Joint Statement on the 8-Nation EIPP Foreign Ministers' Meeting and Security Council Reform: An Evaluation of South Korea's Dual Track Diplomacy

Executive Summary

The 8-Nation EIPP Foreign Ministers' Meeting, held on September 22 in conjunction with the UN General Assembly, is a consultative body at the level of annual statements without a permanent secretariat or implementation mechanism. However, the fact that it consists solely of allies and partner countries excluding the United States, and that it was announced just two days before the US-China summit, suggests it can be interpreted as a signal of preventive cohesion. The broad agenda, which includes Security Council reform, hybrid threats, peace in Ukraine, opposition to changes in the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, and compliance with UNCLOS, is likely to result in a parallel structure where each country pursues its own interests on separate tracks. South Korea is simultaneously operating a flexible track for restoring inter-Korean relations and a cohesive track in the Indo-Pacific and maritime norms. Specifically, South Korea needs to shift its status from a competitor for Security Council seats to a proponent of practical agendas centered on the Hormuz and maritime traffic issues, while also seeking to establish a clear linguistic firewall between the North-South track and the EIPP track.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

Issue Situation Analysis: Joint Statement of the 8-Nation EIPP Foreign Ministers' Meeting and Security Council Reform

1. Background and Progress

The EIPP (presumably Europe-Indo Pacific Partnership) held its first Foreign Ministers' Meeting in New York in September 2025. This is the second meeting. The participating countries are Australia, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. The United States is not on the list of participants. The fact that all eight countries are either treaty allies of the United States or close security partners makes this composition itself unusual.

This trend is part of a broader movement that permeates this year's UN General Assembly. On September 21, India joined as a co-sponsor of the P4M (Partnership for Multilateralism), a group led by the EU, Brazil, Canada, and Kenya, alongside Australia and Barbados. The Economic Times noted that while this trend appears too loose on paper and politically diverse, it highlights a common interest in expanding maneuverability between the Global South and the traditional Western bloc. The EIPP can be viewed as a branch of this UN-driven soda-ism trend, consisting solely of traditional US allies and partner countries.

The demand for Security Council reform itself is not a new agenda. The WSJ reported that dissatisfaction with the P5 (US, Russia, China, UK, France) veto monopoly is a recurring topic at the UN General Assembly, and that the criticisms from countries like India, Brazil, Turkey, and Nigeria, which have increased economic and demographic weight, are growing louder. The EIPP's statement differentiates itself by attaching a specific Western-Indo Pacific coalition to this long-standing grievance.

2. Current Situation

UN Secretary-General Guterres stated in a speech on September 22, "We are clearly moving towards a multipolar world. This trend is irreversible," and emphasized the need for a "networked multipolar world" rather than fragmentation. This can be interpreted as a UN Secretariat-level effort to address the current situation where various soda-ism consultative bodies, including the EIPP, are emerging in abundance.

Australia is concurrently running its own campaign for Security Council entry, separate from its participation in the EIPP. Prime Minister Albanese and Foreign Minister Wong have formalized their goal of securing a non-permanent seat on the Security Council by 2029, highlighting online safety, AI regulation, climate change, and rules-based order as their agenda. In a speech in New York, Prime Minister Albanese diagnosed that "the international order since 1945 is no longer fit for purpose," emphasizing that middle powers must build new partnerships in the context of US-China strategic competition transforming the Indo-Pacific. This aligns precisely with the concerns raised in the EIPP joint statement.

French President Macron also appealed in his last UN speech to "revitalize multilateralism," warning of the risk of the Ukraine war spreading across Europe. Japan has also been active on the practical track separate from the Security Council reform discourse. Foreign Minister Motegi emphasized the freedom of navigation in the Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb straits at a maritime safety conference co-hosted by Japan and Canada, declaring attempts to impose tolls as "unacceptable." This shares a similar concern with the maritime traffic provisions in the EIPP statement.

At the same time, G7 foreign ministers separately gathered to issue a statement demanding an end to Iran's support for the Houthis. The trilateral meeting of South Korea, the US, and Japan on September 21 in Washington reaffirmed the goal of North Korean denuclearization. EAI analysis pointed out that the timing of this South Korea-US-Japan statement was "three days before the Washington US-China summit" and suggested that it indicates a preemptive effort to solidify alliance cohesion in anticipation of uncertainties in summit diplomacy. The EIPP statement, issued just two days before the US-China summit, can also be interpreted in the same context.

3. Key Actors and Interests

Australia is the most active actor within the EIPP. The simultaneous pursuit of its Security Council campaign and EIPP participation allows the Albanese government to combine this with the external message that "old rules no longer apply." For Australia, the EIPP serves a dual purpose: accumulating a voice in the discourse on Security Council reform while also internationally supporting its justification for seeking a seat on the Council.

Japan is pursuing both the multilateral agenda of Security Council reform and the practical agenda of freedom of navigation in the Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb straits. Foreign Minister Motegi's statements show that Japan is not limiting its Security Council reform efforts to mere rhetoric but is linking them to concrete maritime interests.

France and Germany are the leading advocates of multilateralism in Europe. Macron has positioned the restoration of trust in the multilateral system, including the Security Council, as a legacy of his presidency. However, France's status as a permanent member of the P5 imposes inherent constraints on its ability to actively shake the veto structure in the Security Council reform agenda.

South Korea is pursuing two tracks: participation in the EIPP and cooperation with the US and Japan. Foreign Minister Park signed the South Korea-US-Japan foreign ministers' statement in Washington on September 21 and attended the EIPP meeting in New York the following day. EAI analysis indicated that the substantive progress of the South Korea-US-Japan statement remained at the level of reaffirming "the will for North Korea's complete denuclearization," and pointed out that the actual implementation momentum lies in the SMR cooperation track. In this context, the EIPP functions as a separate channel with European and Indo-Pacific middle powers, distinct from the North Korea and South Korea-US-Japan tracks.

India, while not part of the EIPP, serves as a comparative case as it joined the similar P4M. Foreign Minister Jaishankar has been juggling a tight schedule between the campaign for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council and participation in P4M. India's actions illustrate that the EIPP, centered on Western allies, and the P4M, which includes the Global South, coexist in a competitive manner within the UN reform discourse.

4. Key Issues

First, the institutional reality of the EIPP. Aside from the annual meetings and joint statements during the UN General Assembly, there is no permanent secretariat or follow-up implementation mechanism confirmed. The agenda of Security Council reform itself is far from a binding procedure that would actually change the veto structure of the P5. As the WSJ pointed out, the demand for Security Council reform has been a recurring rhetoric at the UN General Assembly, and it remains to be seen whether the EIPP statement can produce substantial progress beyond this rhetoric.

Second, the asymmetry of the composition. All eight countries are allies or partners of the United States, yet the United States itself is absent. This raises the interpretation that while the reform of the multilateral system is the stated purpose, it may actually serve as a pre-coordination mechanism among allies in response to the uncertainty of US policy. The EAI analysis of the simultaneous South Korea-US-Japan meeting pointed out that it was a "preemptive effort to solidify alliance cohesion in anticipation of uncertainties in summit diplomacy," and this same concern can be applied to the EIPP.

Third, the issue of how countries allocate resources between competing soda-ism frameworks. Australia is running a separate campaign for Security Council entry alongside the EIPP, while India has opted for the P4M. South Korea is pursuing both the EIPP and the South Korea-US-Japan tracks, but the prioritization and allocation of resources for implementation between these two tracks have not yet been clearly organized.

II. In-Depth Issue Analysis

In-Depth Issue Analysis: Structural Background of the EIPP Security Council Reform Statement

1. Root Cause: The Paralysis of the Security Council and Political Exhaustion of the P5 Veto

The background of the EIPP's reiteration of Security Council reform as an agenda lies in the functional paralysis of the Security Council itself. The WSJ pointed out that if any one of the five P5 countries exercises its veto, the very criticism from the international community is blocked. The recent pattern of Russia exercising its veto in the Ukraine war and the US doing so in the Gaza and Middle East issues has ingrained the perception among governments that the Security Council does not operate normally in matters involving the parties concerned. The grievances of countries like India, Brazil, Turkey, and Nigeria, which have increased economic and demographic weight, have been a recurring topic at the UN General Assembly, but the difference in this phase is that these grievances have emerged not only from emerging countries but also from the traditional group of US allies.

Delving deeper into this root cause, there is a decline in trust in the United States itself. Australian Prime Minister Albanese mentioned that "the international order since 1945 is no longer fit for purpose," diagnosing that the premises of the post-Cold War era are being put to the test. The audience for this statement is not only China. In a situation where the US is selectively reducing its engagement in multilateralism, there is an underlying calculation that allies must bear the costs of maintaining norms themselves. EAI's separate analysis noted that the South Korea-US-Japan foreign ministers' statement came out "three days before the Washington US-China summit" and interpreted it as a "preemptive effort to solidify alliance cohesion in anticipation of uncertainties in summit diplomacy." The EIPP statement also shares the character of preventive cohesion in the same timeframe, ahead of the US-China summit.

2. Structural Context: The Intersection of Three Layers of Pressure

The discourse on Security Council reform should be seen as the result of simultaneous pressures at the political, economic, and security levels.

Politically, there is a decline in trust in multilateralism itself. Secretary-General Guterres stated, "We are clearly moving towards a multipolar world. This trend is irreversible," proposing a "networked multipolar world" as an alternative. This statement can paradoxically be interpreted as the UN Secretariat itself acknowledging the limitations of the Security Council-centered order. President Macron's appeal to "revitalize multilateralism" in his last UN speech also expresses the same sense of crisis. However, the fact that the group of countries sharing this sense of crisis is divided into P4M (led by the EU, Brazil, Canada, and Kenya, with participation from India, Australia, and Barbados) and EIPP (the eight US allies and partners) shows that the discourse on Security Council reform is already fracturing along ideological lines.

Economically, there is a demand for representation from emerging economies. Countries like India, Brazil, Turkey, and Nigeria have been demanding permanent member status or equivalent voice based on their increased economic and demographic weight. Australia's formalization of its campaign for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council by 2029, with online safety, AI regulation, and climate change as its agenda, suggests that the discourse on Security Council reform is expanding beyond simple seat allocation issues to competition over the formation of digital and climate norms.

In terms of security, practical agendas such as maritime traffic and hybrid threat responses are emerging as alternative paths to counter the paralysis of the Security Council. Foreign Minister Motegi emphasized the freedom of navigation in the Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb straits at a maritime safety conference co-hosted by Japan and Canada, which involved 53 countries and organizations, declaring attempts to impose tolls as "unacceptable." The G7's demand for Iran to cease its support for the Houthis is also a response that bypasses Security Council resolutions. A structure is solidifying where soda-ism consultative bodies take on the practical enforcement functions of norms in areas paralyzed by veto politics.

3. Historical Precedents: The Revival of G7 Expansion Discussions and the D10 Concept

The EIPP is not the first attempt of its kind. EAI's analysis in 2021 highlighted the flow from "G7 to D10," where South Korea, India, Australia, and South Africa were invited to the G7 summit in Cornwall, UK, resulting in a joint statement expressing a "stronger commitment to democratic values." The D10 concept, led by Prime Minister Boris Johnson, aimed to strengthen cooperation "within the traditional multilateral rules-based system of democratic states," but this concept did not lead to institutionalization and remained at the level of individual summit invitations. EAI warned that if such attempts flow into a "systemic competition between democracy and authoritarianism," they could "block multilateralism and create unrealistic choices for many democracies that need both the US and China." This warning applies equally to the EIPP five years later.

The decisive difference between D10 and EIPP is the position of the United States. The D10 was a concept led or at least centered around the US. The EIPP is a structure where US allies and partner countries bond together without the US. This is closer to the inertia of European countries during the Cold War, which maintained separate political coordination channels even under the US security umbrella. However, while the glue of cohesion during that time was a common threat in the form of the Soviet Union, the glue for the EIPP is not a shared perception of threat but a collective preparation for uncertainty in US policy.

The coexistence with P4M (led by the EU, Brazil, Canada, and Kenya, with India joining) suggests another precedent. Similar to the attempts of the non-aligned movement (NAM) during the Cold War to voice a third perspective outside the US-Soviet bipolar structure, the current UN General Assembly is being re-enacted as a dual track where two soda groups, P4M and EIPP, are expanding their maneuverability outside the US-China bipolar structure. The difference this time is that the Western alliance itself is forming one of those branches.

4. Key Variables

The variables that will influence future developments can be condensed into three.

First, the outcome of the US-China summit. The timing of the EIPP statement, issued two days before the summit, serves as insurance against the possibility that the US may pursue a unilateral agreement without prior coordination with its allies. If the conclusion of the summit results in a softening of the US position regarding the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, the EIPP will face its first test of substantive cohesion.

Second, the relationship between the discourse on Security Council reform and P4M. India's joining P4M alongside Australia and Barbados can be read as a strategy for India to secure its share through a broader coalition aiming for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council. Australia's simultaneous pursuit of both the EIPP and its own Security Council campaign also falls within this context. If the agendas of the two groups overlap or compete, it may expose differences among EIPP participants regarding the specific direction of Security Council reform (whether to expand permanent members or limit vetoes).

Third, the accumulation of achievements on the practical track. If responses bypassing the Security Council, such as the maritime safety conference led by Japan or the G7's statement on Iran, continue to accumulate, the EIPP will gain a foundation to evolve into a practical norm enforcement body beyond mere statement issuance. Conversely, if it remains limited to annual statement issuance without practical achievements, the EIPP is likely to fade away without institutionalization, similar to the D10.