[EAI Issue Briefing] Strengthening ‘Future-Oriented’ Perceptions on Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation and Security Cooperation: Analysis of the Results of the 13th Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey

1. Core Agenda of Shuttle Diplomacy: ‘Future-Oriented’ Korea-Japan Cooperation in the Era of US-China Competition

Following the inauguration of President Lee Jae-myung in June 2025, Japan's concerns regarding Korea-Japan relations were quickly alleviated within the framework of the Lee Jae-myung administration's pragmatic diplomacy, leading to the establishment of a stable relationship between the Lee Jae-myung government and the Shigeru Ishiba administration. After the inauguration of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in October 2025, concerns regarding Korea-Japan relations stemming from Takaichi's conservative historical perspective did not materialize. The two leaders first met at the APEC summit held in Gyeongju in October 2025, and subsequently held summits in their respective hometowns (in Nara in January and in Andong in May 2026). The shuttle diplomacy that began with summits between President Lee Jae-myung and Prime Minister Ishiba in Tokyo and Busan in August and September 2025 has continued steadily into 2026.

The shuttle diplomacy between the Lee Jae-myung government and the Liberal Democratic Party administration was made possible primarily because the Lee Jae-myung government did not actively assert its historical perspective centered on the issue of forced labor victims, while both governments shared concerns regarding US-China competition and the uncertainties of the Trump administration. In 2026, the Takaichi administration also agreed to cooperate on the DNA testing of victims from the Chosei coal mine, responding to the Lee Jae-myung government's reserved attitude towards historical issues. However, issues of historical recognition other than the Chosei coal mine were not considered core topics during the January and May summits. In the joint press conference following the January summit, President Lee Jae-myung stated that they discussed practical measures to enhance the quality and expand the scope of Korea-Japan cooperation, mentioning the following before the DNA testing of the Chosei coal mine.

“The areas for future cooperation are limitless, ranging from economic security, science and technology, and the formation of international norms to artificial intelligence and the protection of intellectual property. If the two countries can develop an economic partnership that leverages each other's strengths beyond trade-centered cooperation, it will significantly contribute to global stability and prosperity beyond Asia. Additionally, we reaffirmed our joint commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of lasting peace. Our cooperation for regional stability will serve as a foundation supporting peace and prosperity across Northeast Asia. We agreed to review the achievements of the ‘Korea-Japan Common Social Issues Consultative Body’ launched last August and to strengthen cooperation in responding to transnational crimes such as scams that threaten the safety of our citizens. Furthermore, we plan to continuously expand exchanges between the youth of both countries to foster mutual understanding and trust.”[1]

President Lee Jae-myung presented economic cooperation, security cooperation, and joint responses to future societal challenges and protection of public safety, stating that Korea-Japan cooperation is significant in supporting global stability and prosperity beyond Asia, as well as peace and prosperity across Northeast Asia. The Japanese government's position is not significantly different.[2] The vision of linking economic and security cooperation between the two countries to the stability and prosperity of the regional order in Asia and the global order is the essential logical structure of the ‘future-oriented’ Korea-Japan cooperation theory. The discussions on Korea-Japan cooperation between the Lee Jae-myung government and the Takaichi administration in 2026 are also based on the logic of the ‘future-oriented’ Korea-Japan cooperation theory, and it can be said that the content of that cooperation has been upgraded to reflect the contemporary conditions of US-China competition.

The ‘future-oriented’ Korea-Japan cooperation theory is not new. While the term ‘future-oriented’ has been a long-standing rhetoric in the history of Korea-Japan relations, it began to be actively discussed in the 1990s. The ‘future-oriented’ Korea-Japan cooperation theory was initiated with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa's speech during his visit to Korea in 1992 titled ‘Korea-Japan Relations in Asia and the World’ and was clearly articulated in the ‘Joint Declaration on a New Korea-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century’ between President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in 1998.[3] However, the Korea-Japan relationship based on ‘future-oriented’ cooperation has not developed stably due to identity politics centered on historical recognition issues, which have constrained progress in economic and security cooperation.[4] The two decades following the Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration have seen Korea-Japan relations far from a stable ‘future-oriented’ cooperative relationship that serves as a stepping stone for regional and global order.

