[EAI Issue Briefing] Is Coexistence Possible with a ‘Threatening and Unfavorable’ China?: An Analysis of the 2026 EAI East Asia Barometer Survey Results

1. Introduction

This article analyzes the changes in South Korean perceptions of China and South Korea-China relations based on a public opinion survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) through Hankook Research on July 20-21, 2026. Based on this analysis, it explores ways to coexist with China, an unavoidable neighbor. The 2026 survey shows unusual and distinctive results. Some findings defy expectations, while others are even conflicting and contradictory, making interpretation particularly challenging and requiring careful attention. It seemed possible that focusing only on specific parts of the survey results could risk distorting or misrepresenting the complex and subtle undercurrents of public opinion. Therefore, in addition to this year's survey, I have also reviewed the survey data EAI has accumulated over the past 13 years, focusing on macro-level trends in public opinion, in an effort to interpret the message presented by the public as accurately and objectively as possible.

Amid a historical transition where the international system and order are undergoing structural changes, the uncertainty and instability of the international situation have intensified. It is evident that respondents answered the survey amidst confusion and deep contemplation. Although public opinion may seem contradictory at first glance, at its core lies a consistent prioritization of the national interest and a struggle to find the best option among limited strategic choices while facing the complex realities of the current international situation. We are now tasked with carefully reflecting on and understanding the results of this deep public deliberation and meticulously incorporating them into the formulation of a diplomatic strategy that can maximize the national interest.

The key findings and questions from this survey are as follows. First, despite high expectations for improved South Korea-China relations since the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration, unfavorable sentiment toward China has actually increased. It is not easy for South Korea-China relations, which had stagnated at their lowest point in the decade since the THAAD dispute, to recover in a short period. Nevertheless, despite both governments actively expressing their will to improve relations, holding two summits in an unusually short span of two months, and despite continued high-level contacts and recovering people-to-people exchanges, it is necessary to carefully analyze why unfavorable sentiment is growing.

Second, more concerning than the increase in unfavorable sentiment toward China is the rise in threat perception. In the context of escalating U.S.-China competition, China's rapid rise as a great power itself can be perceived as threatening to its neighbor, South Korea. Nonetheless, a more detailed examination is needed to understand the reasons for the growing perception of a military threat from China, despite the absence of any direct, serious military-security conflict issues. In particular, at a time when the North Korean nuclear threat is intensifying and close communication and cooperation with China are crucial for stability on the Korean Peninsula, it is necessary to analyze the background and implications of why China is now perceived as a threat on par with North Korea.

Third, although unfavorable perceptions and threat perceptions of China are increasing, expectations for improved South Korea-China relations have not disappeared. In reality, China is an important neighboring country where competition and cooperation coexist in fields such as the economy, critical minerals, and advanced technology. This presents a difficult and important challenge: in a situation where exchange and cooperation with an unfavorably and threateningly perceived China are unavoidable, what policies and strategies should be devised and implemented to maintain stable relations with China in the future?

Fourth, despite a sharp decline in trust in the United States, the response that the alliance with the U.S. can protect South Korea's security remains very high. Public opinion prioritizes responding to the North Korean nuclear threat through the alliance with the U.S., but the Trump administration is instead pressing South Korea to play a more active role in checking China. As U.S.-China competition intensifies, South Korea's strategic options will inevitably narrow, and South Korea-China relations are likely to become more precarious. This raises a significant dilemma: what diplomatic strategy is needed to maintain a stable and pragmatic relationship of coexistence with China?

2. Why Is Unfavorable Sentiment Toward China Growing Despite Expectations for Improved Relations?

In the East Asia Barometer Survey conducted by the East Asia Institute in June 2025, 68.3% of respondents said South Korea-China relations would improve after the new administration took office, overwhelmingly outnumbering the 6.7% who said they would worsen. Compared to the outlook for relations with the United States (49.9%), Japan (31.9%), and North Korea (62.6%), expectations for improvement in South Korea-China relations were the highest (Lee 2025).

Expectations for improved South Korea-China relations grew even stronger after the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration, with consecutive summits held following the APEC Summit in Gyeongju in October 2025 and again in Beijing in January 2026, just two months later. Furthermore, China's decision to allow visa-free entry for South Koreans and others starting in November 2024 created a mood of recovery for South Korean travel to China, which had shrunk significantly after COVID-19. Although still short of the 4.76 million in 2016, the number of South Korean visitors to China reached 3,158,091 in 2025, a remarkable 63.9% increase from 2024. In particular, as travel to major Chinese cities like Shanghai became more popular among the younger generation in their 20s and 30s, who previously held the most negative views of China, signs of change appeared in their unfavorable sentiment.

Indeed, while the numbers remained low, responses indicating a favorable impression of China showed an upward trend, rising from 14.8% in 2023 to 19.6% in 2024 and 25.6% in 2025 (Table 1). Regarding South Korea-China relations, responses of “good” increased from 1.3% in 2024 to 2.7% in 2025 and 14.3% in 2026, while responses of “average” also showed an increasing trend, at 38.6%, 43.3%, and 58.6%, respectively (Table 2). A survey by Hankook Research (Hankook Research 2026) shows similar results. The percentage of respondents who viewed South Korea-China relations as “bad” decreased significantly from 65% in 2024 to 45% in 2025 and 26% in 2026. Conversely, the percentage expecting relations to improve over the next year increased from 12% in 2024 to 19% in 2025, and jumped to 44% this year, four times higher than the percentage expecting them to worsen, indicating high expectations for improvement.

<Table 1> Impressions of China

<Table 2> Assessment of South Korea-China Relations (2024-2026)

However, the survey conducted by the East Asia Institute on July 20-21, 2026, showed that unfavorable sentiment toward China had actually increased. Compared to 2025, unfavorable responses increased by 7.4 percentage points to 73.7% (Table 1). This level is close to the peak of 73.8% recorded in 2021. Moreover, the intensity of this unfavorable sentiment has also markedly increased. For instance, responses of “unfavorable impression” surged by a staggering 16.4 percentage points from 18.9% in 2025 to 35.3% in 2026 (Table 3). While the number of respondents who gave a more moderate “somewhat unfavorable impression” decreased, the number of respondents expressing a clear unfavorable view has significantly increased. The upward trend in favorable responses was also broken, falling by 8.7 percentage points from 25.6% in 2025 to 16.9%, regressing to pre-2024 levels.

<Table 3> Impressions of China (2025, 2026)

At the governmental level, efforts were made to improve relations under the banner of a “full restoration of relations,” with summits and continued high-level contacts. The leaders of both countries shared the view that it is crucial to “improve and promote feelings between the peoples of the two countries” and jointly proposed similar solutions, such as to “deepen humanities exchanges, deepen mutual understanding, and strengthen communication and people-to-people and cultural exchanges.” There are limits to how much South Korea-China relations can improve in the short term, even with government-level efforts. In particular, with North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile capabilities and the escalating uncertainty and instability in U.S.-China relations, it is difficult for South Korea-China relations, which are structurally vulnerable to the influence of exogenous variables, to recover quickly. Nevertheless, the fact that unfavorable sentiment toward China is growing—even after the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration, when both countries actively expressed their will to improve relations and no serious conflict issues have emerged—warrants close attention.

Continuing the trend from 2025, the top two reasons for unfavorable views of China were the national character and behavior of the Chinese people (59.3%) and the Communist Party's one-party system (44.1%). The percentage of respondents citing the Communist Party's one-party system as a reason for their unfavorable view increased by 7.2 percentage points from 2025. This suggests that ideological reasons have become more prominent, as unfavorable views were particularly high among conservative-leaning respondents. Reasons that had been prominent until 2024, such as “economic coercion and retaliation” (30.9%), “because China does not respect Korea” (22.6%), and “environmental issues like COVID-19 and fine dust” (26.5%), were relegated to lower ranks (Table 5). While the perception of China as a “military threat” (12.3%) was also cited as a reason for negative impressions, it was the least common response.

Because the main reasons for unfavorable sentiment toward China are shifting toward fundamental and structural issues that are difficult to resolve, such as “national character and the Communist Party system,” the situation is evolving in a way that makes short-term improvement through inter-governmental cooperation alone difficult. In fact, if the heterogeneity of national character and political systems is highlighted, there is a risk that unfavorable sentiment between South Korea and China could become more prolonged and entrenched. This is a situation that requires governments, media, businesses, and academia in both countries to recognize the problem with great seriousness and pool their collective wisdom to actively seek countermeasures.

Subtle changes in unfavorable sentiment toward China are also emerging across generations. Based on the combined “unfavorable” and “somewhat unfavorable” responses, compared to 2025, unfavorable sentiment among those in their 20s decreased, while it actually increased among those in their 30s and 40s, narrowing the generational gap, with all age groups showing high unfavorable ratings of over 70%. However, it is difficult to conclude that unfavorable sentiment among the 20s has decreased. Comparing only the “unfavorable” responses, the rates for those in their 20s (41.5%), 30s (48.3%), and 40s (39.1%) are still high compared to other generations (Table 4). In a sense, it appears that the unfavorable perception among the younger generation is becoming more solid and firm.

<Table 4> Impressions of China (by Generation)

Furthermore, compared to 2025, the gap based on ideological leaning has widened. In 2025, there was no significant difference between conservative-leaning respondents (70.5%) and progressive-leaning respondents (63.8%), with both groups showing high rates of unfavorable sentiment. However, in the 2026 survey, the unfavorable rating among conservative-leaning respondents (83.8%) rose relatively sharply, widening the gap with progressive-leaning respondents (61.5%) (Table 6). In short, not only has the proportion of unfavorable sentiment toward China in South Korea increased compared to 2025, but its intensity has also strengthened. By generation, unfavorable sentiment is spreading across all age groups, increasing not only among those in their 20s and 30s but also in their 40s. Additionally, there is a trend of a significant increase in unfavorable sentiment within the conservative camp. This suggests that the conflict between the conservative and progressive camps in the domestic political landscape is intensifying and extending into the realm of foreign policy.

<Table 5> Reasons for Having an Unfavorable Impression of China

<Table 6> Impressions of China by Political Leaning (2025, 2026)

3. Why Is Threat Perception Growing Despite the Absence of Direct Military Confrontation with China?

More concerning than the unfavorable sentiment toward China is the growing perception of a military threat. Despite the fact that no direct military-security conflicts or confrontations are emerging at the bilateral level between South Korea and China, the perception of a military threat is rising sharply. Specifically, the perception of a military threat has continuously increased from 63.7% in 2024 to 73% in 2025, and by another 5.9 percentage points to 78.9% in 2026 (Table 7). Before the THAAD retaliation in 2016, China was sometimes perceived as less of a threat than Japan, but now the military threat perception of China has reached a level comparable to the 88.4% threat perception of North Korea.

<Table 7> Countries/Regions Perceived as a Military Threat

Since the perception of a threat from China is directly linked to South Korea's security policy, it is necessary to examine its reasons and substance closely. Although threat perception of China has been rising recently, a closer, multi-faceted look at the survey reveals that this perception is compounded by complex and subtle emotions and cognitions regarding the neighboring country of China.

First, while military threat is one of the reasons for unfavorable sentiment toward China, its proportion is relatively small. Only 12.3% cited military threat as a reason for their unfavorable view, the lowest among the six options (Table 5). In particular, respondents in their 20s and 30s, who have high rates of unfavorable sentiment, were the least likely to choose military threat as the reason, at 1.4% and 0.6%, respectively (Table 8). Respondents in their 20s (82.5%) and 30s (80.2%) also reported lower levels of perceiving China as a threat compared to the overall average (85.7%) and other age groups. In short, it does not appear that the perception of China as a threat is exacerbating unfavorable sentiment. Conversely, while unfavorable sentiment could stimulate threat perception, this link is also not clear. There does not seem to be a deep correlation between unfavorable sentiment, i.e., emotional disposition, and threat perception.

<Table 8> Reasons for Having an Unfavorable Impression of China

Second, the reasons for viewing China as a threat include various factors cited with similar weight, in addition to direct military threat perception. The primary reason for threat perception is economic coercion (55.4%). Other reasons include support for North Korea and passivity on denuclearization (32.8%), diplomatic and economic fallout from the U.S.-China hegemonic competition (32.3%), and competition in advanced technology (16.1%), indicating that various non-military threat perceptions coexist. Direct military threat (37.9%) is the second-highest reason, but its share of the total is not large (Table 9).

The increased threat perception of China can be summarized into two main reasons. First, the most significant factor is the perception of an economic threat due to China's economic coercion. Indeed, threat perception began to rise after China's economic coercion and the so-called “Hallyu ban” were imposed following the 2016 THAAD dispute. Second is the threat perception resulting from the influence of exogenous variables, namely the North Korean nuclear threat and U.S.-China competition. The sharp rise in threat perception since 2016 is related to the convergence of these two exogenous variables on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the economic coercion itself was a result of the THAAD dispute, which in turn was directly and indirectly influenced by the exogenous variables of North Korea's nuclear tests and the U.S.-China competition.

Indeed, the 2010 Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling incidents and the 2016 THAAD deployment and retaliatory dispute are the two most prominent cases of serious security-related conflict in the 34-year history of South Korea-China relations, and they share common features. In both cases, as North Korea's unexpected provocations rapidly escalated into U.S.-China confrontations, instability and crisis on the Korean Peninsula intensified, and bilateral relations deteriorated rapidly as compromise or situation management at the bilateral level became difficult. In short, South Korea and China have experienced severe conflicts not due to direct military-security friction, but due to the influence of exogenous variables: North Korea's nuclear threat and provocations, and U.S.-China competition. Public opinion, too, reflects a growing perception of the China threat due to the instability on the Korean Peninsula caused by the recent escalation of the North Korean nuclear threat and U.S.-China competition.

<Table 9> Reasons for Considering China a Threat

Third, while the perception of a threat from China has increased, positive views on South Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation have decreased from 75.3% in 2025 to 66.1% in 2026, a drop of 9.2 percentage points (Table 10). In particular, support for checking China through this trilateral security cooperation has also declined from 64.3% in 2025 to 56.6% in 2026 (Table 11). Although the perception of a military threat from China has grown, positive opinions on ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation and support for checking China have actually decreased. This indirectly suggests that the public does not perceive the threat from China solely in military terms, nor do they believe it should be countered only through military means.

Fourth, the perception of a threat from China shows a clearer divergence based on ideological leaning than the favorability survey results. While 26.9% of progressive-leaning respondents see China as a threat, the figure for conservatives is 53.1%, nearly double (Table 12). This can be interpreted as a widespread perception, primarily within the conservative camp, that the very rise of socialist China as a great power competing with the United States is itself a threat. Additionally, as unsubstantiated political claims from the previous administration—such as China's illegal interference in domestic elections and the leaking of military secrets—proliferated, it seems the perception of a China threat was amplified and reproduced beyond its concrete reality.

In short, although the perception of a threat from China is increasing, South Korea-China relations have not yet seen distinct conflict issues or confrontations at the military-security level. The threat perception of China currently stems less from direct bilateral military threats and more from the structural characteristics of the South Korea-China relationship. That is, as the threats from the escalating U.S.-China competition and North Korea's advancing nuclear program have become more prominent, a comprehensive sense of vigilance toward the rise of China, given its unique geopolitical position, is growing. Furthermore, as Cold War-like currents spread in the security environment around the Korean Peninsula, an ideological confrontation with socialist China is also fueling threat perceptions.

It is essential to clearly grasp the reality of the China threat perception and devise appropriate responses. If South Korea hastily defines China's rise itself as a direct security threat and responds precipitously, it risks further escalating military tensions with China and, paradoxically, increasing security instability on the Korean Peninsula. In the future, South Korea will need to make diplomatic efforts to proactively manage its relationship with the neighboring great power, China, to prevent military tensions from rising as much as possible. In particular, both countries must focus on strengthening close strategic communication on exogenous variables that heighten threat perceptions, especially the North Korea variable, to manage crises proactively.

As neighboring countries, South Korea and China have frequent exchanges and contact in various domains and are deeply interconnected in a complex relationship. Therefore, the vigilance and concern arising from the competitive aspects highlighted by China's rapid rise are likely to be perceived as threats in various dimensions. For example, it is necessary to establish multi-layered communication channels to proactively manage risks and prevent economic and social competition and conflict with China from escalating into a military confrontation.

<Table 10> Stance on Strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Military and Security Cooperation

<Table 11> Stance on ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Military and Security Cooperation

<Table 12> Perception of China as a Threat by Political Leaning

4. Why the Passive Stance on Improving Relations with China Despite Weakening Trust in the U.S.?

The results of the 2026 opinion survey are characterized by confusing and contradictory findings. This itself reflects the reality that South Korea is facing a complex, challenging, and unstable transitional period. The simultaneous unfolding of North Korea's advancing nuclear program, closer North Korea-Russia military ties, Japan's rightward shift and remilitarization, and the U.S.-China competition is creating complex challenges and crises for the Korean Peninsula. In particular, as both great powers, the U.S. and China, exert various forms of direct and indirect pressure and demands on South Korea amid their intensifying competition and confrontation, South Korea faces a more serious strategic dilemma than ever before. Yet, amid a situation where weakening trust in the U.S. coexists with unfavorable sentiment toward China, the public continues to show solid support for the ROK-U.S. alliance.

After peaking at 85.1% in 2022, trust in the United States has continuously declined to 73.2% in 2024 and 66.3% in 2025. In 2026, it plummeted to 45.4%, and for the first time since the survey began, distrust (46.4%) surpassed trust, albeit by a narrow margin (Table 13). Furthermore, the percentage of respondents who believe it will be difficult for China to surpass the U.S. has also been steadily decreasing, from 64.0% in 2024 to 58.5% in 2025 and 57.6% in 2026 (Table 14). The decline in trust in the U.S. is a global trend. There are even survey results showing more favorable views of China than the U.S. For example, in a 2026 survey of 36 countries by the Pew Research Center (2026), the overall average of respondents holding a favorable view of China was 46%, while the U.S. stood at 36%. European countries, for their part, do not hesitate to cooperate with China to check U.S. unilateralism.

<Table 13> Trust in the United States

<Table 14> Can China Surpass the U.S. in the Near Future?

Nevertheless, 62.3% of the South Korean public still believe that security can be ensured through the alliance with the United States (Table 15). The most important reason South Korea chooses to strengthen its alliance with the U.S. remains the North Korean nuclear threat. The public is making a contradictory yet unavoidable choice: to rely on the U.S. for security despite weakening trust. This reflects a pragmatic recognition that, short of developing its own nuclear weapons, South Korea has no choice but to rely on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence to counter the North Korean nuclear threat.

<Table 15> Is the ROK-U.S. Alliance Sufficient for Security?

However, while the public sees strengthening the alliance with the U.S. as necessary to counter South Korea's security threats, there is strong opposition to expanding the alliance's role beyond the Korean Peninsula. Public opinion on the Taiwan issue is a prime example. The percentage of respondents who believe a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is possible is 48.5%, more than double those who think it is not (22.5%), and even higher than in Japan (36.9%), which is in direct confrontation with China over the Taiwan issue (Table 16). However, the percentage of respondents who consider tensions and conflict in the Taiwan Strait important to South Korea's national interest has sharply decreased from 42.2% in 2025 to 20% in 2026 (Table 17). Furthermore, respondents indicated that in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the most serious impact on South Korea would be instability on the Korean Peninsula (34%) (Table 18).

