Trump's UN Speech and Expanding Pressure in the Western Hemisphere: U.S. Strategic Realignment and Policy Directions for South Korea
Executive Summary
President Trump's address to the UN General Assembly is the implementation of a plan to reassert U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere, linking the Greenland security agreement, the arrest of Venezuela's Maduro, and the tightening of the Cuba embargo on a single axis. This is a structural move by the United States to reassert its exclusive sphere of influence, starting in its own backyard, in response to the U.S.-China maritime power transition. The midterm election schedule and the possibility of expanding secondary sanctions are key variables determining the intensity of this policy. The South Korean government and companies should not treat this as an issue confined to Latin America and the Arctic, but rather as a signal that Washington's entire approach to managing allies and competitors is being realigned. In particular, as military assets and diplomatic capital become more concentrated in the Western Hemisphere and the Arctic, resource allocation priorities for Indo-Pacific allies could change. It is therefore necessary to continuously monitor for potential changes to security commitments to Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. In the short term, a strategy is needed that uses trends in Cuba sanctions licensing and the timeline for confirming the Greenland bases as key indicators to watch. In the medium to long term, the strategy should track post-election policy shifts and the evolving reallocation of U.S. resources.
I. Issue Analysis
Trump's UN Speech and Expanding Pressure in the Western Hemisphere: An Issue Analysis
1. Background and Developments
President Trump's recent address to the UN General Assembly was not merely one-off rhetoric. It is an extension of a plan to reshape the Western Hemisphere that has been underway since he took office in January 2025. The pressure, which began with remarks about acquiring Greenland, reached an initial conclusion with the signing of a security agreement with Denmark and Greenland on September 22. The announcement of two new U.S. military bases in his UN speech marks a further step forward [7][12].
As EAI has previously analyzed, this agreement is the "implementation of the plan to strengthen dominance in the Western Hemisphere, as specified in the November 2025 National Security Strategy" [3]. The key point is that this issue has proceeded in the same context as interventions in Venezuela and the Panama Canal [3]. Denmark and Greenland accepted the agreement on the condition that their sovereignty and right to self-determination were recognized, but the mistrust among NATO allies caused by Trump's initial acquisition remarks has not been fully resolved [3].
The pressure on Cuba is also not a new development. According to an EAI analysis, the second Trump administration is "reviving the 'troika of tyranny' frame, centered on the State Department line of Secretary Rubio" [6]. For the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. embargo (*bloqueo*) has been a matter of national survival since the 1960s [6]. The Havana government has long defined it as a violation of international law, which the UN General Assembly has called to be lifted for over 30 years [6]. In this context, the speech's reference to Cuba as a "failed state" is likely to be perceived by Havana not as a new threat, but as a signal of increased intensity within the existing narrative of the embargo.
The Venezuela issue has entered an even more unusual phase. An EAI Global NK commentary noted the "arrest of Venezuelan President Maduro by the Trump administration," assessing it as an exceptional intervention "through a surprise military operation" [8]. EAI interprets this as overlapping with the historical precedent of the 1895 Venezuela crisis, when the United Kingdom recognized America's sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere [8].
2. Current Situation
In his speech at the 81st UN General Assembly at the UN Headquarters in New York on September 22, President Trump significantly increased the proportion of his remarks related to Latin America. Chile's *El Mercurio* reported his statement that the "Cuban regime will fall" alongside his mention of the possibility of "annihilating Iran" and the announcement of the Greenland bases [1]. Local media also noted that Trump took the stage following the tradition of Brazilian President Lula delivering the opening speech [1].
Malaysia's *The Edge Markets* reported Trump's direct quote that "communist regimes are under the greatest pressure ever and will collapse as completely failed states" [4]. Panama's *La Estrella* reported this in a stronger tone, stating that Trump warned he was "prepared to use military force in Latin America if he determines that national interests are threatened" [9]. This is a more advanced expression than previous statements, as it explicitly links military options to intervention in the Western Hemisphere.
Italy's *La Repubblica* reported that the Cuban and Iranian delegations walked out in protest during the speech [11]. This occurred immediately after Trump's remark that "freedom will come soon" to Cuba [11]. This moment symbolically reenacted the U.S.-Cuba conflict on the UN stage, showing that the Havana government's backlash was immediate and public.
Regarding Greenland, the *Jamaica Observer* reported that a signing ceremony between Trump and the leaders of Denmark and Greenland was held at a side event of the UN General Assembly in New York [13]. Trump described it as a "long-term and fantastic relationship" [13]. However, *El Mundo* pointed out that the agreement fell short of the "control over the entire island" that Trump had pursued since the beginning of his term [16]. The report stated that a compromise was reached at a level where the U.S. would possess "permanent, full authority over security-related activities" [16].
India's *The Hindu* directly quoted Trump's statement during the speech that he would "immediately begin the placement of a large military force in an appropriate location" and "build two very important military bases" [12]. Russia's TASS described this as a measure to "immediately and drastically expand the U.S. military presence in Greenland" [7].
3. Key Actors and Positions
The Cuban government views the speech as an extension of the existing embargo narrative, yet it opted for the symbolic response of a delegation walkout [11]. The official position from Foreign Minister Rodríguez's line is to adhere to the frame of defining U.S. actions as a violation of international law [6]. Amid a worsening domestic economic crisis, the U.S. designation of Cuba as a "failed state" could serve as a direct blow to the regime's legitimacy.
The Venezuelan government is seeking negotiation channels following the unprecedented situation of Maduro's arrest. *El Mundo* reported that Trump was pursuing a meeting with Vice President Delcy Rodríguez during the UN General Assembly [16]. This suggests that a path for a diplomatic settlement remains open alongside military pressure. From Caracas's perspective, this means entering a phase of negotiations on which the regime's survival depends.
Denmark and Greenland signed the security agreement on the premise of respect for their sovereignty, but the relationship remains fluid. Turkey's *Hürriyet* had already reported on September 18 that they had "agreed to an expanded U.S. military presence" [14]. The formal signing then took place at a UN side event on September 22 [13][18]. From the perspective of Copenhagen and Nuuk, this can be assessed as a pragmatic choice to transfer the security burden to the U.S. while minimizing infringements on their autonomy.
Within the United States, the Atlantic Council approached the agreement within the framework of its "implications for the transatlantic alliance" [5]. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) also treated Trump's Western Hemisphere vision with considerable weight, dedicating a separate session to it [2]. This suggests that within Washington policy circles, this move is perceived not as a simple regional issue but as a test case for the overall approach to alliance management.
4. Key Issues
The first issue is whether the military option has been made explicit. The statement reported by *La Estrella* about the "use of military force if national interests are threatened" is a step beyond the existing stance of economic and diplomatic pressure [9]. It is not yet clear whether this is a principle that applies to both Cuba and Venezuela or a case-by-case response.
The second is the effective scope of the Greenland agreement. As *El Mundo* pointed out, the deal is a compromise that falls short of "control over the entire island" [16]. However, the concrete measure of establishing two new U.S. military bases is likely to continuously test the gap between the principle of respecting autonomy and the reality of expanding military control.
The third is the link between the remarks on accelerating arms supplies to allies and the policy toward the Western Hemisphere. This means that alliance management in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East will compete for resources within the same allocation framework as intervention in the Western Hemisphere. As EAI has noted, this trend is similar to the redeployment pattern seen "when a maritime hegemon faces a power transition driven by a challenger state" [8]. Whether China and Russia will respond by linking this to issues in Taiwan and the Arctic is a future variable to watch.
II. In-Depth Analysis
Trump's UN Speech and Expanding Pressure in the Western Hemisphere: An In-Depth Analysis
1. Analysis of Root Causes
To read this speech as simple hawkish rhetoric is to miss the main point. The fundamental background is America's structural response to the U.S.-China maritime power transition. An EAI Global NK commentary explains this as a historical pattern: "When a maritime hegemon faces a maritime power transition driven by a challenger state, it has historically shown a tendency to redeploy naval forces from surrounding theaters and seek new alliance relationships or readjust existing ones to compensate" [8]. With China's naval buildup extending not only into the Western Pacific but also into Western Hemisphere infrastructure (ports and logistics), the United States feels the need to re-master its own backyard first.
Cuba, Venezuela, and Greenland may seem geographically unrelated, but they are bound by a single logic. They are all points for reasserting America's exclusive sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere or the Arctic. An EAI analysis defines the Greenland agreement as the "implementation of the plan to strengthen dominance in the Western Hemisphere, as specified in the November 2025 National Security Strategy" and as "an issue that has proceeded in the same context as interventions in Venezuela and the Panama Canal" [3]. Treating these three issues separately means failing to grasp the pattern of Trump's diplomacy.
The pressure on Cuba has a separate root cause within this structure: domestic political drivers. The Cuban-American voter bloc in Florida is a traditional core constituency for the Republican Party. Just as Cuban Foreign Minister Rodríguez has treated the U.S. embargo as a "top diplomatic priority directly linked to national survival," in Washington, regime change in Cuba is consumed as a symbolic achievement [6]. The revival of the "troika of tyranny" frame functions as a mechanism for translating ideological clarity into domestic political gains [6].
2. Structural Context
The most prominent variable in the political structure is the U.S. midterm election schedule. France 24 reported that Trump mentioned he would "reach an agreement with Tehran after the midterm elections" [15]. Although this remark was limited to the Iran issue, it suggests that the overall hardline foreign policy is a timing strategy subordinated to the election schedule. The timing of the Greenland agreement is similar. EAI assesses that "the fact that it was signed ahead of the summit with Xi Jinping and the midterm elections strongly suggests the aim was to secure negotiating leverage" [3].
In the economic structure, the secondary sanctions system is the central axis. Regarding the Cuba issue, EAI points to the "possibility that the pattern of expanding secondary sanctions seen in the case of Iran sanctions could also be applied to Cuba" [6]. This means U.S. policy toward Cuba could move beyond bilateral sanctions to regulate even third-country financial institutions. The diagnosis that the path to entrenching this sanctions structure is a "dependent variable that will be determined by the outcome of the Venezuela situation" is in the same vein [6]. The Cuba and Venezuela policies are not independent variables but are closer to dependent variables derived from a perspective that views the entire Caribbean as a single belt of sanctions and military pressure.
In the security structure, the Arctic and the Caribbean are being reorganized as America's defensive lines on both flanks. The core of the Greenland agreement is a "provision that preemptively excludes the establishment of Chinese or Russian bases in Greenland" [3]. The two new U.S. military bases announced in the speech are a follow-up measure that materializes this exclusionary provision with physical facilities [7][12]. The Atlantic Council reports Trump's comment that the agreement "completely resolved a number of U.S. concerns," while also suggesting that interpretations still diverge within the transatlantic alliance [5].
3. Historical Precedents and Comparison with Similar Cases
The clearest precedent these remarks reference is the assertion of an exclusive sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, in the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine. The 1895 Venezuela crisis, highlighted by the EAI Global NK commentary, is a prime example. At that time, the United Kingdom "began to accept America's claim to a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere," a strategic choice made so that Britain could focus on home defense in response to Germany's naval buildup [8]. It is no coincidence that, 130 years later, Venezuela is once again at the center of a Western Hemisphere issue. The exceptional military operation to arrest President Maduro [8] is the reverse of how Britain then recognized the regional hegemony of a rising challenger (the U.S.); it is the established hegemon (the U.S.) physically eliminating a regional challenger.
The Greenland issue is connected to the U.S. forward-basing strategy in the Arctic during the Cold War. While the Cold War deployment, symbolized by Thule Air Base, was aimed at the Soviet Union, the new bases have an expanded target, aimed not only at Russia but also at China's access to Arctic shipping routes and resources. A key difference, however, is that this time it took the form of an agreement recognizing Denmark's sovereignty, unlike the unilateral base establishments of the Cold War era. *El Mundo* reported this as a situation where the U.S. secured not "complete control" but "the permanent ability to take necessary measures at any time" [16].
The Cuba issue is less a repeat of the 1960s embargo policy and more a recalibration of its intensity. The pattern of the first Trump term, which reversed the normalization of relations from the Obama era and re-designated Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism [6], has now advanced a step further in the second term with the "failed state" designation and predictions of collapse. This is not a change in policy direction but an escalation along the existing trajectory, which distinguishes it from the Greenland and Venezuela cases.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is the outcome of the U.S. midterm elections and the subsequent sustainability of the policy. Whether the current hardline stance is election-year rhetoric or a structural shift articulated in the National Security Strategy will be determined by the actual pace of implementation after the election. Unlike the Iran issue, where an "agreement after the midterm elections" was foreshadowed [15], the Cuba and Greenland issues have already been translated into physical actions (base construction, agreement signing), so the possibility of a retreat should be seen as low.
The second variable is China's response. EAI has pointed out that "the possibility of Beijing responding by linking this to issues in Taiwan and the South China Sea is a major variable to watch" [3]. As the provision excluding bases from Greenland preemptively blocks China's advance into the Arctic, it is plausible that Beijing will play a corresponding card in East Asia.
The third variable is whether there will be actual changes in the domestic political situations in Cuba and Venezuela. Whether Trump's prediction of "collapse" remains rhetoric or leads to actual regime change will determine the stability of the entire Caribbean. The fact that the Cuban delegation walked out during the speech [11] shows that the Havana government took the remark not as a signal for negotiation but as a frontal challenge to its legitimacy. This suggests Cuba may strengthen a confrontational frame rather than compromise in its future relations with the U.S.
The fourth variable is whether trust can be restored with European allies, particularly Denmark and NATO. EAI notes that "the mistrust among NATO allies caused by Trump's initial acquisition remarks has not been fully resolved" [3]. Despite the formal patching-up of the agreement signing, if the U.S. repeats similar pressure tactics on the territory of other allies in the future, the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance itself could be shaken.
III. Final Policy Recommendations
Trump's UN Speech and Expanding Pressure in the Western Hemisphere: Comprehensive Policy Recommendations
1. Overall Assessment and Recommended Responses
This speech was not a series of impromptu hardline remarks against individual countries. The key judgment is that the Greenland security agreement, the arrest of Venezuela's Maduro, and the tightening of the Cuba embargo all lie on a single axis. EAI has previously defined this as the "implementation of the plan to strengthen dominance in the Western Hemisphere, as specified in the November 2025 National Security Strategy" [3]. From the perspective of the South Korean government and companies, this issue should not be treated as confined to Latin America and the Arctic. It should be read as a signal that Washington's very method of managing allies and competitors is being realigned.
The most critical point to note is that America's strategy to re-master the Western Hemisphere could be projected onto the alliance structure in Asia, beyond the Caribbean and the Arctic. Trump's mention in his speech that he would "speed up the supply of weapons to allies" directly connects to the issue of security commitments to Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula and the priorities of resource allocation. As military assets and diplomatic capital are increasingly concentrated in the Western Hemisphere and the Arctic, it is necessary to watch how the methods and speed of resource allocation for Indo-Pacific allies are adjusted.
The recommended response has three prongs. First, in preparation for the potential expansion of secondary sanctions amid the sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela, South Korean companies must review their exposure through transactions routed via third-country financial institutions [6]. Second, South Korea should closely monitor the impact of the Greenland agreement on observer states within the Arctic Council and strengthen channels for information gathering by leveraging its status as an Arctic Council observer [3]. Third, Washington's "'pressure-and-persuasion' pattern of alliance management" should be used as a reference for developing response logic within the ROK-U.S. alliance channel [3]. As seen in the case of Greenland and Denmark, there is a possibility that the pattern of making strong initial remarks followed by a compromise approach that partially recognizes the counterpart's sovereignty at the agreement-signing stage will be repeated.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plan
In the short term (within three months), South Korea should maintain a wait-and-see approach, using the U.S. Department of the Treasury's (OFAC) trends in issuing licenses for Cuba as a key indicator[6]. Given South Korea's recent establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba, it is more prudent from a risk management standpoint to respond after the U.S. sanctions framework is finalized rather than pursuing preemptive engagement. Concurrently, Seoul should monitor when the sites and functions of the two new bases in Greenland are confirmed and incorporate this information into the business plans of domestic companies involved in Arctic shipping routes and resource development[7][12].
In the medium term (six months to one year), it is necessary to monitor potential shifts in U.S. policy toward Iran and Cuba following the U.S. midterm elections. France 24 reported that Trump stated he would "reach an agreement with Tehran after the midterm elections"[15], suggesting that a similar election-dependent timing strategy might be applied to policies on Cuba and Venezuela. South Korean companies will need to adjust their strategies for entering Caribbean and Latin American markets depending on whether U.S. policy intensity eases or strengthens after the elections.
In the long term (one year or more), should the U.S. effort to reassert control over the Western Hemisphere and the Arctic enter its final stages, it will be necessary to track changes in U.S. resource allocation in the Indo-Pacific region. The key variable to monitor is how statements about accelerating arms supplies are reflected in actual logistics support priorities concerning Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. It is necessary to establish an information-sharing mechanism within ROK-U.S. defense industry cooperation channels to detect these changes at an early stage.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is whether the U.S. Department of the Treasury announces secondary sanctions against Cuba. The trigger point is if the pattern of regulating third-country financial institutions, seen in the sanctions against Iran, is applied to Cuba[6]. The second is the start date for the construction of bases in Greenland and the responsive statements from China and Russia. A key variable identified by EAI is the "possibility that Beijing will respond by linking this issue to Taiwan and the South China Sea"[3]. The third is the pace of the power transition process in Venezuela following the arrest of Maduro. This will serve as a reference case for assessing whether the U.S. model of military intervention could be analogously applied to other regions, particularly to the logic of response in a Taiwan Strait contingency.
The fourth is the shift in the Trump administration's tone regarding Latin America after the midterm elections. The key will be whether there is follow-through on the statement, reported by Panama's La Estrella, that the U.S. "is prepared to use military force in Latin America if it determines its national interests are threatened"[9]. The fifth is the list of recipient countries and the volume of arms in U.S. announcements of weapon supplies to its allies. South Korea's position on this priority list is an indicator with tangible implications.
4. Summary and Conclusion
Trump's recent UN speech was not a mere enumeration of separate issues concerning Cuba, Venezuela, and Greenland. Rather, his remarks were made within a single strategic framework aimed at reasserting America's exclusive sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere and the Arctic[3][8]. While the Cuban delegation's walkout and the threat of a tightened blockade represent a continuation of the existing narrative from Havana's perspective[6][11], the new bases in Greenland and intervention in Venezuela demonstrate that the United States has entered a phase of actively redeploying military assets[7][8]. South Korea should not view this trend as limited to Latin American affairs but as a signal of a reorganization in Washington's approach to alliance management and its resource allocation priorities. The most rational path forward is to concurrently address short-term tasks—assessing sanctions exposure and gathering intelligence on the Arctic—while also pursuing the medium-to-long-term task of tracking shifts in arms supply priorities.
References
[1] [El Mercurio] Trump en la ONU: Dice que el régimen cubano
[2] [Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)] Understanding Trump’s UNGA Speech
[4] [The Edge Malaysia] Trump says freedom coming to Cuba in UN speech
[7] [TASS] US to expand military presence in Greenland, build two bases — Trump
[10] [Le Monde] Trump threatens to 'annihilate' Iran and claims Cuba will 'fall' in UN speech
[13] [Jamaica Observer] Trump signs security deal with Greenland, Denmark at UN
[14] [Hürriyet Daily News] Trump announces Greenland deal to expand US military presence
[15] [France 24] Iran, AI and the ICC: Trump makes threats, touts policies at UN General Assembly
[16] [El Mundo] Estados Unidos alcanza un acuerdo de seguridad con Groenlandia
[18] [Le Monde] Trump signs Greenland security deal at the UN
[21] [Yle News] Trump uhkaili YK-puheessaan Kuubaa – Kuuban delegaatio marssi ulos salista
[22] [Vijesti] Tramp u UN zaprijetio da će „uništiti Islamsku Republiku“ ako ne...
[23] [BBC News] US to build two military bases in Greenland under new deal with Denmark
[24] [TASS] US to gain permanent control over Greenland’s security — Trump
[25] [Daily Sabah] US to establish 2 new military bases in Greenland under deal with Denmark
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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