The Indian Navy's Blue-Water Transition and Networked Maritime Security Strategy: Structure and South Korea's Intersection
Executive Summary
The Indian Navy is formalizing its blue-water capabilities by expanding its operational reach to the South China Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic. This expansion serves as a response to China's entry into the Indian Ocean and shifts in India's military calculus, where the China variable has grown more prominent following the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict. The joint development of the UNICORN stealth mast with Japan, the maritime cooperation arrangement with New Zealand, and the push for bilateral exercises in 2027 demonstrate how India is diversifying its partner network to secure strategic autonomy rather than integrating into the United States. This aligns with the structural context in which regional actors are taking self-help measures to fill the gap in US aircraft carrier capabilities in the Western Pacific caused by the prolonged conflict involving Iran. Japan's public request for India to accelerate its internal procedures suggests that joint defense development must be sensitively managed even during the implementation phase after signing. Noting that India's choice of Japan as its first partner was a matter of timing for deploying summit-level channels rather than exclusion, South Korea needs to elevate naval vessel and radar technology cooperation to a summit-level agenda and consider cooperating with minilateral networks led by India and New Zealand through maritime safety agendas within the IP4 framework.
I. Issue Analysis
Issue Analysis: The Indian Navy's Blue-Water Transition and Strengthening Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean
1. Background and Progress
The Indian Navy's transition toward a blue-water navy is not a one-off policy shift. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh stated at the Naval Commanders' Conference, which opened on September 29, that the operational reach of Indian warships has expanded to the South China Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic. This statement officially showcases India's capabilities as a blue-water navy extending beyond the Indian Ocean littoral. This expansionist stance is aligned with changes in New Delhi's military calculus following the four-day India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025. The Pakistani media outlet Dawn assessed that after the conflict, the China variable began to be factored more heavily into the Indian military's strategic planning against Pakistan [12]. In other words, India's naval expansion is being pursued at the intersection of its traditional task of deterring Pakistan and the new challenge of countering China.
In terms of technological cooperation, Prime Minister Takaichi's visit to India in July was a turning point. On this occasion, the two countries agreed on the joint development and production of the UNICORN stealth integrated antenna mast. This is the second defense technology joint development project Japan has signed with an Asian nation, following the Philippines, and the first in India-Japan bilateral relations [1]. An EAI report explains this in the context that "Japan has chosen a pragmatic course of concurrently expanding individual minilateral exercises with multiple partners, including India, the United States, and Australia" [3]. In other words, the UNICORN agreement is not an isolated defense transaction but is read as part of Japan's broader effort to diversify its independent deterrence measures in response to the gap in US aircraft carrier capabilities in the Western Pacific [9].
Cooperation in the South Pacific also materialized around the same time. India signed a maritime cooperation arrangement, a hydrography and nautical charting cooperation agreement, and a mutual logistics support arrangement with New Zealand, and the two navies agreed to pursue their first bilateral exercise in 2027. Coincidentally, New Zealand signed "Plan Tasman" with Australia in the same month, establishing strategic guidelines to deepen the organizational and operational integration of their respective navies [14]. The India-New Zealand cooperation temporally aligns with the ongoing trend of building overlapping minilateral maritime networks in the region.
2. Current Situation
As of September 29, the most concrete issue is the implementation speed of the UNICORN agreement. A senior official from Japan's Ministry of Defense stated in an interview with The Hindu that Japan had requested the Indian side to expedite its internal approval procedures [1]. In the same interview, the official mentioned that the next naval exercise of the Quad member states is scheduled to take place near the Sea of Japan later this year, and hinted that Japan would soon conduct a comprehensive review of its major policies [1]. This demonstrates that Japan is managing its defense cooperation with India in connection with the Quad's maritime security schedule.
