote security cooperation with Japan and Australia (with or without US participation). With the restoration of security cooperation between South Korea and Japan in 2023, South Korea, Japan, and Australia can explore minilateral cooperation not only in Northeast Asia but also in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific in 2024. For instance, the three countries could jointly undertake development cooperation projects in Southeast Asia and expand the scope of cooperation to the South Pacific, which is increasing in strategic importance. Furthermore, it is necessary to promote bilateral cooperation with Australia and Indonesia and actively drive trilateral cooperation among South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia (KIA). Considering Indonesia's economic rise and its status as a leading ASEAN nation, along with the economic and military capabilities of Australia and South Korea as major middle powers, this minilateral consultative body has significant potential to emerge as a key security and economic consultative body in the region. Specific agendas such as defense industry, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and hydrogen energy could foster cooperation among the three countries. Ultimately, based on trilateral cooperation in functional areas like defense industry and energy, it is necessary to initiate security dialogues at the KIA level to foster consensus on regional security issues. Furthermore, if strategic communication between South Korea and China, and between Japan and China, is restored, trilateral cooperation among South Korea, China, and Japan should be revitalized. In that case, from a long-term perspective, various "TCS +" consultative bodies could be attempted, such as TCS-ASEAN, TCS-Europe, and TCS-PIF, using the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) as a platform.

Third, the IP space is where South Korea can establish its identity as a "global pivotal state." A global pivotal state must possess national strength equivalent to or greater than that of a middle power, and at the same time, must have the capacity to influence the order being established (or being shaped) by the US and China, rather than simply accepting it. Therefore, it must at least hold a leading position in its own sub-region and play a connecting role in the networks linking these sub-regions. Countries that can be categorized as global pivotal states in the IP space include Japan and South Korea (Northeast Asia), Indonesia and Vietnam (Southeast Asia), Australia (South Pacific), and India (Indian Ocean). While no single middle power can single-handedly influence the establishment and maintenance of regional security order, forming a "coalition of global pivotal states" would grant a certain degree of leverage over the US and China. Therefore, South Korea must strengthen bilateral and minilateral cooperation with major middle powers in the IP region, such as Japan, Australia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Projects targeting these countries, mentioned in the current implementation plan, should be prioritized and pursued without delay.

Fourth, the trilateral minilateral consultative body among South Korea, the US, and Japan, restored in 2023, should be utilized as a platform not only for the Korean Peninsula but also for the entire Indo-Pacific. The three countries held the first "Trilateral Indo-Pacific Dialogue" in the US on January 5, 2024. If the ROK-US-Japan consultative body establishes itself as a minilateral platform addressing comprehensive security agendas in the IP space, attempts can be made to expand its scope in the format of "ROK-US-Japan + Alpha (α)".

However, there are concerns that the trilateral consultative body among South Korea, the US, and Japan will lead to closer security cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia, further deteriorating ROK-China relations. Nevertheless, with a solid ROK-US-Japan security cooperation as a prerequisite, it can create space for South Korea to increase security cooperation with China while preventing misperceptions by the US and Japan that South Korea is leaning towards China. For example, if South Korea actively coordinates and cooperates with the US and Japan for "maritime capacity building" and MDA enhancement in the IP region, it will create space for South Korea to broaden its engagement with China regarding maritime security. In this case, South Korea could attempt to play a "convenor" role to conduct joint exercises for the "Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)" in the Northeast Asian waters involving South Korea, Japan, and China.

Fifth, in the IP space, ASEAN and India, along with the US, Japan, China, and Russia, are emerging as key regions/countries for our lives and diplomacy (Ha Young-sun 2024). Beyond economic and security cooperation with ASEAN and India, cultural and people-to-people exchanges must be expanded to broaden mutual understanding and respect. The current implementation plan states, "Recognizing that the expansion of people-to-people exchanges and communication in the Indo-Pacific region serves as the foundation for regional peace and prosperity, we will continue to cooperate to strengthen people-to-people connectivity" (Government of the Republic of Korea 2023). However, while the proportion of ASEAN-related projects among the 52 implementation plans is high, the proportion of India-related projects is small. Considering India's strategic importance, India-related projects need to be supplemented. ■

References

Government of the Republic of Korea. 2023. "Republic of Korea's Indo-Pacific Implementation Plan for Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity." December 2023. (Accessed: January 14, 2024.)https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/wpge/m_25838/contents.do

Yoon Seok-jeong. 2023. "Japan's 'New Plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific': Analysis and Implications." Major International Issues Analysis. 2023-25. Korea National Diplomatic Academy. (Accessed: January 14, 2024.)https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/kor/pblct/PblctView.do?csrfPreventionSalt=null&pblctDtaSn=14232&menuCl=P01&clCode=P01&koreanEngSe=KOR&pclCode=&chcodeId=&searchCondition=searchAll&searchKeyword=&pageIndex=3

Lee Dong-ryul. 2024. "China's Global Initiatives in 2024 and ROK-China Relations." EAI New Year Special Commentary Series. January 10. (Accessed: January 14, 2024.)https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22298

Ha Young-sun. 2024. "Changes in the World Order in 2024 and South Korea's Response." EAI Visible Commentary. January 2. (Accessed: January 14, 2024.)https://eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22291

■Park Jae-jeok_Professor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies and Underwood International College.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr