[EAI Issue Briefing] The United States Cannot Be Trusted and China Is Disliked: Is There an Alternative?: An Analysis of the Results of the 2026 EAI East Asia Perception Survey

I. Introduction

Since the alliance relationship began with the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty following the end of the Korean War in 1953, it is hard to recall another period in which only 45.4 percent of South Koreans regarded the United States as a trustworthy partner, only 47.5 percent held a favorable impression of the United States, and only 15.8 percent held a favorable impression of the U.S. president. In the summer of 2026, South Koreans’ perception of the United States has thus deteriorated sharply. Current evaluations of the South Korea–U.S. relationship are also low, now approaching levels similar to evaluations of the South Korea–China relationship. South Korea’s leaders and foreign policy decision-makers now confront public opinion in which favorability toward Japan—and toward the Japanese leader (prime minister)—exceeds favorability toward the United States, while public sentiment toward China expresses a sense of threat and unfavorability nearly on par with that toward North Korea. If the United States cannot be trusted and China is disliked, is there an alternative? What policy implications does such public opinion carry? What considerations should inform future policymaking?

The East Asia Institute has conducted an annual East Asia perception survey since 2013. Among these, items related to Japan and South Korea–Japan relations are used jointly with a Japanese partner institution for a mutual perception survey of the South Korean and Japanese publics, while the results of items concerning East Asia more broadly are introduced in this article. The main findings for 2026 are as follows.

First, the record decline in favorability toward and trust in the United States can be attributed in part to a temporary backlash against President Trump’s unpredictable, inconsistent, and predatory conduct. At the same time, it also reflects a structural distrust arising from the fact that, amid the decline of U.S. hegemony, the United States is selectively scaling back its international engagement, unilaterally shifting burdens onto its allies, and reorganizing alliance relationships around transactional terms.

Second, the record-high unfavorability toward China stems in large part from unfavorable views of the Chinese national character, alongside a heightened perception of threat that now rivals that associated with North Korea. The primary source of this threat perception, the THAAD retaliation, remains, in effect, a security threat, insofar as China sought—through economic sanctions—to compel a change in South Korea’s security policy decision (i.e., the deployment of the THAAD weapons system). In addition, perceptions of economic security threat are also growing, as China’s technological innovation and export offensive in core sectors are seen as threatening the foundations of the South Korean economy.

Third, despite the relative rise in favorability toward and trust in Japan, Japan is not perceived as a substitute for the current alliance system. Public opinion remains reserved regarding security cooperation with Japan, and support for South Korea–U.S.–Japan security cooperation has also declined slightly. At the same time, the public shows a forward-looking attitude toward expanding economic cooperation, as in the case of a proposed “South Korea–Japan Economic Community.”

Fourth, the middle-power solidarity option being championed by Canada and core NATO countries (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) as an alternative to distrust of the alliance has not resonated strongly with the South Korean public. Because South Koreans are accustomed to bilateral relations with great powers, solidarity with a third grouping of countries feels somewhat unfamiliar. Moreover, public opinion is divided regarding Japan, which would need to be a core partner in any such middle-power solidarity.

Fifth, momentum is building behind self-reliance arguments such as the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and nuclear armament, but the public is aware of their limits. Even while distrusting the United States, South Koreans ultimately continue to choose reliance on the South Korea–U.S. alliance. The public expresses discomfort, a sense of betrayal, and anxiety over the fact that the United States views the alliance as a “deal,” yet it also shows a tendency to accept this as the “new normal” and to adapt to a transaction-based alliance system.

Finally, faced with these diplomatic difficulties, South Korea now more than ever needs political consensus to formulate and implement a consistent and sustained national strategy. Yet partisan polarization over perceptions of major countries and foreign policy remains persistent. The possibility of the politicization of foreign policy issues and of national division thus remains open.

II. Distrust of the United States Has Risen Sharply

South Koreans’ favorable impression of the United States fell sharply in 2026, dropping by as much as 25.3 percentage points, from 72.8 percent last year to 47.5 percent. Since favorability toward Japan in 2026 stands at 54.3 percent, the figure for the United States is now lower than that for Japan ([Table 1]). This appears to be an unprecedented development since the country’s founding. As is readily apparent, the main cause is President Trump. South Korea’s impression of the United States deteriorated rapidly amid a series of events under the “America First” approach of the second Trump administration—including the imposition of sweeping tariffs, demands for increased direct investment and defense spending, attempts to annex Greenland and other disruptions to the international order, the abduction of Venezuelan President Maduro, U.S. acquiescence to Israeli repression in Gaza, and the invasion of Iran. The predatory words and actions of the United States, which had not yet been reflected in the survey conducted on August 19–20 of last year, subsequently intensified on both the economic and military fronts, causing the figures to plunge.

