[10th EAI Academy] ① The Young Ones in the Future: The Dream of Korea in the 21st Century

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QwOGZ0WU0GQ

■ Ha Young-sun_Chairman of the East Asia Institute, Emeritus Professor at Seoul National University.

Video Script

Welcome. This academy will be held over a total of 10 sessions. In today's inaugural lecture, I will focus on the reasons for holding this academy and its overall themes. If possible, I plan to have a 30-minute Q&A session after each weekly lecture. I have asked the staff to read materials related to the lecture summary and write a kind of 'intellectual committee letter,' which we can use as a basis for the final 30-minute Q&A. We can also begin the lecture with content that encompasses the theme of the entire 10-session course. The title of the course is 'The Youth in the Future, the Dream of the Republic of Korea.' Where did this title come from?

This title is a kind of parody. About 16 or 17 years ago, in 2009, EAI held an enlightenment lecture series in Yeouido titled 'The Youth in History: From the 18th-Century Northern Learning School to the 21st-Century School of Complexity.' At the time, our country's politicians were in such a mess that we hoped holding the lectures near the National Assembly might enlighten some of its members, but ultimately, not many of them participated. Back then, too, the audience was relatively full of graduate and undergraduate students, and the lecture title was 'The Youth in History.'

That lecture series ran for eight weeks, one session per week, and the content was later made available to students as a book. I hadn't originally intended to write a lecture or a book with the title 'The Youth in History: From the 18th-Century Northern Learning School to the 21st-Century School of Complexity.' It began from a completely unexpected motivation, likely around the early 1990s during the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era—around 1991, when the Berlin Wall had fallen and the Soviet Union had dissolved and become Russia. The changes in international politics at that time were considered a significant upheaval, but it's difficult to easily judge whether the changes we are experiencing now are greater than those of that period. It's possible that today's changes are even more profound. I plan to discuss matters related to this. So, why did I choose the title 'The Youth in History'?

I felt that despite the major transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, people were not taking it seriously enough. This sense of frustration, both personally and at a national level, made me wonder how the youth of past turbulent periods navigated their times. It wasn't a systematic approach; I began looking into it one case at a time. Personally, I think I started with the writings of Yu Kil-chun.

Starting with works like *Seoyu gyeonmun* (Observations on a Journey to the West), I looked at various writings, which eventually became a series of seven or eight pieces. Thus, the title 'The Youth in History' was born. Today's 'The Youth in the Future' will be about ourselves—'the young us.' What is the dream of the Republic of Korea held by 'the young us in the future'? How should we think about it? This will likely be the central theme of our first session. In response to the request to write their thoughts, 14 'intellectual committee letters' were submitted. It seems seven people did not write one, perhaps because they didn't have a suitable counterpart, didn't want to, or didn't do the reading. Of the 14 submissions,

four were on Yu Kil-chun, three on Kim Yang-su, two on Yeonam, and two on another figure. One letter each was submitted on Dong-ju and Yu Yeong-hui. I have briefly read the thirteen or fourteen letters in total, which we can discuss in more detail during the Q&A session later. The topic for today is a re-examination of the final part of 'The World Politics of Love,' the last chapter in the revised edition of the lecture book, which was not in the original lectures. 'The young us in the future'—how should I dream of myself? Or how should we dream of the Korean Peninsula, Korea, the world, the planet, and the universe?

We will spend the next hour and a half contemplating these stories. As those who have seen the book know, of the eight parts, the most discussed was the final section on 'complexity.' For convenience, I included the chapter where I studied international politics with others, but I couldn't include the entire School of Complexity. The book was edited to feature the faces of people your age as representatives. The point I want to make today is that we need to think about 'the young us in the future, the dream of the Republic of Korea, or my dream.' The discussion will inevitably continue in connection with this theme.

Many of you have probably never given much thought to what will become of Korea or the Korean Peninsula. Frankly, I think that is perfectly normal. But the idea of 'my dream' requires some consideration. What will I become? If you are in your twenties now, what will you be like in 50 years? The Korean word for dream, *kkum*, is written with the Chinese character *mong* (夢), but in its pure Korean origin, it is a noun derived from the verb *kkumida*, which means 'to shape' or 'to design.' In other words, it is about how you will shape yourself over the next 50 years. The reason I am raising this now is that we may be at a point in time when we have a particular need to shape that dream.

There are various studies on what people dream about. For instance, just as Marx's *Das Kapital* is to capitalism, Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* is the seminal work on dreams. Freud's primary conclusion after intensively studying dreams was that they are ultimately manifestations of one's own subconscious, and that this subconscious reveals, in a sense, the unfulfilled desires of one's real life.

So, it becomes a matter of shaping or designing. That is, dreaming of the person you will be in your 70s, or designing the dream for the Korean Peninsula or for Korea. Why must we do this at this specific time? If the next 50 years were predictable, there would be little need to dream. The need arises because change is anticipated. If the future were one where you get a job, work at a stable company, get married, have children in a moderately sized apartment, and then pass away after some time, there would be no real reason to dream. But dreams emerge when the future is very difficult to predict.

The Changing World Order and the Dawn of a New Era

So, let's start by talking a little about why this particular time is one that should especially evoke dreams. In the phrase 'the young us in the future,' the word 'future' (未來, mirae) is not a native Korean word. The question is, within the meaning of the word 'future'—that which has not yet come—why is it that we are bound to have an unusual number of dreams? For convenience, I believe I briefly discussed this first table at last month's EAI student meeting. It's a chart that roughly illustrates GDP from 1 AD to 2008. It might look complicated at a glance, but it can be broadly divided into three periods. First, from the beginning of the common era until the 1600s, India and China stand out as the most important countries. Around the year 1000, India had the highest GDP, followed by China. China reached its peak around the 17th and 18th centuries before beginning a sharp decline. Following them are Western Europe and then the United States.

However, the period for which you, 'the young us in the future,' are now dreaming will correspond to the next era, from 2026 to 2050. Broadly speaking, we need to consider this in three parts. First, there was a world until about 1700-1800 that was not dominated by the West. We have become so accustomed to the West leading the world order that we might think it has always been that way. But that's not the case; before that, there were countries like India and China. That's one.

Second, there is the period when the West transitioned from the Middle Ages to the modern era. Roughly from the 15th and 16th centuries, the West, which had been lagging, surpassed the East and came to dominate the present. If there was a long period of the past, or a traditional era, there has also been a modern era of the last 500-600 years. If we were still within that framework, there would actually be no need for today's topic, because there would be little need to dream.

The world we know would continue, and in that context, the theme would not be dreaming but adapting well. It would be a time for diligently following a path where the answers are already known. However, a problem arises because that is not necessarily the case. If we divide history into three major periods, the period we can conveniently call 'tradition' was, as I mentioned, a time when India or China dominated. In our case, it was the period from roughly the Three Kingdoms era until the 19th century, when we were within the framework of the Chinese 'tianxia order.'

Second, the West began its shift from a laggard to a leader in the modern era around the 1500s and 1600s, but it was in the 19th century that this new reality truly manifested itself to us. From the perspective of China, Korea, and Japan, the era of 'Western power moving east' (seose dongjeom) began in earnest in the early to mid-19th century. If we call this second period 'modernity,' then you are now living in a time—though you may not call it this—that I refer to as a 'complex order.' In this situation, where you are already swept up in this complex order, how should you dream your own dream, and how should you dream the dream of the country you belong to? These are, broadly speaking, three distinct parts of the story. This will likely be the story for the next 10 weeks, and you will encounter the various problems that arise in the transition from the second to the third period.

As you can see, 'modernity' brings changes that you can grasp intuitively, so I won't explain it at length. A representative example is the change in the protagonist of the drama. The world shifted from 'tianxia-states' to 'nation-states.' The term 'nation-state' (gukmin-gukga) is also a translated term, created first by Westerners. Depending on whether you emphasize the 'nation' or the 'state' aspect, it could be translated as 'ethnic state' (minjok-gukga) or 'nation-state.' The question, then, is how much this protagonist is changing. A second aspect of the protagonist's change is the stage on which they operate. The 'Western model' that we encountered in the 19th century came to us in the form of 'a rich country and a strong military' (buguk gangbyeong). This may sound like a cliché, but it was a tremendous shock in the 19th century. This is because until then, 'a rich country and a strong military' was the standard of civilization for what were considered base or vulgar nations.

So what was the standard then? At that time, 'propriety' or 'rites' (禮, ye) was at the core of the stage. A familiar expression to us is the 'Eastern Country of Courtesy' (dongbang yeuijiguk), which reflects the belief that a country with propriety was advanced, and one without it was backward. Then one day, 'a rich country and a strong military' emerged as the new standard of civilization, and we faced a change where failure to follow it meant being forced off the stage. So, on that stage of 'propriety' or 'a rich country and a strong military,' what was the core of the performance, the essence of the acting?

The way the actors performed was also very different. In the traditional era, the principle was, as you often hear, 'serving the great and cherishing the small' (sadae jaso). However, in the modern nation-state, 'self-strengthening and balance of power' (jagang gyunse) is the basic principle. You must have your own strength, and strength alone is not enough, so a 'balance of power' is necessary. The term 'gyunse' was the initial translation of the English 'balance of power,' and only later was it re-translated as 'seryeok gyunhyeong' (balance of power). So, primarily it's 'self-strengthening,' and secondarily it's 'balance of power.' From this perspective, it seems that for the vast majority of the older generation today, or over 90% of our country's politicians, the core of their performance is 'self-strengthening and balance of power.' If that's the case, shouldn't we have little to worry about? If we can live within the modern framework, is there really a need to change our dreams? However, the reason we are holding this 10-week course is probably because we cannot think that way. It's a bit more complicated than that.

The content of the performance, how the actors acted, was also very different. In the traditional era, you often heard of serving the great and cherishing the small. This was used as a way to pursue one's own national interests, which made it possible to freely look after smaller nations. However, in the modern nation-state, self-strengthening (jagang) and balance of power (gyunse) are the basic principles. One must build up one's own strength, and strength alone is not enough, so a balance of power is necessary. The term 'balance of power' was initially translated as 'gyunse' when it was imported from English.

Belatedly, this has been re-evaluated and is now translated as 'balance of power.' The primary principle is self-strengthening, followed by balancing power. From this perspective, the core logic for most of the established generation and over 90% of our politicians today seems to be this combination of self-strengthening and balancing power. If so, is there any need to worry? If we live within this modern framework, is there no need to change our dream? However, the reason we are marking our 10th anniversary is likely because we cannot afford to think in such simple terms. The situation is a bit more complex than that.

You have studied diligently, stimulated by professors, senior colleagues, or good books, trying to prepare yourselves and the nation within the framework of 'a rich country, a strong military' and 'self-strengthening and balance of power.' However, the entry into the AI era transcends such a period. A situation where you've studied hard for the test, only to find that the questions are completely different, can realistically happen. Individuals or nations that quickly notice this and prepare in advance will get ahead, but for those who don't, their fate will be different. When the rise of the West was imminent, China, Korea, and Japan each responded differently.

Japan recognized the civilizational shift relatively quickly and sought a path forward by accepting the existing civilizational standard. The so-called Meiji Restoration is one such example. China, on the other hand, having been the center of Sinic civilization for over a millennium, found it difficult to accept that Western powers were presenting a new standard of civilization, calling itself the 'Middle Kingdom.'

It took China half a century to translate the word 'civilization' into Chinese characters. After the Opium Wars in the 1840s, and especially after its defeat by Japan—a derivative of the West—in the Sino-Japanese War, China had to transitionally accept the new civilizational standard and bide its time for the future. Enlightened Joseon, despite being a smaller country than China, did not adapt to the changes as quickly as Japan and held out until the end. As a result, it lost its place as a nation and could no longer maintain its wealth and military strength.

An enormous gap opened up in a short period of time. Looking at the Sino-Japanese War or the Russo-Japanese War after the 1868 Meiji Restoration, Japan was conducting modern naval warfare while we didn't even have proper warships. Of course, one could argue that the histories of Korea, China, and Japan were different from the start. But objectively, a situation arose where if one generation idled for 50 to 100 years, it would encounter a different world. A complete reversal occurred in the roughly 50 to 60 years from the 1850s-60s. If we want to live in accordance with the new order we are experiencing now, the modern framework alone is not enough.

The AI Era and the Reorganization of the World Order into a Complex Stage

The modern framework alone is not enough; we must recognize that another civilizational shift is coming. Isn't it right, then, to dream a new dream for individuals and nations that prepares for this? The world order is being reorganized into a three-tiered complex stage. The first, foundational stage holds technology and knowledge. Above that is wealth and power, and at the very top is 'gong-chi,' a concept commonly known as 'global governance.'

This term 'gong-chi' is not easy to translate into Korean. Even within the country, the Korean Association of Global Governance Studies is grappling with the translation issue. The difficulty of translation may ultimately mean that the concept has not been internalized into our knowledge. That's why I decided that if I had to translate it, 'gong-chi' would be the best option. The most important change in this complex stage is that the foundational stage is changing.

AI is a symbolic example, but broadly speaking, it's the change in advanced technology. Technology has always been important, but in ancient times, religion was central; in modern times, politics; and after the Industrial Revolution, the economy. Now, we are undergoing another shift. Until now, technology and knowledge operated in conjunction with the military, religion, and the economy, but now their role is changing.

In the early days of AI's emergence, international relations scholarship did not treat it as a standalone subject. It was merely considered a subfield of international political economy. The term AI itself first appeared in 1956, originating from discussions about whether it was possible to create an artificial intelligence that mimicked the human brain. At the time, experts expected it would be realized relatively easily.

Seventy years have passed since 1956, leading to the explosive changes we see today. While the argument that the international economy is the core of international politics existed in the socialist bloc, it was only in the 1970s and 80s that it began to be seriously discussed in liberal democratic systems. Before that, war and peace were the main topics of international politics.

Subsequently, as the importance of economics grew, the field of International Political Economy (IPE) emerged, and technological factors such as AI were also included within its scope. Now, however, we face a new shift: the need to re-examine international politics from the starting point of technological knowledge. Therefore, this lecture will be a practical study of how to view international politics. It will offer a framework for how to live for the next 50 years—or, with advances in modern medicine, perhaps the next 70 to 80 years.

It's not as if professors who know the future precisely are teaching it, or that people who dream of the future are the ones educating. Therefore, you must carve out your own dreams. If you decide, 'I will not prepare for the AI era and will finish my life as a modern person,' then what your life will be like in 70-80 years is a problem worth deep consideration.

Paradoxically, the dreams for the future of South and North Korea are quite different. If North Korea does not embrace a new civilizational shift like AI in the same way as South Korea, how different will the two Koreas look in 50 years? They will be vastly different.

If an individual decides to live a life that does not embrace AI because it doesn't suit their disposition, what that individual or such a nation will look like is a topic worth pondering. First, technological knowledge does not simply end as technological knowledge; technologies like AI become factors that trigger changes in other domains of the complex stage.

The role of AI in the military sphere is significant. For the past 70-80 years, nuclear weapons have been important, but as the AI era begins in earnest, the nuclear age may be fading. The term 'AI-nuclear nexus' is emerging, and this is thanks to the development of AI, not an evolution of nuclear weapons themselves.

It is questionable whether North Korea's nuclear weapons development can maintain its utility in the turbulent era of the AI-nuclear nexus. This will also bring new changes to North Korea's military buildup. The economy is also undergoing changes in areas related to advanced technology. This makes it crucial to address how to coordinate and control these new changes in the realm of 'gong-chi,' or global governance.

What was the biggest news last July? Most people were probably focused on the conflict between Iran and the United States or the war in Ukraine. However, it is noteworthy that from July 17 to 20, President Xi Jinping attended the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai and proposed the establishment of an AI cooperation organization. Twenty-nine countries signed on to this proposal.

This is related to the domain of 'gong-chi,' as there are many areas requiring coordination, such as the military and economic uses of AI. There is a prospect that AI-advanced nations will inevitably lead the world. If so, how to control and utilize AI technology will become the biggest issue.

South Korea attended this conference, but was represented by the director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' AI division and the science and technology attaché from the Beijing embassy. In contrast, the United States, the EU, and Japan did not send representatives. The 29 signatory countries were mostly AI laggards, corresponding to the Global South.

There are also doubts about whether such a conference will have much significance, since the center of AI is in advanced countries like the US, Japan, and South Korea. However, the fact that President Xi Jinping attended in person is noteworthy. China reported on it extensively, but there were also counter-reports in the US, EU, and Japan noting that no one from the AI-advanced nations attended.

US-China Competition and the Rise of AI Technology

It would be great if the AI-advanced nations could remain at the center of the world order, but there are many reports that the gap is narrowing. What would happen if, 50 years from now, China surpasses South Korea in the field of AI? We need to prepare for this. This will become a core international political issue for us. Therefore, the importance of a new 'science international politics' has grown, and we must pay attention to how the meaning of 'a rich country and a strong military' is changing due to AI, and how the content of 'gong-chi' is shifting. Furthermore, new changes will begin in earnest in the cultural and ecological spheres as well.

Although these parts are undergoing relatively more change, the content of the performance has also shifted significantly. In modern concepts like self-strengthening and balance of power, the meaning of self-survival is strong. Is such a concept disappearing? It's not so different from your worldview. The competitive system we live in every day feels like it's becoming even more intense. Therefore, it's possible we are shifting towards a system of competition and coexistence.

From my personal experience, I don't feel the element of coexistence much. I think it's good for me to eat well and live well, and for the political group I belong to to do well. Are we undergoing a new change where we think about coexistence, where 'I do well and you do well' too? Competition has been a given since the modern era, but what happens if we take competition to its extreme? When advanced technology changes beyond imagination, if we only pursue competition, we will eventually face a reality where only I become arrogant, and both I and you perish.

Therefore, unless we supplement or temper competition with coexistence, we will seriously confront a system where both I and you perish. At first glance, you might think, 'I've already had many of those thoughts. I am not a traditional or modern person; I have been living as a post-modern, complex individual.' But such cases are rare. Suppose you could prove that we are shifting from a modern to a complex order. You join in creating a 'complex school' theory to shape your life and the nation as a complex individual, not just a modern one. But when you get there, you find that modern individuals still dominate the world. You've gone through all the trouble, only to find you're not the protagonist on stage, there's little space for you, and the performance content is all unfamiliar. We need to examine whose argument is correct.

Changes in Actors and the New International Politics

Of course, I am speaking to you from my perspective. You might listen and accept it, or you might still disagree. You might want to live as a modern person rather than a complex one. That would be your choice of destiny, and I cannot stop you. So, as I said, is the protagonist changing? Are we shifting from modern states to complex states? Is the content of the stage changing? Is the content of the performance changing? We need to examine that. To do so, what is the United States doing now, what is China doing, and what should South Korea, situated at the center of the world order, do? What will be the dream of the Republic of Korea? That is what I intend to discuss. So, before moving on to the US-China story, let's look at the actor. Has the actor changed?

There are many ways to look at actors, but for convenience, let's use the 2025 SIPRI statistics on world military expenditure trends from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It lists the top 15 countries. Global military spending was roughly $3 trillion last year. It was about $2.9 trillion. As expected, the US is first, China second, Russia third, and so on, with South Korea at 13th and Spain at 15th. I'm showing you this so you don't just think vaguely. Who are the central countries in the world order? A major misconception we have, especially when educated in a place like South Korea, is that we often talk about the 'four major powers surrounding the peninsula' and the divided North and South.

Is the concept of 'four major powers' correct? Look at the data. Russia's current military spending is far behind that of the US and China. The US spends roughly $1 trillion, and China about $300 billion. That's a ratio of about 3 to 1. Russia's spending is less than $200 billion, and Japan is in the 12th position, similar to us. So, it doesn't add up. It's not four major surrounding powers. You need to have a rough picture of this in your mind. So, the US spends $1 trillion out of a global total of $3 trillion. The US is a particular issue for next year; Trump has sent a budget to Congress proposing to increase the defense budget from $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion.

That's a $194 billion increase, and $1.5 trillion would be a tremendous military buildup. The implication of this is the question of whether the United States is collapsing or not. Looking at figures like these, a thought comes to mind. The core of the discussion among us international relations specialists is this: we are finally moving from a US-centric order, from bipolarity to multipolarity. To have multipolarity, the first indicator, military spending, must be multipolar. But looking at this data, it's a bit premature to call it multipolar.

Who knows this best? China does. Why doesn't China engage in a head-on confrontation with the United States? It's because fighting when the power distribution ratio is not even 3 to 1 would be foolish. Even in a one-on-one fight, taking on an opponent when you have less than a third of their strength is tantamount to having a death wish. China knows this well. So, it avoids direct confrontation. Therefore, while we might casually think of a US-China-centric order, we must keep in mind the picture that it still contains a degree of asymmetry.

The second indicator is the economy. Military power alone doesn't determine a modern state; the second indicator is the economy. Looking at the economy, the GDP forecast for this year, 2026, is expected to be around $124 trillion. Of that, the US will account for $32 trillion and China for $21 trillion. Compared to military spending, hasn't China caught up to about 70%? The military ratio was about 3 to 1, but this shows a change to something like 70 to 100. Still, the reality is that the United States remains superior.

South Korea is around 15th. So, when people debate whether we are moving from a bipolar to a multipolar world, you should start by thinking with data like this in your head. What does that mean? What kind of picture emerges if it becomes multipolar? But as I've repeatedly explained, these are modern indicators. You need to have a rich country and a strong military to be a star on the main stage. However, I said that in the new order, you don't become the protagonist just by having military and economic power.

The new factors are things like advanced technology. For example, who possesses AI? What happens if a country is somewhat weaker in military and economic terms but is ahead in AI? It's a bit ambiguous to calculate AI as a single indicator like military spending or GDP, but a composite of six types of capital (power, talent, patents, data, energy, and computing power) presented as a sample suggests that the AI superpowers are the US and China, with the US still ahead. The middle-tier AI powers include the EU, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are newly emerging due to their financial power, and then there are the AI laggards.

So, a rough picture should be forming in your minds. Looking at another indicator, this is a global think tank evaluation. There are hundreds, thousands of think tanks worldwide, and this ranking is based on a survey of think tank personnel and related international politics experts. Which ones do they consider most important regarding the world order? Why is this data from 2018? The director who used to release these statistics passed away in 2018, so the data series ended there. This is the last one. Looking at the 2018 statistics, out of the top 20, ten are in the United States. In terms of knowledge power, it's true that the US has a relatively much stronger lead than in military power. In terms of 'knowing.' But what's more complex is, where is the next group? Europe has seven. Ah, you might say that's because they conducted the survey themselves.

But it wasn't conducted just like that. It was a global survey that asked us, and people in Latin America, China, Africa, and the Global South. So why are the results like this? You might ask, if China is number two in both military and economy, shouldn't it have five or six think tanks in the top 20 if the US has ten? China knows this too. The fact that it doesn't have think tanks with the international influence of a Brookings or a CSIS might be one of China's current limitations.

Therefore, at the actor level, while it's true that the United States is still in the leading position in the new complex state framework, it's also true that power is gradually diffusing. However, you need to have concrete data about this in your mind. So, rather than engaging in abstract debates about fragmentation or complexity, it's better to study for yourself the specific extent of the changes and ask what it means for you as an individual.

What happens if China becomes the central actor? Then you shouldn't be learning English. You should be attending a Chinese language academy right now. Isn't that right? You diligently attend a Chinese academy, study Chinese history and culture, and after 50 years of giving up English for Chinese, what if China hasn't become the center of the world order? That would be a huge personal miscalculation, wouldn't it? So that judgment is actually very important. At the same time, going all-in on English is also something to be cautious about, because it's also true that the US is undergoing changes and cannot maintain its former position. So, it's important for me to be sensitive to the emergence of new actors beyond the United States. To what extent should I be sensitive to this? Perhaps I should bet on the rise of a complex network of states. So, professor, I will be more future-oriented and dedicate my life to the Global South, or go all-in on global organizations.

The Importance of Techno-International Politics and the Lack of Experts

However, that scenario presents its own dilemma: without securing a realistic distribution of power, you cannot take center stage. A precise reading of how large this has grown and what its limits are is crucial. The second point I will not elaborate on, as I have explained it before. No matter how much I explained that the stage was changing in the 1990s, people were unwilling to accept it. After some thought, I used the analogy of the Dabotap Pagoda, explaining that it is a three-story structure.

We dedicate all our research to that security and economic order. In fact, if you look at most international politics programs in Korea, they are largely divided into either security studies or the old international political economy. Only recently have people started to show some interest in things like the international politics of technology. Two problems are arising. For instance, the person who worked hardest in this area domestically was Professor Kim Sang-bae of Seoul National University, who was a relative pioneer. Professor Kim was in the class of '88, so around the early 90s he came to me and said, 'Professor, I spent the 80s as a student activist, and now I need to study something else. What would be a good field?'

I told him to go study technology in the United States. He said there was no such field. I told him they do teach it. Why? Because even if it wasn't an established field, there were people interested in technology and international politics, so I told him to go study under one of them. And what do you think happened? It took him nearly 10 years. After he returned from Indiana, we spent the first five years or so reading and studying together. This was because the World Wide Web first appeared in 1994, marking the beginning of the internet era in earnest, and I was becoming known for my work on technology and politics.

So he persisted for 10 years, but nobody in international policy circles cared or invited him anywhere, asking why he was even doing that. So, I can't recall the exact year, but in the early 2000s I told him it was just a matter of time. And what happened? Nowadays, I can't even get a meeting with him. He's become too busy. Most people—from the government, business, and the media—call and ask, 'Besides Kim Sang-bae, is there anyone else who knows about the international politics of technology? We can't ask just one person everything.'

In a sense, his stage has become a massive success. Another problem that has arisen now is the sudden spotlight on AI. But AI is no longer a simple matter of technology, is it? As a general-purpose technology, it is bringing changes to everything—military affairs, the economy, global governance, as I mentioned earlier. What kind of changes will it bring? What will happen to the stock market? What will happen when it enters the military sphere? What will happen between North and South Korea? But because there are no experts, AI specialists have started to provide the answers.

However, among those who study AI, few have experience studying international politics or have taken more than an introductory course. Therefore, this situation can be seen as relatively dangerous. For example, if you ask an AI expert or someone in the AI business to predict how U.S.-China relations will change based on AI, they might make bold predictions from the very narrow perspective of AI technology or business. This is a failure to see the entire stage, and investing based on their predictions could lead to huge losses. Meanwhile, a situation is unfolding where non-specialists are posing as experts. Therefore, it is crucial for you to accurately read the stage that is open to you and to undergo expert-level training on the issue.

Actions and Training Beyond Modern International Politics

The core question becomes whether to act at the individual, national, or global level. In terms of performance, when the actors or the stage change, the actions themselves ultimately change. The key is how to read those movements. As I mentioned earlier, the shift from self-strengthening and balance of power to competition and coexistence implies that human beings can change. When you learn modern international politics, particularly American international relations, it starts with realism and explains that international politics inevitably moves according to 'self-interest.' Is this statement 100% correct?

Can we definitively say that the way one moves according to a modern framework is necessarily the same as the way one moves according to a post-modern order? This requires contemplation. Your performance and training must also change accordingly. Is the assertion that 'no matter how international politics changes, its essence is the maximization of self-interest' truly correct? Looking at the situations with Trump, Xi Jinping, and the European Union (EU), it is difficult to assert this with certainty.

It may not necessarily be the case. The reason for the current complex order is that, among living creatures, we often use the wolf as a metaphor in modern international politics. Real wolves would feel wronged if they heard this, but I don't really trust what people write, so I think international relations scholars tell a lot of lies. If you watch a documentary closely on how wolves live, they do not pursue only 'their own interest' to that extent. Hobbes spoke of a 'war of all against all,' and international politics does have such elements. But the 'wolf spider' I'm talking about is different. The 'network state' refers to being connected like a web, which is related to spiders.

Wolves tend to live in large groups, but a spider connects in all directions. As I pondered this in the 1990s, I thought an era would come where on one hand the wolf would be important, and on the other, the life of the spider would be important. Nowadays you could just ask an AI, but back then it was the early days of the internet, so while searching, I happened to search for 'wolf' and 'spider' together. And then, the wolf spider appeared on the screen.

It was the first time I learned that wolf spiders exist. From then on, I promoted the idea that living like a wolf spider is a key element of our complex modern society. Going beyond the wolf spider, if we look at the symbiotic relationship between a hummingbird and a flower, they both change to a certain extent to survive. The bird's beak grew longer, and the flower changed to make it easier for the bird to feed. This shows how ways of life change simultaneously. The advent of AI is a prime example showing that studying future international politics with only the tools of modern international politics will face great difficulties.

The Revolutionary Impact of AI on the Military

The most universal aspects, the crown jewels of modern international politics, are war and peace. War and the military are the most important parts of modern international politics. So what changes will occur when AI is introduced into modern international politics? In the U.S., the introduction of AI is intended to bring about changes, and three shifts are already underway. What first emerged as a project in 2017 and has now become a system is the change in the method of intelligence gathering.

What changes will occur when AI gathers intelligence? Second, if AI makes military decisions, what changes will that bring compared to when humans did it? Lastly, when the decided action is executed to strike a target, what changes will come as AI develops? These three changes are already apparent, and the methods of intelligence gathering, decision-making, and target striking have become very different before and after AI.

Looking at the three items on the far left, the reason the U.S. became interested in this was that during the war in Afghanistan, drones took countless pictures, but analysts working day and night could only analyze 10% of them. This led to the idea that it would be better to entrust the analysis to AI.

So, for the first time, AI was mobilized to gather diverse intelligence from air, land, and sea into one place to read the enemy's situation. Information that couldn't be processed before began to be read in great detail. Just as when the U.S. attacked Iran, it precisely struck a location where about 40 leaders were gathered and eliminated them in an instant, diverse information is analyzed through the medium of AI and passed on to the decision-making process. Fragmented pieces of information are synthesized to make a decision. With the mobilization of recent AI developments, it is possible to run countless simulations.

What would take over 100 hours can be simulated in under a minute to determine the most effective policy decision. Based on this, a human makes the final decision, and the strike is also carried out with much greater precision than before. In the case of the Korean Peninsula, what makes North Korea uncomfortable about extended deterrence is the message that if the situation develops into a war, we will destroy only the table in your underground bunker without harming the citizens of Pyongyang.

This is already fully possible with the help of AI. Looking at recent developments, a reality is unfolding that makes it difficult to dismiss such predictions as false. The most important issue in U.S.-ROK military affairs is when wartime operational control (OPCON) will be transferred. But what I'm curious about is that while AI is revolutionizing how the U.S. conducts operational control, our own OPCON remains very modern in form. Of course, we are also making rudimentary efforts. However, the U.S. is changing so rapidly that today is different from tomorrow, making it difficult to guarantee that we can receive OPCON in 2028. Even the Ministry of National Defense would find it hard to answer what form U.S. OPCON will take in 2-3 years.

This is a part that is closely linked to AI technological innovation. Therefore, what we—the next generation or a new generation—need to consider is whether we are even exercising the same kind of operational control in the first place. The question of why a country should depend on the U.S. for its wartime operational control is a political issue, but before that, the technical question of whether we possess the same kind of operational control must be resolved first. If the operational control of the two sides is very different, the problem will become very serious. As expected, time is passing very quickly, so I will be brief. Just how sensitively are the U.S. or China trying to keep up with this changing world order?

US and Chinese Responses to the World Order and South Korea's Challenges

In one sense it is true, and in another, it is not. It is difficult to definitively say that the U.S. or China is leading this changing world order. Just look at Trump—his story changes daily, and it's hard to know what his dream is. It's the worst of times for Washington D.C. or American think tanks, because he doesn't trust them. Trump operates with the judgment that no matter what we think about, it's useless; he will do things his own way.

What we can know is what the United States is thinking. There are many ways to look into America's thinking, but the simplest is to look at a representative document, the 'National Security Strategy.' This document is usually published once every four years. Even if Trump does as he pleases, it is drafted by a team that aligns with his thinking, and regardless of whether Trump has read it himself, a report that is completely different from his thoughts is unlikely to be produced.

Therefore, the 'National Security Strategy' report published in November 2025 will be important, and subordinate documents from the Department of Defense and others will follow. To point out just a few things, the most important change is the departure from the 'globalism' of the past. Trump no longer agrees with globalism. As we move into a complex era, we need to think more complexly. Trump's argument typically emphasizes 'America First' and focuses on how to maximize it. This may be Trump's short-term thinking, but in the long run, the very phenomenon of figures like Trump, Xi Jinping, Putin, and the EU appearing within the process of civilizational change can be said to show an important aspect of the great turmoil that modernity is experiencing.

'America First' is the first principle, and significant changes will occur accordingly. The first is the U.S., and the second is the Western Hemisphere. The third thing emphasized is how to dominate the Asia-Pacific, particularly the region centered on China. The fourth is Europe, about which Trump continues to make insulting remarks, saying, 'You have no place.' He is saying Europe is finished. Europe is facing a difficult situation. The Middle East or Africa are on a lower tier.

Accordingly, the Department of Defense is changing its name and simultaneously producing a 'Defense Strategy.' It focuses on how to achieve the aforementioned 'America First' based on strength. The fact that North Korea is mentioned fifth shows that it is an important part.

The order is Homeland, Hemisphere, China, Russia, North Korea (DPRK). Does this mean they truly value North Korea? In fact, they do not. The focus is on the U.S., and second is how to deal with China. Russia, Iran, and North Korea have a limited status compared to the preceding countries. The items at the bottom are about how to deal with them specifically. In the case of 'China in the Indo-Pacific region,' we learn international politics centered on the Korean Peninsula, so it is difficult to escape a short-sighted perspective. But our American friends do not view the Asia-Pacific region with the Korean Peninsula at its center. They set the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere as their primary objectives and look at the Asia-Pacific region for that purpose.

One of their central debates involves dividing the Indo-Pacific into the 'First Island Chain, Second Island Chain, and Third Island Chain.' As the term 'First Island Chain' suggests, these are lines connecting islands. Coming down from northern Japan, Taiwan falls within the First Island Chain, and our country is also located close to the First Island Chain. The U.S. considers how to utilize South Korea to check China in the U.S.-China competition as a primary task, with North Korea being a secondary issue.

We mainly think about this one issue, so a mismatch is bound to arise. What does China think? China's comprehensive national power is somewhat less than that of the U.S., but it is certainly a country that is very well-trained in viewing problems over a very long and broad span. When Kissinger and Zhou Enlai met in 1971, Kissinger was flustered to see that Zhou Enlai viewed history not in terms of today or tomorrow, but in cycles of 10, 20, or even 100 years.

China generally views history in millennial units, going back to the Xia dynasty. Kissinger was very taken aback. Although their power is weaker, they have the advantage of viewing time and space with more latitude. This is well demonstrated in the goals for 2035 and 2050 announced at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022.

From 2020 to 2035, the goal is to basically realize socialist modernization, and by 2050, the goal is to build a 'great modern socialist country.' I would advise my Chinese friends to change this title. When a title is too long, it can mean that what you are trying to do is not clear. If you put in all the good words, the core becomes blurred.

It's like an old school song where a long name is given for a long life, but the story goes that the person drowned. It has to be summarized in a word or two to be clear. Nevertheless, it is certain that in 2022, they are having very serious internal discussions about 2035 and 2050. In South Korea's case, there is not much discussion about where we will be in 2050. This may be your task. To look at the recent content in detail, we can divide it into diplomacy, economy, technology, norms, and security.

The diplomacy and economy parts are modern aspects. China knows better than anyone that it must continue modern competition. Therefore, how to establish a 'new type of great power relations' and a 'new type of neighborhood relations' is important. What Chairman Xi Jinping has emphasized since taking power in 2012 is that he will not clash with the U.S. in the first instance. The principle is 'no conflict, no confrontation,' but based on acknowledging the asymmetry of power, the three main goals are mutual respect, cooperation, and common prosperity. However, in relations with neighboring countries, it cannot be said with certainty that there will never be conflict. This applies to neighborhood relations.

They say that they have no choice but to use military force when their core interests are infringed upon. Core interests refer to national security issues and challenges to socioeconomic security, meaning they can fight within a scope that does not lead to direct confrontation with the U.S. The Taiwan issue is, of course, included. Economically, strategies like 'dual circulation' are being discussed.

In the technology sector as well, China is putting in considerable effort, more than expected. An interesting point is the contrast with North Korea. North Korea, too, cannot help but be interested in the changes in technology and international politics. However, it is reported that North Korea did not attend an event held from July 17 to 20. North Korea's name is not seen among the 29 signatory countries, which raises questions. If they are restricted from such trends, keeping in mind how the leading nations of the 19th century came to lead, the center of the late 21st century will not be nuclear-weapon states. It is more likely to become a burden.

South Korea's Complex State Architecture and Future Prospects

It is much more likely that AI powers will be at the center. In the realm of norms, China's recent proposals for three initiatives—on economy, security, and civilization—are taking shape as a Chinese-style vision. What will happen to South Korea? If we tentatively call it 'complex state architecture,' the protagonist is becoming complex.

We should not reject this. It is not a wise approach. Personally, one might want to live as a modern person rather than a complex one, but it could be a lonely existence. What form of complexification are we talking about? First, there is the problem of how to weave together the Asia-Pacific. Second is geopolitics, and third is the modern-era homework of Korean unification. The unification problem can no longer be deferred; it must be solved in its own right.

The development of a unification plan must also be approached from a post-modern perspective. The emerging issues of cyberspace and outer space are approaching much faster than we think. The term 'cyberspace' appeared in 1984, but now everyone knows it. The same goes for outer space. Finally, there is the issue of domestic space, which has been a problem throughout modern and traditional history.

To acquire factorial complexity, one must also think about complexification at the stage level. First, we have no choice but to pay attention to technology. The president is making efforts, such as participating in the San Francisco AI Declaration, but how to actually build this is up to you. If you want to pursue 'sovereign AI,' it is important to define its relationship with global AI or American AI.

China is going its own way, but why did we send at least a working-level section chief when the U.S., Japan, and Europe did not go? South Korean startups are also participating in overseas exhibitions and the like. This is precisely the central domain of international politics that you must solve.

Therefore, first, there is the issue of how to handle the advanced technology sectors. To science and technology majors, it may seem unrelated to international politics, but this is the core of international politics. Second, tragically, we must solve the modern-era homework of unification. Considering North Korea's theory of two hostile states and the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons in a contingency, finding a way to maintain peace is both a modern-era task and a challenge to be solved within a complex system.

Third is the issue of how to regulate the economic sector. Fourth, as a new civilizational standard, while the modern state emphasized exclusive nationalism, countries are now moving toward a single-country-centric approach. In this situation, careful self-reflection on 'regulation' is necessary. An effort to think about this first is needed.

And as mentioned in the explanation of the stage, we have been given the homework of how to solve the belatedly approaching issues of ecology and culture. The order must be carefully observed. For example, the government previously prioritized ecological issues and opposed nuclear power generation. But now it has judged that the final battle for AI is electricity, and since wind or solar power alone is not enough, it has no choice but to use nuclear power. If they had read international politics correctly, they would not have made this error in judgment.

Ecological problems will come someday, but their turn may not be first. If you had majored in nuclear engineering, you should have stuck with it. Nuclear power plants will continue to operate for a considerable period. However, the judgment to change your major from nuclear engineering because the trend is shifting toward ecological issues may be rational in the short term, but it can be reversed in the long term. Such judgments determine not only the fate of individuals but also the central forces on the stage.

BTS and New Possibilities for South Korean International Relations

Finally, you may wonder why I wrote about this. As we live in a complex era, BTS is one of the representative examples attracting global attention. Of course, recently, the level of attention is not what it used to be. I held a study group for nearly a year to examine the reasons for BTS's prominence from an international political perspective. Since I have never sung a song in my life, all I could do regarding BTS was to read their lyrics.

Looking at BTS's lyrics, focusing on recent songs, there were about 200. They are publicly available on the internet, so they are easy to find. Of course, I did not think the lyrics were solely the thoughts of the seven members or producer Bang Si-hyuk, but I believed they at least showed a certain direction. As a result, I wrote a short paper. I encourage those who are interested to read it.

What I found interesting, though I don't know if they themselves felt it, was that I thought two songs were the most meaningful. One is 'Fake Love,' and the other is 'Mikrokosmos.' 'Mikrokosmos' is not as well-known, but I thought it would be more meaningful to look for their own stories rather than my clumsy interpretations. Listening to the members like RM and Jungkook, RM in particular chose 'Fake Love' if he had to pick one song he sang.

If I had picked it by listening to the song, I might have been wrong, but since I chose it after reading the lyrics, I think I read their feelings relatively well. They themselves might not consider it important, but the reason I thought of 'Mikrokosmos' as the second most important song is that in the 'Love Yourself' series, which was released starting in 2013, 'Fake Love' (a 2018 song) was from a time when they were talking about fake love and real love, whereas 'Mikrokosmos' is, in fact, a story about real love.

I don't need to explain 'Fake Love' as you all know it well. The reason I pay attention to this song can be understood by reading just one chapter of my book, *Love Is in World Politics*. While studying international politics for seven years in my 20s, the concepts I was engrossed in instead of international politics were the relationship between Rousseau's 'amour de soi' and 'amour propre.' 'Amour de soi' is about true love, and 'amour propre' is about fake love. For example, loving yourself as reflected in the eyes of others is fake love, and doesn't that kind of content appear in the song's lyrics?

Loving things like driving a nice car or living in a nice apartment is 'amour de soi.' 'Amour propre' is the best way for self-survival, which corresponds to the part of competition or society, if I were to force a translation. What is the breakthrough for this? 'Mikrokosmos' says this: If the 7 billion people on Earth each take their own candlelight and illuminate the night sky, perhaps those lights will combine to brighten something. From the perspective of competition and coexistence, the order that AI brings has positive elements, but also tremendous risk factors. To mitigate or overcome these risk factors, shouldn't we find a way for oneself to survive while at the same time allowing the whole to survive? This is what 'Mikrokosmos' is trying to say. So finally, if BTS's lyrics contain such content...

...has the South Korean international relations academic community ever seriously dealt with these stories? In my view, no. This is a fortunate thing for you. If senior scholars had already written about all of this, the field would be preempted and there would be nothing left to do, but this is truly a vast, empty space. South Korean international relations has, paradoxically, been trained and researched by heavily relying on American international relations. However, the solution is not to reverse this, but to create a completely new breakthrough. The popularity of songs like those by BTS is not simply because they fit into the existing framework, nor is it because they have simple resistant elements. Isn't it because they show something new in their song lyrics, choreography, and melodies? If such things move ARMY, then perhaps that is the answer. The challenge is to see how you can realize this in your own lives, or in the communities you belong to.

I hope you will take the opportunity during these 10 weeks of lectures to think about this. That is why this program was started. So to speak, it is a bit more of a dream-like discussion, rather than aiming for a deep understanding of international relations in a narrow sense. So there you have it.