[NATO-IP4 Forum] ② The NATO-IP4 After the Ankara NATO Summit Viewed Through the Intersection of US-China-Russia Summit Diplomacy

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJCBV-b55oA&si=RFkdpht-EFK96ARZ

Video script

Yes, hello. I am Jeon Jae-woo, who was just introduced. Before I begin my presentation today, the current situation and the agonizing decisions made during the recent phase, which Director Han mentioned a moment ago, overlap considerably with my presentation. However, I felt there might be slight differences. Therefore, I will move quickly through the overlapping parts and focus my presentation on areas where I believe I can make a relatively greater contribution.

The Concept of Strategic Priority and Analysis of the NATO Summit

My assigned topic is NATO's IP after the NATO summit, viewed within the intersection of US-China-Russia summit diplomacy. I interpreted this as a question that ties together the series of summit diplomacy events that occurred in the middle of this year. Ultimately, I pondered how to connect the US-China summit in May, the China-Russia summit held ten days later, Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang, and the NATO summit in Ankara in July. As my core argument and analysis, I applied the concept of 'strategic priority.' This is not a common term but a conceptual one. To explain it further, think of it not as a list of strategic goals, but as a prioritized framework or a concept with an irreversible direction. I did not include a detailed explanation of this concept in the main text. However, as a brief explanation might be necessary for the presentation, I will elaborate.

I have not included specific explanations. However, as some explanation may be necessary during the presentation, I will elaborate. Regarding these strategic priorities, there are various theorists, with Donald Nuechterlein being a representative example. This can serve as one illustration. Nuechterlein, for instance, categorizes strategic interests into a hierarchy: survival interests, vital interests, major strategic interests, and peripheral interests. Each of these interest categories is distinguished by its intensity, which in English is referred to as 'intensity of interest.'

Survival interests refer to situations where the very physical existence of the state is at stake due to direct attack or nuclear threat. These are the highest national interests, requiring unconditional defense with all national capabilities, where compromise is absolutely impossible. Vital interests, on the other hand, are issues that, while not immediately threatening the state's demise, would inflict fatal and severe damage on national security and economy if strong measures, including the use of military force, are not taken. Major strategic interests are issues important to national security or economic well-being, but not critically so as to be vital. Peripheral interests refer to issues related to humanitarian concerns, the spread of values and ideologies, and cultural symbolism.

When applying the concept of strategic priority, borrowing from these conceptual terms, how can the Ankara summit be evaluated or analyzed? Higher-order interests can delay, leverage, parallel, or instrumentalize lower-order interests or goals. However, the reverse is not possible. Sacrificing higher-order interests for lower-order ones would be considered a misjudgment or failure, rather than strategy. This is the analytical framework that will consistently guide my presentation.

South Korea's Strategic Priorities and the Outcomes of the NATO Summit

So, what do I consider South Korea's strategic priority to be? Personally, I define South Korea's strategic priority as avoiding entanglement in the front lines of great power conflict. This conclusion is based not on ideology or confirmation bias, but on constant factors such as geopolitical conditions that do not easily change. Naturally, this is an interest that goes beyond vital interests, directly related to the survival of the state.

Therefore, the benchmark for evaluating today's presentation will be whether it contributes to this goal. To quickly summarize the outcomes of the Ankara summit, which overlap significantly with what was mentioned earlier, there are four commonly identified achievements. First, the commencement of negotiations for a Framework Agreement on Procurement between South Korea and NATO, providing South Korea with a foothold in a market worth approximately 15 trillion won annually. Second, the expansion of multinational cooperation projects, extending beyond existing areas like munitions and space to include new observer participation in defense industry, rare earth, and raw material projects. Third, the sharing of directions for strengthening standard interoperability, with President Yoon Suk-yeol proposing an upgrade of the South Korea-NATO partnership to 'Partnership 2.0.'

NATO referred to South Korea as a 'close partner.' Fourth, a comprehensive support package of $100 million for Ukraine, excluding lethal weapons. These appear to be the results. However, even within these common points, I identified some differences in the nuance and emphasis of the statements. South Korea used the term 'market access.' NATO, on the other hand, used language like 'industrial deterrence for the alliance,' emphasizing mechanisms for internalizing alliance capabilities.

Interpreting this within NATO's framework, NATO is in a position where it needs to invest more than 5% of its GDP, and from this perspective, there is a need to transition to actual joint procurement and production to strengthen alliance capabilities. In other words, joint procurement and production serve as a means within this series of developments. Furthermore, in addition to these commonalities and differences, there are three points for which judgment is currently reserved. First, what was confirmed is the commencement of negotiations, not the conclusion, so there is still room for reservation. Second, the US-led NATO 3.0 initiative focuses on concentrating NATO within Europe, and consequently, in practical actions, IP (Individual Partnership) countries and Ukraine were not formally invited as participating nations.

There seems to be a gap between the expectations in some parts of South Korea for the institutionalization of IP4 and the somewhat diminished status of IP4 envisioned by the US administration, which warrants further judgment. Third, there is a significant gap between the opening of institutional doors and actual contract awards. As exemplified by Canada's submarine project worth over 60 trillion won, actual contract awards involve factors such as commercial operability, operational track record, and the direction and reliability of political-security strategy. Therefore, further observation is needed, leading me to reserve judgment on these three points.

The Substance and Limits of North Korea-China-Russia Cohesion

Yes. To briefly summarize at the conclusion stage: the commencement of negotiations is not a conclusion. There is a gap between market opening and actual contract awards. What we call a market is interpreted by NATO in the language of alliance. These are the three main points. The next section will directly address North Korea, China, and Russia. I believe there was an implicit premise behind our participation in the NATO summit. This implicit premise is that North Korea, China, and Russia are coalescing to threaten us, and therefore, we also need to consolidate and strengthen our own strategic camp.

Structural Analysis of North Korea-Russia Closeness

So, is this premise actually grounded? I thought it was necessary to examine this. I believe the relationship is fluid and can change in the future, although it is currently as it is. The unity of North Korea, China, and Russia is also a relationship that can naturally change. This is my analysis to date. To date, I have concluded that the closeness between North Korea, China, and Russia has been significantly overestimated. To reach this conclusion, it is of course necessary to analyze the pursuit of national interests by each of these countries. However, in this paper, I will primarily analyze and present the bilateral relationships: inter-Korean relations and North Korea-China relations. The first is the closeness between North Korea and Russia. I focused my analysis on whether Russia would provide reciprocal benefits commensurate with North Korea's expectations, especially after receiving munitions and personnel from North Korea.

I conducted a diachronic analysis. Diachronically, it is an intuitively interesting summary from a historical perspective, which you can read in detail in the text. I have previously published a detailed article on this, which I hope you will refer to later. The main point is that there is a clear pattern in their interactions. What is this pattern? It is that significant and large-scale support for North Korea from China or the former Soviet Union only occurred when their vital interests were at stake. As a specific example, I have published an article analyzing weapons that could be classified as cutting-edge technology at the time as indicators.

These periods mostly include the late 1960s, when the Vietnam War and Sino-Soviet conflict intensified, or the 1980s, when the pursuit of FBI (presumably referring to a specific intelligence agency or operation) was aimed at the collapse of the Soviet Union. Conversely, during the US-China and US-Soviet confrontation in the 1970s, North Korean aid drastically decreased, almost to the point of non-existence. You might feel that a diachronic analysis alone is insufficient. This is because most of those periods were when Sino-Soviet relations were strained, so it might not be directly applicable to the current situation in terms of structure. So, what is the current situation? My conclusion is that the current situation makes it even more impossible to overestimate the North Korea-China-Russia relationship.

This is because Russia currently has no intention or capability to pursue a balance of power against the US alone in East Asia. Therefore, it is difficult for Russia to effectively utilize North Korea as a bridgehead. The US focus is currently on China rather than Russia. In this context, while North Korea's provision of munitions and personnel was a significant factor in the Russia-Ukraine war, it is questionable whether closeness with North Korea in East Asia can be considered a vital interest from Russia's perspective. While there are certainly gaps in their relationships, strategic cooperation in terms of multipolarity or balancing against the US is being maintained stably. This implies that North Korea's strategic maneuvering is currently difficult in the context of heightened Sino-Soviet conflict. In other words, the question is whether Russia can support North Korea to the extent that it would damage Sino-Russian relations, given the strengthened strategic partnership between China and Russia.

In essence, I question whether Russia can act so conspicuously in the competition for leadership in North Korea between China and Russia. Therefore, I judge that the transfer of advanced weapons to North Korea, such as submarines or stealth aircraft, which could maintain the status quo, is structurally difficult at present. There are also reasons for Russia's current situation. Russia is currently in a phase where it must fight the Russia-Ukraine war more aggressively, or its mainland is being attacked more severely, thus becoming more deeply involved in the Russia-Ukraine war. Second, the complex situation in the Middle East also requires continuous resource allocation from Russia's perspective for future influence management. Third is the issue of fulfilling reciprocal benefits to North Korea. Of course, Russia will manage all three of these simultaneously. However, I question whether North Korea can be prioritized among these three.

Structural Factors and Paradoxes in North Korea-China Relations

I question whether North Korea can be prioritized among these three. To summarize this, despite the closeness between North Korea and Russia, North Korea's friendly stance will be maintained, but the substantive content of this closeness will be difficult to achieve as North Korea expects. In other words, I believe it is under pressure of reduction and delay. Next, I will analyze the North Korea-China relationship as the second axis. As you may have seen in the news, signs of anomalies in North Korea-China relations have been detected since the transition from 2022 to 2023. I have listed them here. There were many analyses domestically that suggested a significant recovery, with North Korea and Russia presenting a united front on the occasion of the Victory Day in September 2025.

Instead of interpreting the ups and downs of these relationships as being due to individual events or recovering due to joint progress, I believe a structural approach is necessary. Therefore, similar to the analysis of North Korea-Russia closeness, I have attempted a structural analysis. The first key point is that China dislikes North Korea's nuclear armament itself. It has not preferred it from the beginning, and there can be various reasons for this. It also becomes a variable in China's independent exercise of influence over North Korea.

Second, it can excessively drive the formation of blocs within the region. Third, there is a latent possibility of proliferation into issues that China cannot control alone, such as nuclear proliferation, nuclear management, and domino effects of nuclear weapons in the region. From China's perspective, it is difficult to favor the North Korean nuclear issue. This is one structural factor. Another structural factor in North Korea-China relations is the paradox of North Korea's nuclear weapons. It is not simply that China dislikes North Korea's nuclear weapons; rather, North Korea's nuclear armament has solidified the value of North Korea as a geopolitical buffer, which China has traditionally valued, acting as a land route to block external forces from entering China.

In fact, with North Korea's nuclear armament, entry via land routes has been effectively blocked. The problem is that this was not done at China's behest but was independently decided by North Korea based on its own needs, creating a paradox. From China's perspective, there is no need to provide support beyond preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime. In fact, its leverage has weakened. So, how can North Korea interpret these two points? From North Korea's perspective, these two structural factors of China have not only driven its isolation, contrary to its pursuit of reducing dependence on great powers through nuclear armament, but have also led to a exponential increase in its dependence on China. I believe this is the fundamental background that led North Korea to begin contemplating the issue of asymmetry with China and to turn towards Russia to mitigate it.

Of course, prior to this, there would have been processes of convergence among South Korea, China, and Russia, but how is this closeness between North Korea and China interpreted from China's perspective? The 2024 North Korea-China treaty did not proclaim itself as an alliance treaty. However, its contents include a clause for Russian military intervention in case of emergency. From China's perspective, this means Russia is stepping into an area where China exclusively exercised its authority. In other words, China can perceive its strategic environment as being damaged.

If this is the case, then structurally, if we accurately examine the situations I have listed, North Korea-China relations cannot be good. And surface phenomena that sufficiently corroborate these points are also observed. One such example I have included here is Kim Ju-ae. This is because you would have seen the scene where Kim Jong Un traveled by train with Kim Ju-ae in September 2025. If you recall the scene of them disembarking, the person who followed immediately after Kim Jong Un was Kim Ju-ae.

However, even at that time, Chinese media coverage was significantly less frequent and did not emphasize the event. This indicates that from China's perspective, they deliberately tried not to give it much importance. This became even more pronounced during Xi Jinping's recent visit to Pyongyang. Kim Ju-ae was not brought along at all. I believe these are clear proofs confirming that North Korea is pursuing certain actions that China cannot accept.

So, how can the nature of Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang be defined? I don't think we need to overanalyze their terminology itself. I want to state their terminology as it is: they called it a 'strategic relationship.' It is a strategic relationship, and naturally, given it is the 65th anniversary of the mutual agreement, they emphasized friendly gestures, at least on the surface. However, in reality, I believe the visit was imbued with the nature of managing North Korea's excessive demands and reconfirming China's leadership in North Korea. Furthermore, besides Kim Ju-ae, another piece of evidence is that the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons was not discussed. Rather than making a leap to interpret this as China abandoning denuclearization, it is a more accurate interpretation to assume that from China's perspective, although unpleasant, it is realistically impossible to pursue denuclearization at this moment, so they simply removed it from the agenda.

Comprehensive Analysis of North Korea-China-Russia Relations and South Korea's Strategic Challenges

Therefore, instead of 'defense' or 'military,' the term 'army' was used, and instead of 'cooperation,' the term 'exchange' was used. These are clearly toned-down terms. Considering these three pieces of evidence and the structural factors mentioned earlier, I believe North Korea-China relations are currently not good.

To summarize North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relations, it can be concluded that the cohesion of North Korea-China relations is being significantly overestimated. So, how should we view this? I believe that North Korea's pursuit of a 'new path' or a 'preemptive Cold War' structure, and its strategy of expanding strategic space through such pursuits, will be structurally difficult to proceed smoothly. As evidence for this, looking ahead, the Singaporean Foreign Minister visited Pyongyang from late May to early June. Seeing this, it is possible that North Korea's intentions are not proceeding smoothly, and therefore, there is a possibility of its actions extending to Southeast Asia.

Escaping the Logic of Bloc Formation and Seeking Strategic Autonomy

I will make such a prediction. Whether it is correct or not, we will have to wait and see. Instead of preemptively engaging in this bloc formation of North Korea-China-Russia versus South Korea-US, and further extending it to NATO, we must clearly recognize that these are discourse-generated constructs and avoid the mistake of incurring actual costs to respond to risks that do not yet concretely exist. A cautious stance is necessary. From this perspective, returning to the Ankara agenda, I have taken a somewhat cautious stance on the Ankara agenda. I have divided the interpretation into two. I will not elaborate too much on the first interpretation. This is a criticism that it has deepened South Korea's security crisis. I do not think this interpretation can be entirely dismissed.

Policy Recommendations for Maximizing Strategic Autonomy

This is also intertwined with the three situations for which I reserved judgment earlier. Now, I will focus on Interpretation 2. This is also my personal hope, and listening to the Director's remarks, Interpretation 2 seems correct. Interpretation 2 is that we are not unilaterally leaning towards NATO to pursue preemptive bloc formation, nor are we increasing engagement with China unilaterally. Instead, I would express it in terms of delicately oscillating between the two, thereby maximizing our strategic autonomy.

Of course, there will be many difficult elements in adopting such a strategic path, but I have listed three necessary recommendations. First, it is necessary to clearly define our political right of refusal regarding involvement in conflicts, as needed. Second, in terms of supply chain participation, if this political right of refusal is not clearly defined, it risks becoming too much of a subordinate role, which should be avoided.

Third, we need to carefully manage the handover points so that support for Ukraine does not lead to increased tensions reaching our side. Fourth, in terms of defense industry cooperation, it needs to be adjusted so that it does not carry too much of an ideological or normative bond, but rather is calibrated based on the actual proportional situation in East Asia. Most importantly, when pursuing such a delicate path, the existence of internal principles is crucial. Once again, as I mentioned at the beginning, a very logical and convincing hierarchy of strategic priorities must be established. There must be a hierarchy that everyone can accept.

The policy recommendations include: clear hierarchy of strategic priorities, stopping the level of engagement at a point where the right of refusal remains intact, and actively engaging the counterweight on the other side of the scale. This was written in the early morning of July 8th to 9th. Since then, the President visited Mongolia, fully demonstrating that nuance, and it seems that engagement on the other side, what we commonly call the Northern Policy, is indeed being activated. Although it may seem a bit out of place, I have included the Tumen River estuary variable as a fourth point. This point has very important implications for the future, so although it is a somewhat distant topic, I have included it in the policy recommendations. It may seem that the eastern and western ends of the Eurasian continent are far apart, but there is one example I always mention in my recent presentations.

As you all know, during the Crimean incident, Russia's arms exports to China increased exponentially. What China gained at this time was the S-400 air defense missile system. Of course, this was also because Russia had its own military plan to transition to the S-500 in 2012, but if the asymmetry between China and Russia had not deepened to such an extent, it would not have happened so easily. This materialized in 2015 and, I believe, led to the deployment of THAAD in 2016.

In other words, NATO and East Asia are strategically connected not merely in an abstract, bloc-like manner, but are practically connected based on concrete weapon systems. Therefore, proactive information gathering capabilities and agenda-setting capabilities are needed for these matters. I will conclude my presentation here.