[North Korea Strategy] ② Evidence-Based North Korea Research: Transition of State Strategy and Elite Dynamics in the Kim Jong Un Era

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P1oqqpEIHCc&si=lXQAj5uwVklHS-YD

Video Transcript

The necessity of evidence-based research on North Korea

Hello. I am Kim Taek-bin from the National Defense University. Today, the topic I will discuss is what new approaches can be taken in advancing research on North Korea. I believe that evidence-based research on North Korea is necessary, and this should be the main direction of North Korea policy. I have attempted exploratory research on the subject. The evidence-based research material on North Korea is 'The Shift in National Strategy and Elite Dynamics in the Kim Jong-un Era'.

As you know, North Korea has declared hostile provocations, and inter-Korean relations are very strained. For over 70 years, inter-Korean relations have been in a state of oscillation, alternating between severance and thawing. While it may seem that the severance of inter-Korean relations through hostile provocations will continue in research, I personally believe that a turning point will inevitably come again. So, what preparations do we need to make?

What is needed is the ability to proactively and accurately read the moments of such turning points. The existing methods of analyzing North Korea have largely focused on the teachings of the leader, the words of the supreme leader, and the official documents of the party. The premise of this approach is that all North Korean policy decisions stem from the leader, meaning that a leader-centric deterministic perspective has been the prevailing trend in North Korean research and analysis.

The relationship between elite groups and policy decisions

However, from Kim Jong-un's perspective, no matter how exceptional someone's foresight or intelligence may be, one cannot govern a country alone. Governance is only possible with the support and backing of elite groups. Ultimately, the shift in North Korea's national policy can also be seen as a product of the relationship between the leader and the elites. Therefore, this study aims to analyze whether the significant strategic shifts during the Kim Jong-un era were the result of unilateral decisions by Kim Jong-un or outcomes influenced by specific elite groups.

Until now, when thinking about North Korea from a leader-centric deterministic perspective, it was assumed that once the leader made a decision, it would be implemented as is, and that the leader would decide everything. It was thought that when the leader made a policy decision, people would be fitted into that framework. From this perspective, elites would merely be passive executors. If the leader-centric deterministic view could explain North Korea's actual behavior, we would see a downward model where elite composition changes after policy announcements and the leader reorganizes the elite group.

In contrast, the upward model, or the theory of elite actors, is the opposite. A specific group rises first, influencing agenda-setting and driving the leader's decisions. This leads to the hypothesis that the composition of elite groups changes prior to specific policy decisions, which in turn leads to policy decisions. I aimed to compare these two models broadly.

Underlying this idea is the belief that evidence-based research on North Korea is necessary. Until now, research on North Korea has often centered on discourse analysis or fragmented information interpretation. However, it is essential to systematically gather, verify, and analyze the information that emerges from the closed nature of the North Korean regime. This study is significant not for presenting completed results, but for demonstrating that such an approach is possible in an exploratory manner.

Most studies have depicted elites as passive agents adjusted and controlled by the leader's strategy. Recent research trends have begun to view elites as active actors, and further studies are being conducted on how elite types determine national policy directions. However, studies emphasizing the importance of elites as actors have largely focused on authoritarian regimes with some degree of information transparency, such as China, Russia, and Vietnam. Relatively few studies have focused on the value of elites as actors in the context of North Korea.

There have been a few exceptional studies, but most have been technical-level studies on specific points in time. Research that systematically tracks the phases before and after policy transitions and examines changes in specific elite groups over time is very rare. This represents a gap in existing research, and this study will serve to fill that gap.

Theoretically, the greatest dilemma faced by leaders in authoritarian regimes is not the conflict between the leader and the masses, but rather the conflict between the leader and the elites. According to Milans Boli's research, approximately 67% of dictators in authoritarian regimes are ousted due to betrayal by elite groups. In other words, about 70% of leadership changes occur not through popular uprisings, but through betrayal by close aides. Therefore, leaders must share a portion of their power with elite groups to prepare for and prevent such threats.

Policy transitions can also be understood in this context. When policies are shifted, there will be groups within the elite that gain incentives and those that suffer losses. Policy transitions can be utilized as a tool of control over elite groups, meaning that they can benefit some while punishing others. Conversely, from the perspective of elite groups, policy transitions can also serve to control the leader. Elite groups are not merely passively controlled; through policy transitions, they can maximize or lose their vested interests or influence. Therefore, elite groups can exercise agenda-setting power through the information or policy proposals they provide to the leader.

The Hongzhen conflict frame in North Korean elite research

This can be measured through changes in the composition of elite groups before and after policy announcements. The concept I focus on here is the 'Hongzhen elite,' a theoretical frame derived from Chinese politics. According to Moody's research, the ruling elite competition can be broadly divided into Hong elites and Zhen elites. Depending on which elite holds dominance at a given time, the policy priorities of the regime may change. Hong elites are deeply red elites who value revolutionary spirit, ideological legitimacy, and regime preservation. Career-wise, they correspond to positions in the party, propaganda, ideology, security, and the military.

In contrast, Zhen elites are technocrats who emphasize economic efficiency, expertise, and scientific and technological achievements. Career-wise, they correspond to specialized departments such as cabinet economic departments, science and technology, and industrial sectors.

Although this concept of Hongzhen conflict was inspired by Chinese politics, it is also applicable to North Korea. In fact, empirical cases from North Korea show that conflicts exist among Hongzhen elites. A representative example is the market liberalization policies of the Cabinet under Kwak Bong-ju during the economic reforms of the 2000s, which faced attempts at restraint from the party, resulting in a retreat of economic policies. Even during the Kim Jong-un era, in the 2022 plenary meeting, conflicts were observed where economic officials were criticized for their preference for cooperative technology, reflecting Hongzhen conflicts.

To examine these Hongzhen conflicts, I analyzed Kim Jong-un's accompanying data. While official status changes take time to confirm, local accompanying data can be measured in real-time. It is important to know who accompanied Kim Jong-un during his local inspections and who he kept by his side. Local inspections involve long-distance travel, which creates conditions for opportunities for policy discussions or agenda-setting power.

I cross-verified other materials based on the database of Kim Jong-un's public activities analyzed by the Korea Institute for National Unification. The coding was divided into Hong elites and Zhen elites, based on the actual functions and expertise they have performed in their careers, as well as their main duties at the time. I estimated the proportion of Hong elites over a total of 13 months of panel data, six months before and after the announcement.

This should be understood as exploratory patterns rather than results with perfect statistical rigor. The hypotheses are as follows: first, to see if elite changes accompany policy announcements in a top-down decision-making process. Second, to examine whether the proportion of Hong elites in the elite group changes before the announcement, which is an upward hypothesis. Lastly, the third hypothesis is a mixed form of the two, examining whether continuous power-sharing exists.

Analysis of elite dynamics by major policy decision phases

In conclusion, I examined four major policy decision phases in North Korea: the simultaneous pursuit of economic and nuclear power construction, the total concentration on socialist economic construction, the frontal breakthrough, and the legalization of nuclear power. The patterns vary significantly according to each policy. The graph above the red line indicates a high proportion of Hong elites, while the negative part indicates an increase in the proportion of Zhen elites. During the simultaneous pursuit of economic and nuclear power construction, a high proportion of Hong elites was observed throughout the entire period. Notably, the proportion of Hong elites was statistically significantly higher than that of Zhen elites from six months before the policy announcement to three months after.

Interestingly, in the total concentration on socialist economic construction, the proportion of Zhen elites was significantly higher from six months before the policy announcement, and after about three months post-decision, the proportion of Hong elites began to rise. This can be interpreted as a signal that the economic focus in 2018 was aligned with inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summit diplomacy, indicating a shift in direction. In the case of the frontal breakthrough, the Zhen elites were somewhat dominant before the policy announcement, but from three months after the announcement, the proportion shifted towards Hong elites. During the negotiation dynamics, the technocrat Zhen elites led the agenda, and as the deadlock began, the ruling forces were reorganized to strengthen regime cohesion, resulting in an increase in the proportion of Hong elites.

Finally, in the case of the legalization of nuclear power, no statistically significant changes were observed before and after the announcement. Overall, two points can be stated with certainty: first, the structural dominance of Hong elites has persisted overall. It is very rare for Zhen elites to surpass Hong elites in most periods, and generally, the proportion of Hong elites is much higher.

Academic and policy implications of research findings

However, it can be noted that in economic-oriented phases or phases of economic concentration, the emergence of Zhen elites is pronounced. From an academic perspective, the implications suggest that North Korea's behavior cannot be fully explained by simple leader-centric determinism. The North Korean regime exhibits phases where the importance of elites as actors transcending leader-centric determinism is emphasized, depending on the context and surrounding environment. Additionally, the nature of policies differentiates dynamics, indicating that depending on the nature of the policy, either Hong elites, Zhen elites, or both may have no influence.

Suggestions for evidence-based approaches and expert training

The results suggest that policy announcements may not be the starting point for changes in North Korean behavior, but rather the result. In terms of policy recommendations, I would like to mention three points. The first is the need for an evidence-based approach. As mentioned at the beginning, if previous North Korea policies were based on so-called hopeful thinking to understand and analyze North Korea, it is now necessary to understand North Korea as an entity based on objective signal analysis. This is the first recommendation I would like to make regarding North Korea policy. The second is the need to cultivate specialized personnel who can accurately interpret these signals. It is essential to train North Korea experts who not only possess knowledge about the region but are also proficient in quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and who can clearly recognize the issues and limitations in identifying such information.

Lastly, the third point is the expansion of data infrastructure. I conducted an analysis of public activities, and it is necessary to continue standardizing, accumulating, and publicly disclosing not only this data but also data related to personnel, media, and education. I believe that a cooperative system among research institutions, government agencies, and academia is essential in this process.

In future research, I plan to expand the time window to rigorously organize the results found in this study. Finally, I would like to say that while inter-Korean relations currently appear to be in a state of permanent severance, I personally believe that the winter of severance may be long but will not last forever. What we need to prepare for at this stage is to read the upcoming spring turning point and develop the capacity to respond to it. I believe this is the most proactive task we should undertake now, and I will conclude my presentation.

Thank you.