[Table 1] Impressions of the United States (2023–2026)

[Table 2] Reasons for an Unfavorable Impression of the United States (2025, 2026)

By contrast, a negative impression of President Trump had already emerged dramatically in last year’s survey. The share holding a negative impression rose sharply from 17.7 percent under Biden to 73.1 percent under Trump, and increased slightly this year to 77.4 percent—exceeding even the level of negative impressions of President Xi Jinping (70.2 percent). Meanwhile, positive impressions plunged from 50.9 percent for Biden in 2024 to 22.3 percent for Trump last year and 15.7 percent for Trump this year ([Table 3]).

The deterioration in impressions of the United States and of the U.S. president has translated into declining trust. Trust, which stood at 85.1 percent under the Biden administration in 2022, fell to 46.4 percent in just four years—a drop of nearly 40 percentage points—including a 19.9-percentage-point decline in the past year alone.

[Table 3] Impressions of the U.S. President (2023–2026)

[Table 4] Trust in the United States (2017–2026)

This decline in trust toward the United States is emerging not only in South Korea but as a global phenomenon. According to a June survey conducted by Pew Research across 36 countries, the average level of trust in the United States stood at 47 percent, and average favorability toward the United States stood at 37 percent. The countries showing the sharpest declines are, notably, U.S. allies: trust in Canada fell from 83 percent in 2022 to 35 percent in 2026, in Germany from 83 percent to 39 percent over the same period, in France from 62 percent to 27 percent, and in the United Kingdom from 82 percent to 49 percent (Pew, 2026/6/23). This erosion of trust reflects the Trump factor, but it also stems from structural factors: as U.S. hegemony declines, there is growing resentment and distrust toward the United States’ scaling back of international engagement and its unilateral, transaction-oriented shifting or transfer of burdens onto its allies. This, in turn, is leading to a decline in trust in the alliance itself. For an ally facing a Trump who views the alliance relationship as a deal and treats allied countries as instruments, the absence of a “card” to bargain with can result in a predatory situation (Walt 2026). Here, the card that NATO countries are considering is China—that is, leveraging their relationship with China to check the United States’ predatory exercise of hegemony.

III. China Is Not an Alternative

According to Pew Research, while the image of the United States is declining across major countries worldwide, China’s image is rising. Across the 36-country average, favorable impressions of the United States stand at 36 percent, compared with 46 percent for China. In Canada, the figures are 43 percent for China versus 33 percent for the United States; in Germany, 33 percent versus 27 percent; in France, 36 percent versus 27 percent; and in the United Kingdom, 46 percent versus 41 percent—in every case, China leads. This can well be described as a “blowback” against the United States.

A similar pattern emerged in a February poll conducted by the political outlet Politico. Politico surveyed public opinion in core NATO countries—Canada, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—and found that publics in all four countries regard China as a more reliable partner than the United States. In Canada, 57 percent versus 23 percent view reliance on China as preferable to reliance on the United States; the corresponding figures are 40 percent versus 24 percent in Germany, 34 percent versus 25 percent in France, and 42 percent versus 34 percent in the United Kingdom. To be sure, these results indicate that further reliance on the United States has become difficult, rather than that trust in China has actually increased (Politico 2026/3/15). Nevertheless, China has worked to expand trade and investment relationships by exploiting the resentment that Trump’s coercive rhetoric and actions have generated among U.S. allies. As a result, last winter French President Macron, German Chancellor Merz, British Prime Minister Starmer, and Canadian Prime Minister Carney all visited Beijing and reached agreements to expand trade and investment.

By contrast, the response of U.S. allies in Asia differs. Among the 36 countries surveyed by Pew Research, the countries where impressions of China are lower than those of the United States include Israel, Japan, India, South Korea, and the Philippines. With the exception of Israel, these are countries that perceive China as a geopolitical threat. In South Korea’s case, unfavorable views of China have remained at around 70 percent throughout the 2020s. Over the past year, even as the Lee Jae-myung government has pursued a foreign policy stance of balance toward China—with President Xi Jinping visiting South Korea for the first time in eleven years and President Lee holding his first summit meeting in Beijing this year, strengthening friendly ties at the leader level—unfavorable public sentiment toward China nevertheless rose by 7.3 percentage points compared with the previous year. Unfavorable, or anti-China, sentiment can thus be described as persistent and even intensifying to the point of becoming entrenched.

[Table 5] Impressions of China (2019–2026)

[Table 6] Reasons for an Unfavorable Impression of China (2025, 2026)

Where does this unfavorable, or anti-China, sentiment among the South Korean public originate? A number of possible sources can be considered: antipathy toward the external attitudes and policies of the Chinese government (or its leadership), antipathy toward the Chinese political system, perceptions of security or economic threat from China, or unfavorability toward (or aversion to) the Chinese national character. According to [Table 6], the largest source of unfavorability toward China is aversion to the Chinese national character, followed by the one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party, and then China’s economic coercion and retaliation. In other words, national character, systemic identity, and threat perception all figure prominently. [Table 7] examines threat perception in greater detail.

[Table 7] Countries/Regions Perceived as Military Threats to South Korea (2013–2026)

The country that South Koreans perceive as a military threat, after North Korea, is China. The share of respondents citing North Korea is 88.4 percent, while that citing China is 78.9 percent ([Table 7]). Looking at trends over the past decade, the rise in the perception of China as a threat is particularly notable. The 2016–17 THAAD retaliation constituted systematic, phased economic sanctions imposed by China on South Korea; in substance, however, it was a case in which China used coercive economic means to demand a change in South Korea’s security policy decision (i.e., the decision to deploy the THAAD weapons system). This can thus be regarded as the point at which South Koreans began to perceive China in earnest as a security challenge or threat. As factors such as China’s coercive conduct surrounding the outbreak and handling of COVID-19 in 2020, along with growing perceptions of supply-chain threats posed by China, compounded one another, threat perception has intensified to the point that China is now perceived by the public as a threat nearly on par with North Korea.

As shown in [Table 8], when asked directly about the level of threat felt from China, as many as 85.6 percent of respondents gave an affirmative response—an even higher figure than the 78.9 percent recorded in [Table 7], where China was selected from among a list of countries. The most frequently cited reason was economic coercion, such as the THAAD retaliation (55.4 percent), followed by the view that China “could pose a real and direct military threat to our country” (37.9 percent). This indicates that South Koreans harbor not merely a simple unfavorability toward, or aversion to, China, but a genuine sense of threat. For this reason, trust in China also remains low—having fallen by 7.9 percentage points from last year to 15.9 percent ([Table 9])—and stands at a low level ([Table 10]). Unfavorability toward and threat perception of China are thus driving down trust in China. This stands in contrast to the trend among NATO member states, which are seeking to reduce reliance on the United States while expanding reliance on China; South Korea, by contrast, remains hesitant about cooperation with China.

[Table 8] Level of Threat Posed by China to South Korea (2026)

[Table 9] Reasons for Perceiving China as a Threat (2026)

[Table 10] Trust in China (2017–2026)

IV. Is the South Korea–U.S. Alliance the Ultimate Answer After All?

As trust in the United States declines and the threat from China rises, South Koreans find themselves in a difficult position. European countries and Canada, where distrust of the United States has reached an extreme, believe that even if U.S. security commitments diminish, they can in the long run secure the capacity to respond to the existential threat posed by Russia through solidarity among NATO member states excluding the United States. They are also exploring the option of using the “China card” to fill the relative void left by the United States. South Korea, by contrast, lacks any effective means, apart from the alliance, of responding to the existential threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, even as trust in U.S. security commitments declines. Moreover, unlike the NATO countries, South Korea views China as both unfavorable and threatening, making it difficult to use China as a means of strategic hedging.

In the end, the South Korean public’s choice is that, even though the United States cannot be trusted, the South Korea–U.S. alliance must nonetheless be stably managed and maintained. As shown in [Table 11], 62.3 percent of the public believes that security can be secured through the South Korea–U.S. alliance. Among the 39.5 percent who believe that the alliance alone is insufficient to guarantee security, the most frequently cited response was self-reliance—that is, achieving independence through the buildup of military capabilities—followed by strengthening cooperation with allies and partners such as Japan and Europe, and easing tensions by improving relations with North Korea ([Table 12]).

Military self-reliance through arms buildup is a long-term project, and one that constitutes a political matter requiring national consensus, contingent on future economic growth and fiscal conditions. Moreover, given North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities and the trend of China’s military expansion, “self-reliance” itself is, in reality, unlikely to serve as a viable short-term alternative. Nevertheless, as [Table 13] shows, 45.9 percent of respondents believe that South Korea can achieve security self-reliance through arms buildup within the next three to four years. Such a largely unrealistic outlook—much like the nearly 70 percent public support for nuclear armament—can be interpreted less as a realistic assessment of feasibility than as an expression of aspiration for self-reliance at the level of national sovereignty ([Table 14]).

[Table 11] Whether the South Korea–U.S. Alliance Provides Sufficient Security (2026)

[Table 12] Necessary Responses if the South Korea–U.S. Alliance Is Insufficient (2026)

[Table 13] Likelihood of Achieving Security Self-Reliance within the Next Three to Five Years (2026)

[Table 14] Support for or Opposition to South Korea Possessing Nuclear Weapons if the North Korean Nuclear Threat Persists (2025, 2026)

This same pattern of public opinion is also evident regarding the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON). Fifty-two percent of respondents evaluated positively the transfer of OPCON within 2027–28, citing as reasons that it is “a natural matter for a sovereign state” (57.8 percent), followed by “the need for security self-reliance from the United States” (25.7 percent); only 12.8 percent cited the view that “sufficient preparations have been made.” Among those opposed, the most common reason, cited by 35.8 percent, was that “preparations are unlikely to be complete by 2027–28” ([Table 15], [Table 16]).

In sum, South Korean public opinion clearly reveals a contradictory situation: the United States cannot be trusted, yet South Korea has no choice but to rely on it. Although the circumstances have changed, maintaining and strengthening the alliance remains the top priority of South Korean diplomacy. If so, a strategy is needed to compel the United States—now pursuing a transaction-based rather than trust-based alliance—to honor its alliance commitments. This requires preparing cards with which to bargain with the United States. Without such cards, the United States becomes a predatory hegemon. For example, the reason South Korea has had little choice but to comply with U.S. demands for massive direct investment is the asymmetric bargaining structure resulting from its excessive dependence on the United States.

[Table 15] Views on the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control (2026)

[Table 16] Reasons for Supporting/Opposing the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control (2026)

V. Why South Korea Is Lukewarm toward Middle-Power Solidarity

The more South Korea reduces its military dependence on the United States, the greater its leverage vis-à-vis the United States would become; yet, as noted above, military self-reliance is a long-term project. Could South Korea, then, pursue an option similar to that of the NATO countries—raising its bargaining leverage through cooperation and solidarity with like-minded countries? As shown in [Table 12], when asked what should be done if the South Korea–U.S. alliance cannot adequately secure South Korea, respondents ranked solidarity with Japan, Australia, and European partners, as well as easing tensions through improved inter-Korean relations, next after military self-reliance. Given that the very rationale for the alliance is the threat from North Korea, improving relations with North Korea would clearly be an option for reducing alliance-related anxiety; however, the public views this possibility as unlikely. A similar response is evident regarding the so-called middle-power solidarity option. This is because South Korea has scant experience pursuing meaningful security cooperation with countries other than the United States. This is especially true with respect to multilateral or “minilateral” cooperation with Japan, which would be the most likely partner for middle-power solidarity.

[Table 17] Trust in Major Countries (2017–2026)

For South Korea, Japan is such a constant partner with shared interests across a range of issue areas that it functions almost as a given whenever South Korea pursues middle-power solidarity. Moreover, as noted above, favorability toward Japan this year surpassed that toward the United States (54.3 percent versus 47.5 percent), and, as shown in [Table 17], trust in Japan has also been steadily closing the gap with trust in the United States. The problem is that, where security matters are concerned, South Korean public opinion remains lukewarm toward cooperation with Japan. As shown in [Table 18], the share of respondents who believe security cooperation with Japan “should not be pursued” or “should be limited to its current level” stands at 44.5 percent, nearly matching the 47.9 percent who believe it should be expanded. By contrast, regarding economic cooperation, the share favoring expansion is a much higher 55 percent, compared with a combined 33.3 percent favoring “reduction” or maintaining the “current level” ([Table 19]). In short, while opinion tends toward expanding economic cooperation, responses on security cooperation are more divided. In the case of South Korea–U.S.–Japan security cooperation, support remains relatively high at 66.2 percent, but this represents a 12-percentage-point decline from 78.2 percent last year, while opposition rose by 12 percentage points ([Table 20]). The most commonly cited reason for opposition—that such cooperation “provides a pretext for justifying Japan’s military buildup”—reflects the public’s cautious stance toward security cooperation with Japan.

[Table 18] South Korea–Japan Security Cooperation in the Event of a Crisis in East Asia (2026)

[Table 19] The Future of Economic Cooperation between South Korea and Japan (2026)

[Table 20] Views on South Korea–U.S.–Japan Trilateral Military Security Cooperation (2025, 2026)

This suggests that South Korea’s pursuit of middle-power solidarity would be more appropriately centered on non-security fields, or on the field of economic security, rather than on traditional security cooperation. The arena of middle-power solidarity diplomacy is often described as taking the form of a “variable geometry”—that is, the set and structure of middle powers sharing concerns, crisis awareness, and interests shifts depending on the issue at hand. Examples include a grouping of countries supporting free trade, an economic-security coordination grouping centered on cooperation over critical mineral supply chains, and a digital cooperation grouping focused on artificial intelligence. Solidarity and cooperation in such areas could serve as cards for building leverage in negotiations with the United States.

VI. Partisan Polarization on Foreign Policy Issues Persists

Finally, how has the partisan polarization between the ruling and opposition camps—one of the persistent problems afflicting South Korean diplomacy—evolved over the first year of the Lee Jae-myung government? The phenomenon whereby foreign policy issues become objects of political contestation between conservative and progressive camps, fueling national division and weakening South Korea’s external bargaining power, has intensified alongside the broader polarization of South Korean politics (Sohn 2025). The current survey shows that, despite the change of ruling party, this underlying trend has persisted. Even though the Lee Jae-myung government, under the banner of pragmatism, has largely inherited the previous administration’s policy line—resulting in considerable policy convergence—divisions in public opinion remain unchanged. With respect to perceptions of the United States, South Koreans’ responses to the unilateral, predatory conduct of the Trump administration are markedly partisan. As shown in [Table 21], when asked about trust in the United States, progressives registered 21 percent and conservatives 51.5 percent, a gap of 30.5 percentage points between the two camps. Trust in Japan shows a similar pattern, with progressives at 17.5 percent and conservatives at 54.9 percent, a gap of 37.4 percentage points. By contrast, the gap between the two camps regarding China is relatively narrower: 47.4 percent among progressives and 26.5 percent among conservatives, a gap of 20.9 percentage points. This indicates that trust in China among the progressive camp has risen under the current government—a trend that stands in contrast to the strong anti-China sentiment prevalent among the general public.

What is particularly striking is the partisan divide in evaluations of specific policies. Regarding the transfer of OPCON, positive evaluations stood at 42.8 percent among progressives but only 23.9 percent among conservatives, while negative evaluations showed a stark contrast of 59.8 percent among conservatives versus just 9.3 percent among progressives. Meanwhile, as shown in [Table 22], progressive evaluations of the South Korean government’s Japan policy had consistently been negative, but jumped to 54.8 percent this year, following the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung government—a rise of as much as 36.8 percentage points from 18 percent last year. The Lee Jae-myung government has championed pragmatic diplomacy and pursued improved South Korea–Japan relations as a touchstone of that approach. President Lee has stated that it is undesirable to reverse an inter-state agreement with respect to the comfort women agreement and the forced labor issue, and has even remarked that excessive fixation on historical issues should not be allowed to impede cooperation—thereby maintaining a policy line that continues the previous government’s approach toward Japan. The progressive camp, which had strongly opposed the Yoon Suk-yeol government when it pursued the very same policy line, has now reversed its position to become a strong supporter. Likewise, the conservative camp, which had strongly supported the Yoon government’s pragmatist policy line, has shifted from strong support to strong opposition toward the current government, which has inherited that same line (from 65 percent to 36 percent).

Ultimately, the tendency to oppose the other camp’s policies and to unconditionally support one’s own camp’s policies—hallmarks of partisan confrontation—is fully reflected in foreign policy matters as well. In particular, there is a pronounced tendency to prioritize blocking or disparaging the achievements of the opposing camp over advancing the shared interest, that is, the national interest.

[Table 21] Share of Progressive, Moderate, and Conservative Respondents by Level of Trust in the United States, China, and Japan (2026)

[Table 22] Evaluation of the South Korean Government’s Attitude toward Japan, by Ideological Orientation (2023–2026)

VII. Conclusion

The public sentiment revealed in the 2026 EAI East Asia Perception Survey is one in which distrust and anxiety intersect. Trust in the United States is faltering, and distrust regarding security cooperation with Japan also persists. Even as the public views China with both unfavorability and a sense of existential threat, it nonetheless desires balance between the United States and China, while at the same time lending support to self-reliance arguments such as the transfer of OPCON and nuclear armament. This shift in public sentiment cannot be regarded as a merely temporary phenomenon of the past year. The decline in trust toward the United States reflects not only a temporary backlash against Trump but also a phenomenon accompanying structural changes in the alliance relationship, and the threat posed by China likewise reflects fundamental changes in the international structure. Similarly, the relative rise in favorability toward and trust in Japan, on both fronts, is a phenomenon driven by these same shifts in international dynamics.

At the center of this new normal lies a shift from a trust-based conception of the alliance to a transaction-based one. The public feels discomfort, a sense of betrayal, and strong anxiety at the fact that the United States views the alliance as a deal and treats allied countries as instruments; yet this is not a matter of choice but of adaptation. In this sense, alliance policy ultimately becomes the policy task of preparing negotiating cards for dealing with the United States. In this survey, respondents identified the card of military self-reliance, together with the card of middle-power solidarity with Japan, Australia, and Europe, as complementary mechanisms for the alliance and as sources of leverage vis-à-vis the United States. Going forward, South Korea should develop a careful plan to ensure that its arms buildup translates into leverage vis-à-vis the United States, and should also pursue, as a promising card, middle-power solidarity diplomacy aimed at expanding minilateral networks, following the example of Canada and Europe.

Finally, there remains the risk of internal division. To break through this world of distrust, South Korea needs a foreign policy strategy characterized by consistency and continuity. Although the Lee Jae-myung government has continued to pursue a bipartisan diplomatic course under the banner of pragmatic diplomacy, differences in perception and policy between the political camps remain evident beneath the surface. South Korea has accumulated the capacity to be counted among the world’s top ten military powers, a sophisticated advanced economy possessing cutting-edge technology, and a leading and attractive source of popular culture. However, if partisan polarization over major foreign policy issues continues to divide public opinion and expand the politicization of foreign policy issues, South Korea will fail to exercise diplomatic influence commensurate with its national power, and will ultimately have to accept damage to its national interest. Overcoming partisan polarization is thus a key condition not only for restoring democratic governance but also for enhancing South Korea’s external role and influence. ■

References

Sohn, Yul. [Polarization and South Korean Democracy Series] ⑨ Polarization and Foreign Policy. EAI Working Paper. February 19, 2025.

Pew Research Center, “Trump Gets Negative Reviews Internationally as Fewer Say U.S. Is a Reliable Partner,” June 23, 2026. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/06/23/trump-gets-negative-reviews-internationally-as-fewer-say-u-s-is-a-reliable-partner/?_gl=1*129lm2k*_up*MQ..*_gs*MQ..&gclid=Cj0KCQjw-MDTBhCgARIsAKAkdlSKtsjbggB7_I_BLW69DCgg1p1vYAOq2DojB0fXkJbRHDSpDjFOyLkaAgoZEALw_wcB&gbraid=0AAAAA-ddO9FsydUC2iYNrUCh8odFt46Ei

The Politico Poll, “Top US allies are turning toward China instead. Blame Trump.” March 15, 2026. https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/15/trump-china-europe-closer-ties-00823457

Walt, Stephen. “The Predatory Hegemon,” Foreign Affairs, February 15, 2026. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/predatory-hegemon-walt

■ Yul Sohn_EAI Chair Professor; Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University.

■ In Charge of/Edited by: Sangjun Lee_EAI Researcher
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr