US-China Critical Minerals Rivalry Intensifies in Africa: Strategic Responses for Allied Nations

Executive Summary

The United States has announced $3 billion in investment through separate initiatives by the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Energy, seeking to counter China's dominance in refining within the DRC cobalt supply chain, but the actual pace of private capital execution has fallen short of the announcements. China, rather than issuing central government declarations, is responding through pragmatic expansion at the level of local governments such as Hunan Province and state-owned/private enterprises, thereby expanding trade and mining investment in Africa. The DRC government is prioritizing the capture of domestic value-added through raw ore export bans, building independent bargaining power without becoming subordinate to either the United States or China. Over the next 12 to 24 months, the most likely outcome is that parallel US-China competition will become entrenched without a clear winner, and the United States' allies, including South Korea, should simultaneously pursue securing dual access rights leveraged through refining and processing capabilities, selective engagement that accounts for the time lag between US policy announcements and actual implementation, and the establishment of separate bilateral channels with resource-rich countries. Rather than rushing into preemptive investment, calibrating entry timing to the actual point of capital execution for individual projects should be the core principle of risk management.

I. Situational Analysis of the Issue

US-China Critical Minerals Rivalry Intensifies in Africa: Situational Analysis

1. Background and Development of the Issue

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) accounts for an overwhelming share of global cobalt production. The fact that this cobalt reserve base and production network have been concentrated in the hands of Chinese firms for over the past two decades is the starting point of the US critical minerals strategy toward Africa. Through the Kabila and Tshisekedi administrations, the DRC has continued mine development dependent on Chinese capital, and as a result, China's dominance has become structurally entrenched at the cobalt refining stage.

To break through this structure, the United States has, since the Biden administration, pursued the Lobito Corridor railway project. This was an attempt to connect DRC cobalt to the western Angolan port rather than eastern Dar es Salaam, bypassing China's logistical bottleneck[3]. This initiative was infrastructure diplomacy aimed at countering China, but assessments on the ground suggest that actual US private capital investment in the DRC has not materialized as quickly as expected[1].

The DRC government's position differs in nature from the US security strategy. The Tshisekedi administration has pursued a value-added capture strategy by banning exports of raw cobalt and copper ore and seeking to secure domestic refining and processing stages. This is interpreted as an independent calculation by a local actor seeking to enhance bargaining power through resource sovereignty, rather than aligning with either the United States or China.

2. Current Situation

On August 7, 2026, the Trump administration gathered more than 200 mining industry executives and investors at the Department of State and announced $3 billion in critical minerals and battery project investments[4][11][17]. At the event, President Trump stated, "We are putting miners back to work, and we are reclaiming America's rightful place as the world's mineral superpower"[7][11]. The Department of Defense's Office of Strategic Capital provided a $1.4 billion conditional loan to lithium-ion battery component maker Sila Nanotechnologies[11].

This announcement, coming ahead of President Xi Jinping's planned visit to Washington in September, carries strong overtones of a pressure message directed at China in terms of timing[4]. In the same vein, on August 7 the US Department of Energy announced the $100 million PROSPECT program to build a domestic critical minerals workforce[6], and beginning later this month the United States is also implementing measures banning exports of lithium-ion battery scrap and tungsten waste[15]. Small refining companies such as Phoenix Tailings, which receive Department of Defense support, continue experiments extracting critical minerals from mining waste, but new plant construction is projected to take up to a year and a half[9].

China's response has taken the form of pragmatic expansion at the local government and enterprise level rather than national-level declarations. Hunan Province has announced a three-year action plan to increase trade with Africa to 12 billion yuan (approximately $11.86 billion) by 2028. The plan aims to build ten flagship projects in mining and modern agriculture across 12 African countries[13]. Mozambican President Chapo's visit to Changsha-based heavy equipment manufacturer SANY Group is another example of this kind of provincial government-led diplomacy[13]. The Francophone African outlet Jeune Afrique recently reported that Chinese investment in Africa surged 254% year-on-year to reach $33.5 billion in the first half of 2026, analyzing that investment destinations are diversifying beyond infrastructure into energy, mining, and manufacturing[16].

3. Key Actors and Positions

The DRC governmentis leveraging its position, courted by both the United States and China, as bargaining leverage. The ban on raw cobalt and copper ore exports stems not from an intent to counter China but from an independent objective of securing domestic value-added. While responding positively to the US Lobito Corridor initiative, the reality of delayed actual investment implementation is a factor fueling skepticism within the DRC toward the US partnership[1].

The Trump administrationhas mobilized the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Energy to elevate critical minerals to a security agenda item. The $3 billion investment, the ban on battery scrap exports, and the workforce training program all converge on the single goal of strengthening negotiating leverage vis-à-vis China ahead of Xi Jinping's visit to Washington[4][6][15]. However, critics point out that this approach places emphasis on building domestic production bases, resulting in a relatively slow pace of capital deployment on the ground in Africa[1].

Chinahas opted for a diversification strategy through local governments such as Hunan Province and corporate networks rather than large-scale declarations from the central government. This is a pragmatic approach aimed at maintaining the refining and processing infrastructure advantage it has already built while circumventing Western sanctions and containment frameworks[13][16].

African countriesare choosing to broaden their options between Chinese infrastructure and capital and US security partnerships. Arab News assesses that, with its young population, critical mineral reserves, and vast arable land, Africa has emerged as a central arena of international competition rather than remaining peripheral[14].

4. Key Points of Contention

The first point of contention is the gap between securing raw ore and refining capacity. US investment is concentrated on mining and building domestic refining capacity, but it will be difficult to replace, in the short term, the equipment advantage China has already secured at the cobalt refining stage.

The second point of contention is where the demands of resource-holding countries, including the DRC, for domestic value-added capture collide with the supply chain restructuring strategies of both the United States and China. The DRC's export ban acts as a variable constraining raw ore access for both the United States and China.

The third point of contention is the asymmetry in investment pace. China's investment expansion (a 254% increase) is already appearing as a figure in progress, whereas the US $3 billion investment remains at the announcement stage, creating a stark difference in implementation pace[16][4][1].

II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue

US-China Critical Minerals Rivalry Intensifies in Africa: In-Depth Analysis

1. Root Cause: The Structural Gap at the Refining Stage

The reason the United States is mobilizing $3 billion to counter China in Africa is simple. The gap has widened not in mining but at the refining stage. The DRC accounts for most of the world's raw cobalt ore production, but the refining capacity to process it into battery-grade materials is concentrated among Chinese firms. No matter how many mining stakes the United States secures, if there is no refinery, the raw ore will ultimately flow to China. This is precisely why the Lobito Corridor project has focused on securing an alternate logistics route. While rail can redirect the flow of goods, there remains a limitation in that the refining infrastructure itself cannot be replaced in the short term[3].

From the DRC's perspective, the fundamental problem is different. The Tshisekedi administration's ban on raw cobalt and copper ore exports is not a byproduct of US-China competition but an extension of a long-standing policy objective of retaining domestic value-added within the country. Rather than becoming subordinate to either the United States' or China's security strategy, the DRC is using minerals as a bargaining chip to shift its status from a raw ore exporter to a processing nation. The local assessment that the pace of US investment in the DRC has fallen short of expectations can be seen as a result of a mismatch between this independent DRC calculation and the US political timetable[1].

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: The Asymmetry Between Local and Federal Government

China's approach to Africa operates not through unilateral declarations by the central government but through pragmatic expansion at the local government level. A representative example is Hunan Province's plan to increase trade with Africa to 12 billion yuan by 2028 and to build flagship mining and agriculture projects across 12 countries[13]. This is a structure in which, even without Beijing directly stepping in, provincial governments, state-owned enterprises, and private companies each weave dense links with Africa according to their own interests. As in the case of the Mozambican president visiting a heavy equipment company in Changsha, there is a clear tendency among African leaders to prefer practical cooperation with provincial governments and companies over the central government[13].