<Table 16> Outlook on the Possibility of a Military Conflict in the Taiwan Strait

<Table 17> Importance of Taiwan Strait Tensions to National Interest

<Table 18> Most Serious Impact on One's Country in the Event of a Taiwan Strait Conflict

The public is highly aware of the possibility of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, but they are concerned less with the conflict itself and more with its potential to destabilize the situation on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, they seem to believe that since the Taiwan Strait issue is not directly important to our national interest, South Korea should refrain from involvement as much as possible to avoid indirect harm. In the 2025 survey as well, the most common response was that in the event of a Taiwan conflict, South Korea's role should be limited to humanitarian assistance (49.3%), and the second most common response was that it should not get involved at all (15.8%) (Lee 2025). This response suggests a strong underlying perception that choosing the ROK-U.S. alliance is unavoidable for countering the North Korean nuclear threat. The Lee Jae-myung administration also holds a similar perception and policy stance. However, since this public opinion and policy stance directly contradicts the Trump administration's vision for an expanded role for U.S. Forces Korea, there is a possibility that as trust in the U.S. weakens, conflict between the two countries over the direction of the alliance could grow. In fact, the U.S. has already been continuously pressing South Korea for more active support during the Iran war, placing South Korea in a difficult position.

Besides the ROK-U.S. alliance, the public chooses self-strengthening (69.2%) as the top priority among other options. This is followed by strengthening cooperation with friendly nations like Japan, Australia, and Europe (45.6%), improving inter-Korean relations (44.6%), and improving relations with China (33.4%) (Table 19). However, apart from self-strengthening, there is a clear difference in choice between the conservative and progressive camps. Conservative-leaning respondents chose cooperation with friendly nations (64.3%) as their second priority, while progressive-leaning respondents chose improving inter-Korean relations (67.6%) (Table 20). This confirms that in the face of the North Korean nuclear threat, the gap between the progressive and conservative camps in South Korea over North Korea policy is not narrowing.

<Table 19> Necessary Responses if the ROK-U.S. Alliance is Insufficient

Table 20. Necessary Responses if the ROK-U.S. Alliance is Insufficient (by Political Leaning)

If a future Trump administration continues to use South Korea's security vulnerabilities as leverage to make coercive demands in trade and investment, public opinion may increasingly seek alternatives to the ROK-U.S. alliance. To prepare for this possibility, the government needs to secure a range of effective policy options. This situation also reaffirms the critical task for South Korea of bridging the deep-seated divide between conservatives and progressives on diplomatic approaches beyond self-strengthening, thereby fostering a domestic political environment conducive to a consensus-based foreign policy.

The China variable also influences the continued preference for the United States despite weakening trust. As an alternative to the ROK-U.S. alliance, improving relations with China was the least favored option for both progressives (36.3%) and conservatives (35.8%), with little difference between them (Table 20). High levels of negative sentiment toward China are hindering its consideration as a viable alternative. In a rapidly changing international environment, it is strategically rational for South Korea to secure as many diverse options as possible beyond its alliance. Given South Korea's geopolitical position, improving relations with neighboring China is a pragmatically important diplomatic strategy. However, the fact that emotional antipathy is obstructing this path is contrary to the national interest.

High levels of negative sentiment toward China are even adversely affecting a cool-headed, objective understanding of the country. For instance, despite waning trust in the United States, there is an inertia to maintain and strengthen the alliance. Simultaneously, a deliberate double standard is applied to China, the challenger state: its threat is overestimated, while its national power, including its high-tech capabilities, is relatively underestimated.

First, the high response of 48.5% to the possibility of China initiating a military conflict or crisis in the Taiwan Strait in the near future is unusual (Table 16). This is because tensions in the Taiwan Strait have in fact been easing under the hypothetical second Trump administration. As the second Trump administration’s military support and attention for Taiwan have diminished due to factors like the war in Iran, the likelihood of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has also relatively decreased. It is also a surprising result that South Koreans perceive a higher probability of conflict than the Japanese, even as Sino-Japanese relations are sharply confrontational following remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi suggesting intervention in a Taiwan contingency. This indicates that Sinophobia is spreading a distorted perception of reality and, by extension, fueling the perception of a China threat.

