The U.S.-Denmark-Greenland Security Agreement and Its Implications for U.S.-China-Russia Competition in the Arctic

Executive Summary

The security agreement signed by the Trump administration with Denmark and Greenland on September 18 is centered on a provision that preemptively bars China and Russia from establishing bases in Greenland. This is an implementation of the initiative to strengthen dominance in the Western Hemisphere, as specified in the November 2025 National Security Strategy, and is part of the same context as interventions in Venezuela and the Panama Canal. While Denmark and Greenland accepted the agreement on the condition that their sovereignty and right to self-determination be recognized, the mistrust among NATO allies caused by Trump's initial remarks about acquiring the island has not been fully resolved. The timing of the agreement, coming before a summit with Xi Jinping and the midterm elections, strongly suggests an objective of securing negotiating leverage. A key variable to watch is the possibility that Beijing will respond by linking this issue to Taiwan and the South China Sea. South Korea should leverage its observer status in the Arctic Council to accumulate information, while also drawing lessons from Washington's pattern of alliance management—which combines pressure and appeasement—to develop its own logic for responding within the U.S.-ROK alliance channel.

I. Analysis of the Current Situation

The U.S.-Denmark-Greenland Security Agreement: An Analysis of the Current Situation

1. Background and Developments

The Trump administration's pressure regarding Greenland began immediately after his return to the White House on January 20, 2025. President Trump repeatedly and publicly floated the idea that the United States should acquire the island [2]. This statement caused considerable anxiety among Denmark, a NATO member, and its European partners [1]. While Denmark is the sovereign state holding authority over Greenland's foreign and defense policy, Greenland itself is a semi-autonomous territory with its own self-government [7][12]. This dual structure was a persistent issue during the negotiations. The process of finding a compromise between the level of security control demanded by Washington and the sovereignty and self-determination that Copenhagen and Nuuk sought to protect was at the core of the conflict over the past several months [1].

The roots of this idea are connected to the intent to strengthen dominance in the Western Hemisphere, which was already revealed in the National Security Strategy released by the Trump administration in November 2025 [6]. The fact that the operation to arrest Venezuela's Maduro and ambitions regarding the Panama Canal are discussed in the same context suggests that the Greenland agreement is not an isolated event, but part of a larger framework for reasserting control over the Western Hemisphere [4][6]. Some also point out its similarity to the historical pattern of maritime hegemons responding to the rise of a challenger by realigning alliances in surrounding waters [6].

2. Current Situation

On September 18 (local time), President Trump announced on the social media platform Truth Social that an agreement had been signed with Denmark and Greenland. He described it as a "very important, historic, and special" deal [10]. Trump characterized the agreement as having an "infinite life" and stressed that it would come at no cost to U.S. taxpayers [11]. He stated that Washington would permanently possess the "full ability" to take necessary measures to protect Greenland's security [11].

The Danish government's reaction has been cautious yet positive. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen defined the agreement as one that "simultaneously recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom and the right to self-determination of the people of Greenland" [13]. The government in Copenhagen has officially stated that it welcomes the agreement as "binding" [13][7]. The Premier of Greenland's self-government, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, also expressed satisfaction with the proposed agreement [14]. In a joint statement on Saturday, Denmark and Greenland reaffirmed that an expanded U.S. military presence would not undermine Greenland's sovereignty [14]. Behind this statement can be read the hope in Copenhagen and Nuuk to put an end to the friction caused by Trump with this agreement [14].

A notable part of the agreement's substantive content is the provision that preemptively bars the establishment of Russian and Chinese bases [9][12][15]. The fact that Latin American and Spanish-language media outlets such as Spain's EFE, Uruguay's El País, and Costa Rica's La Nación all highlighted this point by quoting Trump's phrase "forever" (para siempre) shows that the agreement is being consumed more as an external signal aimed at Russia and China than for a domestic U.S. audience [7][9][12][15]. The formal signing of the agreement is expected to take place soon [10].

3. Key Actors and Positions

The U.S. Trump administration is officially framing this agreement as a security measure to block Russian and Chinese access in the Arctic [9][12]. However, analysts, including those at the South China Morning Post (SCMP), are focusing on the timing of the announcement itself. They argue that Trump's calculation was to maximize his negotiating power ahead of the summit with Xi Jinping and the midterm elections [4]. It is also pointed out that this agreement is a carbon copy of Trump's previous plans concerning the Panama Canal [4]. Indeed, with Treasury Secretary Besant and USTR Representative Grier engaging in preliminary coordination with Chinese Vice Premier Li Qiang's side in New York ahead of the U.S.-China summit, Washington appears focused on securing leverage across the board in its negotiations with Beijing [5]. However, the SCMP also conveyed concerns that the agreement could negatively affect trust between major powers and the peaceful development of the Arctic [4].

The Danish government, as a NATO ally, is in a position where it must balance the practical need to manage relations with the United States against the domestic political burden of perceived infringement on its national territory [7][12][15]. Prime Minister Frederiksen's explicit mention of sovereignty and self-determination can be read as an attempt to preemptively block any perception of the agreement as a cession of territory within Denmark [13]. Greenland's self-government is weighing the practical benefits of resource development and security assistance against concerns of diminished self-determination, and Premier Nielsen's positive reaction suggests the agreement was designed, at least on the surface, not to be disadvantageous to Greenland [14].

Reactions within Europe are mixed. Trump's previous remarks about acquiring Greenland had already provoked considerable backlash among NATO allies and European partners [1][7]. The Atlantic Council assesses the deal as a "sign of a thaw" in the transatlantic alliance relationship, while also suggesting that the ill will left by Trump's previously stated intention to acquire the island has not been completely resolved [2].

4. Key Issues

The most fundamental issue is whether the two concepts of "permanent security control" and "respect for sovereignty" can be compatible in the actual implementation phase. Trump stipulated that the United States would permanently have the "full ability" to take necessary measures concerning Greenland's security [11]. In contrast, Denmark and Greenland have insisted, as a precondition for the agreement, that their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and right to self-determination will not be undermined [13][14]. This textual tension is likely to resurface during the detailed implementation process regarding issues such as the scope of U.S. base expansion, troop levels, and the approval authority of the Greenlandic government.

The second issue is the timing and purpose of the agreement. Although it takes the form of a security agreement, the fact that it was announced just before the summit with Xi Jinping and the U.S. midterm elections strongly indicates that it is more than a pure regional security measure, serving as leverage in negotiations with China [4]. This is directly linked to the structure of regional deterrence posture in the U.S.-China strategic competition. The provision preemptively barring the establishment of Chinese and Russian bases in Greenland can be interpreted as a preemptive move by Washington to stake its claim in the trilateral U.S.-China-Russia competition over Arctic shipping routes and resources [9][12][6][8].

The third issue is the repercussion for NATO alliance cohesion. While this agreement is an example of the U.S. alliance network expanding toward the Arctic and the Western Hemisphere, it is uncertain whether the damage to trust caused by America's unilateral attempt to control an ally's territory has been fully repaired [1][2]. Even after the agreement, vigilance within Europe regarding Trump's expansionist territorial ambitions is likely to persist, and this is a variable that could affect member states' future assessments of U.S. leadership within NATO.

II. In-Depth Analysis

The U.S.-Denmark-Greenland Security Agreement: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Root Cause Analysis

The impetus for this agreement was President Trump's personal idea of acquiring Greenland, but to read its background as merely a personal obsession would be to miss the essence of the agreement. The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) released in November 2025 codified the strengthening of dominance over the Western Hemisphere [6]. The Greenland agreement is a derivative of this strategy. The fact that it proceeded concurrently with the operation to arrest Venezuela's Maduro and the attempt to reassert control over the Panama Canal supports this view [4][6].

The root cause is threefold. First is the commercialization of Arctic shipping routes. As climate change rapidly reduces Arctic sea ice, the commercial viability of new sea lanes like the Northeast Passage has become a reality [8]. Second is the dynamic of maritime power transition. The United States is attempting to preemptively secure control over the Atlantic-Arctic axis amid the simultaneous buildup of China's naval power and Russia's militarization of the Arctic [6]. Third is the domestic political timetable. It is noteworthy that the analysis suggesting the need for negotiating leverage ahead of the summit with Xi Jinping and the midterm elections came not from a Washington Post-affiliated outlet, but from Hong Kong's South China Morning Post [4]. This suggests the timing of the agreement was not coincidental but a calculated move to manage the negotiating landscape with China [4].

2. Structural Context

Security Structure: The Dual Sovereignty of a Semi-Autonomous Territory

Greenland holds a special status as part of the Kingdom of Denmark while also having its own self-government. Foreign and defense powers are held by Copenhagen, but domestic affairs and jurisdiction over resources are exercised by the self-government in Nuuk [7][12]. From Washington's perspective, this dual structure acted as a constraint by creating two separate negotiating counterparts. This was because the Danish government and the Greenlandic self-government had different interests. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen's characterization of the agreement as one that "simultaneously recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom and the right to self-determination of the people of Greenland" is rhetoric aimed at papering over this structural tension [13]. The separate expression of satisfaction by Greenland's Premier Jens-Frederik Nielsen is further evidence that approval was needed from both entities [14].

Multilateral Security Structure: Fissures and Repair within NATO

Denmark is a founding member of NATO. Over the past year, Trump's remarks about acquiring Greenland have caused considerable anxiety among NATO allies [1][7]. The very fact that a statement was made that could be seen as an attempt to infringe on the sovereignty of an ally's territory was unusual. This agreement demonstrates a pattern in U.S. alliance management that combines threats and appeasement. The Atlantic Council assessed the deal as "signs of a thaw" [2]. This paradoxically shows that the Greenland conflict had created a real rift in the transatlantic alliance relationship. The fact that such friction occurred in the relationship with a key ally like Denmark, at a time when multilateral security networks like the NATO-IP4 linkage are being discussed, could lead to questions about the consistency of U.S. alliance policy.

U.S.-China Strategic Competition Structure: Establishing a Non-Military Line of Containment

The core provision of the agreement is the complete exclusion of Russian and Chinese base construction in Greenland [9][12][15]. This is a method of preemptively establishing an exclusionary clause not in a region of direct military confrontation like the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, but in the Arctic, which had been relatively loosely managed. The fact that Spanish-language media outlets uniformly featured Trump's phrase "forever" (para siempre) in their headlines [9][12][15] is evidence that the agreement functions more as an external signal to China and Russia than as a matter of U.S. domestic politics. Disclosing such an exclusionary provision on the eve of the summit with Xi Jinping is in line with Washington's method of building leverage outside the negotiating table, similar to its approach to setting red lines on the Taiwan issue [3].

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

An example of a maritime hegemon responding to the rise of a challenger by realigning alliances in surrounding waters can be found in late 19th-century Britain. When the naval power of the United States, Germany, and Japan grew simultaneously, Britain used the occasion of the 1895 Venezuelan crisis to accept U.S. claims to a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere [6]. Subsequently, it signed the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 to adjust its naval burden in the Western Hemisphere and Asia [6]. It also realigned its relationship with France, with which it had come to the brink of war during the 1898 Fashoda Incident, through the Entente Cordiale of 1904 [6]. All of these adjustments were ultimately strategic choices to counter the rising German navy in continental Europe [6].

The current Greenland agreement is structurally similar to this pattern. Faced with the challenge of China's naval buildup, the United States is reaffirming its sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere while simultaneously realigning its relationship with its Atlantic ally, Denmark. The fact that the arrest of Venezuela's Maduro and the Panama Canal policy were pursued concurrently [6] suggests this move is part of a broader redeployment strategy across the Western Hemisphere. Just as Britain concentrated its naval power on home defense while acknowledging the U.S. sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, Washington can be seen as attempting to reorganize the security burden on the Atlantic-Arctic axis under its own leadership by incorporating Greenland as the northern anchor of its Western Hemisphere defense line.

However, there is also a crucial difference. Whereas Britain's sphere-of-influence adjustments were negotiations between peer great powers, this agreement is closer to a case of the United States imposing what is effectively unilateral security control over an ally and relatively weaker state, Denmark. The events of the preceding months, during which Trump's acquisition remarks created anxiety within NATO [1][7], support this asymmetry.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The agreement's legal force and scope of implementation. The Danish government has defined it as a "binding" agreement [13], but Trump only used the phrase "infinite life" on social media, and the formal treaty text has not been released [10][11]. How the actual text at the time of signing defines the scope of the U.S. military presence, the distribution of command authority, and the consent procedures of Greenland's self-government will determine the agreement's effectiveness.

Temporal linkage with the Xi Jinping summit. If, as the SCMP analysis suggests, this agreement functions as negotiating leverage ahead of the summit [4], Beijing's reaction will determine the agreement's subsequent development. If Beijing pushes back by linking it to the Taiwan issue or the South China Sea, it could affect the agenda-setting of the summit itself [3]. Conversely, if Beijing dismisses it as a symbolic measure and ignores it, the agreement's actual deterrent effect could be limited.

The trajectory of Greenland's domestic politics. Despite Premier Nielsen's approval, there is a possibility that debates over independence sentiment and resource development rights could reignite within Greenland. The stability of the trilateral Copenhagen-Nuuk-Washington relationship will depend on how the self-government politically digests this agreement in future election cycles.

Chain reaction from NATO member states. There is an underlying concern in Europe that this case could lead to similar U.S. pressure tactics regarding the territories of other NATO members [1][2]. Although the Atlantic Council expressed relief with the term "thaw" [2], this is also proof that the preceding tensions were significant. Whether the United States applies a similar security control model in other regions, following Panama and Venezuela, will be a litmus test for alliance credibility [6].