Moreover, despite a high normative recognition of the necessity for ‘future-oriented’ cooperation in the mutual perceptions of both Korea and Japan, there has been significant mutual distrust and dissatisfaction centered on historical recognition issues, leading to a reserved attitude towards ‘future-oriented’ economic and security cooperation.[5] Additionally, during the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, the politicization of Korea's policy towards Japan has led to a divided public opinion on Korea-Japan relations, making it difficult to see an overall consensus on ‘future-oriented’ Korea-Japan cooperation.[6] However, after the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung government in 2025, the overall stance of the Korean public towards Korea-Japan relations showed a trend of increasing recognition of the necessity for ‘future-oriented’ Korea-Japan cooperation, moving beyond polarization.[7]

2. Recognition of ‘Future-Oriented’ Korea-Japan Relations: Joint Responses in the Nexus of History-Economy-Security in the Era of US-China Competition

The 13th Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey, jointly conducted by the East Asia Institute and the Japan Foundation in July 2026, confirms that the positive perception of ‘future-oriented’ Korea-Japan cooperation among the Korean public has strengthened compared to the 2025 survey. This trend is clearly reflected in perceptions of economic cooperation and security cooperation.

In the 2025 perception survey, the issue that should be prioritized in the Lee Jae-myung administration's diplomacy towards Japan was found to be ‘promoting future-oriented cooperation in areas such as economy, technology, security, and environment’ (49.6%), surpassing ‘resolving historical issues’ (31.5%). This trend continues in the responses regarding economic cooperation and security cooperation in 2026.

First, in the 2026 perception survey, 85% of the Korean public responded that economic cooperation between the two countries should be maintained or strengthened at the current level. Negative opinions advocating for a reduction in Korea-Japan economic cooperation accounted for only 3.3% (<Figure 1>). Of course, even during the period from 2019 to 2021, when historical recognition conflicts led to Japan's export restrictions against Korea and the Korean society's anti-Japan responses emerged, the normative support for the necessity of Korea-Japan economic cooperation was around 80%. However, the 2026 perception survey not only shows strong support for strengthening Korea-Japan economic cooperation but also reveals that the reasons for the necessity of such cooperation are now more clearly articulated in terms of joint responses to global structural changes. Among the 850 respondents who indicated that strengthening economic cooperation is necessary, only 21.2% cited the benefits that bilateral interdependence could create as a reason for the necessity of economic cooperation. In contrast, 76.8% responded that economic cooperation between Korea and Japan is necessary in the context of US-China competition (<Figure 2>). Of course, there are various opinions regarding the level of economic cooperation. However, the significant level of agreement regarding the ‘Korea-Japan Economic Community’ proposed by Chey Tae-won, Chairman of SK Group and the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, is noteworthy.[8] This indicates that the recognition of the importance of Korea-Japan economic cooperation for Korea's economic future is deepening amid the intensifying US-China competition. Such a strengthening of perception supports the trend in which the governments of both Korea and Japan are discussing economic security as a central theme of economic cooperation, focusing on global supply chains and emerging technologies.

Meanwhile, the 2026 perception survey also confirms the active agreement of the Korean public towards Korea-Japan security cooperation. Of course, the Korean public has consistently shown a high level of support for Korea-US-Japan security cooperation, and this trend continues into 2026 (<Figure 3>). However, in the 2026 perception survey, the support for Korea-Japan security cooperation was 88.9%, surpassing the support rate of 66.1% for strengthening Korea-US-Japan security cooperation (<Figure 4>). It is particularly noteworthy that the positive responses towards Korea-Japan security cooperation are higher than those for Korea-US-Japan security cooperation. This cannot be seen merely as a continuation of the pattern where, despite a high valuation of the Korea-US alliance, there has been a reserved attitude towards security cooperation with Japan while maintaining a normative support for Korea-US-Japan security cooperation. The positive perception of the Korea-US alliance, which underpins Korea-US-Japan security cooperation, is diminishing amid the uncertainties of the Trump administration (<Figure 5>). This suggests that Korea-Japan security cooperation cannot be viewed merely as a subordinate task of Korea-US-Japan security cooperation. Of course, there are various opinions among the Korean public regarding the level of Korea-Japan security cooperation. While 41.0% preferred the current level of information sharing, 21.7% supported a reserved level of mutual military supply cooperation, and 26.2% supported the development of alliance-level security cooperation within the Korea-US-Japan framework (<Figure 4>). Despite the high consensus on the necessity of Korea-Japan security cooperation, the results indicate that creating a domestic consensus on the level of such cooperation is not an immediate task.

