[10th EAI Academy] ④ China's Global and U.S. Strategy and South Korea's Response

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hyLdKy8r0zg

■ Lee Dong-ryul_EAI Senior Fellow, Professor in the Department of Chinese Language and Literature at Dongduk Women's University.

Video Transcript

China's Revisionist Challenge to the International Order and Its Trajectory

I have condensed my talk today into four questions. You might think four is a lot, but they are all interconnected. The biggest question is whether China is a revisionist state seeking to dismantle the existing U.S.-led international order and create a new one. What are your thoughts? This question might seem a bit unfamiliar, but it has become a very active topic of discussion recently. China's rise as a great power is not new, but the recent surge in debate focuses less on China itself and more on the relative decline of the hegemonic order of its counterpart, the United States. This leads to the question: if the U.S.-centric existing international order declines, and does so more rapidly, what is the alternative? China is once again gaining attention as that alternative. This brings us to the question of whether China, as an alternative, has the capability and the will to create a new order.

Does the question itself strike you as interesting, or does it sound absurd? This is because perceptions of China, especially within South Korea, show extreme polarization. On one hand, there is the perception of China as a provocative, threatening, and hegemonic state. On the other hand, the belief that 'China will soon collapse' coexists. Revisionist states generally follow a certain path. They cultivate grievances against the existing order, build up their power based on these grievances, and once their power grows, they challenge the norms and institutions of the existing system.

If a challenge is met with no adequate punishment or sanctions, it becomes a fait accompli, and the order eventually moves toward change. This is a kind of basic pattern. So, did China have many grievances? There is the so-called 'century of humiliation.' This refers to the 100 years of pain and shame from the Opium War in 1840 to 1949, when China suffered from imperialist aggression. The government has continuously emphasized this humiliation to the public, fostering the logic that 'we must build a rich country and a strong military.' This is a point that has been stressed by all leaders, from China's founding leader Mao Zedong to the current leader Xi Jinping. The targets of that humiliation were the hegemonic and imperialist powers.

During the Mao era, there was an attempt to build a rich country and a strong military, but it failed. It was pursued through the Great Leap Forward, which was a complete failure, and the aftermath of that failure led to the Cultural Revolution. As a result of the Cultural Revolution, China was able to attempt a radical new transformation called 'reform and opening up.' Now, 40 years after the start of reform and opening up, China has achieved development beyond imagination. In that process, its accession to the WTO in 2001 gave wings to its reform and opening up policy.

As it achieved dramatic growth, China came to perceive that the existing order and norms were not sufficiently accommodating it or reflecting its interests in proportion to its expanded national power. Consequently, it began to show a pattern of gradually challenging these norms. Some believe that, in line with this path, China is employing a 'gray zone strategy' in areas like its Air Defense Identification Zone, South China Sea sovereignty issues, and especially the Taiwan Strait, gradually probing the norms and observing the responses. The pattern is very similar. The case that best fits this pattern is that of Hitler's Germany after World War I and before World War II. It is very similar, but there are also differences.

What are the differences? Germany departed from the order locally and exited quickly. China, however, remains within the order and even enjoys the benefits it provides. That was the essence of the reform and opening up policy, and the pinnacle of that policy was its achievements within the WTO system created by the United States. This is the biggest difference. If Germany was destructive, China is productive, and its process unfolds over a very long period. For example, over the past 70 years, it has gradually and incrementally expanded its influence, and as its influence has grown, it has slowly begun to challenge the norms. Until the 1970s, China was a state that thoroughly resisted the existing order.

However, things started to change in 1980 with the beginning of the reform and opening up policy. China began to selectively participate in existing U.S.-led international organizations and institutions that were advantageous and helpful to this policy. These were mainly international economic management organizations and institutions that aided its opening-up policy, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT. Although it ultimately failed to join GATT, it continued to move in that direction. Throughout the 1980s, there was much criticism of this Chinese policy.

The criticism was that of a 'free rider.' China was accused of maximizing the benefits provided by international organizations while failing to fulfill its due obligations and responsibilities. In the 1990s, to mitigate this, China proposed the theory of a 'responsible great power' and began to participate in international institutions and norms related to security and human rights, which it had previously avoided or been reluctant to join. Before, it had regarded organizations like the ARF and the CTBT as international bodies designed to contain and constrain China.

It evolved in the direction of playing a role befitting a responsible great power. In the 2000s, it began to show a will to participate fully and take a leading role. Of course, during this period, it also joined the WTO. More noteworthy is that China took the lead in creating the SCO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and expanded its voice within it. At the same time, China began to seriously talk about its 'peaceful rise.' The international community started to focus on the 'rise' aspect, and this was the point when the 'China threat theory' began to spread.

Since 2012, during the Xi Jinping era, China has gone a step further. Beyond simply participating and leading, it began to argue that existing international organizations must be reformed. It started to voice the opinion that 'this does not suit me. Since this system and its norms were originally created centered on the United States to serve American national interests, they must now be reformed in a way that reflects our interests.' To summarize, although it has been a very gradual and slow process over 70 years, China has been challenging the norms and steadily building its capacity to do so.

China's Vision for the World Order and Its Global Strategy

So, what is the next step? This will be our point of interest. It is clear that China is following the path of a revisionist state, but it is different from Germany. It does not seek to thoroughly destroy the existing order. In fact, recently, it has been arguing that it should uphold the existing order and system created by the United States better than the U.S. itself does. It's paradoxical. And the timeline is unfolding very slowly. What is particularly noteworthy is that if you look at the process of change in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, as China's foreign policy evolved from independent diplomacy to a responsible great power, peaceful rise, and major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, it has adjusted its diplomatic strategy in a manner befitting its capabilities whenever its national power reached a certain level.

In other words, it prioritized accumulating power first, rather than adjusting its diplomatic strategy and then exerting its strength. However, in the Xi Jinping era, that pattern has started to show slightly different aspects, or rather, it is evolving more proactively and rapidly. It appears to be pursuing both the accumulation of power and the reform of institutions simultaneously, which makes us pay closer attention and inevitably focus on China's revisionist moves.

Looking at China's vision for the order, it seems to have a three-tiered structure. The focus is still concentrated on norms and diplomatic discourse. It contains many idealistic words like 'community with a shared future for mankind,' 'sovereign equality,' 'international law,' and 'multilateralism.' What does this mean? The next step is that it has begun to present concrete institutions and standards. This is a phenomenon that emerged in the 2020s, representing a further step. It has moved beyond just reforming existing U.S-led institutions and norms to putting forward Chinese-style institutions and norms that China can lead.

And it is expanding its networks. The biggest difference with the United States is that China does not have allies. To compensate for this weakness, China persistently opposes alliances. This is because it cannot form alliances itself. Instead, it is expanding its networks through means like the BRI, AIIB, BRICS, and SCO, primarily mobilizing economic tools.

Particularly since around 2023, its diplomatic strategy has shown a trend of globalization. China traditionally divided its diplomatic space into four frames: great powers, the periphery, developing countries, and multilateral forums. Depending on its assessment of the changing situation in each period, it would prioritize great power diplomacy or periphery diplomacy. However, starting in 2014, it began to integrate these into a 'global' strategy, the core of which is multipolarization and globalization.

It has been moving in that direction. Then in 2025, unexpectedly, it held a 'Work Conference on Periphery Diplomacy' for the first time in about 10 years. This was a conference mechanism for strengthening diplomacy with its neighbors. I personally found it surprising. Why go global and then return to the periphery? I believe this timing coincided with the inauguration of the Trump administration. China was very concerned and sensitive about the start of the Trump administration. So, I think it was a temporary tactical response to first placate its neighbors. Then, Trump and Xi Jinping held a summit in Busan in September 2025.

After meeting, Xi Jinping found that Trump did not have as many cards as he had thought. He began to gain confidence that he could negotiate from a position of equality, and since then, China has been adjusting its diplomatic strategy back toward a global orientation. So, it is putting forward these 'five global roles' and declaring it will compete with the United States on an equal footing. But if you look closely, and I will continue to emphasize this later, China faces internal constraints and limitations.

It faces a dilemma where it's difficult to push too hard due to economic stagnation and the difficult task of sustaining the one-party system of the Communist Party. The roles China talks about are as follows—China is truly good at coining phrases. For example, it says it will act as a stabilizer in the unstable international situation and as a guide for the changing international order. It also talks about becoming the engine of world economic growth. In this way, it is presenting very specific roles, and I feel that its global strategy is becoming incomparably more concrete than before as it moves to realize them.

At the same time, especially in forward-looking fields that will be crucial in future power competition, such as AI, digital, and green technologies, even the United States does not yet have established norms, values, or institutions. China is taking a more proactive approach in these areas, and while its success is uncertain, it is proceeding with initiatives like an international arbitration court, an AI cooperation organization, and projects related to the digital economy and green, low-carbon development, mainly targeting the Global South where U.S. influence is weaker.

This, too, is not an attitude of 'now we can go head-to-head with the U.S.,' but rather a very cautious and careful crafting of its global strategy. In a way, it looks very sophisticated. I showed you the 70-year history earlier, and as I was creating the graph, I wondered if China had really planned and executed this over 70 years, as everything seems to fit together so well. At the same time, there is Xi Jinping's vision of the 'Two Centennials.'

It began in 2012, so the first centenary was in 2021, and the second is in 2049. The first centenary has already passed, and there are still several decades until the second. When I first heard this, I thought it was absurd. From our perspective, we have never designed a 50- or 100-year future vision. But as time passed, that period actually arrived.

So, I think there is a surprising aspect to it. China's vision for global governance includes all the right words: sovereign equality, international law, people-centered, effectiveness-oriented. However, there is a sense of disappointment and inadequacy when it comes to what it is actually doing. It requires a lot of energy and resources, but China is very hesitant to use them. Why is that?

China's Internal Constraints and the Limits of Its Foreign Strategy

I believe it is due to domestic vulnerabilities. Although China says many fine things and is crafting a long-term global strategy, a closer look reveals many limitations. The most obvious limitation is its domestic constraints. In the current situation where several wars are taking place, is China playing a role as a global leader to guarantee peace and create the people-centered peaceful world and community with a shared future for mankind that it talks about? It said it would play a role in both the Russia-Ukraine war and the Iran-U.S. conflict, but in the end, it did nothing.

To do something, you need to present a clear policy and show the proactiveness to support at least one side. In the Ukraine war, China should have condemned Russia for violating another country's sovereignty and territory, but its existing stance prevented it from doing so. At the time, Russia, which was confronting the U.S., was one of China's few friendly nations, so it couldn't bring itself to condemn it. Russia repeatedly requested support from China, such as the provision of military supplies.

However, China did not readily comply. Nor did it side with Ukraine. Conscious of Europe, Russia, the United States, and Ukraine, it only made ambiguous and abstract statements that could satisfy all parties, without playing any concrete role. The Iran-U.S. conflict is the same. Even though Iran is a friendly nation to China, no less important than Russia, China did not take active military action or provide support even when Iran was attacked by the United States. It merely repeated principled statements about stopping the conflict and making peace.

Nor did it side with the United States. This is what shows China's limitations. It requires real costs, such as material support, but China is very passive. On the other hand, there are traces of its efforts to avoid provoking the U.S. in the Ukraine and Iran wars by being mindful of Washington's reactions. All of this is because China is saddled with domestic constraints. In addition to economic problems, there is the particular issue of regime stability. The one-party system of the Communist Party has been in place for 70-80 years, and it has been very stable and has gained a lot of support since the reform and opening up policy.

The biggest variable that secured regime support and stability at that time was dramatic economic growth. For Chinese people who lived through the Cultural Revolution, present-day China is practically heaven. Since it's a one-party Communist system, there's no reason to oppose it; the achievements are theirs. There was a question of whether Xi Jinping could produce similar results, and Xi faces a dilemma. That's why he is promoting 'major-power diplomacy.' Xi's major-power diplomacy is called 'daguo waijiao' in Chinese, which the world reads as great-power diplomacy. China tends to distinguish between 'major power' (daguo) and 'strong power' (qiangguo), but it's hard to deny that China is already a great power. It is formalizing major-power diplomacy, but there is a dilemma.

Regime stability, economic recovery, the need for technological self-reliance to overcome U.S. sanctions, and its core interests like the Taiwan and Hong Kong issues—given China's position as a superpower that has not yet completed its modern state formation—are all at stake. These have become issues that Xi Jinping, with his particularly fragile power base, cannot carelessly compromise or concede on. This is because he himself has emphasized them so strongly. I believe the main reason for the perception that China is likely to disrupt the order lies right here. The Taiwan issue, the South China Sea issue, and the Hong Kong situation have worsened China's image and created the perception that China is trying to become a revisionist state. From China's perspective, these are internal problems and tasks to complete its modern state system. If criticized for this, it cannot stand by and finds it difficult to concede.

Even if China is a revisionist state, this is not the age of imperialism or Hitler, so it cannot create an order by force alone. China must present its own order and persuade the international community to agree to and implement it, which is not easy. At the same time, with economic recovery and technological self-reliance being issues directly linked to regime stability, China must focus on them and finds it difficult to spend too much. The United States is engaged in wars here and there, but China does not have enough capacity to participate in overseas wars.

It needs to spend that money on technological self-reliance. That is an important means of maintaining the one-party Communist system, including Xi Jinping's four major tasks. China has been proceeding for a long time, slowly, through a path different from traditional revisionism, in a sophisticated, step-by-step manner, but it is facing limits at the final moment. The fact that there is no clear alternative country that can overcome these limits can be seen as a new crisis facing the international order. No matter how strong China becomes, it seems it will not have the will and ability to dare to challenge the U.S. and create a new order, at least not before 2049.

What happens after 2049, we will have to see then. I won't be around by then, but you all will be there to see it. At the rate China has been progressing over the last 70 years, not much time is left. I believe the biggest variable here is not China, but the United States. It depends on whether this trend of U.S. decline will continue, and how quickly it will persist. China still cannot ignore the influence of the United States. Looking at its attempts to avoid conflict with the U.S. over issues like the Iran war, China is making very difficult strategic judgments. This is a clear decline of the U.S., and it will decline no matter who comes to power.

However, it remains tentative whether China can see this as an opportunity and devise a new strategy to surpass the United States. Trust among allies has also weakened, and especially the value-based diplomacy that the U.S. previously used to pressure China does not seem likely to be brought back by the Biden administration. Diplomatic space is opening up in Europe, Asia, and the Global South. Disappointment with the U.S. is growing, but the U.S. is still ahead in military technology and its alliance network is still functioning. The U.S. cannot act as the world's policeman in every domain, but it will focus its response on key challengers. This includes Iran, but also China. China still cannot be taken lightly.

China's growth has come from being arguably the biggest beneficiary of the liberal international, free-trade order. The global supply chain is already established, and if it were to be disrupted, China would not find the collapse of the existing order desirable. A too-rapid collapse would not be a good situation. The Iran war presents an opportunity for China in some respects, but that's not the whole story.

China seems to believe that the U.S.-led hegemonic order is in long-term decline. Therefore, it sees a need to cautiously penetrate areas where the U.S. has weakened and use that space to expand its influence, for example, targeting the Global South or Southeast Asia. At the same time, it believes it needs to concentrate more on the 15th Five-Year Economic Plan starting this year and the realization of a modern socialist great power by 2035.

Changes in U.S.-China Relations and China's Strategic Calculus

This is because it is a matter directly linked to maintaining the Communist Party system. Looking at China's foreign policy strategy for 2026, Foreign Minister Wang Yi has been in his post for 14 years, serving longer than Xi Jinping has been in power. Every year-end, he announces the foreign policy strategy for the year. What is important here is the 15th Five-Year Plan, cooperation, and safeguarding national interests, and they will conduct the necessary diplomacy to achieve this. In other words, the strategy is to manage U.S.-China relations by taking an indirect route rather than confronting the U.S. directly, and in that time, to focus more on China's development and regime stability.

This is likely what China is thinking. There has also been a change in its messaging toward the United States recently. Until 2024, before Trump's emergence, it used a lot of very harsh language. For example, 'Make five promises: you will not start a new Cold War, not attempt to change China's system, not form anti-China alliances, not support Taiwan independence, and not seek conflict with China. If you promise, we will get along.' Or, 'Do not cross the four red lines (the Taiwan issue, the system, institutions, democracy and human rights, and the right to development). If you don't cross them, we will respect you and get along.' This kind of language reveals China's vulnerability. It's saying, 'We are vulnerable, so please don't touch us.'

While it had previously made many negative and hardline statements, with Trump's emergence in 2025, China was initially very cautious. But after the September Busan summit, it thought, 'This is not such a big deal.' Since China had a tough time with Trump during his first term, it was tense about his second, but after seeing him at the Busan summit,

for example, when China said, 'We have a rare earth card too,' Trump responded with, 'Then it's a truce, I'll suspend the tariffs.' Negotiation was possible. They came to think, 'He is someone you can negotiate with.' Since then, they have consistently talked about stability, cooperation, and coexistence, and Wang Yi also said that building a new paradigm seemed possible. Finally, at the Beijing summit in May of this year, the term 'constructive strategic security relationship' emerged. I was curious about what on earth that meant and what they were trying to do.

The key word here is 'cooperation.' It means competing, but with restraint; acknowledging clear differences, but managing them; and achieving sustainable stability. This is the constructive strategic security relationship. But beyond the content itself, what's interesting is that China was the one to first propose a future vision and direction for U.S.-China relations, and the U.S. accepted it. This feels like a first in the 70-year history of U.S.-China relations. The relationship has always been one where the U.S. leads and China reacts. The U.S. takes the initiative and provokes China, and China responds within a certain limit. The key issues in U.S.-China relations include Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet. These are all areas of Chinese vulnerability, which the U.S. has appropriately used when it wants to contain or sanction China.

I was curious about it all. So, after looking into it, what I want to talk about now is cooperation. The keyword here is cooperation. They will compete, but it must be restrained competition. Competition is inevitable, but within a restrained scope, the differences are clear. The U.S. and China have different systems and institutions. But let's manage them. And let's achieve sustainable stability. This is what the constructive strategic relationship means. But beyond the content itself, what's interesting from my perspective is that China was the one to first propose a future vision and direction for U.S.-China relations, and the U.S. accepted it. This feels like a first in the 70-year history of U.S.-China relations. U.S.-China relations have always been, and I think that aspect still remains, one where the U.S. leads. The U.S. takes the initiative and provokes China, and China responds and reacts accordingly within a certain limit. So, take a look at the key issues in U.S.-China relations. What are the biggest issues? Things like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet. These are all areas where China is vulnerable. When the U.S. decides it needs to contain and sanction China, it picks one of these at an appropriate time.

When the U.S. played its cards to contain China, China would respond by reacting strongly at times, compromising at others, and accepting at others. Now, its status seems to have changed. In 2012, when Chairman Xi Jinping first visited the United States, he proposed a new paradigm for U.S.-China relations called the 'new model of major-power relations.' The core of it was that in great-power politics, the Thucydides Trap could be avoided.

The Thucydides Trap is the idea that great-power politics inevitably leads to war, but the new model of major-power relations proposed that this could be avoided. The U.S. president at the time was Obama, but he ultimately rejected and did not accept it. More than a decade later, in 2026, China proposed a 'constructive strategic security relationship' in a more concrete manner, although I believe the content is not significantly different. This time, President Trump did not say, 'We never did such a thing,' and the situation is that China claims an agreement was reached and the U.S. also consented. The fact that the U.S. is not saying, 'What are you talking about, we never did that,' suggests that the U.S. may have accepted China's proposal as a way to call a truce and get along, given its own various headaches.

I believe U.S.-China relations are heading in this direction. Scholars within China, drawing an analogy to 'mutually assured destruction,' say that if trade frictions escalate to an extreme, it becomes a game where both sides are ruined, so they have no choice but to compromise at an appropriate level. China has rare earths, supply chains, markets, and manufacturing capabilities, while the U.S. has tariffs, controls, technology, and its alliance system, so they will be able to compromise appropriately.

China seems to be fully utilizing the effectiveness of these cards, but it doesn't appear to believe that this can completely resolve the nature of the great power competition between the U.S. and China. However, China wants to repeatedly call truces and buy time as it expands its influence until 2049. Especially during the Trump era, with his transaction-oriented nature, China will likely actively leverage this to extend the truce period. During that period, China's position seems to be to focus more on resolving the THAAD deployment issue, achieving technological self-reliance, and recovering its economy.

For a while, there was also talk of a 'grand bargain' between the U.S. and China. Although it ended up as a small deal rather than a grand bargain, the idea is to start with the easier economic and trade sectors. China would purchase U.S. agricultural products and energy and increase investment in the U.S., in exchange for the U.S. reducing its controls on China. If this succeeds, the next step would be to move on to the technology alliance issue. If the U.S. eases technology regulations, China would reduce its rare earth regulations.

China believes it has cards to counter this and that it can secure negotiating power through them. In the end, it could even extend to security issues. However, this seems a bit risky. The security issues China wants to compromise on are the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, and Taiwan—and the Korean Peninsula is unexpectedly included. Without even asking us. In the context of a small deal scenario, if they compromise on security issues, while the South China Sea and Taiwan are difficult to compromise on, there's a thought that the U.S. and China might be able to make a deal on the Korean Peninsula, relatively speaking.

Regardless of the will of our people or government. In the past, when U.S.-China relations were good, they included language about the Korean Peninsula issue in joint statements, but they never achieved any substantial results. Despite the advancement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, the fact that they talked about it every time they met shows that, historically, the Korean Peninsula has been the easiest security issue for the U.S. and China to reach a compromise on. Of course, this is not something that can be done easily, given the experience of the Korean Peninsula becoming a battleground when U.S.-China competition intensified, but at the same time, it is a situation where we must be concerned about both aspects.

This is what the constructive strategic security relationship is about. In my view, while preparing for a prolonged competition with the U.S., China is trying to buy time to carry out its 15th Five-Year Plan and concentrate on technological self-reliance. At the same time, it wants to continue extending small deals with the U.S. as much as possible to weaken technology controls, because that is how China can grow. While doing so, it is subtly launching a very active diplomatic offensive toward the Global South. This seems to be working well, but in reality, the countries of the Global South are countries that need money.

Geopolitical Constants in Korean Peninsula Policy and the Impact of U.S.-China Relations

The reason the Global South welcomes China is for the money. To do this, China also needs to spend a lot of money, but while China seems to have a lot of money, it is actually very frugal. A problem may arise someday, but for now, with the Trump administration focused on 'America First,' there clearly seems to be an opening for China. China's revisionism is ongoing, but in a very different manner. It is proceeding in a sophisticated and gradual way and also has many limitations. Now, let's move on to the Korean Peninsula.

China's policy on the Korean Peninsula is very important to us. However, I find it difficult to agree with the phenomenon we see when observing that policy—that is, trying to measure and predict changes in ROK-China or DPRK-China relations based on certain indicators. For example, there are attempts to gauge changes in ROK-China or DPRK-China relations by the number of summits, but I find that to be somewhat difficult.

I believe there is an unchanging structural variable in China's policy toward the Korean Peninsula: its geopolitical specificity. As Chairman Xi Jinping himself said, 'Neighbors can't move,' which signifies this unchangeable geopolitical characteristic. As U.S.-China competition has intensified recently, we must see that from China's perspective, the strategic specificity of the Korean Peninsula is changing, with its strategic value either increasing or decreasing.

Therefore, when looking at China's policy on the Korean Peninsula, ROK-China relations, and DPRK-China relations, we must never forget the geopolitical specificity that China sees. Within that framework, ROK-China and DPRK-China relations change according to the fluidity of U.S.-China relations. For example, during the Park Geun-hye administration, ROK-China relations were at their best, but they immediately changed to their worst. President Park attended the Victory Day parade, and in 2014, she sat in the spot where Chairman Kim Jong Un had been. Despite doing everything possible, including joining the AIIB and signing an FTA, the relationship deteriorated rapidly.

The reason was U.S.-China relations. The decision to deploy THAAD was one of the few cards President Park had to offset the threat of North Korean provocations, but China considered it a weapon for the U.S. to contain China. Therefore, no matter how good ROK-China relations are, if a problem arises in U.S.-China relations or if North Korea provokes, ROK-China relations can turn sour overnight. This is due to geopolitical specificity, and when the U.S. and China engage in geopolitical competition, ROK-China relations are bound to be affected.

For these reasons, I believe ROK-China relations are improving again now under the Lee Jae-myung administration. When ROK-China relations improve, what our diplomacy wants to do most is to improve them further. With relations getting better, if President Lee Jae-myung meets Chairman Xi Jinping or Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits, what would we want to say to Minister Wang? We would want to say, 'Please somehow make North Korea give up its nuclear program, or arrange for substantive talks.' However, this is not an issue that can be decided at the level of ROK-China relations.

It's not a problem that can be solved no matter how good ROK-China relations are. This year marks the 34th anniversary of ROK-China diplomatic ties. I remember leaving my family and job to go to China. For the 34 years since then, this pattern has repeated itself. We call it ROK-China relations and diplomacy toward China, but in fact, I believe that no South Korean government, whether progressive or conservative, has ever properly conducted diplomacy toward China. What was written as diplomacy toward China was actually diplomacy toward North Korea. We thought of the space in Beijing as a forward base for diplomacy toward North Korea. It is necessary to remember that no matter how good ROK-China relations are, China will not control or persuade North Korea in a way that aligns with our interests. As bleak as that sounds.

Changes in North Korea-China Relations and China's Global Strategy

A notable change was observed during President Xi Jinping's recent visit to North Korea. The summit between the two leaders made no mention of Korean Peninsula issues, North Korea's nuclear program, or U.S.-North Korea dialogue. Instead, President Xi promoted his global strategy, a 'global multipolarity initiative'—a topic he consistently raises with other heads of state. This was the first time he had discussed it with a North Korean leader. This suggests that China is no longer viewing the Korean Peninsula as it did in the past, but is now framing it within the context of its global strategy.

China is now viewing the Korean Peninsula through the lens of its global strategy. While the peninsula has unique geopolitical characteristics, their relative significance is diminishing. It appears China now believes it must manage its neighbor, North Korea, within its sphere of influence as part of this broader global strategy. There is much talk of a rapid recovery in North Korea-China relations, which were once very strained. Summits are crucial to this relationship because the leaders of the two countries can only hold them through mutual visits. Unlike other countries that frequently hold bilateral talks on the sidelines of multilateral conferences, this is difficult for North Korea, making these dedicated visits especially important.

In fact, before South Korea and China established diplomatic relations, North Korea and China maintained a schedule of regular summits almost annually. Because both countries are top-down systems where the supreme leader makes all decisions, frequent meetings between them are crucial. Effective communication is the key. Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong reportedly had a close relationship; Kim Il Sung was said to speak Chinese well enough to converse without an interpreter. This is a unique aspect of their bilateral relations. The frequency of summits began to decline after Xi Jinping took power, and their nature also changed. The recent visit to China was the first in seven years.

While bilateral meetings often occur at multilateral forums like the G7 and the UN, this is difficult for North Korea. This makes dedicated summits particularly important for North Korea-China relations. In fact, before South Korea and China established diplomatic ties, North Korea and China held regular summits almost every year. Since both are top-down systems where the supreme leader makes the decisions, frequent meetings between them are crucial. Effective communication is what matters. Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong reportedly had a close relationship, with Kim speaking Chinese well enough to converse without an interpreter. This highlights the unique nature of their relations. The frequency of summits began to decline after Xi Jinping came to power, and their character has also changed. The recent visit to China was the first in seven years.

While bilateral meetings often occur at multilateral forums like the G7 and the UN, this is difficult for North Korea. This makes dedicated summits particularly important for North Korea-China relations. In fact, before South Korea and China established diplomatic ties, North Korea and China held regular summits almost every year. Since both are top-down systems where the supreme leader makes the decisions, frequent meetings between them are crucial. Effective communication is what matters. Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong reportedly had a close relationship, with Kim speaking Chinese well enough to converse without an interpreter. This highlights the unique nature of their relations. The frequency of summits began to decline after Xi Jinping came to power, and their character has also changed. The recent visit to China was the first in seven years.

Xi Jinping's first visit to North Korea was in 2019, marking the first visit by a Chinese leader in 14 years. While the visit, with its lavish protocol, showcased a recovery in relations, it was in fact a visit after a seven-year interval. The reason for the 2019 visit was that the Korean Peninsula was in a state of flux at the time. In 2018 and 2019, a series of U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean dialogues were held, five U.S.-North Korea summits took place, and Kim Jong Un visited China four times that year.

This pattern of frequent visits has occurred on three occasions. The first was around the Korean War, when North Korea was persuading China to provide support. The second was during the third-generation succession from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un. At the time, Kim Jong Il's repeated visits to China were seen by some as puzzling. Not long after, he passed away, revealing that these visits had been part of the preparations for the succession.

During this process, Kim Jong Il likely brought Kim Jong Un with him on at least one visit to explain North Korea's situation to China and ask for its backing. When the succession occurred, it was viewed negatively because Kim Jong Un was only in his early twenties and seemed to be inheriting power solely because he was the leader's son. However, China was the first to recognize and support Kim Jong Un's leadership, which encouraged other countries to accept it as a fait accompli. This is consistent with the trend of strengthening North Korea-China exchanges that began in 2018.

However, this pattern of regular exchanges no longer holds. Visits now occur only for specific reasons, and the kind of regular leader-to-leader contact seen in the past has diminished. After taking power, President Xi Jinping visited South Korea before North Korea. Correspondingly, President Park Geun-hye visited China before Japan. These moves broke with traditional diplomatic protocol for state visits.

While President Xi Jinping may not personally favor North Korea, he appears to believe, "I can't keep them at arm's length; I must keep them close and manage them." Recently, the dynamic has shifted: while China, as a major power, is expected to be North Korea's patron, it is North Korea that now holds more leverage over China. Pyongyang's nuclear program, its military cooperation with Russia, and its pursuit of a meeting with Donald Trump are all moves that can put pressure on Beijing.

What North Korea wants from China is recognition as a nuclear-weapon state and the lifting of UN sanctions. If China were to grant this, the international community would likely have to follow. However, China is not in a position to do this quickly. Beijing needs to offer Pyongyang something to maintain its influence, but at present, North Korea holds more leverage, putting China on edge. I believe the recent North Korea-China summit was held because Beijing judged it necessary to placate Pyongyang ahead of a potential meeting with Trump.

Changes in South Korean Perceptions of China and Diplomatic Challenges

Several challenges persist in South Korea-China relations. Public opinion polls show that South Koreans continue to view China negatively, a trend particularly driven by those in their 20s and 30s. Although there were some positive shifts as travel to China increased after visa waiver measures were introduced, recent surveys indicate that negative perceptions have reached a new peak.

Previously, China's negative image was attributed to situational factors like the THAAD deployment and the COVID-19 pandemic. Now, however, it is seen as stemming from more fundamental issues, such as perceptions of national character and China's one-party communist system. These factors are becoming 'constants' that are difficult to change, and we must seriously consider the possibility that hostile relations between South Korea and China could become entrenched.

Additionally, the percentage of South Koreans who perceive China as a military threat has surged. While the perceived threat from North Korea has declined, the perception of a military threat from China has been increasing by 10% annually. In the past, Japan was viewed as the greater concern, but perceptions of China as a military threat have been rising in the 2020s.

The only way to counter this perceived military threat is to strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance and security cooperation. This places South Korea in the awkward position of having to increase its reliance on the United States. Despite the desire for good relations with China, there have been no clear instances of direct military threats from Beijing against Seoul. There are no territorial disputes, and while Chinese aircraft have entered South Korea's air defense identification zone, it is ambiguous whether this constitutes a direct military threat.

It is therefore surprising that China is perceived as a military threat. At the same time, an overwhelming 88% of respondents agree that China is important to South Korea. This can be interpreted as a belief that "only practical interests matter." Just as one must find a way to get along with a disliked person who is nonetheless important in one's life, this situation calls for skilled diplomacy.

The fact that the majority of South Korea's public diplomacy budget is spent on the United States shows how much effort is dedicated to maintaining relations with a country with which we are already on good terms. Perhaps now is the time to direct more diplomatic energy toward those countries that are important purely for practical interests. This could be a significant challenge for South Korea.

When polls ask why China is considered a threat, economic coercion is cited overwhelmingly more than military threats. The experience of the THAAD dispute and South Korea's high economic dependence on China, including in advanced industries, likely fuels this perception of threat from economic coercion. While managing this economic dependence is necessary, the perception of a military threat needs to be re-evaluated more soberly.

Interestingly, trust in the United States is also declining. According to a Pew Research survey, when asked which country they view more favorably, China surpassed the U.S. for the first time. South Korea was one of the countries that answered "neither," and it has a peculiar public opinion landscape where, unlike other nations, China is perceived more positively than the United States.

As someone who has studied China for a long time, I find it regrettable that significant misunderstandings and distorted views about the country have taken root. The nations that perceive China as a threat—such as Israel, Japan, India, and the Philippines—are those with territorial disputes or direct conflicts of interest with Beijing. Yet South Korea, despite its overwhelmingly close economic and cooperative relationship with China, also dislikes it and perceives it as a threat.

The Importance of China Studies and Future Prospects

China is evolving in increasingly sophisticated and subtle ways, and I worry that we are viewing it through a one-dimensional, emotional lens. If political logic is shaping our perceptions of China, we must instead pay keen and nuanced attention to how China is changing. It is a sad reality that interest in China studies is currently waning in academia.

Some people believe that China is now preferable to the United States, that the situation has reversed. However, on a global average, some countries believe the era of President Xi Jinping is better than that of the Trump administration. What do you think? There are also countries that disagree. South Korea is among the top four of those. There are about five or six countries that would say "no," and South Korea is one of them. Most other countries believe China is preferable to the United States. I feel that our situation is very unique; we seem to have a peculiar public opinion landscape.

To be frank, as someone who has studied China for a long time and made a living in this field, I find the current situation regrettable. I personally feel that significant misunderstandings and distortions about China may have taken root. I also think we need to understand the actual substance of the perceived threat more clearly. The countries that view China as a threat are, first, Israel, followed by Japan, India, and the Philippines. The Philippines, India, and Japan are countries that have actual territorial disputes with China.

I don't need to explain the situation with Israel. But it makes me wonder why South Korea perceives China as a threat. Among all these countries, South Korea has by far the highest level of economic dependence on and cooperation with China. This will need to continue in the future, as it is tied to South Korea's own future. So I have come to wonder why we dislike China so much and see it as a threat. In fact, this is something I always say when I meet with policymakers, and it is the final point I want to make.

China is evolving into a state that makes increasingly sophisticated and subtle adjustments. Aren't we viewing it through a very one-dimensional, emotional lens? Isn't political logic dictating our perception of China? We need to move away from this quickly. We too must pay keen and nuanced attention to China's changes, but the reality in our universities and academic circles is that interest in China is being cut off. This is my last semester teaching, and I feel we are in big trouble. I even joke that it's a relief I'm retiring before my department disappears, which it might have if I'd stayed longer. In any case, the number of students is dropping sharply.

Almost no students are entering master's or doctoral programs. This means new researchers are not being trained. It may not seem like a major issue right now, as older scholars like myself are still active. However, I feel a sense of crisis that in 10 or 20 years, when we desperately need China experts to help redefine our relationship with Beijing, there may be no one left who has conducted serious research. On the other hand, this is an opportunity that you, the next generation, should seize.

Not now, but in 20 or 30 years, China experts will be sought after everywhere. The principle of scarcity will apply. I began studying China as a university student in the 1980s. Seeing the normalization of U.S.-China relations in 1979, I thought it was the right time to start China studies. At the time, China was still seen as a communist country, but I predicted something would change in 20 years. It didn't even take 20 years; South Korea and China established diplomatic relations in just 10 or 12 years. Thanks to that, I have made a good living studying China for the past 30 years.

Please edit this part out later. It is both regrettable and, in a way, a relief. There are clear cycles in area studies. I often find myself quoting President Xi Jinping, and I have no choice but to do so because we must live alongside a China that is growing immensely. Therefore, we must constantly contemplate how to coexist with it peacefully and stably. This is not a situation that can be resolved by power alone. It requires sophisticated and sensitive diplomacy, and this will be the task for your generation, which will lead our society in 20 years. I will conclude with the hope that you will take this sense of crisis seriously, rediscover the field of China studies that many have shied away from, and become the scholars of the future.

Yes.