[North Korea Strategy] ② Evidence-Based North Korea Research: Transition of State Strategy and Elite Dynamics in the Kim Jong Un Era

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P1oqqpEIHCc&si=lXQAj5uwVklHS-YD

Video Script

The Necessity of Evidence-Based North Korea Research

Hello, I am Kim Taek-bin from the National Defense University. Today, I will discuss what approach we should take in advancing North Korea research and what new approaches may be. I have always believed that evidence-based North Korea research is necessary and that it should be a major direction of our North Korea policy, which led me to attempt exploratory research based on this belief. The evidence-based North Korea research textbook is titled 'The Strategic Shift of the State under Kim Jong-un and the Dynamics of the Elite'.

As you know, the inter-Korean relationship has entered a very strained phase since North Korea declared a hostile governance relationship. For over 70 years, the inter-Korean relationship can be seen as a pendulum movement of severance and thawing. While it seems that the severance of inter-Korean relations through a hostile governance relationship may continue in research, I personally believe that a turning point will inevitably come again. So, what capabilities and preparations do we need to have?

Analysis of Elite Dynamics Beyond Leader Determinism

I believe that the ability to proactively and accurately read the moment of such a turning point is necessary. Looking at the existing methods of analyzing and interpreting North Korea, they have generally focused on the teachings of the leader, the words of the supreme leader, and the official documents of the party. The premise of this approach is that all policy decisions of the state of North Korea stem from the leader, meaning that a leader determinism perspective has been the prevailing trend in North Korea research and analysis.

However, if we consider it from Kim Jong-un's perspective, no matter how great a foresight or intelligence a person possesses, they cannot govern the state alone. Governance is only possible with the support and backing of an elite group. Ultimately, it is because they are human. Therefore, the shift in North Korea's state policy can also be seen as a product resulting from the relationship between the leader and the elite. This research aims to analyze whether the significant strategic shifts in North Korea during Kim Jong-un's era were unilateral decisions made by Kim Jong-un or outcomes produced under the influence of specific elite groups.

Until now, when thinking about North Korea based on leader determinism, it was assumed that once the leader makes a decision, it will be implemented as is, and that the leader decides everything. It was thought that when the leader decides on a policy, people would be fitted to it accordingly. In this perspective, elites would merely be passive executors. If the leader determinism perspective can explain North Korea's actual behavior, then the composition of the elite would change after the policy announcement. In other words, the leader decides and reorganizes the elite group. This is the top-down model of leader determinism that we think of.

On the other hand, the bottom-up model, or the theory of power distribution or elite actors, is the opposite. It suggests that a specific group first rises to influence agenda-setting and drives the leader's decisions. This implies that the composition of elite groups changes prior to the decision of a specific policy, leading to policy decisions. I aimed to compare these two models broadly.

Current Status and Challenges of North Korean Elite Actor Research

Underlying these ideas is the belief that evidence-based North Korea research is necessary. Until now, most North Korea research has been biased towards discourse analysis or fragmented information-based interpretations. While this may be meaningful in certain topics, there is a need to systematically gather, verify, and analyze the information that seeps out through the closed cracks of the North Korean regime. Therefore, this research presentation is intended to show that such an approach is possible, rather than presenting a completed product.

Until now, the majority of research has often depicted elites as relatively passive agents, that is, beings adjusted and controlled by the leader's strategy. Recently, research trends have begun to emerge that view elites as active actors. Furthermore, recent studies have been conducted suggesting that the type of elite determines the direction of state policy. However, research emphasizing the role and importance of elites as actors has generally been conducted in authoritarian regimes where some information is publicly available, such as China, Russia, and Vietnam. Relatively few studies have focused on the value of elites as actors in North Korea.

There are a few exceptional studies, but even these studies have mostly been at a technical level regarding specific points in time. Therefore, research that systematically tracks the periods before and after policy shifts and examines the changes in specific elite groups over time is very rare. This represents a gap in existing research, and I believe that the research I am presenting today can help fill this gap.

Theoretically, existing research argues that the greatest dilemma faced by leaders in authoritarian regimes is not the conflict between the leader and the public, but rather the conflict between the leader and the elite. According to Milans Boli's research, the rate at which authoritarian regime dictators are ousted is about 67%, which is due to betrayal by elite groups. In other words, when dictators are replaced, nearly 70% are replaced not by popular uprisings but by betrayals from their close aides. Therefore, leaders perceive this situation as the greatest threat and must share a portion of their power with elite groups to prevent it.

Policy shifts can also be understood in this context. When policies shift, there will be groups within the elite that gain incentives and groups that suffer losses. Therefore, policy shifts can be used as a tool of control over elite groups, that is, to reward some while punishing others. Conversely, from the perspective of elite groups, policy shifts can play an important role in controlling the leader. Elite groups are not merely passively controlled; they can also maximize or lose their vested interests or influence through policy shifts. Therefore, elite groups can exercise agenda-setting power through the information or policy proposals they provide to the leader.

The Concept of Hongzhen Elite and Its Applicability to North Korea

This can be measured through changes in the composition of elite groups before and after policy announcements. The concept I focus on is that of 'Hongzhen elite,' which is a theoretical framework derived from Chinese politics. According to Moody's research, the ruling elite competition can be broadly divided into Hong elites and Quan elites. Depending on which elite is dominant at a given time, the policy priorities of the regime may change. Broadly speaking, Hong elites are those who are deeply red to the bone.

