The US-Argentina Andes-Atlantic Corridor: Restructuring Critical Mineral Supply Chains and South Korea's Response Strategy

Executive Summary

Signed on September 23, the US-Argentina Andes-Atlantic Corridor agreement represents an attempt to reroute the logistics of critical minerals, such as lithium and copper, toward Atlantic ports. However, because China's asymmetric advantage stems from its monopoly over the refining and processing stages rather than raw ore reserves, diversifying procurement sources alone will not resolve structural dependency. The fact that the US-Argentina trade agreement signed in February 2026 has not yet received congressional ratification is a key variable limiting the implementation of this corridor initiative, while the Milei administration's weak political and monetary foundations also cast a shadow over the agreement's future. A parallel structure is likely to persist for the time being, in which individual projects backed by Chinese capital, such as Ganfeng Lithium, continue to expand on a separate track from the US-led corridor. Therefore, rather than approaching the current situation through the lens of bloc politics or choosing sides, it is more rational for South Korea at this stage to leverage the Posco Group's existing investment track record in Argentina to secure bargaining power as a refining and processing partner.

I. Analysis of the Issue

Analysis of the US-Argentina 'Andes-Atlantic Corridor' Issue

1. Background and Developments

Since the inauguration of the Milei administration, the Salta and Jujuy provinces in northwestern Argentina and the Vaca Muerta shale formation in Patagonia have emerged as exceptional growth engines for the economy. The local media outlet Ámbito Financiero analyzed that while manufacturing and construction have slumped, sectors based on natural resources and external demand are serving as a "productive refuge" [6]. Within this asymmetric restructuring, expanding resource export infrastructure was not merely an industrial policy for the Milei administration, but a key card supporting its fiscal consolidation narrative [6].

The bottleneck was logistics. Lithium and copper produced in the northwestern mineral belt have traditionally sought export routes through Chilean Pacific ports. The rail and port infrastructure connecting these areas to Argentina's Atlantic coast had long been neglected. The initiative formalized this time as the 'Andes-Atlantic Corridor' is designed to fill this gap.

On August 28, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru had already declared a joint roadmap for strategic minerals in Santiago [3]. However, this declaration was limited to information sharing and coordination on investment attraction, while individual project expansions by Chinese capital, such as Ganfeng Lithium, continued on a separate track within Argentina [3]. From the US perspective, it appears to have been judged that a multilateral declaration alone could not secure control over logistics. Against this backdrop, the United States chose to intervene directly in the physical infrastructure itself through a bilateral channel with Argentina.

2. Current Situation

On September 23, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, Argentine Secretary of Finance Pablo Quirno and US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau signed the corridor agreement [1][4]. The initiative envisions investing up to $7 billion by 2027 in energy, mining, transport, and telecommunications infrastructure [1]. The Buenos Aires Times reported on this, quoting a joint statement from both countries expressing the US desire to become a "fundamental partner" in Argentina's infrastructure and investment sectors [4].

The reactions of local provincial governments are generally positive but conditional. Ámbito Financiero reported that while the provinces welcomed the initiative as a "historic opportunity," they are still waiting for the fine print, or the so-called "letra chica" [9]. In other words, while local governments welcome the investment itself, uncertainty remains regarding the actual distribution of benefits and contractual terms.

La Tercera summarized that this corridor is an initiative to connect Vaca Muerta and the northwestern mining region to Atlantic ports through multiple means, including railways, gas pipelines, new ports, and digital infrastructure [7]. In a separate article, Ámbito Financiero noted that lithium and copper mining and processing projects are included in this framework, pointing out that this aligns with the US strategy to diversify international supply chains [11].

However, there is a shadow over the outcomes of President Milei's visit to New York. Ámbito Financiero reported that Milei left New York for Paris without securing a photo opportunity with Trump [12]. This suggests that the announcement of the corridor was closer to a working-level agreement signing rather than an event showcasing close ties between the two leaders.

At the same time, the United States is providing multi-layered support to Argentina. The Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) proposed up to $6 billion in financial support for an Argentine LNG project [10], while President Trump held a "Shield of the Americas" meeting in New York, calling for sanctions against 24 criminal organizations and praising the Milei administration as a "great victory" [13]. This demonstrates that the Andes-Atlantic Corridor is not an isolated mineral and energy cooperation initiative, but part of a comprehensive package of closer ties with Argentina spanning security and finance.

3. Key Actors and Their Positions

The Argentine Government (The Milei Administration): It seeks to use closer ties with the United States as an external anchor for monetary and fiscal stability. A Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) report assesses that while Milei's stabilization program has sharply reduced inflation and achieved unprecedented fiscal adjustment, the nominal anchor of monetary policy remains fragile [2]. It also offers a conditional assessment that while the Trump administration's financial support is "unprecedented," its continuation depends on Milei's future political success [2]. In other words, for the Argentine government, this corridor is the final puzzle piece to complete its economic stabilization narrative, but it is also a card tied to its political vulnerability.

The Argentine Congress and Provincial Governments: Provincial governments welcome the investment opportunities themselves but are reserving judgment on the specific terms [9]. A more fundamental constraint is Congress. The Buenos Aires Times reported that advisors to the Milei administration informed the Trump administration that they lack the votes in Congress to ratify the bilateral trade agreement signed in February [14]. While the Argentine side is demanding renegotiation, citing a US Supreme Court ruling on Trump's tariffs, the United States has made its position clear that renegotiation is impossible because it would set a precedent for other countries [14]. This suggests that, regardless of the infrastructure investment announcement, the Andes-Atlantic Corridor must also pass through the bottleneck of Argentina's domestic political processes.

The US Department of State and the Export-Import Bank: The fact that Deputy Secretary of State Landau was the signatory demonstrates that this initiative has a strategic character led by foreign policy and national security channels rather than trade agencies. The parallel LNG financial support from EXIM [10] supports the view that this corridor is not merely about funding individual projects, but is an attempt to diversify the channels of US capital supply to Argentina as a whole.

Neighboring Countries (Chile and Bolivia): Chile is a stakeholder in the existing logistics routes through Pacific ports. If Argentine minerals are diverted to the Atlantic route, it could affect Chile's status as a logistics hub. Meanwhile, Bolivia has recently shown moves to attract US investment in AI, hydrocarbons, mining, and green energy through a new law [15], which aligns with a broader trend where the US Western Hemisphere critical minerals strategy is not confined to Argentina but is expanding across the entire Lithium Triangle.

Chinese Capital (Ganfeng Lithium, etc.): Chinese capital is already deeply entrenched in northwestern Argentina [3]. Even if the Andes-Atlantic Corridor attempts to restructure logistics control, it is highly likely to coexist on a separate track from Chinese-backed projects that have already secured mining rights.

4. Key Issues

First is the gap between agreements and legislation. With even the bilateral trade agreement signed in February yet to receive congressional ratification [14], this corridor must pass through the separate hurdle of Argentina's domestic political processes to translate into actual, binding investment execution.

Second, restructuring logistics routes does not alter the landscape of mining rights. Chinese capital can continue production through projects it has already secured, whether via the Chilean route or the Atlantic route. While the corridor can change the direction of export logistics, it cannot directly replace ownership structures or mining rights themselves.

Third is the political sustainability of the Milei administration. PIIE points out that US financial support may depend on Milei's future political success [2]. Although the corridor is billed as an infrastructure investment "for a generation" [4], the speed and scale of its realization could be constrained by the political lifespan of the Milei government.

II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue

In-Depth Analysis of the US-Argentina 'Andes-Atlantic Corridor' Issue

1. Root Cause Analysis

The origin of this agreement is not a matter of mineral reserves. The bottleneck lies in the refining and processing stages. China holds a monopolistic position in lithium refining and rare earth separation processes. This is an issue distinct from the raw ore reserves held by Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia. This is precisely why the United States signed the logistics infrastructure agreement with Argentina. It stems from the assessment that securing mining rights alone is insufficient to gain control over the supply chain.

Ganfeng Lithium's acquisition of its third project in Argentina is concrete evidence of this issue [3]. Chinese capital is already deeply entrenched in the Salta and Jujuy regions [3]. The four-nation joint declaration issued in Santiago on August 28 was a multilateral response to this issue. However, this declaration was closer to "a declaratory agreement focused on information sharing and investment coordination rather than a binding, cartel-like mechanism" [3]. From the US perspective, this confirmed that multilateral declarations could not halt the expansion of individual projects by Chinese capital.

In this context, the method chosen by the United States is to redesign the physical flow itself. It is an attempt to control which ports the minerals pass through and which processing networks they enter. This is why the Andes-Atlantic Corridor seeks to restructure rail, port, power, and digital infrastructure toward the Atlantic [7]. This should be read as an attempt to overturn the practice of certain mining projects that have sought export logistics through Chilean Pacific ports. The calculation is that by anchoring the route toward Western markets, the room for Chinese capital's intervention can be reduced, at least at the logistics stage.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: The Milei Administration's Weak Domestic Foundation

The Milei administration's alignment with the United States does not rest on a politically stable foundation. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) assesses that while Milei's stabilization program has sharply reduced inflation and achieved unprecedented fiscal adjustment [2], it also points out that the nominal anchor of monetary policy remains fragile, the debt service burden is heavy, and the unemployment rate is on an upward trend [2]. The diagnosis is that while the Trump administration's financial support is "unprecedented," its continuation may depend on Milei's future political success [2].

This vulnerability also casts a shadow over the corridor agreement. The US-Argentina trade agreement signed in February 2026 has not yet received congressional ratification. According to the Buenos Aires Times, advisors to the Milei administration informed the Trump administration that they lack the votes to pass ratification in Congress [14]. While the Argentine government is demanding renegotiation, citing a US Supreme Court ruling on Trump's tariffs, US policymakers are refusing out of concern that renegotiation would set a precedent for other countries [14]. This suggests that infrastructure agreements like the Andes-Atlantic Corridor may ultimately be subordinate to Argentina's domestic political landscape, particularly the relationship between provincial governments and congressional forces under its federal system.

Reactions at the provincial government level also reflect this structural uncertainty. While the provinces welcomed the corridor as a "historic opportunity," they are still waiting for the detailed clauses, the so-called "fine print" [9]. This means that while they welcome the investment attraction itself, they do not yet have certainty regarding the actual distribution of benefits. This foreshadows that as the agreement transitions from the signing stage to the implementation stage, negotiations between the provinces and the federal government—a characteristic feature of Argentine federalism—are likely to resurface.

The fact that President Milei left for Paris without a photo opportunity with Trump in New York [12] also illustrates the nature of this agreement. It indicates that the event was a working-level signing rather than a showcase of close personal ties between the leaders. The very fact that the agreement was concluded at the level of Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and Argentine Secretary of Finance Pablo Quirno suggests that this project is closer to policy execution by bureaucratic agencies rather than political symbolism [1][4].

Economic Structure: Asymmetric Restructuring toward the Resource Sector

The Argentine economy has been undergoing asymmetric restructuring since Milei took office. Local media assess that while manufacturing and construction have slumped, sectors based on natural resources and external demand are serving as a "productive refuge" [6]. Within this structure, the Vaca Muerta gas field and the lithium-copper belt are not merely individual industries, but key cards sustaining the fiscal consolidation narrative [6]. The $24 billion LNG export project pursued by YPF, which is awaiting a final investment decision in November, falls within the same context [6]. The US Export-Import Bank's proposal of up to $6 billion in financial support [10] and the Andes-Atlantic Corridor's $7 billion infrastructure investment operate on separate tracks but are structurally mutually reinforcing.

This resource-dependent growth strategy is structurally vulnerable. Relying on resource exports as the primary source of foreign currency inflows while the monetary policy foundation remains unstable leaves the overall Argentine economy dependent on international commodity prices and the US commitment to sustained investment. The Peterson Institute's observation that US support for Argentina is tied to Milei's political survival [2] conversely implies that the development of Argentina's resource sector is also exposed to US domestic political variables.

Security Structure: Expansion of US Influence in the Western Hemisphere

The fact that the United States has funneled over $1 billion into Latin American critical minerals since January 2025 reveals its intent to strengthen its influence over the Western Hemisphere. This framework was clearly illustrated when President Trump, speaking at the "Shield of the Americas" meeting in New York, called for sanctions against 24 criminal organizations and praised the Milei administration as a "great victory" [13]. Securing resources, countering drugs and crime, and securing political allies are bundled together into a single package.

A similar trend is detected in Bolivia. Following the inauguration of President Rodrigo Paz, the United States expressed interest in new investment legislation in AI, hydrocarbons, mining, and green energy [15]. This suggests that rather than an approach confined to a single country, this is a Western Hemisphere-wide restructuring attempt targeting the entire Lithium Triangle.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparison of Similar Cases

The closest point of comparison is Chile's Special Lithium Operation Contract (CEOL) case. On August 25, Chile signed the country's first CEOL with the private company SQM (Quiborax) in the Arica and Parinacota region [3]. This represents a departure from the traditional state-controlled approach to lithium development, approving a project under full corporate control—a result of the government making its regulatory framework more flexible to attract private capital [3]. The Andes-Atlantic Corridor embodies a similar logic, representing regulatory flexibility designed to attract US private and public capital rather than state-led infrastructure development.

However, the crucial difference from the Chilean case lies in the federal system. Under a centralized state structure, Chile's central government could conclude contracts unilaterally. In contrast, Argentina is a federal state where individual provinces, such as Salta and Jujuy, hold significant jurisdiction over mining rights. Reports that provincial governments are waiting for the "fine print" [9] reflect caution stemming precisely from this federalist gap. It indicates that a signature between the federal government and the US Department of State alone does not guarantee actual implementation.

Another point of comparison is the US approach to Venezuelan resources. The White House recently announced transactions involving Venezuela's oil reserves of over 65 billion barrels and the acquisition of a 35% stake in North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP) [5][8]. Similar to the Andes-Atlantic Corridor, this demonstrates a pattern where the United States simultaneously pursues equity and logistics control over Western Hemisphere resources. However, while the Venezuelan case involved transactions conducted amid adversarial relations with the Maduro regime, the Argentine case proceeds within a cooperative framework with a friendly administration, meaning the nature of the political risk is different. Yet, a friendly-nation model does not necessarily translate to low implementation risk. As the Milei administration's weak congressional foundation demonstrates, political alignment and institutional implementation capacity are distinct variables [14].

The US Export-Import Bank's proposal of $6 billion in financial support for the US-Argentina LNG project [10] is another precedent to consider alongside this corridor. In both initiatives, the Trump administration has adopted a method of rapidly deciding on financial support on an individual project basis. Unlike traditional development finance channeled through multilateral institutions, this pattern involves intensively injecting capital into political allies through bilateral channels. While this offers the advantage of speed, it also carries a structural vulnerability where project continuity is dependent on the political fortunes of individual administrations.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is whether the Argentine Congress will ratify the trade agreement. If the critical minerals agreement signed in February 2026 fails to pass Congress, the legal foundation of the Andes-Atlantic Corridor itself will remain incomplete. Advisors to the Milei administration have already admitted that they stand no chance in a congressional vote [14]. As long as the United States refuses to renegotiate, this deadlock is likely to persist.

The second variable is the negotiation over the distribution of benefits between provincial governments and the central government. The level of cooperation from each province will depend on the details of the "fine print" that local governments are waiting for. Another variable is the extent to which provinces in the lithium belt, such as Salta and Jujuy, will seek to maintain their existing contractual relationships with Chinese capital. Existing Chinese investments, such as Ganfeng Lithium's Cauchari-Olaroz project, are unlikely to be immediately terminated solely due to the announcement of this corridor [3].

The third variable is whether refining and processing capabilities are actually transferred. Rerouting raw ore logistics toward the Atlantic and reducing dependence on China in the refining and processing stages are distinct challenges. If the latter does not progress, the corridor will remain a mere logistical detour and will not lead to a substantive restructuring of the supply chain. At this stage, the processing capabilities of South Korean companies with existing investment track records in Argentina, such as the Posco Group, have room to serve as bargaining assets [3].

The fourth variable is the political survival of the Milei government itself. The assessment that US financial support, amid a weak monetary policy foundation, may depend on Milei's political success [2] conversely implies that the long-term viability of this corridor hinges on policy continuity under post-Milei administrations. The possibility that the investment execution schedule through 2027 will overlap with Argentina's next election cycle cannot be ruled out.