3. Strengthening the Task of Perception of Partisanship in Security and Economic Cooperation

The statement released by the Blue House spokesperson after the summit in Andong in May 2026 included the following content.

“President Lee emphasized that for regional peace and stability, not only Korea-Japan and Korea-US-Japan cooperation but also the cooperation among the three countries of Korea, China, and Japan, which seeks common interests through mutual respect and collaboration, is important. In particular, he suggested exploring ways to prioritize civilian-centered cooperation among the three countries to activate Korea-China-Japan cooperation.”[9]

This phrase suggests the necessity of linking Korea-Japan cooperation to Korea-China-Japan cooperation, while also being mindful of the tense situation between China and Japan that began with Prime Minister Takaichi's remarks in November 2025 regarding Japan's existential crisis in the event of a Taiwan contingency. It implies that Korea-Japan cooperation should not be positioned solely within the partisan nature of US-China competition but should enhance its inclusiveness and flexibility.

However, it appears that the perception of partisanship regarding US-China competition is increasingly strengthening among the Korean public. First, the perception of threat from China is deepening. The security threat perception of China, which was sometimes not seen as a threat compared to Japan before the THAAD retaliation in 2016, has increased to 78.9% in 2026. This level is comparable to the 88.4% perception of threat from North Korea. The perception of threat from China is expanding (<Figure 6>). A phenomenon of synchronization with the Japanese public's perception of the threat from China is also observed. Regarding the possibility of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, it seems that the Korean public perceives the likelihood of occurrence to be greater than that of the Japanese public (<Figure 7>). In relation to this, there is also an increasing recognition among the Korean public that Korea-US-Japan security cooperation should be considered for regional expansion beyond the Korean Peninsula. While the Korean public still raises the North Korean issue as the primary reason for supporting Korea-US-Japan security cooperation (76.6%), the proportion of those who agree on the necessity to contain China's rise (56.6%) and those who support strengthening the US-centered regional security cooperation system (30.6%) is also significant (<Figure 8>). In the context of Korea-Japan economic cooperation, the proportion of those who agree with the perception that Korea-Japan economic cooperation is necessary to strengthen Korea-US-Japan cooperation is also considerable at 20.1% (<Figure 2>).

Of course, the perception of partisanship appears to be much stronger among the Japanese public than among the Korean public. In terms of Korea-Japan economic cooperation, the proportion of Japanese citizens who agree that Korea-Japan economic cooperation is necessary for Korea-US-Japan cooperation significantly exceeds that of Koreans. In terms of security cooperation, Japanese citizens seem to overwhelmingly perceive a significant threat from China. Furthermore, there may be potential differences in specific discussions on future security cooperation between Korea, which considers the impact of China's military threat on the security environment of the Korean Peninsula more significantly, and Japan, which is more concerned about security instability in the East China Sea (<Figure 9>).

The expanding consensus among the citizens of both Korea and Japan regarding the threat from China indicates that the perception of partisanship in Korea-Japan cooperation is growing in the era of US-China competition. This raises questions about whether the diplomatic policy seeking a virtuous cycle between Korea-Japan cooperation and Korea-China-Japan cooperation can expand its domestic acceptability.

4. Imagination for Korea-Japan Cooperation Beyond Partisan Diplomacy

The Korea-Japan relationship, which was born during the Cold War, fundamentally possessed the characteristics of partisan diplomacy, and currently, an increase in support for the strengthening of partisanship in Korea-Japan cooperation is being observed among the citizens of both countries amid US-China competition. However, even during the Cold War and the US-China competition, the attitudes towards partisan diplomacy between Korea and Japan did not completely align. Compared to the clarity of Korea's stance on partisan diplomacy relative to Japan during the Cold War, Japan is now showing a clearer position on partisan diplomacy in the context of US-China competition.[10]

In the 2026 perception survey, the 78.8% of the Korean public and 57% of the Japanese public who responded that Korea-Japan relations are important indicate that the reasons for the importance of Korea-Japan cooperation do not necessarily align between the two countries. While Japanese citizens consider the necessity of security cooperation to be the highest priority, the recognition of shared security interests between Korea and Japan is also increasing among the Korean public. This shows that the perception of partisanship in Korea-Japan cooperation is growing even within Korea amid US-China competition. However, the fact that 30% of the Korean public agreed with the option presented only in the survey for Koreans, stating that ‘Korea-Japan cooperation could become a new axis amid conflicts between great powers,’ is noteworthy. This perspective suggests that Korea-Japan cooperation could play a role in alleviating the partisan conflicts of US-China competition and contribute to the stability and inclusiveness of regional and global order. However, whether this imagination can expand beyond the perception of partisanship in the recognition of ‘future-oriented’ Korea-Japan cooperation among the citizens of both countries remains uncertain. It appears to be an important point for policymakers to actively engage in domestic diplomacy (internal diplomacy) to enhance the recognition of such imagination alongside the deepening and implementation of diplomatic plans for Korea-Japan cooperation to lead the future of regional and global order.

<Figure 1> The Future of Economic Cooperation between Korea and Japan

<Figure 2> Reasons for Strengthening Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation

<Figure 3> Positions on Korea-US-Japan Triangular Military Security Cooperation

<Figure 4> Korea-Japan Security Cooperation in Times of East Asian Crisis

<Figure 5> Perception of the United States

<Figure 6> Countries/Regions Perceived as Military Threats

<Figure 7> Prospects for Military Conflict in the Taiwan Strait

<Figure 8> Positions on Korea-US-Japan Triangular Military Security Cooperation

<Figure 9> Most Serious Impact on Korea in the Event of Conflict in the Taiwan Strait

[1] “Looking forward to a new 60 years of Korea-Japan relations (January 2026 Korea-Japan summit).” Ministry of Foreign Affairs.https://jp.mofa.go.kr/jp-ko/brd/m_1059/view.do?seq=1344872&page=1

[2] “Japan-Korea Summit.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs.https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/a_o/na/kr/pageit_000001_02697.html

[3] Yoon Seok-jung. 2019. “Korea-Japan Relations in the 1990s and the Korea-Japan Joint Declaration: Attempts at Cooperation and Institutionalization in the Post-Cold War Era.” Journal of Japanese Studies 120: 243-261.

[4] Son Yeol. 2018. “The International Politics of the Comfort Women Agreement: The Nexus of Identity-Security-Economy and the Park Geun-hye Administration's Diplomacy towards Japan.” Journal of International Politics 58(2): 145-177.

[5] Son Yeol and Lee Jeong-hwan, eds. 2024. Public Opinion on Korea-Japan Relations 2013-2023. Seoul: EAI.

[6] Son Yeol. 2024. “Korea-Japan Relations Disturbed by Political Polarization: Relationship Improvement and Opinion Division Revealed in the 2024 Opinion Survey.” EAI Issue Briefing, 1-19.https://www.eai.or.kr/project/project_01_view.php?no=9795&project=103

[7] Son Yeol. 2025. “Korea-Japan Relations Desire Future-Oriented Cooperation over Historical Issue Resolution: Analysis of the Results of the 2025 EAI East Asia Perception Survey.” EAI Issue Briefing, 1-19.https://www.eai.or.kr/project/project_01_view.php?no=9829&project=103

[8] “Chairman of SK Group Calls for ‘Economic Rule-Making, Led by Korea and Japan’ in Dialogue on the Future of Asia.” The Nikkei, June 10, 2026.https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOCB087XV0Y6A600C2000000/

[9] “Korea-Japan Summit.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs.https://jp.mofa.go.kr/jp-ko/brd/m_1059/view.do?seq=1344878&page=1

[10] Yoon Dae-yeop. 2022. “Partisan Competition in East Asia and Korea-Japan Relations: A Comparison of the Cold War and US-China Competition.” Edited by Lee Jeong-hwan. Global Structural Changes and Korea-Japan Relations. Social Review Academy.

■ Lee Jeong-hwan_Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Responsible and Edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher
Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr