[EAI-IHJ Joint Press Conference] Announcement of the Results of the 13th Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VRKRKVQAhw&si=_pcXc_ppCwPfjFjn

◆ Announcement of the 13th Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey

The East Asia Institute (EAI), in collaboration with the International House of Japan (IHJ), conducted the "13th Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey" and has announced the analysis results. This survey aims to understand the mutual perceptions and trust levels between the citizens of Korea and Japan, and to conduct an in-depth diagnosis of public opinion trends on key bilateral issues such as historical disputes and economic cooperation. Additionally, it presents policy implications through comparative analysis of public opinion regarding East Asian security issues, including perceptions of the United States and China, self-nuclear armament, and the Taiwan Strait issue.

Detailed results of this survey can be confirmed through the East Asia Institute's public opinion briefing, and more in-depth analysis will be provided in an issue briefing scheduled for future publication.

◆ Press Conference for Domestic and Foreign Media

· Date: Monday, August 3, 2026, from 10:30 AM to 12:50 PM

· Location: East Asia Institute Conference Hall (1 Sajik-ro 7-gil, Jongno-gu, Seoul)

· Presenters: Son Yeol (Chair Research Fellow at East Asia Institute, Professor at Yonsei University), Jimbo Ken (Director of API, Professor at Keio University)

· Audience: Journalists from domestic and international broadcasting companies, newspapers, and online media, including those from Korea and Japan

· Language: Simultaneous interpretation in Korean and Japanese

Video Script

Hello. I am Sohn Yul. We have been in charge of the South Korean side of the survey. Today, I will speak for about 20 minutes on the main issues, focusing on the results of the South Korea-Japan survey. This will primarily be a report on the South Korean survey results, with comparisons to Japan where appropriate. Some of the points I will discuss today are already available in an Issue Briefing on our East Asia Institute website, which you may find useful for future reference.

The survey was conducted simultaneously in South Korea and Japan over two days, on July 20 and 21. In South Korea, Korea Research has been conducting this survey with the East Asia Institute for 13 years. In Japan, the survey was jointly conducted by the research firm Macromill and the International House of Japan. The response composition should be informative. The first point is the impression of the other country.

Across 13 rounds of this public opinion poll, the most frequently mentioned topic has been the impression of the other country. This is very important because it goes beyond a simple image of the other country; it significantly influences attitudes toward that nation, which in turn strongly affects perceptions of the bilateral relationship. If you look at the chart, there was a slight increase when comparing 2025 and 2026. The increase is shown on the next page, where blue represents a good impression and red represents a bad impression. Since 2022, we have been setting a new record high each year.

Following last year's trend, this year's figure of 54.3% is the highest we have ever recorded in our survey. Negative impressions have also been steadily declining. Since 2020, there has been a clear trend of unfavorable impressions decreasing while favorable ones increase. Notably, 2020 followed a period of numerous issues in Korea-Japan relations in 2019, including trade disputes and security problems, which was described at the time as the worst period since the normalization of diplomatic relations. Reflecting this, since the 2020 survey, favorable impressions have risen by more than 40 percentage points, from 12.3% to 54.3%.

Similarly, as impressions improve, there is a tendency to evaluate the bilateral relationship more positively and to have a more positive assessment of trust in the other country. The yellow line represents 'bad,' and the purple line represents 'average.' Since the ROK-Japan relationship has rarely been good, the 'good' rating is very low, and the 'average' line is the one that moves. After hitting a low point in 2020, it has been continuously rising. The proportion of those who rate the relationship as 'bad' has also shown a significant downward trend, falling from 88.4% in 2020 to 20% at present. Trust in Japan shows a similar graph.

The figure for 'trustworthy' is 37%, while 'not trustworthy' is 52%. Considering that trust in the United States is around 45%, we can see that trust in Japan is quite high. Trust in China is in the 10% range. Looking at the blue graph, trust in Japan, which was 4.4% in 2020, has shown remarkable growth to 37.1%. This is a very positive trend, and an analysis of this trend is documented in the Issue Briefing.

Drivers of Change in Perceptions of the Other Country

Those who are interested may find it helpful. There are three main drivers. The first is travel and visiting the other country. The effect of travel is very significant. In the past, South Korea's perception of Japan was shaped by education and established media, which largely reflected the stereotypes of the older generation.

A process has emerged where individuals form their own impressions of Japan at a personal level by actually visiting, interacting with Japanese people, and experiencing the culture, which we believe leads to a positive impression. This is the first driver, a bottom-up dynamic occurring at the civil society level. The second is a top-down driver: the impression of Japan's leader has a major impact on the impression of the country. This is clearly demonstrated through statistical analysis. Looking at the impression of the Japanese leader, which I will show on the next page, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's rating was 32.5% in last year's survey, and this year it is 29%. The key is how to interpret this 29%.

