Morocco Emerges as a Key Pillar of US Military Strategy in Africa
Executive Summary
As the US Senate Armed Services Committee designated Morocco as the top military partner in Africa for the next decade in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2027, US-Morocco security cooperation, which has continued since the 2020 Abraham Accords, has entered a phase of institutionalization. The implementation plan under Section 1268 of the NDAA and the 2026–2036 defense cooperation roadmap demonstrate that this cooperation is not a temporary policy of a specific administration but a structural shift based on bipartisan consensus. On the security front, the acquisition of HIMARS and the potential integration of Israel's LORA missiles are taking concrete shape. On the diplomatic front, successive declarations of support from Mauritius, Bolivia, and Mali are accumulating ahead of the October 2026 expiration of the MINURSO mandate. Amid the Sahel military juntas' tilt toward Russia and the exclusion of Algeria, Morocco has positioned itself as virtually the only alternative in the US strategy for Africa. Given South Korea's limited scope for direct involvement in the security domain, Seoul should prioritize trade and industrial channel responses tailored to Morocco's strengthening role as a trade and logistics hub, using MINURSO voting trends and the NDAA implementation plan submission deadline as leading indicators.
I. Issue Analysis
Morocco Emerges as a Key Pillar of US Military Strategy in Africa
1. Background and Progress of the Issue
Defense cooperation between Morocco and the United States reached a turning point with Morocco's participation in the 2020 Abraham Accords. At the time, Morocco secured US recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for normalizing relations with Israel. Since then, bilateral relations have developed in a package format, linking security cooperation and the Western Sahara issue.
The Allison Center under the Heritage Foundation recently proposed prioritizing the deepening of cooperation with existing members, particularly Morocco, over expanding new signatories as the next step for the Abraham Accords [1]. This demonstrates that Morocco's standing in Washington's policy discussions on Africa is the result of a long-term accumulation of influence.
The Western Sahara issue is also facing a major watershed at the UN level. The mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which has been stationed in the region since 1991, is set to expire on October 31, 2026 [14]. While Algeria hopes for a gradual US withdrawal from this issue, Morocco is intensifying its diplomatic campaign, with Foreign Minister Bourita directly meeting with UN Secretary-General Guterres [14].
2. Current Situation
During its deliberations on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2027, the US Senate Armed Services Committee passed a bill designating Morocco as the top US military partner in Africa for the next 10 years. Section 1268 of the bill requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a detailed implementation plan to Congress within 180 days of the law's enactment [7]. This plan is linked to the US-Morocco defense cooperation roadmap, which spans from 2026 to 2036 [7].
Abdellatif Loudiyi, Minister Delegate in charge of the National Defense Administration of Morocco, met with a US congressional delegation to review the status of this defense cooperation [7]. Concrete steps are also being observed on the military execution front. The Moroccan military is scheduled to acquire the US-made HIMARS multiple launch rocket system during Fiscal Year 2027, and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) plans to showcase the LORA long-range precision strike missile system at the Marrakech Airshow [15]. The Israeli media outlet Globes suggested the potential integration of LORA and HIMARS [15]. This indicates that Israel-Morocco defense industrial cooperation under the Abraham Accords is entering a stage of substantive weapons system integration.
On the diplomatic front, Morocco has recently secured two major achievements. On the occasion of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly, Mauritius declared its support for the Western Sahara autonomy plan under Moroccan sovereignty as the "most credible solution" [4][10]. Mauritian Foreign Minister Ramgoolam stated that the country reviewed its position during a cabinet meeting following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2797 [4][10]. Bolivia decided to open a diplomatic mission in Rabat and a trade office in Dakhla [12]. Bolivian Foreign Minister Huanca signed a joint statement with Minister Bourita, and the Dakhla office is expected to serve as a hub for Bolivian goods entering the African market [12]. Mali also reaffirmed its position expressed in April 2026, maintaining its support for Moroccan sovereignty [17].
3. Key Actors and Positions
The Moroccan Governmentis operating defense cooperation and the diplomatic campaign over Western Sahara virtually on a single track. A dual approach is observed: while Foreign Minister Bourita meets successively with foreign ministers of various countries in New York to secure declarations of support, Loudiyi, Minister Delegate in charge of the National Defense Administration, manages security channels with Washington [7][12][14]. From Morocco's perspective, the US designation as a top partner is a political asset that guarantees Washington's continued involvement in the Western Sahara issue, going beyond mere military benefits.
The US Senate Armed Services Committeeimposed a specific implementation deadline on the Department of Defense through Section 1268 of the NDAA. This is interpreted as an attempt by Congress to institutionalize cooperation with Morocco as a legal obligation rather than leaving it to executive discretion [7]. Washington think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation, are proposing the deepening of ties with existing partners like Morocco, rather than expanding to new countries, as a policy alternative for the next stage of the Abraham Accords [1].
Algeriais clearly on the defensive in this situation. While it has adopted a strategy of hoping for a US disengagement from the Western Sahara issue ahead of the expiration of the MINURSO mandate [14], the successive shifts in position by Mauritius, Bolivia, and Mali are working to weaken the standing of the international public relations campaign that Algeria has led.
Israelseeks to expand the tangible achievements of the Abraham Accords through defense cooperation. IAI's demonstration of the LORA missile system and its potential integration with HIMARS reflect the Israeli defense industry's intention to utilize Morocco as an export hub for Africa and the Middle East [15].
4. Key Issues
First, the key is whether Section 1268 of the NDAA will actually lead to budget allocation and an implementation plan after the final passage of the bill. In similar cases, there have been precedents where a time lag occurred between the US policy announcement and actual execution [9]. Second, the direction of the Western Sahara issue will depend on how explicitly the United States reaffirms its support for Morocco during the Security Council discussions ahead of the expiration of the MINURSO mandate (October 31, 2026) [14]. Third, another point to watch is the potential for Israel-Morocco defense cooperation to stimulate a regional arms race and further escalate tensions with Algeria [15].
II. In-Depth Analysis
Morocco Emerges as a Key Pillar of US Military Strategy in Africa: In-Depth Analysis
1. Root Cause Analysis
The emergence of Morocco as the center of US military strategy in Africa is driven not by a single factor, but by a coincidental convergence of multiple interests. The starting point is the 2020 Abraham Accords. Morocco secured US recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for normalizing relations with Israel. This deal established a precedent of bundling security cooperation and territorial sovereignty issues into a single package.
Crucially, this combined structure remains valid five years later. The Allison Center of the Heritage Foundation proposed deepening cooperation with existing members, particularly Morocco, rather than expanding new signatories as the next step of the Abraham Accords [1]. This indicates that in Washington's policy circles, Morocco is treated not as a new partner, but as an already proven one.
The geopolitical vacuum is another root cause. Following the withdrawal of French forces from the Sahel region, the military juntas in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have expanded cooperation with entities affiliated with Russia's Wagner Group. The United States needed a regional hub to fill this vacuum, and Algeria was excluded from consideration due to its military cooperation with Russia. Morocco remained virtually the only alternative, offering political stability and the predictability of its monarchical system.
The timeline of the Western Sahara issue also serves as a root cause. The MINURSO mandate is set to expire on October 31, 2026 [14]. At this juncture, the Security Council must decide whether to extend the mission. Morocco has a strong incentive to accumulate as much international recognition as possible before this deadline to solidify a fait accompli. The recent declarations of support from Mauritius and Bolivia, along with Mali's reaffirmation, can be read as part of an all-out diplomatic campaign targeting this deadline [4][10][12][17].
2. Structural Context
Security Structure: US-Morocco defense cooperation has already entered the stage of institutionalization. Section 1268 of the FY 2027 NDAA mandates the Secretary of Defense to submit a detailed implementation plan within 180 days of the law's enactment [7]. This is linked to the US-Morocco defense cooperation roadmap to be applied from 2026 to 2036 [7]. The time horizon of a 10-year roadmap itself signals that this cooperation is not a temporary measure within the Trump administration's term but aims for bipartisan institutionalization. Integration is also underway at the actual weapons system level. The Moroccan military is scheduled to acquire the US-made HIMARS during FY 2027, and Israel's IAI is exploring the possibility of integrating the LORA long-range missile with HIMARS at the Marrakech Airshow [15]. The structure of combining Israeli precision strike technology with US weapons systems demonstrates that the Abraham Accords are transitioning beyond diplomatic symbolism into substantive trilateral defense industrial cooperation.
Political Structure: The diplomatic campaign over Western Sahara is unfolding in the form of bilateral statement battles on the stage of the UN General Assembly sessions. Morocco adopts a method of concentrating bilateral meetings with individual countries during the UN General Assembly, with Foreign Minister Bourita serving as the primary channel [4][10][12][17]. Mauritius explicitly stated that it revised its position following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2797 [4][10]. This demonstrates a structure where changes in the multilateral framework of Security Council resolutions serve as a justification for individual countries to shift their bilateral stances. Conversely, Algeria is pursuing a strategy of hoping for a gradual US disengagement from this issue [14], making the competition between the two sides to secure legitimacy inevitably more acute as the Security Council vote approaches.
Economic Structure: The trade office that Bolivia decided to establish in Dakhla demonstrates how the recognition of sovereignty over Western Sahara is combined with economic incentives [12]. Dakhla is a port city in the Western Sahara region under Morocco's de facto control, and the very establishment of a foreign trade office there has the effect of reaffirming the country's recognition of sovereignty at the level of the real economy. Through this strategy of establishing trade hubs, Morocco seeks to project the Western Sahara region as a space for normal economic activity rather than a disputed territory.
3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases
The closest precedent is the transaction structure itself at the time of the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords. At that time, the first Trump administration exchanged the normalization of Israel-Morocco relations for the recognition of sovereignty over Western Sahara. The current NDAA provisions and discussions on the next stage of the Abraham Accords are an extension of the same transaction. However, the difference this time lies in the higher level of institutionalization of security cooperation. While 2020 was an exchange of diplomatic recognition, the FY 2027 NDAA is taking concrete shape through a 10-year defense roadmap and specific weapons system transfers [7][15].
There is also a structural similarity with the case of Latin American military aid reallocation recently analyzed by the East Asia Institute (EAI). The State Department's reallocation of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) originally designated for Slovakia, North Macedonia, Tunisia, and Iraq to Panama, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia [3] demonstrates a common pattern where "security cooperation is bundled with trade issues such as tariff reductions" [3]. In the case of Morocco, the simultaneous progression of defense cooperation and the opening of the Dakhla trade office aligns with this pattern [12]. The method of bundling trade and economic incentives when the United States assigns security priorities to regional partners is establishing itself as a recurring approach of the second Trump administration.
The case of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement also serves as a point of comparison. Signed on August 7 by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, this agreement contains provisions similar to NATO's Article 5 [2]. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) evaluated this, stating that "the US-led Middle East order is over" [2]. This case represents a scenario where regional powers formed an independent security bloc without US involvement. The Moroccan case points in the opposite direction. In that the United States still holds the initiative and maintains a top-down structure designating a specific country as a regional hub, it suggests that a Middle East-style multipolarization pattern has not yet emerged in Africa.