At the same time, India is hosting the multinational air exercise 'Tarang Shakti 2026' in Jodhpur from September 26 to October 12. US Air Force F-35s performed tactical missions alongside Indian fighter jets from an Indian base for the first time [4]. Defense News specified that the exercise took place at the Jodhpur base in Rajasthan, approximately 200 kilometers from the Pakistani border [4]. Australia, France, Germany, Greece, the UAE, and the United States deployed forces to the exercise, while 32 countries attended as observers. Prior to this, from September 9 to 21, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force deployed fighter jets to Indian territory for the first time in history to conduct the 'Veer Guardian 26' exercise in Rajasthan [3]. An EAI analysis defines this as "the result of a cumulative response to the gap in US aircraft carrier capabilities in the Western Pacific and the rise of China, coupled with India's pursuit of strategic autonomy," diagnosing that this network is in a "low-intensity, parallel expansion phase that has not yet solidified into an integrated alliance" [3].
India is also conducting independent multilateral diplomacy regarding the safety of sea lines of communication. India and Liberia gathered around 20 countries at the UN to launch the 'Group of Friends on Safety and Security of Shipping and Seafarers.' Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar led this inaugural meeting [10]. This is interpreted as a move by India to secure leadership not only in naval power projection but also in shaping multilateral norms.
Tension factors also coexist. As Iran escalates its level of threat against US military vessels near the Strait of Hormuz, the maritime security environment in the western Indian Ocean is becoming unstable [17]. Remarks by an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy official targeting all US vessels traversing the Indian Ocean were reported [17]. Given that the Indian Navy's blue-water deployment overlaps with these areas of tension originating from Hormuz, India's westward deployment goes beyond a simple display of capability and takes on the character of operating in actual high-risk waters.
3. Key Actors and Positions
Indiaconsistently maintains a policy of strategic autonomy, expanding partnerships without becoming subordinate to any single axis. Its participation in the F-35 multinational exercise demonstrates that defense cooperation channels are operated separately, even amidst US-India trade disputes and tensions over India's purchase of Russian crude oil [4]. At the same time, India is choosing not to fully integrate into any single framework, instead establishing individual cooperation with Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States [3].
Japanis pursuing joint defense development with India as part of expanding its independent deterrence measures under the structural constraints of China's rise and the gap in US aircraft carrier capabilities in the Western Pacific [9]. Its push to expedite the implementation of the UNICORN agreement is read as an attempt to manage this in connection with the Quad naval exercise schedule planned for later this year [1].
United Statesis maintaining military cooperation with India separately from trade and energy disputes, while simultaneously accelerating its own fielding of unmanned systems. On September 24, the US Navy launched the Robotics and Autonomous Systems Warfare Development Center (RASWDC) at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek in Virginia to begin developing doctrines for aerial, surface, and undersea unmanned systems [7]. This shows that a technological competition along a different path from India's manned-platform-centric blue-water naval transition is taking place concurrently.
New Zealand and Australiaare building a separate axis of integration in the South Pacific. While signing a maritime cooperation arrangement with India, New Zealand has formalized its strategic dialogue framework and operational integration goals with Australia through "Plan Tasman" [14]. New Zealand is effectively serving as an intersection connecting multiple maritime networks in the Indo-Pacific simultaneously.
Iranis forming another axis of regional tension by escalating its level of threat against US vessels in the western Indian Ocean [17][11]. Brookings points out that the prolonged conflict involving Iran has exposed the gap between Washington's declared Indo-Pacific priorities and its actual resource allocation [11].
4. Key Issues
First is the actual implementation speed of the UNICORN agreement. If India's internal approval procedures are delayed despite Japan's urging, it could escalate into a credibility issue for the first joint defense development project between the two countries [1]. Second is whether India's networked naval diplomacy will converge into an institutionalized framework like the Quad, or continue as a loose structure where individual bilateral and minilateral cooperation coexist [3]. Third is the potential for technological asymmetry to arise if India adheres to a traditional manned-vessel-centric blue-water transition path while the United States and China accelerate their respective competitions in unmanned and stealth technologies [7]. Fourth, given that tensions in the western Indian Ocean originating from Iran directly overlap with the Indian Navy's deployment routes to the Atlantic and Mediterranean, how New Delhi manages this risk remains a key variable for future developments [17].