Prime Minister Kishida's 32.5% was the highest figure ever in our survey. If you look at the graph of favorable impressions of Japanese leaders, the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had the worst image among the South Korean public. In 2020, it was to the point that 90% of respondents disliked him. Since his resignation, various prime ministers have seen their ratings fluctuate. Similarly, favorable impressions have been rising again since 2020. At that time, the favorable rating was 1.1%, meaning virtually no one in South Korea liked him.

From that point, Prime Minister Kishida's rating rose to 32.5%, and in the current survey, it is 27.3%. Therefore, I can say that the image of the Japanese leader is very important in shaping the impression of Japan, and these results bear this out. Looking at the reasons for the 54% favorable impression, personal experience was key for both South Koreans and Japanese. Rather than reasons like national identity, being an advanced country, or a democratic nation, the top three reasons were feeling that the Japanese people have a good character after interacting with them, as well as popular culture, food culture, shopping, and travel. In the Japanese survey as well, the main impressions stemmed from personal experiences such as food, culture, shopping, tourist attractions, the appeal of Korea as a travel destination, dramas, K-pop, and the friendly demeanor of Koreans.

Unfavorable impressions are overwhelmingly related to history issues. The South Korean side sees the historical perception of the Japanese side as unsatisfactory, which is the source of the bad impression. This is not about the historical awareness of the general public, but rather that of Japanese leaders. Therefore, South Korea points out that Japan's historical perception has not been properly reflected upon. Japan, on the other hand, feels a sense of risk not so much from the historical perception itself, but from the anti-Japanese sentiment of Koreans related to it or excessive criticism of Japanese people, which leads to a negative impression.

Ultimately, the South Korean public evaluates a Japanese leader positively when they take a relatively objective, restrained, or pragmatic attitude toward historical perception. Conversely, the Japanese public gets a negative impression when they perceive strong anti-Japanese sentiment, hear hardline remarks against Japan, or get the impression that bilateral agreements are being broken.

Changes in Japanese Perception of South Korea and Their Background

That is one point. The second is the Japanese public's perception of South Korea. As you saw in the chart earlier, the change in South Korea's impression was very dramatic, with 2020 as a turning point. However, in Japan's case, the range of change is relatively small. The fluctuations are smaller than in Korea, and while favorable impressions have been steadily rising from their low point, the rate of increase is weaker than South Korea's. Notably, there was a sharp drop recently.

Last year, the impression of South Korea fell to 24.8%, but it rebounded to 35.3% this year. You can see there are more fluctuations compared to South Korea. I expect Director Jinbo will explain this part well. From my perspective, I have briefly noted the reasons for the sharp drop in the impression of South Korea to 24.8% and its subsequent rebound. Last year's drop can be attributed to the survey being conducted on August 19 and 20, which was two months after President Yoon Suk Yeol's inauguration and a week before his visit to Japan.

At that time, the impression among the Japanese public was that South Korean politics were unstable following a change in government and an impeachment, and that its democracy was regressing. Additionally, it is interpreted that the negative perception reflected the critical remarks the newly inaugurated president had made about Japan when he was the opposition party leader. The 10% rebound this year seems to be a process of these negative perceptions being partially resolved. First, South Korean politics have returned to stability. Second, President Yoon Suk Yeol has created a friendly atmosphere through ROK-Japan shuttle diplomacy, holding three summits with Prime Minister Kishida, and a total of eight summits overall, including five with Prime Minister Kishida.

Current Status of ROK-Japan Economic and Security Cooperation

In this process, he also stated his intention to continue the Yoon Suk Yeol administration's policy toward Japan. I believe these factors may have contributed to this year's rebound. For more on that, you can listen to Director Jinbo's remarks. Finally, with the 2-3 minutes I have left, I will introduce just three key policy areas. These are the economic cooperation and security cooperation sections. This is about the future of economic cooperation between South Korea and Japan.

When designing the questionnaire, we scaled the options from the weakest form of approval. A is to reduce economic cooperation, B is to maintain the current level, and C and D are to expand it. C is joining the CPTPP for greater free trade with Japan, and D is to establish a ROK-Japan economic community to solve common challenges and achieve economic integration. Looking at the graph, while 33% of the South Korean public supports maintaining the current level, the combined opinion for expansion is about 56%.

The South Korean public believes that economic cooperation with Japan should be expanded much more than it is now. In particular, the concept of a ROK-Japan economic community is being circulated in Korean society, so the public is responding positively to it. On the other hand, in Japan, the sum of A and B is greater than the sum of C and D. In other words, Japan prefers to maintain the current level of cooperation, and the opinion for expansion is at a similar level. We can see there is a disparity in views on economic cooperation between South Korea and Japan. For security cooperation, the situation is the opposite.

This is generally accepted as common sense; the prevailing sentiment in South Korea is that while economic cooperation with Japan should be expanded, caution is needed in security cooperation as Japan is not yet considered a trustworthy country. In South Korea, there is an opinion against pursuing security cooperation. When divided into four options—impossible, maintain current level, expand, and alliance level—South Koreans are split about evenly between maintaining the current level and expansion. In contrast, in Japan, about 23% support the existing level of cooperation, while about 47% believe it should be expanded.

The Japanese public can be seen as wanting to pursue ROK-Japan security cooperation more actively. An explanation for this will follow. Finally, there is a question on whether to prioritize future-oriented cooperation or the resolution of history issues in the ROK-Japan relationship. A is the view that future-oriented cooperation is difficult without resolving history issues, while B is the optimistic view that creating a future-oriented cooperative relationship will help resolve history issues. Over time, B has shown a slight increasing trend. Lastly, I believe our survey results are relatively more balanced compared to other public opinion polls. As for the current...

Japanese Survey Results: Perceptions of South Korea and the Importance of the Relationship

While 47.7% of respondents believe that regulations on the import of Fukushima seafood should be maintained, 45% believe that regulations should be eased if safety is confirmed through scientific evidence. Public opinion on both sides is closely divided. This concludes my presentation. This is the first public opinion survey jointly conducted by the International House of Japan and EAI. I will report on how Japanese society currently views South Korea, Japan, and the bilateral relationship, focusing on the 1,552 respondents in Japan. First, as was mentioned earlier, the Japanese survey results were obtained from 1,552 respondents through an online survey by a company called Macromill from July 14 to 21, 2025.

The South Korean side obtained responses from 1,547 people from April 2 to 10. In this survey, 47 of the 92 questions in the Japanese data are common questions for both countries. Since rankings are based on real numbers, there may be differences in values if simply summed. The South Korean results can be viewed alongside the EAI presentation. The Japanese results will be easier to understand if divided into three parts. First, Japan's impression of South Korea is improving compared to last year. Second, the proportion of those who perceive South Korea as a partner is decreasing. Third, while support for security cooperation in Japan is high, the impression and trust in South Korea are low, and the central view is that functional and strategic importance coexist. Looking at the impression of South Korea, 35.3% of Japanese respondents answered 'good,' an increase of 10.5 percentage points from 24.8% last year. The response 'not good' was 44.1%, a decrease of 6.9 percentage points from 51.0% last year. However, there are some differences in the composition of the choices between last year and this year, so it is necessary to be cautious about how much this can be compared to an actual change in attitude.

Reasons for Japanese Perceptions of South Korea and the History Issue

Therefore, it is important to understand this 10.5 percentage point increase not as a pure change in attitude, but with the awareness that there are limitations to its comparability. Negative impressions exceed positive ones by 8.8 percentage points, and the neutral response is 20.6%. The response that South Korea is trustworthy was 24.5%, while the response that it is not trustworthy was 50.2%. The proportion of respondents who said the ROK-Japan relationship is important to Japan was 57.0%, significantly exceeding the 26.5% who said it was not important, and this was a 2.9 percentage point increase from 54.1% last year. In other words, the functional and strategic judgment that recognizes the importance of the ROK-Japan relationship is not pointing in the same direction as the impression of or trust in South Korea. How to bridge this gap can be considered an important policy challenge. Next, I will present the direct items regarding impressions. When asked for two reasons for a positive impression of South Korea, 'attractiveness as a travel destination' was 53.6%, and 'culture in general' was 50.7%. For negative impressions, 'strong criticism or negative perception of Japan' was 49.3%, the perception that 'agreements or promises between South Korea and Japan are not sufficiently kept' was 35.9%, and 'dissatisfaction with historical perception' was 35.3%. These are multiple-response items, and the percentages are not based on the number of respondents. Limited to the 447 respondents who have visited South Korea, 79.6% said they maintained or strengthened their positive impression.

History Issues, Cooperative Relations, and Future Goals

However, it should be noted that 47.2% have not visited South Korea in the last five years. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze this carefully by including overall contact experience, rather than equating it with recent contact based only on those with experience. Next is the relationship between history issues and cooperation. The response that cooperation should proceed and will lead to a resolution even if history issues remain was 32.6%. The response that cooperation will not proceed unless history issues are resolved was 17.6%. The response that resolution is difficult regardless of cooperation was 32.0%, and the response that it will not be resolved was 17.8%. These 32.6% and 32.0% have different implications, so it is not appropriate to sum these two items. As for future goals, security cooperation was the top priority at 30.2%, followed by relationship recovery at 29.0%, youth-centered exchanges at 26.4%, and resolution of history issues at 22.3%. Next, please look at the slide on the relationship. The response that the ROK-Japan economic relationship is complementary was 40.8%, significantly exceeding the 28.2% who saw it as competitive. However, neutral or 'don't know' responses also accounted for 31.0%.

Japanese Perceptions of ROK-Japan Economic and Security Cooperation

The response that it is not complementary was 32.3%. The response that the current level is appropriate was 23.3%, building a new relationship such as South Korea joining the CPTPP was 22.0%, and a ROK-Japan economic community was 9.4%. Conversely, the response to reduce it was 13%. Although the perception of complementarity is very strong, a clear will for cooperation is not being expressed, which is an important part of the data. I will also talk about ROK-US security cooperation. For trilateral security cooperation, 51.2% were in favor, 20.3% were opposed, and 28.5% said they did not know. This is almost the same level as last year's 51.7%. In a separate question about the depth of cooperation, 24.9% said cooperation should be deepened, 22.7% supported practical cooperation including logistics and supplies, 17.3% supported limited cooperation, 6.6% said it should not proceed, and 28.5% had a negative view.

This is also characteristic, I believe, in that compared to the South Korean results on ROK-US security cooperation, the Japanese side shows a considerably more forward-looking attitude and willingness to cooperate. Let's look more closely at the reasons for support and opposition. Among the 794 people who supported strengthening security cooperation with South Korea, 56.9% cited 'responding to China's military threat and growing influence,' and 55.0% cited 'North Korea's nuclear and missile issues and stability on the Korean Peninsula,' which were similar figures. Conversely, among the 315 people who opposed it, 43.5% said 'security cooperation is difficult due to differences in historical perception,' and 32.4% cited the 'possibility that military cooperation could escalate regional tensions.' This shows that both the proponents and opponents have their own logic regarding security cooperation. This suggests that how to incorporate balance of power and transparency when proceeding with cooperation will be an important issue. Next is a question about what Japan feels. The countries or regions that Japan feels a military threat from were China at 74.9%, North Korea at 71.9%, and Russia at 59.1%. The United States was 13.9%, and South Korea was 8.2%. This confirms Japan's strong sense of caution towards China and North Korea. Meanwhile, I should mention that this question's specific items about what constitutes a military threat were changed from last year's survey, so a simple comparison is difficult.

Perceptions of Major Countries and Japan's Stance on the Taiwan Issue

We also asked about impressions of the United States, China, and Taiwan. Impressions of the United States were similar, with 39% responding 'good' and 38.3% 'not good.' When asked if they see the United States as a trustworthy partner, 34.7% said 'trustworthy,' and 47% said 'not trustworthy.' The unfavorable impression of former President Trump was 70.9%. Regarding China, 81.1% said their impression was not good, and 83.7% said it was not trustworthy. The unfavorable impression of President Xi Jinping was 78.9%. Nevertheless, 44.3% held the position that cooperation with China should continue in the future while considering security issues. For reference, the favorable impression of Taiwan was 74.5%. There is also a question about Taiwan. Regarding the possibility of a military conflict or crisis in Taiwan, 36.9% said 'there is a possibility,' 19.6% said 'there is no possibility,' and 43.6%, the largest group, said 'don't know.' The proportion who see tension or conflict risk in Taiwan as important to Japan's national interest was 75.8%. As for serious impacts, 25.9% mentioned security risks in the South China Sea, 18.9% mentioned logistics disruption, and 3.4% mentioned energy supply suspension. The question of to what extent Japan should be involved in the Taiwan issue has been asked since last year. In this survey, 22.5% responded that Japan should cooperate with the United States, including the use of force by the Self-Defense Forces. 20.8% supported assistance while refraining from the use of force, 14.1% supported support for external forces and military response, 11.7% supported limiting involvement to intelligence sharing and the defense of Japan, 9% said Japan should not be involved, and 21.8% said they didn't know.

Generational Differences in Perception and the Impact of Travel Experience

We can see that public discussions are heading in different directions. However, a trend that has emerged this time is that, compared to last year, the Japanese public's expectations for the role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces have increased. Finally, let's look at the generational analysis. I presented the rankings of impressions of South Korea in numbers earlier, but when we look at it by generation, a major trend emerges. For example, the impression of South Korea is 47.1% among those in their 20s, which exceeds the overall average of 35.3%. In particular, for those aged 18 to 19, it is 75.8%, meaning almost all respondents have a good impression of South Korea. However, please understand this as a reference value as the number of respondents is small at 33. The proportion who see the ROK-Japan relationship as important is high among the younger and older generations: 63% for those in their 20s, 60.6% for their 60s, and 65% for their 70s. It was somewhat lower for those in their 30s (47.3%) and 40s (47.1%). In other words, while the felt sense of connection is high among the younger generation, the importance of the relationship is supported for different reasons across generations, rather than simply being high for the young and low for the old. I will summarize in about four points. First, although there are limitations in comparability, the impression of South Korea is on an improving trend according to the data. However, unfavorable impressions still exceed favorable ones, and the response 'not trustworthy' reached 50.2%. Second, the importance of the ROK-Japan relationship stands at 57%, and strengthening ROK-US security cooperation at 51.2%, confirming support for functional and strategic cooperation. Third, regarding the relationship between history issues and cooperation, there were many multiple responses and withheld judgments. Fourth, the evaluations of the United States, China, and Taiwan should not be viewed one-dimensionally but should be read by considering their importance and policy choices. Finally, what is important from a policy perspective is not to let the direction of these exchanges end as a temporary mood, but to build trust through concrete and verifiable cooperation. It is necessary to achieve results in security and economic security exchanges, and to continue dialogue on history issues, managing them concurrently with cooperation. The reference materials for this report include questions and figures from 92 to 953. By comparing with the Japanese results, we can further discuss the points of convergence and divergence in the perceptions of both countries. Personal experience has a great impact on national image. Meanwhile, Japan's increase was smaller compared to South Korea's. This is the difference between Koreans visiting Japan and Japanese visiting Korea. According to the data, looking at the trend over the past six years, especially regarding travel, 2020 and 2021 were periods of COVID-19 lockdowns. In 2022, visits were fully permitted, and mutual visitor numbers began to appear. As you can see, the proportion of people going from South Korea to Japan is much higher than from Japan to South Korea, and the gap is widening. In 2022, we thought both sides visited the other country in similar proportions, because Japan's population is 2.5 times that of South Korea. When compared by simple numbers, it seemed that way, but looking at the proportion of respondents, at that time, South Korea was around 40% and Japan was in the 20% range. Now, South Korea has risen to almost 70%, while Japan remains in the 20% range. Looking at the overall trend, although economic factors such as exchange rate changes may have had an impact, it can be judged that the proportion of South Koreans visiting and enjoying Japan is relatively larger than that of the Japanese. This suggests that at the private level, the driving force supporting mutual perception of Japan is relatively larger on the South Korean side than the Japanese side. In 2025, the number of Korean visitors to Japan is expected to reach 3.65 million, which is an increase of 1.2 million from 2023. It is difficult to acknowledge a relationship where the weak won significantly affected the number of visitors to Korea. As mentioned earlier, the proportion of Koreans visiting Japan relative to the country's population and the proportion of Japanese visiting Korea relative to Japan's population are clearly different. Therefore, it is statistically difficult to show a clear advantage in how direct contact experiences between South Korea and Japan are changing. The current Japanese perception of the US was quite surprising. What was very low was

The opinion that cooperation should be pursued was 24.9%, practical cooperation including export supplies was 22.7%, limited cooperation was 17.3%, the opinion that it should not proceed was 6.6%, and the opinion that it is not good was 28.5%. In this way, I think it is also characteristic that, compared to the South Korean side, the Japanese side is showing a considerably more proactive attitude and willingness to cooperate on ROK-Japan security cooperation.

Let's look more closely at the reasons for this support and opposition. Among the 794 people who believed that security cooperation with South Korea should be strengthened, 56.9% cited responding to China's military threat or growing influence, and 55.0% cited North Korea's nuclear and missile issues and stability on the Korean Peninsula, showing similar figures. Conversely, among the 315 who were opposed, 43.5% cited the difficulty of security cooperation due to differences in historical perception, and 32.4% cited the possibility that military cooperation could escalate regional tensions. This shows that both the proponents and opponents have their own logic regarding security cooperation. Therefore, I believe that how to balance power and transparency when proceeding with cooperation can be presented as an important perspective.

Next is a question about the countries or regions from which Japan feels a military threat. The countries that Japan answered it feels a military threat from were China at 74.9%, North Korea at 71.9%, and Russia at 59.1%. The United States was 13.9%, and South Korea was 8.2%. This result confirms Japan's strong sense of caution towards China and North Korea. Meanwhile, please note that the specific content of this question differs from last year's survey, so a simple comparison is difficult.

We also asked about impressions of the United States, China, and Taiwan. Impressions of the United States were that 39% responded 'good' and 38.3% 'not good.' To the question of whether they see the United States as a trustworthy partner, 34.7% responded 'trustworthy,' and 47% responded 'not trustworthy.' The unfavorable impression of former President Trump was 70.9%. Impressions of China were that 81.1% said 'not good,' and 83.7% said 'not trustworthy,' while the unfavorable impression of President Xi Jinping was 78.9%. Nevertheless, 44.3% held the position that exchanges with China should be continued in the future while considering security issues. For reference, the favorable impression of Taiwan was 74.5%.

There is also a question about Taiwan. Regarding the possibility of a military conflict or crisis occurring in Taiwan, 36.9% responded 'there is a possibility,' 19.6% responded 'there is no possibility,' and 43.6% responded 'don't know,' with those who reserved judgment being the largest group. The proportion who see tension or conflict risk in Taiwan as important to Japan's national interest was 75.8%. As for serious impacts, 25.9% mentioned security risks in the South China Sea, 18.9% mentioned logistics disruption, and 3.4% mentioned energy supply suspension. The question of to what extent Japan should be involved in the Taiwan issue is one we have been asking since last year. In this survey, 22.5% were of the opinion that Japan should cooperate with the United States, including the use of force by the Self-Defense Forces, 20.8% believed in providing support while avoiding armed conflict, 14.1% supported a diplomatic response, 11.7% thought it should be limited to providing intelligence and defending Japan, and 9% were of the opinion that Japan should not cooperate.

The opinion that they should not cooperate was 21.8%. We can see that the opinions of the public are varied. However, compared to last year, I think it has emerged as a trend this time that the expectations of the Japanese people regarding the role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces have increased. Lastly, let's look at the perceptions by generation.

I presented the rankings of impressions of South Korea in numbers earlier, but when we look at it by generation, a major trend emerges. For example, the impression of South Korea is 47.1% among those in their 20s, which exceeds the overall average of 35.3%. In particular, for those aged 18 to 19, it is 75.8%, meaning almost all respondents have a good impression of South Korea. However, as the number of respondents is small at 33, I would appreciate it if you understand this as a reference value. The proportion who think the ROK-Japan relationship is important is high among the younger and older generations, at 63% for those in their 20s, 60.6% for their 60s, and 65% for their 70s. On the other hand, it was somewhat lower for those in their 30s (47.3%) and 40s (47.1%). In other words, while the felt sense of connection is high among the younger generation, the importance of the ROK-Japan relationship is supported for different reasons across generations, rather than simply being high for the young and low for the old, which I think is a characteristic.

Summary of Survey Results and Policy Implications

I will summarize in about four points. First, although there are weaknesses in comparability, the impression of South Korea has improved according to the data, and currently, there are more good impressions than bad ones, and the response 'not trustworthy' was also 50.2%. Second, the importance of the ROK-Japan relationship is at 57%, and strengthening ROK-US security cooperation is at 51.2%, confirming support for functional and strategic cooperation. Third, regarding the relationship between history issues and cooperation, a majority of respondents reserved judgment. Fourth, evaluations of the United States, China, and Taiwan need to be read not from a single perspective but by considering importance and policy choices.

Personal Experience, National Image, and Mutual Visit Statistics

Finally, what is important from a policy perspective is not to let the direction of these exchanges end as a temporary mood, but to build trust through concrete and verifiable cooperation. I believe it is necessary to achieve results in exchanges in the security and economic security fields, and to continue dialogue and manage history issues. As reference materials, I have presented questions and figures from '92 to '95. By comparing with the Japanese side's results, we can see the differences in perception between the two countries more clearly. Personal experience has a great impact on national image, and Japan's increase was smaller compared to South Korea's. This is the difference between Koreans visiting Japan and Japanese visiting Korea.

There is data, and if we look at the trend related to travel over the past six years since 2020, 2020 and 2021 were, well, the period of the COVID lockdown. Then, in 2022, visits were fully permitted, and from then on, mutual visitor numbers started to come out. As you can see here, the proportion of people going from South Korea to Japan is much higher than that from Japan to South Korea. And that gap is gradually widening. So, when we thought about around 2022, we thought that both sides visited the other country in quite similar proportions, because at that time, the figures showed that Japan's population is 2.5 times larger.

So when we compared the simple numbers, we saw it that way, but now if you look at the proportion of respondents here, at that time South Korea was at some 40-something percent and Japan was at 27% or so, but if you look at that figure now, South Korea has gone up to almost 70% and Japan is still stuck at 20%. So because the overall trend is like that, although economic factors like, say, changes in the exchange rate certainly had an impact, if you look at the broad trend, the proportion of South Korean people who visit and enjoy Japan is considerably larger than that of the Japanese.

To put it another way, at the private level, the momentum from the South Korean side in supporting a favorable mutual perception of Japan is relatively stronger than that from the Japanese side. Numerically, it can be judged that way. Actually, the number of Korean visitors to Japan is recorded at 3.65 million in 2025, which is actually an increase of about 1.2 million compared to two years ago in 2023. The notion that the weak won had a significant impact on the number of visitors to Korea is not acknowledged. And, as you mentioned earlier, the proportion of visitors to Japan relative to the national population and the proportion of visitors to Korea among the Japanese population are certainly different, so it is statistically difficult to show a clear advantage in how direct experiences are changing. Now, Japan's perception of the US was quite surprising. What was very low was

Security Threat Perception, Nuclear Possession, and Middle Power Cooperation

is emerging. I would like to ask what you see as the cause of such a rapid change, and also, as military cooperation between North Korea and Russia is deepening significantly, this is seen as a threat to South Korea and Japan. I would like to ask for your assessment of this. In a public opinion survey on security by the Japanese Cabinet Office, when asked about trust in the alliance, more than 70% of Japanese respondents answered that they trust the alliance. However, the current question is about whether the US can be trusted, or whether one is impressed by the US president, which I think reflects the Japanese perspective on the politics, society, and foreign relations of a second-term Trump America.

However, in Japan's survey, the perception of military threat, especially concerning China and North Korea, is becoming more pronounced. Accordingly, I believe that the opinion to strengthen Japan-US security cooperation, in addition to strengthening Japan's defense capabilities, is also clearly emerging. Therefore, while trust in the United States and the US president is declining, trust in the Japan-US alliance and its military role can be seen as still high.

Generational Perception Analysis: South Korea's Importance and Favorability

Earlier, it was discussed that Koreans go to Japan frequently, but why don't more Japanese come to Korea, and the exchange rate is often mentioned. That's not it. I asked an AI. There is a huge difference in passport ownership rates between South Korea and Japan. 63% of Koreans have a passport, while only about 23% of Japanese do. Another AI says only one in five Japanese people has a passport. Therefore, there is an overwhelming difference in the proportion of people who own a passport between the two countries to begin with. In addition, over 30% of Koreans traveled abroad last year, while very few Japanese do. So, I hope the statistics are interpreted considering that Japan's overall international travel is overwhelmingly low, not just looking at the ROK-Japan case. My question is for Mr. Jimbo, regarding page 29.

It's a question about generations. I haven't seen the data for South Korea as there is no comparable graph, but looking at Japan, the perception of South Korea's importance is U-shaped by generation. Young people say South Korea is important, it decreases towards middle age, and then rises again among the elderly. On the other hand, having a good impression of South Korea is high among the youth, then decreases and levels off. Unlike the sense of importance, it does not rise again among the elderly.

Japan's Age Demographics and Generational Perception Analysis

Looking at favorability or trust, favorability and trust in South Korea are low among middle-aged Japanese, especially those in their 40s and 50s. An explanation for that would be needed. In South Korea, the 50s age group tends to be the most progressive, and the more progressive one is in South Korea, the stronger the perception that Japan has not sufficiently apologized for historical issues. But when this ideological aspect is combined with travel experience and other factors, I would like to ask Mr. Ken Jimbo to explain if he has any thoughts on why trust or favorability toward South Korea is low among this middle-aged 40s-50s bracket. It's difficult. I would like to explain why the survey and generational responses came out that way and add my analysis. Japan is an aging society, so it's inevitable in public opinion polls that certain age groups increase depending on the sample ratio. Out of 1,552 people, by age, there are 33 people aged 18 to 19, 186 in their 20s, 408 in their 30s, 268 in their 40s, 221 in their 50s, 221 in their 60s, and 432 aged 70 and over. I need to explain the large number of people aged 70 and over in two ways.

First, from age 20 to 60, the brackets are in 10-year increments, but the 70s are a single category. It's not unnatural for this category to be the largest. Second, this proportion of people aged 70 and over did not increase by chance during the survey; it was because the pre-survey sample target was set at 27.9% for this group, so the responses were obtained almost as targeted. This is very similar to the population statistics from Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and looking only at the age composition, I believe this public opinion poll was conducted in a valid manner.

Analysis of the Causes of Generational Differences in Perception

Given Japan's unique age demographics, I would like to discuss why those in their 40s and 50s, in particular, reported less favorable impressions of South Korea and viewed it as less important. On one hand, the reason for the positive perception among the younger generation seems clear. We can plainly see the phenomenon of South Korean soft power and popular culture spreading with relatively little resistance. As for the elderly, we have previously discussed that their perceptions of South Korea are highly ambivalent and contain subtle nuances.

However, they are said to recognize South Korea's importance more clearly when considering security or strategic issues. Businesspeople in their 40s and 50s tend to view the world from a more business-oriented perspective, rather than through a distinct national lens. Consequently, they are more likely to assess South Korea's importance within the broader context of global business, not in isolation. For them, South Korea is important, but so are Europe and the United States.

Changes in South Korean Perceptions of Japan by Generation

I suspect many would also consider Australia important. I believe that as people get older, a clearer strategic map forms in their minds, and they become more conscious of cooperation with neighboring countries, which consequently elevates South Korea's importance. In other words, the perspective on the nation held by the working and retired generations is key. >> If I may, just to add to that... [clears throat] Let me briefly touch on the South Korean case by generation. As mentioned, the overall favorable impression of Japan was 54.3%. For South Koreans in their 20s, the figure was 69.5%, which is slightly lower than the corresponding figure for their Japanese counterparts. It seems the Japanese youth figure was very high in this survey.

For those in their 30s, the figure is 59.6%. So, favorability is in the high 60s for the 20s and high 50s for the 30s, while it is lower for those in their 40s, 50s, and 60s. We surveyed this 10 years ago. Back then, those in their 20s and 30s had very high favorability, and this has persisted as a cohort effect. Meanwhile, the generation that was in their 40s and 50s ten years ago—a relatively progressive cohort critical of Japan—has now aged by a decade, leading to a gradual shift in the 60s demographic. The most peculiar finding is for the 70s age group. At 56.2%, they now have the third-highest favorability rating after the 20s and 30s. Other recent surveys show that since 2023, this age group has rapidly shifted toward what might be called a pro-Japan stance. This seems related to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration. Because they support the Yoon administration's policy toward Japan, they have come to hold a more favorable view of Japan itself. This explains the trend among those in their 70s.

Security-Related Questions: Trust in the U.S. and Nuclear Possession

When the president and I conducted and presented this survey 10 years ago, the results formed a pyramid structure where antipathy toward Japan increased with age. A key change now is that the elderly in their 70s have shifted to a favorable impression of Japan. That seems to be a notable feature. >> Yes, that's very interesting. I have a security-related question, and I'd welcome responses from both of you. Trust in the United States appears to be on a downward trend, and notably, the level of distrust is higher in Japan than in South Korea, which is somewhat contrary to expectations. While this may be distinct from support for the alliance itself, this significant decline in trust in the U.S. on security matters is a major finding, and its causes are important. Regarding Japan, support for possessing nuclear weapons increased by 6 percentage points, while opposition fell by 13.1 percentage points. This is a very significant shift. The question was framed around the continuation of North Korea's nuclear threat, but the threat from North Korea didn't actually increase that much last year. So, I wonder if this reflects views on Japan's potential nuclear armament in response to China's military threat. Broadly speaking, security policy discussions often mention middle power cooperation as an alternative to self-reliance or alliances. I'd like to ask if you think this trend could affect South Korea-Japan security cooperation.

The Relationship Between Declining Trust in the U.S. and Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation

Regarding the 47% figure for trust in the U.S., I actually considered it to be quite high. For Japan, the Japan-U.S. alliance is the cornerstone of security, and the situation in Asia can be seen as relatively stable compared to the turmoil in Europe or involving China. I also think the relationship between Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden remains relatively strong compared to U.S. relations with other countries. For these reasons, I had assumed Japan's trust in the U.S. would not change much, regardless of who is president. That is why the increase in Japanese respondents saying they cannot trust the U.S. is a very significant point.

Changes in Japan's Stance on Nuclear Possession and Taiwan

However, as I mentioned, distrust in the United States and support for Japan-U.S. security cooperation are proceeding on separate tracks. The key point is that Japan is showing that from a functional and strategic standpoint, this security cooperation is indispensable. Its importance remains unchanged, even with negative impressions of the U.S. or a figure like President Trump. On the issue of Japan possessing nuclear weapons, comparing with last year and looking first at the opposition, 49.9% of the Japanese public is opposed. Similarly, 57.4% of Japanese oppose South Korea possessing nuclear weapons.

I believe opposition has increased in both cases. [Scoffs] However, even with what is considered a strong societal 'allergy' to nuclear weapons, the gradually increasing proportion of respondents who support possessing them must be interpreted as a shift in Japanese society. Lastly, on the use of the Self-Defense Forces regarding Taiwan: last year, support and non-military responses were favored over direct intervention in an armed conflict. Now, support for the use of force by the SDF as the top option has grown by 5 percentage points. I think this symbolizes the rise of public opinion in Japan that the country must respond adequately to the severe security situation it has faced over the past year.

Declining Trust in the U.S. and Perception of the China Threat

Yes, to elaborate a bit... [Scoffs] This survey essentially reveals a sentiment of 'we can't trust the U.S., and we don't like China.' A notable finding regarding the dislike for China is a shift in reasoning. In the past, it was about the character of the Chinese people, the government's dismissive attitude toward South Korea, or the THAAD retaliation. Now, it's the perception that China poses a security threat. A significant number of respondents cite military threats, and in terms of economic security, there's the economic coercion we are all too familiar with. So, to address the president's question, it seems we are in a situation where trust in the U.S. is declining, yet turning to China is not an option. When we designed this question, we referenced a Politico survey of five European countries from this February. The results were startling: a clear opinion emerged that they should move closer to China, and there was considerable optimism, including the view that China surpasses the U.S. in advanced technology. A Pew Research survey in June showed similar results, with calls to strengthen ties with China. However, unlike in Europe, we in South Korea perceive a very strong security threat from China. This threat is felt both militarily and—as we have long experienced—economically. The question, then, is what to do. Across several survey questions, we found very low support for the idea of overcoming this difficulty by building solidarity with middle powers, including Japan.

South Korea's Security Dilemma and Anxiety

So, China and the United States continue to loom large in the minds and strategic maps of the South Korean people, who have not yet reached the point of considering a third way. Similarly, we are not in a position to guarantee our own security, nor can we develop nuclear weapons overnight. I believe these dilemmas are clearly reflected in this opinion poll. In the end, even if the U.S. cannot be fully trusted, the belief that the ROK-U.S. alliance must be maintained is still evident. However, as the reality of an unreliable alliance draws nearer, I believe the South Korean public must be seen as being in a state of great security anxiety. Thank you. This concludes the presentations and the Q&A session from both the Korean and Japanese sides.

Attachment: JimboKen(IHJ)_Korea-Japan_Press_Conference_Presentation.pdf

China and the United States loom large in the minds and strategic maps of the South Korean people. They are in a situation where they are unable, or have not yet managed, to conceive of a third way beyond these two powers. Similarly, as they are not in a position to develop nuclear weapons immediately, this dilemma is clearly reflected in the opinion poll. Ultimately, while the United States may not be trustworthy, the perception that the ROK-U.S. alliance must be maintained remains evident. However, with the reality of an unreliable alliance drawing near, the South Korean public must be seen as being in a state of great security anxiety. This concludes the presentations and the question-and-answer session from both the Korean and Japanese sides.

Attachment: JimboKen(IHJ)_Korea-Japan_Press_Conference_Presentation.pdf