[NATO-IP4 Forum] ① The Reconfiguration of Alliances and NATO-IP4 Through the Russia-Ukraine War and the U.S.-Iran War

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Azj-HJZDzU&si=kGezOjZ2Mxz6W_eT

Video script

Yes, it is a pleasure to meet you. I am Yeon Dam-lin from the Defense Research Institute. Thank you for inviting me. In fact, the fundamental points I wanted to make have already been covered by the Korean scholar. I wonder if you might have seen my paper in advance and alleviated some of the burden. After receiving the request, I wrote the paper and revised it two or three times to ensure the direction was correct. Hearing the comments from the Korean scholar, I feel relieved that I have indeed captured the right direction.

The Strategic Vision of the United States and the Reconfiguration of Alliances

My basic thought regarding NATO IP4 is that merely providing a chronological explanation of the situation is insufficient while studying international politics. It is necessary to discuss what the substantial national strategy that the United States pursues in international politics is. Under that framework, I believe we must examine the international order that the United States seeks and, within that context, understand NATO IP4 to clarify its essence. The overarching theme you presented ranges from the fragmentation of alliances to their reconfiguration, and I have concluded that the United States is attempting to reconfigure its alliances. In this process, I believe we must consider NATO IP4. Finally, I find myself contemplating what the policy implications for Korea as a think tank are and what strategies should be pursued.

I have been able to study through such opportunities. I have pondered a lot about the paradigms of international politics. Is the hegemony of the United States, its superpower status, in decline, or is it transitioning to another form? Having studied international policy from a Russian perspective, I have considered the weakening of American superpower status.

Russia's Eurasian Great Power Strategy

From a Russian perspective, many of these points have been exposed, and while studying F4 this time, I revisited these thoughts. Essentially, since Putin came to power, Russia has pursued a Eurasian great power strategy for 26 years. To achieve this, a multipolar world must be established. This is Russia's position, as it believes that only then can its great power strategy be realized. In Russia's 2024 National Security Strategy (NSS), it refers not merely to a simple multipolar order but to a 'polycentric world.' In other words, the world order that Russia envisions is one centered around various great powers. Professor Jeon Jae-sung mentioned that a parallel regional order must be created.

Russia's perception is that it can achieve a great power order in the Eurasian region, and this is the goal of the Putin regime. One cannot help but question whether the parallel regional order that Russia pursues, namely the polycentric world, is legitimate. Particularly after the outbreak of the Ukraine war, fundamental questions must be asked. If the international community cannot agree with the international order that Russia seeks, how should we evaluate the international order that the United States pursues? From my perspective, I believe we need to reassess the international order that the United States seeks. In conclusion, I have recognized that the United States is not in decline but is establishing a new hegemonic order through the reconfiguration of alliances. In this regard, I will introduce three basic concepts.

The Reconfiguration of American Hegemony and Technology-Based Alliances

First, the strengthening of the 'Western Hemisphere' as mentioned in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) document. I believe this should be expanded through the concept of the Trump Corollary. Academically, I have defined this as the concept of 'Fortress Western Hemisphere.' A doctoral researcher at our institute is also working on this task, which is a coincidence.

I conceptualized the strategy of fortifying the Western Hemisphere and observed that through the Trump Corollary, both the Biden administration prior to the Trump administration and the superpower United States are moving in this direction. In other words, by solidifying the fortification of the Western Hemisphere, this strategy document suggests that the United States aims to secure its hegemonic status in the 21st century. If the United States achieves its hegemonic status through this fortification strategy, it will transform into another form. This is why we discuss NATO IP4. Therefore, the existing method, which is based on military power, is insufficient. What should the new form of alliance look like? The second concept is moving towards a technology-based network alliance order.

I have defined this as 'GITI-NAO.' Through this concept, the United States will reconfigure its relationships with other allies following the solidified Western order. My concern is that the United States seeks to maintain its superpower status by combining its existing military alliances with a technology-based alliance order. In this context, how should we view NATO IP4? I believe that under the two platforms of the Western Hemisphere fortification strategy and the technology-based alliance order, NATO IP4 will serve as an institutional platform. Ultimately, Korea must make sound judgments and fully engage in strategic assessments regarding these international order flows to achieve the strategic autonomy it seeks.

The Russia-Ukraine War and the Nature of Modern Warfare

This is my basic thought. Later, Dr. Jeon Ji-woo will likely discuss related concepts, but how should we view the Russia-Ukraine war and the U.S.-Iran war? As a specialist in Russia, I have pondered a lot about the Russia-Ukraine war. Russia perceives itself as a player in the pursuit of a fair international order, seeking a great power order in Eurasia while also pursuing its interests. However, this perception began to shatter with Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. There has been much contemplation regarding the international order that Russia seeks to establish, and from Russia's perspective, the basic recognition was a reaction against NATO's eastward expansion, but conversely, there may have also been concerns about Russia becoming overly powerful and encroaching into the Western Hemisphere, which is America's backyard.

In any case, the basic recognition is that Russia wants to establish a regional order in Eurasia, and NATO could not help but respond to this.

What is important is how the United States will view the Russia-Ukraine war in the process of reconfiguring its hegemony. As the director mentioned, the dynamics of the war have completely changed. Conducting war with traditional military power has become difficult. With advanced technologies such as drones being utilized in warfare, Russia initially faced setbacks, and as the war progressed into a war of attrition, Russia is also adapting to the dynamics of modern warfare and developing related technologies. As the thumbnail suggests, the war will not end this year; Russia believes that if it engages in war, it must see it through to the end. The Putin regime, having surpassed 26 years, can legally continue until 2030 and may extend beyond that, so it will not easily conclude the war. If their strategic objectives are not achieved, they will not wrap it up easily. This is not a war that began easily, nor will it end easily. There is a high possibility that it will become a prolonged conflict, and Russia will continuously pursue military reconfiguration and technological development that aligns with the nature of modern warfare.

One of Russia's most vulnerable areas is space technology, specifically military satellite technology. It lacks technologies like Starlink. Ukraine has been able to conduct precise drone strikes through Starlink, causing difficulties for Russia. Since 2014, Russia has been under international sanctions and has pursued a self-reliant economic path. In the meantime, it has attempted to develop military satellites like Starlink, but has not succeeded. Since the Soviet era, Russia has developed technology through relations with Europe, and in the current situation where relations with the United States are severed, it cannot help but struggle. It is facing difficulties in developing semiconductors, AI, drones, and other technologies independently.

Traditionally, Russia has developed technology through its relations with Europe, and as an alternative, it is collaborating with China and India to develop AI and drone technologies, but there are clear limitations. However, from Russia's perspective, achieving military technological capabilities independently without European assistance is a concern. Therefore, it can be predicted that the war will not end easily. NATO will likely have similar concerns. The era of traditional warfare is over, and warfare is transforming into a new form that incorporates advanced technologies, with AI integrated into warfare, making the Ukraine war a testbed. Similarly, in the continuous line of events, the Iran-Israel war will also be a significant concern for NATO regarding how to achieve alliance reconfiguration in the changing landscape of warfare.

Korea's Strategic Response and Technological Alliances

In this context, both the Ukraine war and the Iran war serve as experimental catalysts from NATO's perspective. The technology alliance I mentioned, GITI-NAO, is taking shape as an attempt to utilize this war as a battlefield. In this regard, we must also consider the NATO IP4 alliance. What response strategy should Korea adopt in the process of the United States reconfiguring its alliance order? I have pondered a lot about this, but I also questioned whether the term NATO IP4 itself is appropriate. For now, I will set aside the issue of terminology and will organize the concepts later based on the comments from the discussants.

If Korea's relationship with the United States has been a military alliance based on military power, then in the context of the hegemonic transition and the shift towards a technology alliance, Korea must also evolve beyond a military alliance into a technology alliance. Only then can we achieve our strategic autonomy and the strategic goals we pursue. This will also enable the current government's goal of becoming a leading AI nation.

Cooperation in Central Asia and Korea's Role

I recently returned from a trip to Central Asia. The Korean government is seeking to build solidarity with cooperating countries through middle power diplomacy, and to emerge as an AI powerhouse, it must utilize mineral resources such as rare earth elements that go into semiconductors. There are many such minerals in Central Asia. The first Korea-Central Asia summit is scheduled for September, and the Central Asian countries have an open mind towards cooperation with Korea and middle power collaboration centered on AI. If the roles of Korea and the Central Asian countries can be integrated in building a future just international order, they believe that together they can contribute to the establishment of a just international order.

From the Korean government's perspective, if Korea can effectively leverage its technological advantages, it can play a role in advancing from a military alliance to a military plus technology alliance in cooperation with NATO or the United States. As a specialist in Russia, it is a difficult statement to make, but since we cannot ignore the alliance order, I believe that Korea's participation in establishing a new alliance order and setting relationships will greatly assist in securing the strategic autonomy pursued by both the current and past governments. I will conclude my presentation here, and I will speak if there are any comments later. Thank you.

If the roles are well aligned, it can help create a more just international order cooperation as a middle power along with Korea's own localization. From the Korean government's perspective, if Korea effectively utilizes its technological advantages in the current initiative, it can play a role in advancing from a military alliance to a military plus technology alliance in cooperation with the United States. While it is a very challenging statement from the perspective of a Russian specialist, we cannot ignore the alliance order, so I believe that Korea's participation in establishing a new alliance order and setting relationships will also help secure the strategic autonomy pursued by both the current and past governments.

I will conclude my presentation here, and I will speak later if there are any comments. Thank you.