They value revolutionary nature, ideological legitimacy, and regime preservation, and career-wise, they include elites in the party, propaganda, ideology, security, and military sectors. In contrast, Quan elites are technocrats, that is, elites who focus on economic efficiency, expertise, and scientific and technological achievements. Career-wise, they correspond to elites in specialized departments such as cabinet economic departments, science and technology, and industrial sectors.

This Hongzhen conflict is a concept inspired by Chinese politics but is also applicable to North Korea. In fact, empirical cases from North Korea show that conflicts between Hongzhen elites have existed. A representative example is the market liberalization policies of the Cabinet under Kwak Bong-ju during the economic reforms of the 2000s and the party's attempts to counter them, leading to a retreat in the marketization of economic policies. During the Kim Jong-un era, a Hongzhen conflict was observed in 2022 during the plenary meeting, where economic officials were criticized for their preference for cooperative technology as reactionary and technocratic.

Methodology for Analyzing Kim Jong-un's Accompanying Data

To observe this Hongzhen conflict, I analyzed Kim Jong-un's accompanying data. While changes in official status take time to confirm, local accompanying data can be measured in real-time. When Kim Jong-un conducts on-site guidance, who he is with and who he keeps by his side can be very important. On-site guidance involves long-distance travel, which creates conditions for opportunities for policy discussions or agenda-setting power.

I cross-verified other materials based on the database of Kim Jong-un's public activities reported by the Korea Institute for National Unification. I coded the accompanying elites of Kim Jong-un into Hong elites and Quan elites. I coded them based on their actual career functions and expertise, as well as their main duties at the time. This analysis estimates the proportion of Hong elites over a total of 13 months of panel data, covering six months before and after the announcement.

This should be understood as exploratory patterns rather than results with perfect statistical rigor. The hypotheses are as follows: first, to see whether elite changes accompany policy announcements in a top-down decision-making process. Second, to see whether the proportion of Hong and Quan elites changes before the announcement in a bottom-up hypothesis. Finally, the third hypothesis is a mixed form of these two, examining whether a continuous power distribution exists.

Analysis of Elite Dynamics by Major Policy Decision Phases

In conclusion, I examined four major policy decision phases of North Korea: the dual track of economic and nuclear force construction, the total concentration on socialist economic construction, the frontal breakthrough, and the legalization of nuclear force. The patterns varied significantly according to each policy. The key point is that the graph above the red line indicates a high proportion of Hong elites, while the lower negative part indicates an increase in the proportion of Quan elites. The dual track of economic and nuclear force construction showed a high proportion of Hong elites throughout all periods. Notably, from six months prior to the policy announcement to three months after, the proportion of Hong elites was statistically significantly higher than that of Quan elites.

Interestingly, in the total concentration on socialist economic construction, the proportion of Quan elites was already significantly high from six months before the policy announcement, and from about three months after the decision, a pattern emerged where the proportion of Hong elites increased. This can be interpreted as a signal that the economic concentration in 2018 was aligned with inter-Korean and North American summit diplomacy, indicating a shift in direction. In the case of the frontal breakthrough, overall, the Quan elites were somewhat dominant before the policy announcement, but from three months after the announcement, the proportion shifted towards Hong elites. During the negotiation dynamics, the technocrat Quan elites led the agenda, and as the deadlock began, the ruling forces were reorganized to ensure regime cohesion, leading to an increase in the proportion of Hong elites.

Finally, in the case of the legalization of nuclear force, no statistically significant changes were observed before and after the announcement. Overall, two points can be stated with certainty: first, the dominance of Hong elites structurally persists. It is very rare for Quan elites to surpass Hong elites in most periods, and generally, the proportion of Hong elites is much higher.

Academic and Policy Implications of Research Findings

However, it can be noted that in economic-oriented phases or economic concentration phases, the rise of Quan elites is pronounced. From an academic perspective, the implications suggest that simply relying on leader determinism cannot fully explain the behavior of the North Korean regime. It shows that there are phases where the importance of elites as actors surpasses leader determinism, depending on certain aspects or surrounding environments. Additionally, the nature of policies distinguishes dynamics, indicating that depending on the nature of the policy, either Hong elites, Quan elites, or both may have no influence.

The results suggest that policy announcements may not be the starting point for changes in North Korean behavior but rather the outcome. In terms of policy recommendations, I would like to mention three points. The first is the need for an evidence-based approach. As mentioned at the beginning, if past North Korea policies were based on so-called wishful thinking to understand and analyze North Korea, it is now necessary to understand North Korea as an entity based on objective signal analysis. This is the first recommendation I would like to make regarding North Korea policy.

Future Research Directions and Policy Suggestions

The second is the need to cultivate specialized personnel who can properly interpret these signals. It is essential to have experts who are not only knowledgeable about the region of North Korea but also proficient in quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and who can clearly recognize the issues and limitations in identifying such information.

In the final point, there is a need to expand data infrastructure. It is necessary to continue standardizing, accumulating, and publicly sharing data related not only to public activity analysis but also to personnel, media, and education. I believe that a collaborative system among research institutions, government agencies, and academia will be essential in this process.

In future research, I intend to expand the time window to rigorously organize the results found in this study. Lastly, I would like to say that while the inter-Korean relationship currently appears to be in a state of eternal severance, I personally believe that although the winter of severance may be long, it will not be eternal. What we need to prepare for at this stage is to first read the turning point of the coming spring and develop the capacity to prepare for it. I believe this is the most proactive thing we can do right now, and I will conclude my presentation.