Netanyahu's Secret Diplomacy Shakes Up the Gulf Security Landscape
Executive Summary
Prime Minister Netanyahu's unannounced visit to Abu Dhabi on September 27 can be interpreted as an extension of the deepening Israel-UAE security cooperation amid the conflict with Iran, as well as a diplomatic move for domestic political consumption ahead of the Israeli general election on October 27. The denials by Saudi Arabia and Jordan regarding their reported participation in the meeting stem from different motivations—protecting their own negotiating leverage and defending against domestic public opinion, respectively—rather than the factual accuracy of the reports. In contrast, the UAE was the only country to officially confirm the visit, actively leveraging its status as a signatory to the Abraham Accords and a beneficiary of Israeli air defense assets as a diplomatic asset. This reveals a rift in the regional normalization landscape, characterized by the stalled expansion of the Abraham Accords since the Gaza war and Saudi Arabia's Palestinian preconditions. South Korean companies and the government need to manage mid- to long-term risks by distinguishing between the potential formalization of the Gulf-Israel security cooperation axis and the uncertainty surrounding Saudi-Israel normalization negotiations.
I. Issue Analysis
Controversy over Netanyahu's Secret UAE Visit: Reshaping the Economic Cooperation Landscape of the Abraham Accords
A Private Jet to Abu Dhabi, and the Exposed Rifts
On Sunday, September 27, Prime Minister Netanyahu arrived in Abu Dhabi by private jet and spent the day with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed [6]. Israel's public broadcaster Channel 12 reported that the visit was an unannounced, secret trip [6]. The Israeli Prime Minister's Office subsequently confirmed the visit [8]. The UAE Presidential Court also issued a statement, announcing that "the two sides discussed UAE-Israel bilateral relations and ways to strengthen and develop them" [7][17].
Local reports confirm that this visit was not the first. Pakistan's *Dawn* newspaper reported that Netanyahu had also paid a private visit to Abu Dhabi to meet President bin Zayed in March, when the conflict with Iran was at its peak [Deleted Source]. This indicates that the September visit was not an isolated incident, but rather an extension of the informal, high-level channel between Israel and the UAE that has been utilized repeatedly this year. An Israeli source quoted by CNN stated that the Iranian issue dominated the agenda of this meeting as well [1]. Israel and the UAE have been deepening their security cooperation amid the conflict with Iran; earlier this year, Israel even provided the UAE with the Iron Dome air defense system along with personnel to operate it [15].
A Diplomatic Card on the Campaign Trail
The timing of the visit is notable. The Israeli general election is scheduled for October 27, meaning Netanyahu's secret diplomacy took place just one month before the vote [1]. Previous EAI analyses have pointed out that Netanyahu has often reframed international criticism into a narrative to rally his hardline domestic base [2]. The UAE visit can be interpreted in a similar context. *Dawn* evaluated this move as part of Netanyahu's envisioned "hexagon of alliances" strategy [Deleted Source]—an attempt to formalize Israel-UAE relations as a core axis of the regional security network.
However, this visit has presented a political double-edged sword for Netanyahu. According to a report by *Haaretz*, Netanyahu reportedly asked President bin Zayed to deny the details of their phone conversations and specifics regarding the October 7 attacks [16]. This could be read as an attempt by Netanyahu to cover up the situation amid resurfacing allegations that he had received prior warning of the October 7 Hamas attack. Indeed, on September 27, immediately after reports of the visit surfaced, hundreds of Israeli citizens gathered at Habima Square in Tel Aviv to protest against Netanyahu. Protesters criticized him for failing to act despite receiving advance warnings of the Hamas attack [11].
Gulf Silence and Denials: Who Is Trying to Hide What?
Israeli media reported that the meeting was held in an "expanded format" with Saudi officials in attendance, and that the agenda covered security cooperation, Iran, the Houthis, and regional air defense systems [4]. However, a Saudi official immediately denied this, making it clear that "there was no official meeting" [4]. Jordan followed a similar pattern. An official source in Amman dismissed claims of Jordanian representation at the meeting as "baseless lies," countering that the narrative was spread for electoral purposes by Israeli media outlets close to Netanyahu to counter his international isolation following the UN General Assembly [13].
These two denials carry significance beyond a simple dispute over facts. They indicate that both Saudi Arabia and Jordan view any perceived "complicity" with Netanyahu as a political liability. In the case of Saudi Arabia, as noted in previous EAI analyses, the country is facing pressure from the Trump administration, which has linked a U.S. civil nuclear agreement to normalization with Israel [5]. Saudi Arabia maintains its position of demanding an "irreversible path" to the establishment of a Palestinian state as a precondition for normalization [5]. Under these circumstances, if rumors of Saudi participation in a backroom meeting with Netanyahu were accepted as fact, it would directly clash with the principled stance that the bin Salman regime has declared domestically and internationally. Saudi Arabia's swift denial should be seen as a preemptive measure to avoid this political cost.
In contrast, the UAE took the opposite approach, officially confirming the visit rather than denying it [7][17]. This choice was possible because the UAE had already established formal diplomatic relations with Israel through the 2020 Abraham Accords. For the UAE, the incentive to publicly showcase the tangible security and economic benefits of the relationship outweighs any motivation to conceal its alignment with Israel.
Tehran's Warning
On Tuesday, September 30, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement warning that countries hosting "actors who foster regional instability" on their territory would pay a price [10]. The *Tehran Times* reported this alongside harsh criticism of the "child-killing and warmongering Israeli prime minister" [10]. This warning was an immediate reaction to reports that Netanyahu had visited the UAE at the official invitation of President bin Zayed [10].
Iran's warning is not aimed solely at the UAE. Amid the ongoing conflict with Iran [1], Israel's deployment of the Iron Dome in the UAE and the dispatch of personnel to operate it [15] represent a clear security threat from Tehran's perspective. Iran's statement serves as a deterrent signal to regional states to refrain from further alignment with Israel. At the same time, the timing of scheduled indirect negotiations with the United States must also be considered. Italy's *La Repubblica* reported that news of new indirect talks between Iran and the United States emerged the day after Netanyahu's visit to the UAE [9]. For Iran, this represents a dual strategy of issuing warnings to the UAE while simultaneously engaging at the negotiating table with the United States.
Türkiye's Intervention: Moving to Avoid Exclusion from the Gulf Realignment
It is also noteworthy that around the same time as this controversy, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited the UAE. *Daily Sabah* reported this as Fidan's second visit to the UAE since March, stating that Türkiye intends to confirm its "full solidarity with the UAE, one of the biggest victims of the Gulf War" [14]. A Turkish diplomatic source stated that Türkiye plans to emphasize the need to strengthen "regional ownership," arguing that the intervention of external powers has exacerbated regional conflicts [14]. This is interpreted as an attempt by Türkiye to establish a separate axis of influence through the High-Level Strategic Council with the UAE, amid deepening Israel-UAE security alignment. For Türkiye, which maintains complex relations with both Israel and Iran, this signals that it will not stand by and watch the UAE tilt exclusively toward Israel.
Key Issues: What Is at Stake?
The core issues of this matter can be summarized into three main areas.
First is the dispute over the truth regarding the participants in the "expanded meeting." With Israeli media reports and the denials from Saudi Arabia and Jordan in direct conflict, it remains unconfirmed which side's claim is closer to the truth [4][13]. Depending on the outcome of this dispute, regional perceptions regarding the actual extent of behind-the-scenes contact between Israel and Saudi Arabia/Jordan—both of which remain outside the framework of the Abraham Accords—will shift.
Second is the intersection of Netanyahu's electoral strategy and the accountability for October 7. If the allegation reported by *Haaretz* regarding his "request to deny the phone call details" is confirmed [16], the nature of this visit shifts from a simple diplomatic event to an extraterritorial operation aimed at evading domestic political responsibility. The reaction of Israeli public opinion, which has already manifested in street protests, is also a key variable [11].
Third is whether Iran's warnings will translate into actual action [10]. As the UAE continues to publicly pursue security alignment with Israel [7][15], any escalation of regional military pressure by Iran beyond mere statements could once again heighten tensions across the Gulf, including the Strait of Hormuz. This opens up the possibility that the scenario of a prolonged, low-intensity, multi-front stalemate, as pointed out in previous EAI analyses [3], could become even more complex in the wake of this UAE visit controversy.
II. In-Depth Analysis
Controversy over Netanyahu's Secret UAE Visit: Reshaping the Economic Cooperation Landscape of the Abraham Accords - In-Depth Analysis
The Politics of Denial: Why No One Admits to Attending
While the denials by Saudi and Jordanian officials appear identical on the surface, they operate on different dynamics. Saudi Arabia's denial stems from the framework of its incomplete normalization negotiations. Saudi Arabia has set an "irreversible path" toward the establishment of a Palestinian state as a precondition for normalizing relations with Israel [5]. If Riyadh were to acknowledge its participation in the expanded meeting with Netanyahu while this condition remains unmet, Crown Prince bin Salman would fall into the contradiction of undermining his own preconditions. Furthermore, because the civil nuclear agreement offered to Saudi Arabia by the United States is linked to normalization with Israel, even the mere confirmation of informal contact could weaken Saudi Arabia's negotiating leverage [5].
Jordan's denial has a different nuance. An official Jordanian source characterized the Israeli media reports as "clear falsehoods spread for electoral purposes by media outlets friendly to Netanyahu" [13]. Jordan is already a party to a peace treaty signed with Israel in 1994, meaning it has no reason to hide the existence of diplomatic relations. What Jordan denied was not the existence of relations, but rather being co-opted into Netanyahu's election campaign. Given a domestic public opinion shaped by a majority Palestinian-origin population, the monarchy in Amman incurs political costs simply by appearing in Netanyahu's campaign narrative. Thus, while both denials react to the same event, they stem from different motivations: Saudi Arabia seeks to "protect negotiating leverage," while Jordan aims to "defend domestic public opinion."
Why the UAE Is Not Silent
Interestingly, the UAE was the only party that did not issue a denial. Instead, the UAE Presidential Court issued a statement officially confirming that they discussed ways to strengthen bilateral relations [7][17]. This asymmetry stems from the UAE's structural position. As a signatory to the 2020 Abraham Accords, the UAE has already publicly institutionalized its relations with Israel [15], leaving no relationship to hide. Furthermore, the UAE is a security beneficiary that has actually received the Iron Dome air defense system and operating personnel from Israel amid the conflict with Iran [15]. With this security dependence already in place, denying high-level contact would be counterintuitive.
This stance of the UAE is reaffirmed by the public disclosure of a telephone conversation between Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed and his Israeli counterpart to discuss bilateral relations [18]. Instead of concealment, the UAE chose a strategy of openness. It appears to be utilizing its status as the only Gulf oil-producing state that can officially showcase cooperation with Israel as a diplomatic asset.
Structural Background: Five Years of the Abraham Accords, a Stalled Expansion Track
The Abraham Accords were launched in 2020 with the normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain [15]. The original design of the accords was an expansion track aimed at securing additional normalization partners, including Saudi Arabia. However, this track has been virtually halted since the outbreak of the Gaza war. The nuclear cooperation agreement offered to Saudi Arabia by the Trump administration is an attempt to restart this stalled track, but its structure directly clashes with Saudi Arabia's Palestinian preconditions [5]. Both sides continue to lack a compelling justification to withdraw their positions in the short term [5].
Amid this deadlock, the UAE remains the "only functioning node" of the expansion track. While Saudi Arabia and Jordan deny official participation, the UAE-Israel channel remains practically operational. This is demonstrated by the repetition of high-level visits through the same channel, including the secret visit in March during the height of the conflict with Iran and this latest visit in September [Deleted Source]. In a situation where the expansion of the Abraham Accords has stalled, the deepening of relations with the UAE, an existing signatory, functions as a substitute.
Historical Precedent: Differences from the 1981 Sadat Model
In the Middle East, there is precedent for leaders maintaining secret contacts with Israel despite risking backlash from Arab public opinion. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 provoked regional backlash severe enough to lead to Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League. However, Sadat made a bold political gamble with his public visit, securing tangible achievements in return, namely the Camp David Accords and the return of the Sinai Peninsula.
President bin Zayed's approach stands in contrast. Despite already being a formal normalization partner, the UAE employs a dual strategy of keeping high-level contacts private. It openly secures security and economic benefits (such as the provision of the Iron Dome and statements on bilateral relations) while keeping politically sensitive summit meetings behind closed doors to minimize exposure to regional public opinion. Unlike the Sadat model, which accepted the political costs of normalization, this can be described as a latecomer model that manages costs while reaping benefits even after normalization. The reason Iran issued a warning targeting the UAE as an "actor fostering regional instability" [10] is because Tehran detected a deepening of "high-level alignment" that cannot be explained solely by the UAE's status as a formal normalization partner.
Iran's Warning: Who Is the Message For?
Immediately after reports of Netanyahu's visit surfaced, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement warning of the "consequences of hosting an actor that fosters instability on one's territory" [10]. The recipient of this statement is not the UAE alone. Given that the statement comprehensively referred to "regional states," it carries a strong character of a preemptive warning aimed at Saudi Arabia [10]. This is a strategic move to block the possibility of Saudi Arabia leaning toward normalization under pressure from the United States regarding the nuclear agreement.
Such warnings from Iran are closer to discourse preemption than effective deterrence. Iran has already failed to prevent the air defense support provided to the UAE amid its conflict with Israel [15]. It is also difficult for Iran to immediately exercise practical military options, such as blocking the Strait of Hormuz, against Gulf oil-producing states. Ultimately, Iran's warning can be evaluated as an attempt to establish a psychological barrier to prevent the spread of normalization, rather than a demonstration of military capability.
Key Variables: Three Clocks Ticking at Different Speeds
How this issue unfolds in the future depends on three independent clocks. The first is the Israeli domestic political clock. In the month or so leading up to the October 27 general election, whether allegations of a cover-up regarding the October 7 advance warnings spread further could shake Netanyahu's election narrative itself [16][11]. The second is the U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement clock. The speed with which this agreement is processed in Congress will alter Saudi Arabia's incentives to pivot toward UAE-style private contacts [5]. The third is the intensity clock of the conflict with Iran. Amid signs of a potential resumption of indirect talks between Iran and the United States [9], whether the situation escalates or remains in a low-intensity stalemate will inevitably force the UAE and Saudi Arabia to adjust the level of their security alignment with Israel.
While these three clocks are interconnected, they run at different speeds. The Israeli general election clock ticks the fastest, while the Saudi normalization negotiation clock moves the slowest. This difference in speed itself is highly likely to leave the UAE as the "only practical node of the Abraham Accords expansion track" for the foreseeable future.
References
[4] [Daily Sabah] Saudi official denies Kingdom engaged with Netanyahu in UAE
[6] [N1 (BA)] Netanyahu se sastao s predsjednikom UAE tokom tajne posjete Abu Dhabiju
[7] [Gulf News] UAE President receives Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
[8] [Hürriyet Daily News] Netanyahu office confirms UAE visit
[11] [Hürriyet Daily News] Israelis protest amid Netanyahu’s reported UAE visit
[12] [Der Standard] Für Netanjahu war Abu Dhabi lange ein Sehnsuchtsziel
[14] [Daily Sabah] Türkiye, UAE set for new talks amid Iran war, Israeli expansion
[15] [The Edge Malaysia] Passengers overcame pilot who tried to crash flydubai flight, Israel says
[17] [Gulf News] US-Iran conflict: Tehran ready for talks or war as Trump expects new diplomacy
[18] [Gulf News] Abdullah bin Zayed, Israeli FM discuss bilateral relations during phone call
[20] [Al-Monitor] MBS hosts Sheikh Mansour as Saudi-UAE ties thaw: What to know
[22] [Daily Sabah] Flydubai co-pilot tried to crash Tel Aviv flight: Netanyahu
[23] [The New York Times] FlyDubai Under Scrutiny After Cockpit Attack
[24] [Cyprus Mail] Passengers overcame co-pilot who tried to crash flydubai flight, Netanyahu says
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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