Furthermore, when asked which country possesses more advanced technology, the United States or China, a striking 70.2% chose the U.S., while only 11.0% chose China (Table 21). This result is markedly different from the responses of other countries in similar recent public opinion surveys. For example, in a 2026 Pew Research Center survey, 36% of American adults said China was ahead of the U.S. in AI development, compared to only 12% who said the U.S. was ahead. This means that even among Americans, those who believe China has the upper hand are roughly three times more numerous (Jacob Poushter 2026).

A survey on the perception of U.S.-China technological superiority conducted by the American political news organization Politico in February 2026 among approximately 2,000 people in each of five countries—the United States, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—yielded similar results (Politico 2026). In all four countries excluding the United States, a majority responded that China holds the advantage: Canada (54% for China vs. 37% for the U.S.), France (50% vs. 36%), Germany (55% vs. 30%), and the United Kingdom (53% vs. 35%). Although the United States still maintains an overall lead in advanced technology, China continues to achieve remarkable growth and narrow the gap in certain areas—such as artificial intelligence (AI) chips, memory semiconductors, quantum technology, and batteries—despite stringent U.S. technology controls. The perception that the United States has an overwhelming technological advantage over China is not based on an objective understanding of reality. In short, compared to the international average, South Korea shows a tendency to relatively underestimate China's development and capabilities in comparison to the United States.

This suggests an implicit self-persuasion that in the context of U.S.-China competition, choosing the ally, the United States, is rational because China, while threatening, remains inferior. Nevertheless, public opinion calls for a balanced diplomacy: more respondents believe South Korea should be close to both the United States and China (39.9%) than believe it should be closer to the U.S. and distance itself from China (32.2%) (Table 22). In other words, even while perceiving China as unfavorable and threatening, the public is making a rational judgment that maintaining cooperative relations with both major powers is in the pragmatic national interest.

Table 21. Country with Superiority in U.S.-China Advanced Technology

Table 22. South Korea's Position Between the U.S. and China: Strengthening Ties vs. Distancing

5. What is Important for Restoring South Korea-China Relations?

Despite expectations and a series of efforts to improve South Korea-China relations, negative sentiment toward China has instead worsened and become entrenched. A perception is even spreading that China poses a threat comparable to North Korea. Although trust in the United States is plummeting due to the Trump administration's "America First" policy, its unpredictable and impulsive actions, and its coercive demands on allies, South Korea, facing the North Korean nuclear threat, confronts the harsh reality of having no immediate alternative but to rely on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.

South Korea is facing its worst diplomatic environment in history, with overlapping challenges: the North Korean nuclear threat, weakening trust with the United States, limits to cooperation with Japan, strained relations with Russia, and now threats emanating from China. To respond to these complex crises and challenges, South Korea must maintain a solid alliance with the United States while, in the medium to long term, preparing other options to expand its diplomatic flexibility and autonomy. As suggested by public opinion, it should actively pursue self-strengthening and enhanced cooperation with friendly nations, while also seeking to improve inter-Korean and South Korea-China relations to broaden its available options as much as possible. While pursuing dialogue and improved relations with North Korea—the most direct threat—is ideal, it faces practical difficulties. In contrast, improving relations with China, although a lower-priority option, is more feasible, as both countries have the will to do so and the environment is conducive.

However, strong emotional antipathy and threat perception toward China are impeding the improvement of relations. If this sentiment expands beyond mere unfavorability to become hatred and a perceived threat, South Korea will face a worst-case scenario: having to simultaneously confront the North Korean nuclear threat and a threat from the neighboring great power, China. The United States has already designated China, rather than North Korea, as its clearer target for containment. It is not only expanding the role of U.S. Forces Korea to check China but also demanding that its ally, South Korea, take a more active role on the front lines of this effort.

Far from being considered an alternative, China is emerging as a significant threat factor that paradoxically reinforces security dependence on the United States, even as the foundation of trust in the U.S. is weakening. If the U.S.-China strategic competition escalates across all domains—from diplomacy and security to the economy and advanced technology—the United States will demand more forcefully and persistently that its ally, South Korea, join in containing and pressuring China. In such a scenario, South Korea's strategic options will inevitably shrink, and the possibility of its relationship with neighboring China transforming into a hostile one, marked by confrontation in all areas including the economy, advanced technology, and military affairs, cannot be ruled out.

In short, the starting point for improving relations with China lies in managing the spread of emotional Sinophobia and political anti-China rhetoric. If negative sentiment toward China becomes entrenched due to structural reasons—such as perceptions of national character and the Communist Party system—and escalates into hatred and a perceived threat, both neighboring countries must seriously recognize the possibility of their relationship solidifying into one of chronic tension and explore various countermeasures. First, it is necessary to draw lessons from the case of improving South Korea-Japan relations. Just as direct experiences, such as visiting Japan, have provided a path to overcoming stereotypes, South Korea should leverage its geographical proximity to actively promote visits to and exchanges with China, thereby creating an environment where the younger generation can break free from the confines of prejudice.

Second, a collective effort is needed within domestic political and media circles to guard against and raise awareness of the mobilization of Sinophobia and anti-China sentiment as tools for domestic political infighting. Public opinion surveys continue to show a significant perception gap between conservatives and progressives on issues related to North Korea and China, indicating a high probability of these issues being exploited for political gain. Opinion leaders must be awakened to the need to preemptively control the amplification and reproduction of baseless, extreme anti-China issues that arise when negative sentiment is used as material for political conflict. It is crucial to prevent a vicious cycle in which being mired in the one-dimensional emotion of Sinophobia and the political logic of anti-China sentiment deepens the lack of objective understanding of China, accumulates distortions and misunderstandings, leads to errors in policy toward China, and consequently results in a further deterioration of South Korea-China relations.

Third, the government, academia, and industry must cooperate closely to revitalize Chinese language education and China studies, which have been significantly curtailed by Sinophobia. If the current trend continues, education and research on China within academia could effectively be hollowed out, failing to cultivate a next generation of researchers. This could lead to a situation in about a decade where China experts become extremely scarce in South Korean society. There is a concern that this absence of expertise could diminish the motivation and momentum for cooperation between South Korea and China, allowing misunderstandings and distortions to be amplified and reproduced, potentially leading to a chronic state of conflict and confrontation. ■

References

Lee, Dong-ryul. 2025. “Analysis of the 2025 EAI East Asia Survey Results ①: Expectations and Challenges for Improving Relations with an ‘Unfavorable’ China for the New Administration.” EAI Issue Briefing.

Hankook Research. “[2026 Survey on Perceptions of China] Diagnosis of ROK-China Relations and Cooperation Tasks, Evaluation of Summit Meeting.” March 11, 2026.https://hrcopinion.co.kr/archives/35700

Jacob Poushter. 2026. “What Americans think about the global AI race.” July 23.https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/07/23/what-americans-think-about-the-global-ai-race/

Pew Research Center. 2026. “Trump Gets Negative Reviews Internationally as Fewer Say U.S. Is a Reliable Partner.” June 23.https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/trumpgets-negative-reviews-internationally-as-fewer-say-u-s-is-a-reliablepartner/?_gl=1*129lm2k*_up*MQ..*_gs*MQ..&gclid=Cj0KCQjwMDTBhCgARIsAKAkdlSKtsjbggB7_I_BLW69DCgg1p1vYAOq2DojB0fXkJbRHDSpDjFOyLkaAgoZEALw_wcB&gbraid=0AAAAA-ddO9FsydUC2iYNrUCh8odFt46Ei

The POLITICO Poll. 2026. “The reviews are in. It's not looking good, America.” March 14.https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/14/america-allies-divided-reviews-democracy-stability-00803863

■ Lee Dong-ryul_EAI Senior Fellow and Professor of Chinese Language and Literature at Dongduk Women's University.

■ Editor: Lee Sang-joon_EAI Research Fellow. For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr