Security Implications of the U.S.-Denmark-Greenland Security Agreement and the Establishment of New Arctic Military Bases
Executive Summary
On September 22, the United States, Denmark, and Greenland signed a trilateral security agreement to establish two new U.S. military bases in Greenland and grant the U.S. indefinite access to its airspace and territorial waters. While Denmark sought to frame the agreement within a NATO oversight structure, its actual provisions more closely resemble bilateral powers secured by Washington that bypass the alliance’s multilateral framework. This could serve as a precedent for the United States to secure individual security deals with allies through a combination of pressure and persuasion, and it reinforces the practice of Greenland’s autonomous government negotiating directly with Washington rather than through Denmark. South Korea should take note of this negotiating pattern for future ROK-U.S. defense cost-sharing and Status of Forces Agreement talks. It must also assess the potential impact of Washington’s resource concentration in the Western Hemisphere and the Arctic on its Indo-Pacific priorities, while also examining the limitations of its observer status in the competition over Arctic shipping routes and resources.
I. Issue Analysis
Greenland is a semi-autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. While Denmark retains authority over foreign affairs and defense, the Greenlandic government exercises significant autonomy in domestic matters. This dual structure proved to be a persistent obstacle throughout the negotiations [3]. The core of the talks was the process of finding a compromise between the level of security control demanded by Washington and the sovereignty and self-determination that Copenhagen and Nuuk sought to protect [3].
Immediately after his inauguration on January 20, 2025, President Trump publicly stated on several occasions his idea that the United States should acquire Greenland [3]. These remarks caused considerable anxiety among Denmark, a NATO ally, and other European partners [3].
From the outset of negotiations, the Danish government attempted to frame the issue as a NATO matter rather than a bilateral one. Just before the agreement was signed, Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen stated that NATO would play a leading role in Arctic security [6]. Copenhagen explained that the agreement would not place the responsibility for Arctic security solely on Washington and Copenhagen but would bring it under the oversight of NATO as a whole [1]. This can be read as a reflection of Copenhagen's calculation to dilute President Trump's personal territorial claims within the multilateral framework of the alliance.
The agreement was finalized on September 22 with a trilateral signing by President Trump, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, and Greenlandic Premier Jens-Frederik Nielsen on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York [4][8]. The full text of the agreement was released immediately after the signing [13].
The core of the agreement is the establishment of two new U.S. military bases in Greenland. The Narsarsuaq base, used during the Cold War, will be rebuilt in the south, and a new base will be established on the eastern coast, an area currently used by Denmark's dog sled patrol [11]. At the signing ceremony, President Trump announced that he would "begin the process of immediately developing a large-scale military presence in appropriate locations" [8]. The agreement has no expiration date, creating a structure that permits an extensive U.S. military presence indefinitely [15].
The text of the agreement grants U.S. military aircraft and vessels free access to Greenland's airspace and territorial waters [9]. It also includes a provision that preemptively blocks the possibility of "hostile powers" such as Russia and China establishing bases in Greenland [15][3].
President Trump claimed the agreement grants the United States "permanent control" over Greenland's security [1][14]. In contrast, the governments of Denmark and Greenland, while not directly refuting this statement, repeatedly emphasized that the agreement does not undermine Greenland's sovereignty [1][10][17]. Prime Minister Frederiksen assessed the agreement as "good for the U.S., Denmark, and Greenland, as well as for Europe and NATO," while Premier Nielsen described it as "a victory for all three parties" [8].
Public opinion in Greenland is a mix of relief and distrust. Naja Nathanielsen, a Greenlandic member of the Danish Parliament, told Reuters, "I am very relieved and think the result is quite reasonable. We can be satisfied" [12]. However, Defense News reported that many Greenlanders have not yet shed their distrust of Washington [12]. This means that President Trump's repeated expressions of intent to acquire Greenland have left a fissure in trust that has not been fully repaired even after the agreement's signing.
Positions and Strategies of Key Actors
The Danish governmentfocused on preserving its formal sovereignty over Greenland while embedding Washington's demands for security control within the multilateral framework of NATO. The repeated emphasis on NATO's role by both Foreign Minister Rasmussen and Prime Minister Frederiksen demonstrates Copenhagen's political calculation to manage the distrust within the alliance, sparked by Trump's personal remarks, through the logic of a multilateral security system [1][6].
The Greenlandic governmentaccepted the agreement on the condition that its right to self-determination was recognized. From the draft stage, Premier Nielsen stated that he was "satisfied with the proposed agreement" [10]. However, there are underlying concerns within Greenland that the expansion of U.S. military bases could, in the long run, constrain the trend toward greater autonomy. This is evident in a local news headline stating, "Trust is still unstable" [12].
The U.S. Trump administrationpursued the agreement as part of its plan to reassert dominance in the Western Hemisphere. According to EAI analysis, this agreement is "an implementation of the Western Hemisphere dominance concept specified in the November 2025 National Security Strategy" and was pursued in the same context as interventions in Venezuela and the Panama Canal [3]. President Trump is highlighting the agreement as a political achievement, framing it as securing "permanent control" [1][14].
Russiais approaching this agreement from the perspective that it constitutes U.S. military expansion. The TASS news agency highlighted the fact that the agreement grants the United States unlimited access to Greenland's airspace and territorial waters [9]. This suggests that Moscow perceives the expansion of the U.S. military footprint in the Arctic as a security threat.
Chinawas explicitly designated as an excluded party in this agreement. The provisions of the agreement itself are focused on preemptively blocking the possibility of China establishing a base in Greenland [3][15]. EAI analysis presents the possibility of Beijing responding by linking this issue to matters in Taiwan and the South China Sea as a key variable to watch [3].
Key Issues
The first issue is the gap between sovereignty and de facto control. While Denmark and Greenland emphasize that their sovereignty is maintained, the agreement grants the U.S. military near-unlimited and indefinite access to their airspace and territorial waters [9][15]. The difference in interpretation between President Trump's "permanent control" remark and the statements from Denmark and Greenland on maintaining sovereignty has not been fully resolved, even after the agreement's text was released [1][13].
The second issue is the problem of trust within NATO. Denmark is attempting to restore alliance cohesion by framing this matter as a collective NATO responsibility [1][6]. However, given that the rift was initially triggered by President Trump's unilateral remarks about acquiring Greenland, it remains uncertain whether this agreement will lead to a fundamental restoration of trust, as evidenced by the lingering distrust in Greenland [12].
The third issue is the potential for escalation into a U.S.-China-Russia competition in the Arctic. The agreement's exclusionary clauses against Russia and China have the effect of institutionalizing great-power competition over the Arctic [3][15]. How Beijing and Moscow will adjust their Arctic shipping route and resource development strategies in response is a future variable to watch [3][9].
II. In-Depth Issue Analysis
The U.S.-Denmark-Greenland Security Agreement and New Arctic Military Bases: An In-Depth Analysis
1. Analysis of Root Causes
The roots of this agreement lie in Greenland's dual legal status. Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, with Copenhagen holding authority over foreign and defense policy. At the same time, its autonomous government exercises significant control over domestic affairs [3]. This structure is the product of a compromise that dates back to the Cold War. The problem is that this compromise did not anticipate a situation in which a major power would overtly express territorial ambitions. President Trump's remarks about acquiring Greenland directly exploited this legal ambiguity.
The Trump administration's approach is not an isolated case. As previously analyzed by EAI, this agreement is "an implementation of the Western Hemisphere dominance concept specified in the November 2025 National Security Strategy" [3]. The fact that it occurred around the same time as the arrest of Maduro in Venezuela and intervention in the Panama Canal suggests it should be seen not as a regional coincidence but as a consistent expression of a policy orientation [5]. In this framework, Greenland, while geographically in the Arctic, is politically incorporated into the logic of reshaping the Western Hemisphere.
This is compounded by the rising commercial value of Arctic shipping routes. As climate change rapidly reduces Arctic sea ice, new maritime transport routes like the Northeast Passage have become viable, simultaneously reshaping energy and mineral resource landscapes as well as military and security dynamics [7]. Greenland is at the geographical center of this competition. From Washington's perspective, the calculation was that it could not leave a region with both commercial potential and security vulnerabilities open to Russia and China.
2. Structural Context
Politically, the power asymmetry among the three parties—Copenhagen, Nuuk, and Washington—defined the entire negotiation process. Although Denmark holds foreign and defense authority over Greenland, it is difficult for it to unilaterally handle security matters without the consent of the Greenlandic government [3]. Greenlandic Premier Nielsen's description of the agreement as a "victory for all three parties" [8] is both an expression of genuine satisfaction and a political message that the autonomous government secured an independent voice at the negotiating table.
To mitigate this asymmetry, Denmark actively brought in the multilateral framework of NATO. Foreign Minister Rasmussen stated just before the signing that NATO would play a leading role in Arctic security [6]. Copenhagen explained that the agreement would not place the responsibility for Arctic security solely on the U.S. and Denmark but would bring it under the oversight of NATO as a whole [1]. This was a calculation to dilute President Trump's personal territorial claims within the institutional framework of the alliance. However, the powers granted to the U.S. by the agreement itself are strongly bilateral in nature. The provisions for free access to airspace and territorial waters and for an indefinite military presence were secured directly by Washington without going through NATO's collective decision-making structure [9][15].
Economically, Greenland's financial structure acted as a constraint on its negotiating power. Greenland has a small economy that is heavily dependent on financial support from Denmark. While its potential for mineral and energy resource development is significant, its current industrial base is weak. In this context, large-scale U.S. investment in military infrastructure likely served as a tangible incentive for the local economy. The rebuilding of a base in a region like Narsarsuaq, where the population has dwindled to a few dozen people [11], entails not only security logic but also local employment and infrastructure benefits.
In terms of security, the structure of trust within NATO was put to the test. Denmark is a founding member of NATO and a long-standing U.S. ally. For the leader of an allied nation to publicly express an interest in acquiring another ally's territory was unprecedented in the post-Cold War era. Even though an agreement has been reached, it is difficult to say that the rift created by these remarks has been fully mended. This is why both relief and distrust are being detected simultaneously in Greenland [12].
3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases
U.S. military interest in Greenland is not new. The Narsarsuaq base was a facility built by the U.S. military during World War II and served as a reconnaissance and transport hub targeting the Soviet Union during the Cold War [11]. This agreement involves rebuilding this base, so in form, it is akin to reviving past Cold War infrastructure. However, this time the agreement codifies an indefinite presence, making its nature different from the provisional deployments of the Cold War era [15].
The 1951 U.S.-Denmark defense agreement is another relevant precedent. That agreement secured U.S. operational rights for Thule Air Base (now Pituffik Air Base). For decades, this base has remained a key asset in the missile early warning system. The new two-base system created by the current agreement represents a shift from a single-hub structure centered on Thule to a distributed deployment of assets along the southern and eastern coasts. This can be read as an intention to expand Arctic surveillance coverage to all of Greenland.
A comparison between President Trump's 2019 proposal to purchase Greenland and the current situation reveals a clear evolution in approach. In 2019, the purchase offer was thwarted by Denmark's immediate and firm rejection. This time, unlike during his first term, the administration maintained pressure but ultimately chose a method of obtaining de facto military access within the formal framework of respecting sovereignty. In contrast to the direct intervention methods used in Venezuela and Panama under the Western Hemisphere realignment plan, the approach to Greenland was cloaked in the institutional sheath of an agreement [5].
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is the actual pace of the agreement's implementation. If base construction proceeds as rapidly as President Trump has publicly stated, there is a possibility that opposition sentiment within Greenland could be reignited. Despite MP Nathanielsen's expression of relief [12], the fact that a majority of Greenlanders have not shed their fundamental distrust of Washington could become a source of friction during the implementation process.
The second is the level of NATO's substantive involvement. The key question is whether the "NATO collective responsibility" frame emphasized by Denmark [1][6] will be institutionalized into a genuine alliance-level decision-making structure, or whether it will remain mere rhetoric to justify a bilateral U.S. military presence. This can be gauged by whether the issue is placed on the agenda of future NATO summits.
The third is the response from Russia and China. The "hostile powers" exclusion clause specified in the agreement [15][3] is aimed directly at Beijing and Moscow. The possibility that China might link this to issues in Taiwan and the South China Sea, and that Russia might intensify its military activities in the Arctic, remain as external variables that will affect the agreement's efficacy.
The fourth is the U.S. domestic political calendar. Given that the agreement was signed ahead of the summit with Xi Jinping and the midterm elections [3], some assess that it strongly reflects the short-term objective of securing negotiating leverage. Whether Washington's policy intensity will be maintained after the elections, or whether resource allocation priorities will shift to other regions, is a variable that will determine the agreement's long-term implementation.
III. Final Recommended Courses of Action
The U.S.-Denmark-Greenland Security Agreement and New Arctic Military Bases: A Comprehensive Response Strategy
1. Overall Assessment and Recommended Courses of Action
This agreement is a structural event that reshapes the Arctic security landscape. It is difficult to view it as a simple bilateral basing agreement. The fact that the agreement has no expiration date supports this view [15]. The United States has secured indefinite free access to Greenland's airspace and territorial waters [9]. This should be interpreted as Washington having institutionalized a permanent military presence in the Arctic.
Denmark's attempt to position this agreement within a NATO oversight framework is assessed as only partially successful. Foreign Minister Rasmussen's remarks on NATO's leading role [6] and Copenhagen's "responsibility sharing" framing [1] are closer to political rhetoric. The actual provisions of the agreement are bilateral powers secured directly by Washington without going through NATO's decision-making structure [9][15]. The implications of this gap for the future European security architecture are twofold. First, it sets a precedent for the United States to bypass alliance multilateralism to strike direct security deals with individual member states. Second, it establishes a practice of the Greenlandic government sitting at the negotiating table directly with Washington, without Denmark as an intermediary [8]. Both trends reinforce a dynamic where bilateral relations take precedence over NATO's principle of collective defense.
The implications for the South Korean government and businesses can be summarized on three levels. First, this case is an empirical example of the pressure-and-persuasion pattern that Washington employs with its allies. The sequence of events, starting with a threat of acquisition and concluding with an agreement, is a developmental pattern that warrants consideration in future ROK-U.S. negotiations on defense cost-sharing and the Status of Forces Agreement [3][5]. Second, as the United States concentrates its military assets and diplomatic capital in the Western Hemisphere and the Arctic, there is a possibility that resource allocation to the Indo-Pacific region could be relatively deprioritized [5]. Third, as the commercialization of Arctic shipping routes and competition for resources intensify, South Korea's observer status leaves it with limited channels for substantive information access and participation [7].
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plan
In the short term, the focus should be on information gathering and observation. It is necessary to track the start date and scale of the two new bases in Greenland. The timeline for the reconstruction of the Narsarsuaq base and the commencement of work on the eastern coast base are direct indicators of the pace of U.S. militarization in the Arctic [11]. At the same time, the level of China's response must be monitored. A key point to observe is whether Beijing will link this issue to matters in Taiwan and the South China Sea, in conjunction with the schedule for the summit with Xi Jinping [3]. The fact that Russia's TASS news agency promptly reported on the agreement as securing U.S. access to airspace and territorial waters [9] also suggests that Moscow is likely to respond within a framework of Arctic competition.
In the medium term, the South Korean government should strengthen substantive information channels by leveraging its observer status in the Arctic Council, which is currently considered largely symbolic.[7] If any domestic companies are interested in developing Greenland's mineral and energy resources, they must separately examine how the expanded U.S. military presence will affect development licensing and foreign investment reviews. As the agreement includes provisions that effectively block Russia and China from establishing bases in Greenland,[15][3] projects involving Chinese capital are likely to face additional constraints during the review process.
In the long term, it is necessary to separately analyze the negotiating structure this case implies for the management of the ROK-U.S. alliance. If Washington repeatedly secures negotiating leverage by directly engaging with an ally's semi-autonomous territories or sub-national administrative units, this could become a pattern applicable to its management of other regional alliances. It is also crucial to continuously monitor whether U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy documents explicitly mention any adjustments to priorities concerning the Arctic and the Western Hemisphere.[5]
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is the progress of base construction in Greenland. It will be necessary to sequentially confirm the start of construction, the scale of troop deployment, and the introduction of weapons systems.[11] The second indicator is follow-up action at the NATO level. A key point to watch is whether the “NATO oversight” framework advocated by Denmark materializes in the form of actual NATO Council discussions or joint statements.[1][6] If this framework fails to lead to substantive multilateral procedures, it would indicate that Washington's structure of bilateral dominance has become entrenched.
The third indicator is the response from China and Russia. Key trigger points will be whether Beijing makes statements explicitly linking Greenland to issues in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and whether Moscow expands its deployment of military assets in the Arctic.[3][9] The fourth indicator is the trend of local public opinion in Greenland. It will be crucial to watch how the distrust of Washington,[12] which exists alongside reassuring statements from MP Nathansen, is expressed in future elections for Greenland's autonomous government or in discussions on independence. A spread of anti-American sentiment within the autonomous government could lead to renewed friction during the implementation of the agreement.
The fifth indicator is the U.S. domestic political calendar. As the agreement was signed ahead of the midterm elections,[3] a key variable to watch is whether the Trump administration maintains or adjusts the intensity of its implementation after the elections.
4. Summary and Conclusion
This agreement institutionalizes indefinite U.S. military superiority in the Arctic. While Denmark and Greenland secured the justification of maintaining their sovereignty, a significant degree of practical security control has been transferred to Washington. The claim of shared responsibility through a multilateral NATO framework reveals a gap between political rhetoric and institutional reality. South Korea should not view this issue as confined to the Arctic but should instead read it as a signal of a shift in Washington's very approach to alliance management. In the short term, Seoul should monitor the base construction and the reactions of major powers. In the medium and long term, it must work to strengthen its channels for participation in the Arctic Council and separately analyze the implications for the negotiating structure of the ROK-U.S. alliance.
References
[1] [Defense News] Denmark says NATO shares responsibility for Arctic security under Greenland deal
[4] [Daily Sabah] US to establish 2 new military bases in Greenland under deal with Denmark
[6] [Hürriyet Daily News] NATO to play leading role in Greenland deal: Denmark
[8] [BBC News] US to build two military bases in Greenland under new deal with Denmark
[9] [TASS] US to get free access to Greenland’s airspace and territorial waters
[11] [Defense News] US to open two new military bases in Greenland, sources say
[12] [Defense News] Greenland welcomes US military pact but trust still shaky
[14] [Jamaica Observer] Trump signs security deal with Greenland, Denmark at UN
[16] [Le Monde] Trump signs Greenland security deal at the UN
[17] [Rappler] Greenland, Denmark say US deal will not cede sovereignty
[18] [Channel News Asia] CNA Explains: What does the US-Greenland security deal actually change?
[20] [Bangkok Post] Trump claims ‘infinite’ Greenland security deal with Denmark
[23] [Cyprus Mail] Greenland, Denmark say US deal will not cede sovereignty
[25] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Trump hails Greenland security deal
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
How can I help you?