[Korea's North Korea Strategy] Vol. 1: A Theoretical Discourse on the 'Korean Peninsula Individualization' Strategy: The Demise of North Korea's Security-Legitimacy Dilemma and South Korea's Mid-to-Long-Term North Korea Strategy

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RezKM0uzXlg&si=IhkJLoYTmM-gFZaR

Video Transcript

Hello. I am Oh In-hwan, the Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute. As I considered the order of presentations with the director, I thought it might be better to present at the beginning rather than at the end, as doing so would place the burden on me to comprehensively integrate the high-quality presentations of Professor Kim Taek-bin, Professor Lee Jong-min, and Dr. Choi In-ho. I lacked confidence in that regard. Therefore, I would like to propose a significant idea.

The Dilemma of Security Legitimacy in North Korea and Strategic Realignment

I have titled this 'The Strategy of Individualization on the Korean Peninsula.' It is a theory, and I will strive to elaborate on it further if you provide good feedback. I have prepared this in two parts: diagnosis and prescription. Over the past 30 years, in explaining North Korea's foreign policy, I would like to first mention that there has been a dilemma of security legitimacy from the perspective of someone who specializes in security, and that North Korea's efforts to address this have persisted for 30 years. However, it seems that this dilemma of security legitimacy has been discarded. North Korea appears to be focusing on security by further strengthening its nuclear capabilities. The reason it is a dilemma is that creating a nuclear program and continuously developing nuclear weapons for security will inevitably lead to sustained sanctions, and if that happens, the substantial legitimacy derived from economic achievements, as demonstrated by China or Vietnam, will inevitably weaken.

North Korea is aware of this, and when it makes concessions regarding its nuclear program, it has made significant efforts to offset this through the normalization of relations with the United States. Although it has been limited, it has indeed been within that dilemma. However, it seems that this has been discarded. In light of this significant strategic realignment in North Korea, I have contemplated what we should do, which led me to consider the 'Strategy of Individualization on the Korean Peninsula.'

The Concept and Necessity of the Strategy of Individualization on the Korean Peninsula

We should think of the Korean Peninsula as a single large unit. To be more specific, even if we keep the name of the Ministry of Unification, we could consider it as a 'Ministry of Korean Peninsula Strategy' in practical terms. Given the strengthening of relations between North Korea and China, as well as between North Korea and Russia, it is necessary to enhance the roles within the Ministry of Unification that deal with North Korea-Russia relations or North Korea-China relations, as previously, the focus was on inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. relations. I believe it is necessary to set the Korean Peninsula as a single unit in this context.

I will discuss the theoretical aspects further later. If we look closely at the fundamental aspects of the abandonment of the security legitimacy dilemma, I believe there were two premises. These are the two basic premises of North Korea's foreign policy and the fundamental policies we have responded to. Ultimately, North Korea has sought to confirm signals regarding the normalization of relations with the United States when making concessions on nuclear weapons. When the U.S. provides some signals regarding the normalization of relations, North Korea may be willing to make some concessions on its nuclear program, and there was an assumption that if this were provided, it could move toward long-term denuclearization. The second premise is that whether it is nuclear unification, agreed unification, or a federation, we have planned our North Korea policy with the vision of unification, but this has also unfolded in a situation that is no longer acceptable from North Korea's perspective.

As an alternative to this, North Korea has been tightening its ties with Russia, and there has been a situation where the triangular cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia is linked. The concessions on North Korea's nuclear program have been made as leaders like Kim Jong-un and the elite have been exploring the reliability of U.S. commitments with long-term calculations to address domestic political pressures and issues of substantial legitimacy. Decisions regarding concessions on nuclear weapons have occurred when the reliability of U.S. commitments was assured. Therefore, the basic premise of normalizing relations with the U.S. was not merely a carrot; it has acted as a substitute for the weakening of security through nuclear deterrence.

Domestic pressures can be seen as almost constant, and it can be observed that North Korea's policy decisions have been significantly influenced by the reliability of U.S. commitments. Since 1994, the light water reactor project has been the most institutionalized and has demonstrated a technically institutionalized level of commitment reliability. According to a paper by Chris Lawrence, if North Korea had only considered compensation for energy issues in 1994 and 1995, building fossil fuel power plants would have been much more efficient. However, North Korea continued to demand light water reactors, which ultimately required intervention from the Western world, despite the need for continuous inspections and technical cooperation. They stubbornly insisted on light water reactors instead of choosing coal-fired power plants.

The reason for this was the need for a physical commitment from the U.S., as the U.S. could turn back at any time. From an international relations perspective, the relationship between North Korea and the U.S. is highly asymmetric, and the U.S. is a country that would not suffer significant damage regardless of North Korea's actions. Therefore, North Korea has operated its nuclear program as a form of political hedge, but because the U.S. could withdraw at any time, North Korea demanded the establishment of a physical and technical institutionalization in the form of light water reactors, calculating that this would compel the U.S. to engage in the long term. This is Chris Lawrence's argument, and I believe it holds validity.

Thus, after about 7 or 8 years, it collapsed. The collapse occurred when the U.S. raised issues related to North Korea's nuclear materials in 2002, and although there were the September 19 Agreement and the February 13 Agreement afterward, the imposition of financial sanctions on North Korea at Banco Delta Asia in Macau right after the September 19 Agreement damaged the situation. Therefore, from North Korea's perspective, the reliability of U.S. commitments was not very high, as the light water reactor project provided the most decisive positive commitment reliability. I believe this significantly influenced North Korea's decision-making. Professor Victor Cha acknowledges this but argues that North Korea never intended to draw back. If that is the case, then this dual-track approach of nuclear and economic development occurred in 2013, and later shifted to a focus on economic development during the North-South and North-U.S. talks in 2017 and 2018, only to return to nuclear issues after the Hanoi summit. This oscillation is not easily explained. If they were solely pursuing nuclear capabilities, they could have focused on that from the beginning; it raises the question of why they needed to exhibit such oscillation for 30 years.

I believe that the cumulative crises, credibility crises, and U.S. credibility crises reached a critical point in 2019. Kim Jong-un reportedly stated in his diplomatic correspondence that he has no intention of attacking South Korea or starting a war. He truly does not think that way. As will be evident in the presentations of Professor Kim Taek-bin and Professor Lee Jong-min, North Korea's nuclear concessions manifest in the international context. The introduction of market economy mechanisms was significantly implemented from 2012 to 2016, and from 2013 to 2019, the dynamics of the elite also exhibited fluctuations.

Imperfect Sovereignty and Pre-Individualized Quasi-Stability

If we combine our foreign policy towards North Korea, domestic economic policy, and the dynamics of the elite up to 2019, we can observe a back-and-forth movement in one direction. I believe this 30-year pendulum movement has ultimately concluded in 2019. The term 'individualization' may be somewhat difficult, but I recall that the director mentioned the concept of 'imperfect sovereignty theory' while explaining the theory of East Asian states. We are well aware that both North and South Korea are in a state of sovereign deficit, and the same applies to China and Taiwan.

Constitutionally, Taiwan has a legitimate regime that governs all of mainland China, but this is not the case in reality, and the same applies to our country and North Korea. The People's Republic of China is also in a similar situation. Japan, due to its pacifist constitution, cannot maintain a military, thus cannot be considered a fully sovereign state, and all East Asian countries are in a state of imperfect sovereignty. Because of this imperfect sovereignty, they have not entered into an anarchic state among fully sovereign states. This is essentially the theory.

I believe this connects significantly with the concept of 'individual' as discussed by Gilbert Simondon. That is, they have not become individuals yet. We are still in a state of not having become individuals, but there is a concept of 'pre-individual quasi-stability.' Simondon does not view this as a negative concept; rather, he sees it as a state of full potential. It is a state where potential energy has not yet been manifested, and there are two incompatible elements that can become individualized when specific conditions and shocks are applied. A concrete example from physics or chemistry is crystallization. I have included a photo later, and I believe the state of imperfect sovereignty described by the director is similar to the pre-individual state discussed by Simondon. Simondon views the pre-individual state as a state of full potential energy.

Therefore, it is not negative but positive, and it can be seen as a state that can become individualized at any time if certain conditions are met. An example of a supersaturated solution can illustrate this. If we take this analogy, we can introduce desired substances into the supersaturated solution. If the current state is in a state of imperfect sovereignty, we can plant decision seeds in the individual environment that we desire. Thus, we can think that these decision seeds can be guided to individualize in the direction we want when specific conditions arise.

To provide a more concrete example, crystallization occurs in a supersaturated solution. Many incompatible substances are present in a supersaturated solution. In this state, various seed crystals can be introduced, and when specific external shocks or internal condition changes occur, crystallization happens. At this point, the formation of crystals can be seen as individualization. If we view the Korean Peninsula as a large individual, we can say that individualization has not yet occurred, and crystallization has not taken place, but we are living within a state of pre-individual quasi-stability. This is an example. The most familiar example is a liquid hot pack. In winter, it is in a supersaturated solution state, and when a specific click is made, crystallization occurs, leading to individualization. It becomes hot ice.

The transition from a liquid state to a solid state occurs without anything being created from nothing; rather, it is the manifestation of the energy that was inherent in the supersaturated solution. The liquid state transforms into a solid state. This is what I refer to as the concepts of crystallization and individualization. If we consider the principle of hand warmers that utilize the properties of supersaturated states, where a small shock instantly transforms the liquid into solid while releasing heat, this can be seen as an example of individualization and crystallization from the perspectives of physical science or chemistry.

Specific Application Measures for the Strategy of Individualization on the Korean Peninsula

What will happen when we bring this to the Korean Peninsula? As I mentioned at the beginning, would it not be better to set the still incomplete Korean Peninsula as a single individual state? If the Ministry of Unification has been focusing on North Korea relations or North Korea-U.S. relations until now, it might be necessary to expand its role to include tasks related to North Korea-China relations, as well as research and activities related to North Korea-Russia relations, while also considering a more expanded form of tasks such as lobbying towards the U.S. and Japan. Recently, North Korea has placed the United Front Department under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as of February this year. It was thought to have been disbanded, but it has changed to the 10th Bureau and was reduced to 10 bureaus in the 2024 Central Committee. I believe it is a foreign leadership bureau, and its name has come under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The United Front Department, which previously managed relations with South Korea, has now come under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If we view the Korean Peninsula as a single unit through the lens of individualization rather than merely responding, we can consider North Korea as part of the Global South. If we increase our points of contact with North Korea without directly engaging in dialogue, we can think about development cooperation and AI support for the Global South, which North Korea could also be included in as we strategize.

Recently, North Korea placed its United Front Department under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February of this year. I thought it had been disbanded, but it was changed to the 10th Bureau and was reduced to 10 bureaus at the 2024 Central Committee meeting. I believe it is considered a foreign leadership bureau, and its name has come under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The United Front Department, which previously managed relations with South Korea, has now come under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If we view the Korean Peninsula as a single unit with the concept of individualization, North Korea can be seen as part of the Global South. If we consider increasing points of contact with North Korea, even if we do not directly engage in dialogue with North Korea, we can think about development cooperation and AI cooperation support for the Global South, and North Korea could be included in that strategy.

This can be considered from a macro perspective, and from a micro perspective, I view inter-Korean relations as a pre-individualized tense relationship. A pre-individualized relationship is one with a primary stability. There are two incompatible elements, but it is a state of full potential, and specific conditions and shocks may change the internal dynamics of the elite. Alternatively, if the qualitative growth of the North Korean economy halts, and the elites feel that it is not desirable to continue with an economy that does not grow qualitatively, changes may occur. Externally, with the spread and diffusion of AI, South Korea is moving in that direction, as are the U.S. and China. However, if North Korea remains in a completely isolated state, while discussing AI, automation, translation, and gaming, it will not survive under international AI pressures. I thought that these dimensions could be positively described as a state of full potential.

I have about 20 seconds left, and I believe I have conveyed most of what I wanted to say. I think it is necessary to plant decision seeds in various areas.

Future Scenarios and Implications of the Individualization Strategy

We cannot predict when and how shocks and changes will occur. It could be a change among North Korean elites, a reassessment of the North Korean economy, or various structural pressures such as external AI pressures, the collapse or reorganization of relationships, or the restructuring of U.S.-China relations. When these shocks and changes occur, even if not immediately, we need to consider ways to channel them in a direction favorable to South Korea and the entire Korean Peninsula in the medium to long term. There are four scenarios: A represents the current state, while B represents a very low probability state. What we can think of more creatively is the partial recovery of the legitimacy dilemma. In particular, it may recover partially due to the reassessment of elites, and when a technological bifurcation occurs globally due to AI structural pressures, there may be external pressures. At that time, we need to prepare for it to be advantageous for South Korea and the Korean Peninsula.

We should not set a singular form of unification but rather strive to understand individualization and the individual itself. Individualization is real, and the process of becoming individualized is the essence. It is through individualization from a state of pre-individual quasi-stability that we become individuals; it is not the case that individuals exist a priori and that individualization or unification occurs artificially or forcibly. This is the key insight. Therefore, I believe it is important to plant many decision seeds that can lead to individualization and crystallization of the Korean Peninsula in the medium to long term.

With that, I will conclude my presentation.