II. In-Depth Analysis
In-Depth Analysis: The Indian Navy's Blue-Water Transition and Strengthening Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean
1. Root Cause Analysis
The primary driver behind the expansion of India's naval power projection is the Chinese Navy's entry into the Indian Ocean. Using its base in Djibouti as a springboard, China has increased the frequency of its warship deployments to the western Indian Ocean. The Indian military perceives this as an extension of the traditional "String of Pearls" strategy. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh's remarks at the Naval Commanders' Conference on September 29, emphasizing that the operational reach of Indian warships has expanded to the South China Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic, strongly reflect a response to this threat perception. In effect, India has externally demonstrated its resolve not to appear pushed back in the Indian Ocean through its track record of blue-water deployments.
The second driver is the shift in military calculus left by the four-day India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025. The Pakistani media outlet Dawn assessed that after this conflict, the China variable began to be factored more heavily into the Indian military's deterrence planning against Pakistan [12]. In other words, India's logic for military buildup has been restructured from a Pakistan-only variable to a China-Pakistan linked variable. This restructuring is directly projected onto the navy. The Indian Navy's expansion of its operational reach to the Western Pacific and the Atlantic is not a simple outward expansion, but rather an asymmetric response to the structure through which Chinese naval power influences the Indian Ocean.
The third driver is a technological gap. While India's shipbuilding industry has achieved success in quantitative production, a gap remained in stealth and signature-reduction technologies. UNICORN is a technology that integrates multiple antennas into a single mast to reduce the radar cross-section, an area that India would find difficult to acquire in the short term through independent development. The joint development agreement with Japan was a realistic choice to bridge this gap. Prime Minister Takaichi's visit in July demonstrates that this agreement was elevated to a summit-level agenda [1].
2. Structural Context
Security Structure: Structural Gap in US Aircraft Carrier Capabilities
India's naval expansion is intertwined with a gap in the regional deterrence posture. An EAI report points out that a gap in US aircraft carrier capabilities occurred in the Western Pacific as the Yokosuka-based USS George Washington was diverted to the Middle East due to the prolonged conflict involving Iran [9]. This gap is assessed "not as a deliberate neglect of Asia by the Trump administration, but as a result of structural constraints where an 11-carrier fleet cannot simultaneously handle dual theaters," and is analyzed as "an early instance of a pattern that will likely repeat in the future" [9]. Under these structural constraints, Japan is "expanding its independent deterrence measures through a 1.2 trillion yen budget and a policy of excluding China from the defense supply chain," while India "has chosen a path of strengthening strategic autonomy instead of integrating into the United States, using defense and maritime security cooperation with Japan as a medium" [9]. India's blue-water transition is situated within this broader framework of self-help responses by regional actors to this structural gap.
Brookings also points out that the war involving Iran has exposed the gap between Washington's declared Indo-Pacific priorities and its actual policies [11]. Given that the incentive for regional countries like India, Japan, and Australia to fill the gap through bilateral and minilateral frameworks has grown while the United States is tied down in the Middle East, India's moves can be read as a dual strategy of reducing dependence on the United States while maintaining individual connections with it.
Political Structure: Continuation of the Strategic Autonomy Policy
India's network expansion is designed in a way that does not conflict with its principle of strategic autonomy inherited from its non-aligned tradition. While the fact that F-35s participated in the Jodhpur exercise for the first time demonstrates the continuation of US-India defense cooperation [4], this does not signify the procurement of F-35s or a policy shift toward an alliance level. Concurrently, India is signing a maritime cooperation arrangement, a hydrography cooperation agreement, and a mutual logistics support arrangement with New Zealand, while jointly developing defense technology with Japan. This is a method of simultaneously building capabilities across multiple axes without becoming subordinate to any single partner. As the EAI report points out, Japan has also chosen a "pragmatic course of concurrently expanding individual minilateral exercises with multiple partners, including India, the United States, and Australia" [3], leading the strategic orientations of India and Japan to converge in a similar direction.
