[New Year Special Commentary Series] ⑤ Indo-Pacific Prospects for 2023 and Korea's Challenges

1. The Indo-Pacific in 2022: Spatial Conceptualization and Visualization

Since France in June 2019, over ten countries or country groups have published Indo-Pacific (hereafter IP) strategy documents, with South Korea being the latest in December 2022. Within six years of the Trump administration's announcement of the IP strategy in November 2017, IP is rapidly establishing itself as a replacement term for Asia-Pacific (hereafter AP). The US, which leads the IP discourse, has published IP strategy reports through the Department of Defense and the State Department in 2019, and through the White House in February 2022. In addition, Japan, Australia, and India, which form the security cooperation alliance 'Quad' with the US, as well as European countries such as the UK, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, are actively disseminating the concept of the IP space.

However, the geographical scope of the IP space remains contentious. Throughout 2022, there has been a growing tendency to define the IP space broadly, extending beyond South Asia to the 'Horn of Africa' region in the western Indian Ocean. This is because the UK and France, which have territories in the maritime region from South Asia to East Africa dating back to the imperial era, have declared themselves 'IP countries.' Consequently, in 2022, as in 2021, they actively deployed their naval vessels in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and frequently participated in multilateral naval exercises in the Pacific and Indian Oceans organized by all or some of the Quad countries. The broadly defined IP space implies a shift in the strategic competition between China and the US in the region from a bilateral contest to a competition between China and a US-led network encompassing the 'West'.

Another characteristic of the IP space in 2022 was the visible eruption of geopolitical and geo-economic competition between China and US-led security networks, not only in the existing areas of the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea, but also in the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In the South Pacific, relations between China and Australia, which had reached their worst in 2020-2021, remained unrepaired in 2022. Amidst this, China, which had been pursuing aggressive infrastructure investment targeting South Pacific island nations, signed a military agreement with the Solomon Islands in April 2022. In response, Australia and Japan significantly strengthened their aid and security cooperation with South Pacific countries. The US also hosted the 'US-Pacific Island Country Summit' in Washington in September 2022 and, as part of its plan to increase the number of embassies from six to nine in 14 Pacific island countries, opened an embassy in Papua New Guinea in December 2022. In June 2022, Australia, the US, Japan, New Zealand, and the UK launched the 'Blue Pacific Partners' with Pacific island countries.

Strategic competition in the Indian Ocean also became clearly visible. China established a military base in Djibouti in 2017 under the pretext of participating in 'Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)' in the East African region. While China is not the only country to have built a military base in Djibouti, it is increasing its naval power projection in the Indian Ocean region under the guise of PKO participation. According to media reports, it is considering building another military base in the Indian Ocean region. In May 2022, Sri Lanka's sovereign default intensified criticism that China's infrastructure investment in developing deep-sea ports in the South Asian region was trapping recipient countries in a 'debt trap.' China docked the 'Yuan Wang 5' at Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port, for which it secured a 99-year operating lease through infrastructure investment, for a week in August 2022. China claims the Yuan Wang 5 is a scientific research vessel, while the US and others suspect it of being a 'dual-use spy ship.' The Yuan Wang 5 re-entered the Indian Ocean from the South China Sea in December 2022. To counter China's naval power projection, India is strengthening its navy, commissioning its indigenously built aircraft carrier 'INS Vikrant' in September 2022. Amidst this, a brawl between soldiers of China and India recurred in the border region between the two countries in December 2022.

2. Indo-Pacific Outlook for 2023: Competition for Primacy among US-led Security Networks, ASEAN, and China

1) Strengthening 'Connectivity' in US-led Security Networks

It remains uncertain whether the IP will evolve beyond a spatial concept into a regional concept. This is because establishing a regional identity that collectively links East Asia, the South Pacific including Australia, South Asia including India, and Europe including France and the UK is not easy. Nevertheless, given that the AP space, which emerged to promote regional trade, has become established as a regional concept despite the mix of East Asian countries and non-Asian countries like Canada and Chile, the possibility of the IP ultimately expanding into a regional concept cannot be ruled out. From this perspective, the Quad countries, the UK, France, and others that have led the IP space discourse will seek to strengthen inter-state connectivity centered on US-led security networks and create mechanisms for security cooperation that permeate the IP space in 2023.

First, concrete programs will be launched to foster maritime capabilities and maritime domain awareness among regional countries, centered on the Quad countries. The Quad already agreed to launch the 'Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA)' at the third summit meeting held in May 2022, but has not yet presented specific implementation plans. European countries such as the UK, France, Germany, and the Netherlands also have significant interest in maritime security in the IP region, so IPMDA is expected to be activated.

Second, technological hegemony alliances will be emphasized. The Quad and various Quad Plus initiatives that expand the Quad are addressing cyber security, advanced technology, infrastructure investment, maritime security, and supply chain diversification, all of which are directly or indirectly related to the competition for technological hegemony. Given that the primary purpose of the 'Australia, United Kingdom, United States Security Pact (AUKUS)' signed in 2021 is the joint development of advanced technology and the sharing of sensitive information, there is a high probability that the Quad (Plus) and AUKUS will attempt to link up in 2023. If this happens, democratic countries, centered around the US, Australia, and the UK, will be able to consolidate their technological capabilities, enhance their competitiveness, and expand their data sample size.

Third, regional military exercises, which were suspended or scaled down due to the spread of COVID-19 over the past three years, are expected to resume in earnest. In 2023, a significant increase in the multilateralization of bilateral exercises and the scaling up of exercise scope is anticipated. The Combined Maritime Exercise Komodo, Pitch Black, Super Garuda Shield, Pacific Vanguard, and Noble Raven 22, held in 2022, already exhibited these characteristics.

Fourth, just as formwork is built before constructing a building, the Quad countries, France, and the UK are expected to begin laying the groundwork for linking the US-led network with NATO in earnest in 2023. The Quad countries are strengthening inter-state connectivity by pursuing Quad Plus initiatives in various issue areas such as maritime security, disaster relief, cyber security, health security, climate change, counter-terrorism, supply chains, and advanced technology. Furthermore, they aim to utilize the outward expansion of the Quad as a link connecting the US-led security network in the IP region with NATO in Europe. The joint statement of the third Quad summit held in May 2022 explicitly welcomed Europe's engagement in the IP region. NATO invited the so-called 'Asia-Pacific Four (South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, AP4)' to its summit held in June 2022 and adopted the 'Strategic Concept 2022,' which explicitly mentions countering China. In a joint statement following a summit with Australia held virtually in February 2022, the UK pledged to invest 25 million pounds (approximately 38 billion won) for security in the IP region. In this context, the frequency and scale of military exercises in the 'Quad - x + Alpha' format, led by all or some of the Quad countries and joined by the UK and France, major NATO member states, will increase in 2023.

2) ASEAN's Efforts to Secure 'Centrality'

The strengthening of connectivity in the IP space led by the Quad countries, the UK, and France ultimately leads to the strengthening of US-led security networks. Therefore, ASEAN is concerned that Southeast Asia will become a periphery in the IP space.

Southeast Asia is located at the heart of the IP map, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Despite this geographical advantage, ASEAN countries are concerned that the US's pursuit of its IP strategy will undermine 'ASEAN Centrality.' To date, discussions on regional multilateral cooperation have revolved around ASEAN. ASEAN has established expanded multilateral forums such as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, and the 'East Asia Summit (EAS),' and has played a leading role in security forums like the 'ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)' and the 'ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+).' ASEAN is paying attention to the US's promotion of various mini-lateral security cooperation bodies as part of its IP strategy and its pursuit of their expansion and linkage, and is wary of the possibility that US-led mini-lateral security cooperation bodies may emerge as the primary mechanisms for regional multilateral cooperation, bypassing ASEAN. Although the Quad countries, the UK, and France have pledged to respect ASEAN Centrality to alleviate ASEAN's concerns, these are likely diplomatic rhetoric. Therefore, from ASEAN's perspective, the IP space, where European countries are emerging as major actors in addition to the US and China, poses a serious challenge to ASEAN Centrality.

ASEAN's concerns have been exacerbated by the worsening of ASEAN's unity due to internal disagreements regarding the Myanmar military junta following the 2021 Myanmar coup. Only five out of ten ASEAN countries attended the informal consultation on the Myanmar situation held by Thailand on December 22, 2022. There are also significant disagreements within ASEAN regarding the US's 'Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP)' in the South China Sea as part of its IP strategy. While countries in ASEAN that have (potential) territorial disputes with China welcome the US-led FONOP, Laos (81.8%) and Cambodia (81.5%), where respondents in a 2022 survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore indicated they would choose China over the US if forced to choose between the two, oppose the US-led FONOP.

If Indonesia, which will assume the ASEAN chairmanship in 2023, fails to coordinate the internal disagreements within ASEAN and develop concrete implementation plans for the 'ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)' published in 2019, ASEAN Centrality in the IP region will be severely challenged. The AOIP proposes that ASEAN should pursue IP policies with a focus on connectivity, economic cooperation, and non-traditional security. Therefore, concrete implementation plans should prioritize the promotion of mini-lateral cooperation centered on ASEAN countries. For example, the trilateral joint maritime patrol agreement signed by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to combat piracy in the Sulu and Celebes Seas was renewed in 2022 under Indonesia's leadership. Thus, Indonesia is expected to leverage its position as the ASEAN chair in 2023 to promote various mini-lateral security cooperation initiatives centered on ASEAN countries. Furthermore, as ASEAN held its first summit with Europe in December 2022, it remains to be seen whether Indonesia, as the ASEAN chair, will secure 'ASEAN Centrality' by utilizing the ASEAN+1 format with regional countries and country groups.

3) China's Response

China does not accept the concept of the IP space. China criticizes the emergence of such a space as a legacy of the Cold War, fabricated by the US to strengthen its own security network. In particular, it denounces the mini-lateral consultations led by the US in the IP space as 'cliquish.' China, which previously preferred the concept of East Asia, excluding the US, over the Asia-Pacific which includes the US, has put forth the regional concepts of 'pan-Asia' and 'global Asia' along with the Belt and Road Initiative. Recently, it has emphasized multilateralism, the UN, and the 'global' community. At the Boao Forum in April 2022, President Xi Jinping proposed the 'Global Security Initiative (GSI),' criticizing the US for violating the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and opposing unilateralism and bloc politics.

In 2023, China is expected to further emphasize multilateralism. It will emphasize the frameworks of ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, and EAS, and seek to expand the 'Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)' and the 'Consortium of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS).' While recognizing that the US is encircling China with a US-led security network composed of a layered linkage of alliances and mini-lateral security cooperation, China is not pursuing the establishment of a China-led security network like the US. This is because, in addition to China's adherence to non-alignment, there are not many 'like-minded countries' with whom it can pursue mini-lateral security cooperation due to historical issues and territorial disputes. In this context, China is expected to enhance security cooperation with Russia and North Korea, and increase solidarity with Middle Eastern and African countries that have experienced colonial rule and are developing countries, similar to China.

Meanwhile, in response to the US increasing its contributions to regional countries in various functional areas as a mechanism to strengthen the connectivity of its own security network, China will also increase such contributions. For example, China's contributions to foster maritime capabilities and maritime domain awareness among regional countries have so far been limited to small reconnaissance vessels with low performance. However, as the Quad countries, France, and the UK focus on enhancing the maritime capabilities and maritime domain awareness of key countries in the IP region, China will also increase the quantity and quality of its contributions. It is of interest to see when China, which has large-scale shipbuilding capacity and possesses numerous decommissioned vessels, will actively engage in contributions. Then, the geopolitical competition between the US-led security network and China in the maritime security domain will intensify. Furthermore, China will strengthen aggressive capital investment by exploiting the urgent need for economic recovery in regional countries in the post-COVID era, while mitigating the 'debt trap' controversy with China's 'high-quality infrastructure construction projects.'

3. Challenges for South Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy

In its Indo-Pacific strategy report released in December 2022, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration set the IP space to extend to the East African region. As observed earlier, in a situation where the strategic competition between China and the US in the IP region is transforming into a competition between China and a US-led security network, this appears to imply that South Korea is a member of the US-led security network, which includes the UK and France. South Korea now finds itself in a strategic environment where it must consider its appropriate 'positioning' between China and the US-led security networks, rather than simply between China and the US in the IP space.

A burden for South Korea in the 2023 IP environment will be Japan's clear positioning as the central axis of the US-led security network. Japan signed a 'Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA)' with Australia in January 2022 and is expected to sign RAAs with the UK and France in 2023. These agreements will make it easier for Australia, the UK, and France to deploy large-scale military forces to Japan or the maritime region of Northeast Asia for joint military exercises with Japan. If Japan's status within the US-led security network is strengthened and it functions as the Northeast Asian axis, South Korea's relative standing will diminish. Furthermore, if Japan takes the lead in forming regional mini-lateral security cooperation bodies, as seen with the Quad, our position in (mini-)lateral security cooperation will also be overshadowed by Japan.

Therefore, South Korea must focus on strengthening its position within the US-led network in the IP region. To this end, first, security relations with Japan and ROK-US-Japan security cooperation must be restored. ROK-US-Japan security cooperation needs to be approached not only from the perspective of the North Korean issue but also from the perspective of strengthening the US-led security network. If restoring relations with Japan abruptly in 2023 is difficult due to historical issues or territorial disputes, South Korea should enhance its standing in the US-led security network by strengthening security cooperation with Australia, India, and key Southeast Asian countries. In particular, if ROK-US-Japan security cooperation remains stagnant for a long period, the ROK-US-Australia security cooperation relationship should be utilized as an alternative. In this context, the emphasis on ROK-US-Australia security cooperation in the recent IP strategy report was timely.

Second, South Korea's IP strategy report expressed its intention to substantially contribute to comprehensive security in the region, and concrete implementation plans must be presented in 2023. While South Korea has so far expressed principled support for the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes, the rule of law, and freedom of navigation and overflight, it has maintained a distance from sensitive regional security issues. Not only Quad countries but also many regional countries have criticized South Korea for its passive response to regional security issues beyond the Korean Peninsula, which is inconsistent with its national capabilities. It is now time for South Korea to present concrete implementation plans to dispel these criticisms and enhance its security standing. Among various comprehensive security areas, it seems advisable to first focus on fostering the maritime capabilities and maritime domain awareness of regional countries. This is because the Quad countries, the UK, France, Germany, and the Netherlands are actively engaged in enhancing the maritime capabilities and maritime domain awareness of key countries in the IP region. South Korea needs to continue its individual contributions to regional countries while also increasing cooperation and coordination with these countries.

Meanwhile, given ASEAN's concerns about the erosion of ASEAN Centrality due to the strengthening of connectivity in US-led security networks, South Korea must pursue an IP strategy that considers ASEAN's domestic situation and its unity. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration's IP strategy report emphasizes universal values such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. If South Korea, which has achieved economic growth and democratization simultaneously in a short period, does not contribute to the spread of democracy, the establishment of the rule of law, and the promotion of human rights, its positive image in the international community will be damaged. However, on the other hand, since many Southeast Asian countries have authoritarian regimes, they are concerned that the Quad countries, France, and the UK will project values such as good governance, transparency, and democracy into their ASEAN policies.

Although the US, since the Biden administration took office, has emphasized democracy and human rights to rally international support, it is highly likely that it will relax its standards on democracy and human rights in its relations with Southeast Asian countries, as cooperation with these countries is crucial for implementing its IP strategy. Therefore, while South Korea should participate as a mid-tier power in establishing universal principles and norms, it needs to be cautious about taking the lead or participating ahead of other countries.

Furthermore, South Korea's IP strategy must express a strong commitment to promoting mini-lateral alliances centered on mid-tier powers in the region. In the context of intensifying competition between US-led security networks and China in the IP region, mid-tier powers, which are weaker than the US and China, are insufficient to influence the establishment and maintenance of the regional security order on their own. However, by forming a 'coalition of mid-tier powers' to create an alternative regional order, they can possess a certain degree of leverage. That is, while a mini-lateral alliance of regional mid-tier powers may not have enough influence to fundamentally alter the dynamics between the US and China, it can possess 'positional power' to exert some influence on how the US and China operate and maintain their respective spheres of influence.

If a mini-lateral alliance formed by key mid-tier powers in the IP region, such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam, secures a position within the US-led security network while also gaining autonomy, it can deter the US-led security network from excessively functioning as a tool for US-China confrontation. Furthermore, if it is linked with indigenous (mini-)lateral cooperation initiatives emerging within ASEAN, such as Mekong River cooperation, anti-piracy efforts, and maritime information sharing, it will lay the foundation for pursuing more autonomous multilateral security cooperation amidst the US-China strategic competition. For example, as part of its IP strategy, South Korea should consider promoting bilateral cooperation with Australia and Indonesia and actively pursuing trilateral cooperation among Korea, Indonesia, and Australia (KIA). Considering Indonesia's economic rise and its status as an ASEAN leader, along with the economic and military capabilities of Australia and South Korea, which are upper-tier mid-tier powers, this mini-lateral consultation body has the potential to emerge as a significant security and economic forum in the region.■

■ Author: Park Jae-jeok_Professor at the Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Australian National University. He has served as a visiting professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security and a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification. His research areas include US-led security networks in the Indo-Pacific region, regional security order, mini-lateral security cooperation, the US-Australia alliance, and Australian security policy. His recent publications include “The US-led Security Network in the Indo-Pacific in International Order Transition” (2023) and “South Korea’s Investment for the U.S.-South Korea Alliance and Its Implications for Sino-South Korea Relations” (2022).

■ Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

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