A contrast with the case of US-China competition over critical minerals is also instructive. The US $3 billion investment program targeting the cobalt supply chain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo exposed limitations, namely "delayed execution relative to announcement" [9]. In contrast, US-Morocco defense cooperation is already detailed with legal provisions, roadmap documents, and actual weapons system acquisition schedules [7][15], making it highly probable that implementation will proceed faster than in the mineral sector, where capital execution is the key bottleneck.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
Security Council Decision at the Expiration of the MINURSO Mandateis the most imminent variable. Depending on whether the Security Council chooses to extend, reduce, or terminate the mission before October 31, 2026, the speed at which Morocco's diplomatic victory solidifies into an international legal fait accompli will vary [14]. Whether Algeria succeeds in inducing a US disengagement by this point must also be monitored [14].
Final Passage of the NDAA and Submission of the Implementation Planis also key. Passage by the Senate Armed Services Committee is merely one step in the legislative process. It must undergo reconciliation with the House and receive the President's signature, and whether the Secretary of Defense actually submits the detailed implementation plan within 180 days of the law's enactment will serve as a litmus test for the effectiveness of this provision [7].
Actual Progress of Israel-Morocco Defense Integrationis another variable to watch. The integration of LORA and HIMARS is still in the reporting stage, and it remains to be seen whether the demonstration at the Marrakech Airshow will lead to an actual procurement contract [15]. If this integration is realized, it will serve as a representative case demonstrating the military materialization of the Abraham Accords.
Scope of Expansion of the Western Sahara Diplomatic Campaignis also subject to continuous tracking. Which countries will additionally shift their positions following Mauritius, Bolivia, and Mali, and how far this trend spreads to the African Union and Latin American nations, will determine whether Algeria faces diplomatic isolation [4][10][12][17]. Tensions in Morocco-EU relations within the European Parliament, triggered by the migration crisis in Ceuta, Spain [16], could also act as a variable on another front of Moroccan diplomacy.
III. Recommended Responses
Morocco Emerges as a Key Pillar of US Military Strategy in Africa: Comprehensive Response Measures
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommended Responses
The institutionalization of Morocco-US defense cooperation is not a one-off policy of the Trump administration. The implementation plan required by Section 1268 of the NDAA is linked to the 2026–2036 roadmap [7]. A 10-year time horizon presupposes a bipartisan consensus in Congress. The South Korean government and businesses must treat this structure not as a temporary variable, but as a structural variable that will persist over the next decade.
The rise in Morocco's strategic standing is the result of three pillars moving simultaneously. First, on the security pillar, the acquisition of HIMARS and the potential integration of Israel's LORA missiles are taking concrete shape [15]. Second, on the diplomatic pillar, successive declarations of support from Mauritius, Bolivia, and Mali are accumulating ahead of the expiration of the MINURSO mandate [4][10][12][17]. Third, on the regional vacuum pillar, the Sahel military juntas' tilt toward Russia and the exclusion of Algeria have left Morocco as virtually the only alternative. In a phase where these three pillars are being strengthened simultaneously, there are no visible factors that would decrease the Moroccan government's bargaining power for the time being.
For South Korea, a rational approach would be to separate security and trade channels. In the security domain, there is little incentive or justification for South Korea to directly intervene in Morocco-US defense cooperation. Conversely, in the trade and industrial domains, there are tangible benefits to riding the wave of Morocco's emergence as a gateway to Africa. Bolivia's plan to open a trade office in Dakhla to use it as an access platform for the African market [12] demonstrates that Morocco is functioning as a regional logistics and trade hub, going beyond a mere military partner.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plans
Short-term (3–6 months): It is crucial to closely monitor voting trends in the UN Security Council ahead of the expiration of MINURSO's mandate on October 31, 2026 [14]. If the Security Council decides to terminate or downsize the mission at this juncture, Morocco's effective control over Western Sahara will be further consolidated under international law. Korean companies interested in infrastructure, fisheries, and renewable energy projects in areas adjacent to Western Sahara, such as Dakhla and Laayoune, should treat the outcome of this vote as a leading indicator for their investment decisions. It is also necessary to track the deadline for submitting the implementation plan under Section 1268 of the NDAA (180 days after the enactment of the law) [7]. The contents of this plan will reveal the actual scale of the U.S. military presence and the level of facility investment in Morocco.
Medium-term (1–2 years): It is necessary to monitor whether Israel-Morocco defense cooperation materializes. If the integration of LORA-HIMARS leads to an actual contract [15], Morocco will emerge as virtually the only country in North Africa with precision strike capabilities. This could also affect the military balance with Algeria, potentially reshaping the security landscape of the Maghreb region. Rather than directly competing with U.S. and Israeli supply chains in the Moroccan market, it is more realistic for Korean defense companies to seek separate entry routes in niche areas that these competitors do not cover (e.g., surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, non-lethal force support systems).
Long-term (3–5 years): As the initiative to expand the Abraham Accords shifts its focus toward deepening ties among existing members rather than attracting new signatories [1], Morocco is highly likely to establish itself as a core hub within the Abraham Accords framework over the next five years. South Korea should consider a mid-to-long-term trade strategy that utilizes this structure as an indirect gateway for entering West and North Africa. However, given the potential for diplomatic friction with Algeria, hedging is required by maintaining parallel channels with Algeria rather than relying solely on a Morocco-centric approach.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is the UN Security Council's decision regarding MINURSO's mandate. A decision to terminate or significantly downsize the mission would serve as a trigger, effectively solidifying the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty as the majority view of the international community [14]. The second indicator is whether the Secretary of Defense submits the implementation plan under Section 1268 of the NDAA, as well as its contents [7]. If the plan specifies the scale of bases, training, and equipment deployment, it will allow for an estimation of the permanent U.S. military presence in Morocco. The third indicator is the pace at which the coalition of countries supporting Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara expands. Whether additional countries follow Mauritius, Bolivia, and Mali in shifting their positions serves as an indicator of the tangible achievements of Morocco's diplomatic campaign [4][10][12][17]. The fourth indicator is the intensity of Algeria's response. If Algeria expands military cooperation with Russia and China or pursues a counter-resolution through the African Union, it should be seen as a signal of escalating tensions in the Maghreb region [14].
4. Summary and Conclusion
With the convergence of three trends—deepening security cooperation, diplomatic victories over Western Sahara, and the power vacuum in the Sahel region—Morocco is establishing itself as virtually the sole anchor of the U.S. strategy toward Africa. The 10-year roadmap mandated by Section 1268 of the NDAA [7] suggests that this alignment is not merely the policy of a specific administration but an institutionalized stance. Since South Korea has limited room for direct involvement in the security domain, it should focus on a pragmatic approach that utilizes Morocco as a commercial hub for entering Africa. However, a dual-track monitoring approach is required to simultaneously track short-term inflection points, such as the expiration of MINURSO's mandate and the Security Council vote, alongside the potential backlash from Algeria.
References
[5] [Brookings Institution] Defense & Security
[7] [Morocco World News] Loudiyi Receives US Congressional Delegation, Reviews Defense Cooperation
[8] [Brookings - Economic Studies] U.S. Defense Policy
[11] [Columbia SIPA - CGEP] Middle East + North Africa
[12] [Morocco World News] Bolivia to Establish Trade Office in Dakhla, Diplomatic Mission in Rabat
[15] [Globes] Morocco mulls procuring Israel Aerospace missiles - report
[17] [Le Matin du Sahara] Le Mali réitère sa position prise en avril 2026 soutenant la souveraineté du Maroc sur le Sahara - https://lematin.ma/nation/le-mali-reitere-sa-position-sur-la-souverainete-du-maroc-sur-la-sahara/366847
[19] [Morocco World News] Morocco Hosts Launch of First African Convention on Child Soldiers
[20] [Morocco World News] Morocco, Uganda Seek to Strengthen Bilateral and Economic Ties
[22] [Morocco World News] Bourita Reiterates Morocco’s Support for Palestinian State at UN
[23] [Morocco World News] Hammouchi Receives Kuwaiti Ambassador, Two Sides Eye Security Memorandum
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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