Economic Structure: Indo-Pacific Sea Lines of Communication and India's Geopolitical Position
India's maritime security moves are also intertwined with its economic interests. Together with Liberia, India launched the Group of Friends on Safety and Security of Shipping and Seafarers at the UN, bringing together more than 20 countries [10]. This can be seen as an attempt by India to secure the safety of its energy import routes and export shipping lanes through a multilateral framework amid rising tensions in the Strait of Hormuz [17]. The Indian Ocean is the route through which most of India's crude oil imports pass and serves as a critical corridor for India's export volume. Securing these sea lines of communication is directly linked to the structural interests of the Indian economy, separate from any military display.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Case Analysis
India's current moves are an extension of the gradual expansion of minilateral maritime networks that has built up since the mid-2000s. The Quad was elevated to a summit-level consultative body after its reactivation in 2017, and a CSIS analysis assessed that the Quad has expanded its agenda to the area of strategic infrastructure [2]. At the time, the expansion of the Quad followed a path that began in non-military domains such as infrastructure, vaccines, and technology cooperation, and gradually shifted its center of gravity toward military and maritime security domains. The current India-Japan UNICORN cooperation and the India-New Zealand maritime cooperation arrangement represent the latest stages of this path, demonstrating a process where minilateral cooperation materializes from declaratory agendas to the level of actual equipment and technology sharing.
Japan's expansion of defense exports also has precedents. Japan previously exported a radar system to the Philippines, and India has become its second Asian partner in this trend [1]. While the Philippine case was defense support for a party directly confronting China in the South China Sea, the Indian case strongly takes on the character of sharing the role of countering China in the Indian Ocean. Both cases share a pattern where Japan, despite the constraints of its pacifist constitution, utilizes defense exports as a tool for minilateral security cooperation following the revision of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.
In terms of a qualitative shift in military technology competition, this can be compared to the movements of both the United States and China. The US Navy's launch of the Robotics and Autonomous Systems Warfare Development Center in Virginia to begin developing doctrines and tactics for unmanned systems [7] is similar to the pattern of Cold War-era stealth technology development, which initially started at a few R&D hubs and spread with a significant time lag before fielding. India's adoption of UNICORN is highly likely to follow a similar path. The process from a joint development agreement to actual deployment requires multi-year stages, including technology transfer procedures, production line establishment, and integrated testing. The current situation where Japan is requesting the Indian side to accelerate internal procedures [1] is a bottleneck commonly observed at the beginning of this stage.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
First, the implementation speed of the UNICORN agreement is a short-term indicator. The very fact that Japan's Ministry of Defense publicly requested the Indian side to accelerate internal procedures [1] suggests that this project is experiencing delays relative to the planned schedule. Since India's bureaucratic approval procedures and defense procurement system are traditionally known to be slow, the actual implementation speed over the coming months will serve as a litmus test for the credibility of joint defense development between the two countries.
Second is whether the gap in US aircraft carrier capabilities persists. If the situation involving Iran deteriorates again and additional US Navy assets are tied down in the Middle East [9][11], the incentive for Japan and India to expand their independent deterrence measures in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean will grow even stronger. Conversely, if US aircraft carrier capabilities quickly return to the Western Pacific, the pace of independent network expansion by India and Japan could somewhat moderate.
Third is China's response. The EAI report projects that China "will continue to employ a framing that defines even individual exercises as 'bloc politics'" [3]. As India-Japan and India-New Zealand cooperation accumulates, there is a possibility that China will define this as an encirclement strategy and increase the frequency of its force deployments in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. In this case, India's networked projection strategy could, contrary to its intentions, act as a factor that accelerates regional tensions.
Fourth is the volatility of India-Pakistan relations. As long as the shift in military calculus following the May 2025 conflict [12] persists, India will continue its naval buildup considering the China-Pakistan linked variable. However, if accidental clashes with Pakistan recur, the possibility that Indian Navy assets will be redeployed for regional defense in South Asia rather than blue-water deployment cannot be ruled out.
III. Final Recommended Responses
Final Recommended Responses: The Indian Navy's Blue-Water Transition and Strengthening Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommended Responses
India's networked naval power projection is not an exclusionary measure targeted at South Korea. Behind India's choice of Japan as its first partner for the joint development of UNICORN lies New Delhi's decision to choose "a path of strengthening strategic autonomy instead of integrating into the United States" amid the structural gap in US aircraft carrier capabilities [9]. Japan was selected along this path because, at a time when a partner was needed to bridge a specific technological gap in stealth integrated masts, Prime Minister Takaichi's visit in July successfully secured a summit-level agreement [1]. It is more accurate to view South Korea's failure to secure a position within this framework not as a defeat in competition, but rather because it has not yet deployed summit-level channels with New Delhi for this particular agenda.
The fact that Japan publicly requested the Indian side to accelerate internal procedures paradoxically offers implications for South Korea [1]. It highlights that joint defense development can be bogged down by the partner country's bureaucratic procedures even after an agreement is signed, and that such procedural delays are managed with enough sensitivity to be made public through diplomatic channels. If South Korea pursues similar projects with India, it must put more effort into the institutional design of the implementation phase rather than the signing of the agreement itself.
From the perspective of regional affairs and conflict domains, the expansion of the Indian Navy's deployments to the South China Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic demonstrates that security competition over sea lines of communication (SLOCs) is becoming multipolarized beyond the Indian Ocean. From the perspective of alliance and multilateral security domains, there is a clear pattern of minilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, India, and New Zealand expanding and overlapping individually outside the formal Quad framework. South Korea must find pragmatic points of convergence at the intersection of these two domains—namely, Quad Plus-style maritime security cooperation.
The recommended responses are threefold.First, elevate the naval vessel and radar technology cooperation channel with the Indian Ministry of Defence and Naval Headquarters to a summit-level agenda item. Second, benchmark Japan's implementation of the UNICORN project to proactively refine the institutional design of a South Korean model for joint defense development. Third, bring maritime security and supply chain resilience agendas to the forefront within the IP4 (Indo-Pacific 4) cooperation framework to avoid a defense alliance framing, while considering cooperation with minilateral networks led by India and New Zealand.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plans
Short-term (Within 3 Months)
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense should designate the implementation progress of the UNICORN project as a subject for joint monitoring. Japan's precedent of requesting India to fast-track its internal processes [1] serves as a reference case for South Korea to identify potential delay factors during the implementation phase when designing similar projects. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) should review existing cooperation channels with India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and pursue working-level contacts to showcase South Korean defense companies' technological capabilities in naval radar and mast integration to the Indian side. At the same time, referencing the precedent of 32 countries participating as observers in the Tarang Shakti 2026 exercise [4], South Korea should consider sending a military observer delegation to future similar multinational exercises. This is classified as a low-cost, highly reversible measure at the level of observation and networking, rather than an intervention at the level of a defense alliance.
Medium-term (6 Months to 1 Year)
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could propose a similar non-military maritime cooperation agenda between South Korea and India, referencing the maritime cooperation arrangement and hydrographic/nautical charting cooperation model signed between India and New Zealand. The "shipping and seafarers safety and security group" [10] led by Liberia and India at the UN level is an example of a multilateral platform in which South Korea can participate with low burden. Such channels are suitable for securing the legitimacy of South Korea's participation under the pretext of maritime safety and seafarer protection, rather than a defense alliance. The Ministry of National Defense should elevate the channel between South Korean and Japanese defense authorities for sharing information on the Quad member naval exercise (near the Sea of Japan) [1] that the Japanese Ministry of Defense plans to promote within the year. Through this, South Korea should secure early information on the subsequent phases of India-Japan defense cooperation (e.g., Phase 2 production of UNICORN, additional joint development items).
Long-term (1 to 3 Years)
The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and DAPA should concretize a South Korean joint development model in niche areas such as radars, sensors, and propulsion systems within the Indian naval shipbuilding market. The sequence in which Japan selected India as its second Asian joint development partner after the Philippines [1] leaves open the possibility that India will seek third and fourth partners in the future. South Korea must build an image as a partner equipped with the preconditions to enter this sequence—namely, technology transfer reliability and procedural transparency. At the same time, considering the existing assessment that minilateral maritime security cooperation at the IP4 level is highly likely to continue as a "low-intensity parallel expansion phase that has not yet solidified into an integrated alliance" [3], it is more realistic for South Korea to set its long-term goal as gradual integration in the areas of supply chains and maritime safety, rather than participation at the level of a defense alliance.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
First is the timing of the completion of India's internal approval for the UNICORN agreement. Since Japan has publicly requested a fast-track process [1], any delay in approval could raise questions about the overall credibility of the India-Japan defense cooperation model. Conversely, an early conclusion could bring forward the timing of India's search for subsequent defense partners, meaning South Korea must also advance its window of approach.
Second is whether the Quad member naval exercise (near the Sea of Japan) scheduled within the year is actually held, as well as its scale of participation [1]. This serves as an indicator to gauge whether the India-Japan-Quad linkage is transitioning into substantive military cooperation.
Third is the preparation status of the India-New Zealand bilateral naval exercise (scheduled for 2027) and the implementation speed of the Australia-New Zealand "Plan Tasman" [14]. If the South Pacific minilateral network deepens to the level of actual operational integration, preemptive contact is required before South Korea's window of participation narrows.
Fourth is the progress of unmanned systems doctrine development by the U.S. Navy's Robotics and Autonomous Systems Warfare Development Center (RASWDC), along with the corresponding announcements of unmanned technology investments by India and China [7]. If unmanned systems emerge as the next axis of competition following stealth technology, the strategy for South Korean defense companies to enter the Indian market will also need to be adjusted from a radar- and mast-centric focus to an unmanned systems-centric one.
Fifth is whether military tensions between India and Pakistan reignite. Considering the assessment that the China variable has been more deeply factored into India's military calculus since the May 2025 conflict [12], the possibility cannot be ruled out that a recurrence of regional tensions in South Asia could instead readjust the Indian Navy's blue-water deployment posture back toward regional defense.
4. Summary and Conclusion
India's pursuit of a blue-water navy is the result of three overlapping drivers: responding to China's entry into the Indian Ocean, recalculating the Pakistan-China linkage variable, and the structural vacuum in U.S. aircraft carrier power. The UNICORN joint development with Japan and the maritime cooperation arrangement with New Zealand are concrete examples illustrating the technology and partnership axes of this strategy, both of which follow a pragmatic minilateral cooperation model rather than a defense alliance. The implications for South Korea can be summarized not as exclusion, but as an untapped opportunity. Rather than putting forward a defense alliance framing, South Korea should gradually approach the networks led by India, Japan, and New Zealand under the pretext of maritime safety and supply chain resilience, while designing a cooperation model that proactively incorporates the institutional risks revealed in the implementation delays of the UNICORN project. The most critical task is to not miss the window when India seeks its next defense joint development partner, which must be preceded by the early activation of summit-level channels.
References
[1] [The Hindu] Japan calls on India to fast-track internal process on UNICORN naval radar agreement
[2] [CSIS - Reconnecting Asia] The Quad’s Strategic Infrastructure Play
[4] [Defense News] US F-35 fighters to debut in Indian multinational air exercise
[7] [Defense News] US Navy stands up hub to prepare unmanned systems for combat
[8] [Brookings - Health Policy] Defense & Security
[10] [Daily Observer (LR)] Liberia, India Rally Nations to Protect Shipping
[11] [Brookings Institution] The Iran war and America’s widening strategy gap in Asia
[12] [Dawn] How South Asian military calculus has changed after May 2025
[14] [Defense News] New Zealand, Australia sign pact to deepen naval cooperation
[15] [Mint] The week in charts: India-NZ FTA, growth forecasts, trillion-dollar club
[18] [The Diplomat] Why Has the Maldives Inserted Itself Into the Chagos Sovereignty Dispute?
[19] [The Diplomat] What Will Indonesia Do With Its New Aircraft Carrier?
[20] [Times of Oman] India gifts 12 drones to Fiji to support sugarcane production, healthcare
[21] [The Diplomat] Indonesia Finally Has Its Aircraft Carrier. Now Comes the Hard Part.
[22] [The Diplomat] India’s Javelin Deal: The Unending Loop of Procurement
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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