By contrast, the US approach resembles a collection of policies announced separately by the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Energy. The Department of State's $3 billion investment announcement, the Department of Defense's loan to Sila Nanotechnologies, and the Department of Energy's PROSPECT workforce program all emerged from different agencies at different times[4][6][11]. This is the product of political timing, as the Trump administration seeks to highlight the achievements of multiple agencies at once ahead of Xi Jinping's visit to Washington, but it simultaneously reveals a structural limitation in that US-style policy implementation tends to operate more as individual achievement promotion than as inter-agency coordination.

Economic Structure: The Gap Between Capital Mobilization Capacity and Risk Tolerance

Jeune Afrique's analysis, showing that Chinese investment in Africa increased 254% within a year to reach $33.5 billion in the first half of 2026, illustrates this gap in numerical terms[16]. Chinese capital can supply long-term, low-interest funds through state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises, and has a financial structure that prioritizes securing long-term resource access over short-term profitability. In contrast, the US $3 billion combines conditional loans from the Department of Defense's Office of Strategic Capital with attracting private investors, premised on verified commercial profitability[11]. The fact that a nascent refiner like Phoenix Tailings, despite receiving a $500 million loan from the Department of Defense, still requires up to a year and a half to build a new plant[9] suggests that the US private-sector-led model finds it difficult to catch up in the short term with China's state-led speed of execution.

Security Structure: The Merging of Defense Demand and Supply Chain Security

The US decision to ban exports of lithium-ion battery scrap and tungsten waste[15] reflects not merely a commercial supply chain restructuring but the securitization of defense procurement. The fact that critical minerals extracted by Phoenix Tailings are used in weapons systems, including missiles deployed in the Iran war[9], means that the critical minerals competition in Africa has now been elevated from pure industrial policy to a matter of national defense procurement security. This carries significant implications for allied nations as well, since the US minerals race has the potential to shift from a purely commercial supply chain diversification effort into pressure to incorporate allies into its own defense supply chain.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents

The current critical minerals rivalry in Africa is structurally similar to the US-China conflict over rare earths in the 2010s. At that time, China wielded substantive influence not through rare earth mining but by monopolizing refining and separation technology, and the United States, attempting belatedly to resume domestic production, ran into limitations due to the absence of refining capacity. The current dynamics surrounding DRC cobalt follow the same pattern. The United States is in a relatively advantageous position in securing mining stakes, but it has not built the infrastructure to replace China at the refining stage in the short term.

The historical experience of Africa becoming an arena for proxy wars during the US-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War is also worth referencing. At that time, both the United States and the Soviet Union supported various African governments not for resources but to secure ideology and camp allegiance, while local governments pursued pragmatic strategies of extracting aid from both sides by employing non-aligned positioning. The DRC's current approach of advancing critical minerals partnership with the United States while simultaneously seeking to secure domestic value-added through the raw ore export ban is in line with this Cold War-era practice of strategic hedging by African nations[1].

4. Key Variables in the Development of the Issue

The first variable is the outcome of Xi Jinping's planned September visit to Washington. Since the Trump administration's $3 billion announcement was a pressure card issued ahead of this visit[4], the intensity of subsequent US measures may vary depending on how trade and tariff issues become linked with critical minerals issues at the summit.

The second variable is whether the DRC's raw ore export ban is actually sustainable. Given the lack of refining infrastructure, prolonging the export ban would inevitably deal a blow to the DRC's own fiscal revenue. Whether this measure functions as leverage to draw out refining investment more quickly from either the United States or China, or instead becomes a headwind for the DRC economy, is a key indicator for gauging the next phase.

The third variable is the actual pace of execution of US private capital. Given that the time lag between the Department of State's announcement and actual capital disbursement has already been pointed out on the ground[1], whether projects such as Sila Nanotechnologies or Phoenix Tailings produce visible results within the next six months to a year will determine the credibility of the US approach.

The fourth variable is the sustainability of investment originating from Chinese provincial governments. Whether Hunan Province's three-year plan leads to actual projects, or remains merely a provincial-level declaration, will determine the effectiveness of China's method for maintaining influence in Africa[13].