[Special Commentary on the US-Iran War] ⑤ The Post-US-Iran War International Order: China's Vision and Strategy

I. Introduction

The US-Iran War, contrary to US expectations, has become prolonged, inflicting complex shocks not only on military conflicts in the Middle East but also on the US-led international order, alliance systems, global energy supply chains, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. China's Xi Jinping government also views this war not as a mere regional conflict, but as a significant event with profound implications for the transitional international order, revealing the functioning and limitations of US hegemony. Since the latter half of 2025, China has been mentioning the decline of US hegemony and has begun proposing practical transactional negotiations with the US from a position of equality to establish a stable coexistence relationship.

In this context, the sudden US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, followed by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, have undoubtedly become an unexpected and significant challenge for China as well. In the early stages of the war, China focused internally on securing stable energy and logistics supply, while externally advocating for a mediator role and urging a swift end to the war. However, as the war has become prolonged, it has caused unforeseen repercussions on the international order and US-China relations, leading China into complex strategic considerations. Therefore, this article will first, summarize China's perception and assessment of the US-Iran War; second, analyze China's expectations and predictions regarding changes in the international order after the war; and third, based on this, examine the characteristics and limitations of China's diplomatic vision and strategy for constructing a new order.

II. China's Perception and Assessment of the US-Iran War

1. The Failure of the US in the Iran War: Structural Causes

The United States and Israel identified Iran's nuclear weapons development and support for terrorism as major security threats, using these as justifications for the war. However, China views these claims not as the root causes of the war, but as pretexts to legitimize military action. China assesses that the US aimed not only to weaken Iran's military capabilities through the war but also to reshape the Middle Eastern order in favor of the US and Israel by instigating regime change in Iran.

China evaluates the US airstrikes on Iran as a reckless act characterized by 'three lacks' (lack of preparation for prolonged conflict, lack of prior consultation with European and Middle Eastern allies, and lack of political and military exit strategies), which underestimated Iran's strong resistance (廖百智 唐志超 陈文鑫 陆如泉 陈庆鸿. 2026). This assessment aligns with Foreign Minister Wang Yi's remarks at the Two Sessions press conference in March 2026, stating that the US-Iran War was a 'war that should not have happened' (中华人民共和国外交部. 2026). In essence, the US underestimated Iran's resistance capabilities and overestimated its own military power, attempting to apply the so-called 'Venezuela model' to Iran—removing leadership and achieving regime change through a short, decisive military action—but instead became mired in a protracted war of attrition. China assesses that this has led to heightened international instability and uncertainty, causing significant chaos and shock to the international order.

China argues that the US's lack of preparation and misjudgment were not merely tactical failures but stemmed from structural causes that revealed the functioning and limitations of US hegemony. Specifically, China believes that the unilateralism, protectionism, and hegemonism that China has long criticized, implicitly targeting the US without direct naming, ultimately led to this failed war. Consequently, it has further exposed the reality of the erosion of US international credibility and alliance networks, and China argues that this is promoting the multipolarization of the international order, which China has consistently advocated for.

As if waiting for this moment, the Chinese State Council published the so-called Global Governance White Paper in June, titled 'Building a Fairer and More Reasonable Global Governance System: China's Vision, Proposals, and Actions' (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2026). The white paper argues that the current international crisis stems from unilateralism, protectionism, hegemonism, and exclusive bloc politics. Furthermore, the white paper criticizes great powers for using force to oppress smaller nations, resorting to armed force against sovereign states, and undermining international justice with self-interest and double standards. It also identifies the politicization, instrumentalization, and weaponization of economic and trade issues, as well as the abuse of unilateral sanctions and extraterritorial jurisdiction, as causes of global chaos. Although the US is not directly named, China is essentially seizing the opportunity of the US's attack on Iran and the failure of the war to criticize US hegemonic unilateralism while expressing hopeful expectations for the decline of hegemony.

2. Erosion of Trust in US Hegemony and Weakening of Alliance Networks

China emphasizes the erosion of credibility in US hegemony as the most significant outcome of the war, more so than material losses. While the US aimed to maintain and strengthen its influence in the Middle East at minimal cost, it has instead suffered a decisive loss in the form of diminished trust in its hegemony and weakened alliance cohesion. In fact, despite Trump's strong pressure, Britain, France, and Germany did not participate in the military strikes or escort operations, and France refused airspace passage for US arms shipments to Israel. Italy and Spain refused to allow the US to use their bases for attacks on Iran. The US not only saw its international credibility and alliance mobilization capacity weaken but also experienced disruptions to its global strategy, which aimed to focus on China and Russia by redirecting military forces deployed in Europe and the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Notably, despite relying on the US security umbrella, Gulf states became primary targets of Iranian attacks during the war. Although not directly involved in the conflict, the Gulf states suffered immense military, economic, and humanitarian damage and became dissatisfied with the lack of sufficient prior consultation with the US regarding military actions that directly affected their security. Disagreements between the US and Israel over attack targets and ultimate objectives also widened, leading the war into a state of extreme confusion with no clear exit strategy. China is actively highlighting the dysfunctional aspects of the alliance system, demonstrating that a US-led alliance system can become a 'fuse' for war rather than a security umbrella.

Furthermore, this war, characterized by precision strikes and AI-driven warfare, has further increased the risks of alliance entanglement and escalation. China also emphasizes that this situation has raised doubts about the sustainability of strategies aimed at securing absolute security through traditional military alliances. Consequently, it suggests the possibility that US allies and friendly nations, including Gulf states, may expand their strategic autonomy by strengthening their self-defense capabilities and diversifying their foreign relations. Based on this, China emphasizes that while the war's failure may not lead to a rapid decline in US hegemonic influence, it has confirmed a significant weakening of the credibility of US security commitments and its ability to manage alliances.

Moreover, China claims to have confirmed through this war that the nature of US hegemony itself is changing. The US is transforming from a nation that builds and maintains the international order to one that subverts it and produces risks. China portrays the US as no longer a guardian of the order providing global public goods, but as a predatory hegemonic power that creates new risks in the energy, supply chain, food, science and technology, and cyber domains, and shifts the costs onto its allies and the international community. The Chinese academic community views the theory of hegemonic stability, which claims to ensure world order and peace, as having lost its persuasiveness following this war.

China anticipates that the US will have to pay a higher price to restore the credibility of its hegemony, which has been further damaged by the war. China believes the US may face a choice between investing greater military, economic, and diplomatic resources than before to rebuild its hegemony, or gradually reducing its hegemonic role due to the inability to bear these costs. However, China acknowledges that the US still possesses overwhelming military power, extensive alliance networks, and financial, technological, and institutional influence. Therefore, China is formulating its response strategy with an emphasis on the gradual progression of a multipolar international order and the relative weakening of the US-centric unipolar order over a long period.

III. Characteristics of China's Vision and Strategy for the International Order

1. Strengthening Leadership in Global Governance Reform Discourse

China is seizing the US failure in the US-Iran War as an opportunity to actively disseminate its vision of global norms and discourse. China argues that the US-led order, centered on hegemonic politics and military alliances, is declining, and that the global governance vision it proposes can serve as an alternative. China's global governance vision, presented in the white paper, attempts to differentiate itself from the existing US-led international order by emphasizing five core principles: sovereign equality, adherence to international law, multilateralism, a people-centered approach, and a focus on effectiveness.

China portrays the US as a reckless hegemonic power that prioritizes its own interests and pursues unilateralism, while contrasting itself as a reliable manager that values stability and order and aims for a multilateral system. Furthermore, China actively showcases itself as a responsible great power contributing to the maintenance of an international order based on international law and a UN-centered multilateral system, as well as to peace and development. While proposing a 'constructive strategic stable relationship' with the US in bilateral relations to delay or circumvent direct power conflicts and manage them stably, China is aggressively disseminating diplomatic discourse and visions to the international community to persuade them of the legitimacy of a China-centric international order and the relative decline of the US.

2. Undermining the US Alliance Network

China has long recognized the US alliance network as a key structure that constrains its rise. Compared to the US, China has a limited number of allies and close friendly nations, and lacks the means to counter the military, technological, and economic containment deployed by the US through its alliance network. Therefore, the distrust and gaps revealed between the US and its allies during the US-Iran War are perceived by China as a crucial strategic opportunity that cannot be missed. China anticipates that if the cohesion between the US and its allies weakens, containment against China will ease not only in core security areas like the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea but also in advanced technology, economic trade, and global governance, thereby expanding China's strategic space. The reason China emphasizes multipolarization and global governance reform is not only to present a normative alternative but also to weaken the cohesion of the US-centric alliance structure and create a new structure to counter it.

In practice, rather than directly confronting and escalating competition with the US, China is concentrating its diplomatic efforts on Europe, ASEAN, the Global South, and multilateral institutions to build what it calls a 'China-led multipolar order' through extensive and broad diplomacy. Starting with French President Macron in December 2025, China is actively and shrewdly capitalizing on the backlash against the Trump administration's unilateralism by pursuing a series of summit meetings in early 2026 with leaders of traditional US allies and friendly nations such as South Korea, Ireland, Canada, Finland, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Germany.

Furthermore, to advance a multipolar order, China is leading global governance reform and strengthening practical solidarity with Global South countries. For example, China officially launched the International Mediation Agency (国际调解院), the first intergovernmental international organization for resolving international disputes through mediation, on May 30, 2025, with its founding agreement entering into force on August 29. The International Mediation Agency aims for the peaceful resolution of international disputes and cooperation among 'Global South' countries, spearheaded by China. Additionally, China is concretizing its intention to secure leadership in industrial standards and norms in future advanced industries such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), the digital economy, and green low-carbon development, which are governance blind spots. China has also proposed the establishment of the 'World AI Cooperation Organization' (世界人工智能合作组织). China's strategic judgment is that by avoiding direct confrontation with the US through these indirect methods, it can effectively counter and respond to the US in the long run.

3. Seeking Expansion of Maritime Power for Energy Security and Logistics Supply Chain Stability

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, disruption of transport, rising energy prices, and the global economic downturn were unexpected shocks to China's economy, which is highly dependent on external trade. China possesses coal as its basic energy source and a final safety net, and it also has world-class competitiveness in renewable energy. It absorbed some of the initial shock of the war through oil and gas reserves and diversification of import sources. Nevertheless, China is re-recognizing the need for long-term diversification of crude oil import routes and stable securing of key maritime chokepoints and logistics routes, and is discussing countermeasures. China may concurrently strengthen its land-based energy transport networks and its capacity to protect maritime transport routes. It also seeks to secure economic and strategic benefits from the accelerated energy transition after the war by leveraging its industrial competitiveness in solar power, wind power, electric vehicles, and batteries.

On March 16, the Communist Party's theoretical journal 'Qiushi' (求是) republished remarks on maritime affairs made by President Xi Jinping at the Central Finance and Economics Commission meeting in July 2025, such as 'We must walk the path of a maritime power with Chinese characteristics' (《求是》杂志编辑部. 2026) and 'We must complete the cooperation mechanism with countries along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road' (习近平. 2026), following the outbreak of the US-Iran War. While Xi Jinping presented 'maritime power' as an important national agenda early in his tenure in 2012, public mentions decreased as tensions and conflicts with the US in maritime areas escalated. His recent emphasis on this agenda during the US-Iran War warrants attention. China's rapid naval expansion, including aircraft carriers, suggests the possibility of more active projection of military power to overseas port facilities, which have been limited to rotational deployments in Djibouti and the Gulf of Aden. It is also necessary to monitor the series of measures China is taking to strengthen its maritime control after the US-Iran War, which could trigger a naval arms race.

IV. Limitations of China's Vision and Strategy for the International Order

1. Limitations of China's Middle East Diplomacy and Mediation Capacity

Although China advocates for the reform of the global governance system and showcases its status as a globally responsible power, its role and influence have been exposed as limited in the current situation where the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has caused significant disruption to global energy supply. Similar to the Russia-Ukraine War, China has been unable to play a substantive mediation role in the US-Iran War, beyond issuing normative diplomatic rhetoric calling for peace and negotiations. Despite repeatedly presenting four principles from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—immediate cessation of military action, return to dialogue and negotiation, opposition to unilateral acts, and prevention of war escalation—it has not been able to act as a substantive mediator beyond these.

Instead of stepping in as a mediator, China has largely maintained a wait-and-see attitude, refraining from deep involvement in the conflict. Just as China minimized substantive military cooperation with Russia during the Russia-Ukraine War to consider European sensitivities, it has cautiously and indirectly provided military support to Iran, its traditional ally in the Middle East, while considering its relations with the US and pro-US Gulf states in the region.

China expresses its support for Iran within the framework of reaffirming the principled justifications it has consistently advocated for, such as the spirit of the UN, non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. For example, China pointed out that the US and Israeli military attack on Iran without UN Security Council approval was a clear violation of international law and condemned indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians and non-military targets. Furthermore, regarding the election of Mojtaba Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader of Iran, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson emphasized opposition to external interference in internal affairs and respect for Iran's sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, stating it was a decision made according to the constitution.

China has also minimized direct confrontation with the US, despite increasing points of friction due to recent events like the Venezuela and Iran wars. China is proceeding cautiously, seeking to avoid provoking the US and expanding conflict fronts over the war issue, given that it must negotiate complex issues such as tariffs, technology controls, and the Taiwan issue with the US. This reveals China's limitation as a great power focused on protecting its national interests, rather than a 'responsible great power' capable of acting decisively in critical situations. China's foreign strategy continues to prioritize balancing relationships, managing external risks, and expanding overseas markets while maintaining strategic ambiguity, making it difficult to characterize as the diplomatic approach of a full-fledged order-leading power.

2. Limitations of Leading the International Order Through Norms and Discourse

While China actively disseminates arguments and discourse on the multipolarization of the international order and global governance reform, it is not actively pursuing concrete actions to lead an alternative international order. The norms and diplomatic discourse it presents also prioritize creating an international environment conducive to the security and rise of the Chinese system. For instance, the 'multipolarization of the world on the basis of equality and order, and an open, inclusive, and balanced economic globalization'—a representative global norm and vision that China has consistently emphasized on the diplomatic stage—inherently aims to create conditions and an environment for revitalizing external economic cooperation while circumventing or breaking through US containment and pressure. China's role in areas of global public goods that an order-leading power should provide, such as resolving international disputes, ensuring navigational safety, stabilizing energy markets, and providing large-scale humanitarian assistance, remains limited.

The white paper published in June, perhaps conscious of the assessment that China is weak in providing international public goods as a responsible power, enumerates specific public goods provided by China. However, the international public goods China offers are concentrated in areas crucial for strengthening China's future national competitiveness and securing leadership, such as AI, cyber, maritime, polar, space, and climate change. It is questionable whether these can be fully accepted by the international community as examples of public good provision.

Simply criticizing US unilateralism and presenting alternative norms is insufficient to legitimize China's vision for the international order. For China to be recognized by the international community as a new responsible power, as it emphasizes itself, it must demonstrate concrete and predictable policies, institutional transparency, cost-bearing, and crisis management capabilities beyond presenting principles and norms. China still shows a limitation of seeking strategic benefits from the decline of the US while minimizing the costs required to fill the resulting vacuum.

3. Persistence of US Hegemonic Capabilities and Caution Regarding Hegemonic Competition

China's global vision is predicated on the relative decline of US hegemony, yet the US still retains influence over global military projection capabilities, alliance networks, the dollar-centric financial system, advanced technology ecosystems, and international institutions. China is wary that although US hegemony is declining, the US still surpasses China in areas like advanced technology and military power, and is determined to control China's development. China is concerned that the US, to overcome its weakening hegemony, may concentrate strategic resources on core areas essential for maintaining hegemony rather than global expansion, and implement 'targeted containment' against major strategic competitors.

China also recognizes that the failure of the US in a specific war does not automatically guarantee the establishment of a China-centric order. China aims to accumulate its economic, technological, and diplomatic capabilities over the long term by increasing the costs of US hegemony, weakening alliance cohesion, and spreading the discourse of multipolarization. While China's long-term strategy is prudent and realistic, its influence may remain limited to certain regions and sectors if it fails to gain international trust and institutional leadership.

4. Domestic Constraints and Selective Engagement

China's domestic political and economic situation constrains its expansion of external roles. The current challenges faced by the Xi Jinping government, including slowing growth, youth unemployment, sluggish domestic demand, and mounting debt, make it difficult to sustain investment in external policy resources. The Xi Jinping government must not only minimize confrontation and conflict with the Trump administration but also overcome US trade and technology controls to focus internally on economic structural reform, revitalization, and technological self-reliance.

Notably, President Xi Jinping faces the significant political task of securing a fourth term through the 21st Party Congress in 2027. While there appear to be no major obstacles to Xi Jinping securing a fourth term, it is necessary for him to achieve economic recovery and development to gain strong support and ensure a stable re-election, thereby laying the foundation for long-term rule. In essence, the stable launch and success of the 15.5 Plan, commencing in 2026, are linked to the stability and fourth term of the Xi Jinping regime, making it realistic to prioritize domestic economic recovery. Consequently, China intends to selectively engage, focusing on areas directly related to its own security and development, rather than unnecessarily expanding the front of competition with the US.

This selective engagement is a rational strategy that reduces costs and risks in the short term, but it may widen the gap between China's claims of being a responsible great power and its actual actions in the long run. In particular, maintaining friendly relations with all major actors in the Middle East while evading decisive responsibility offers diplomatic flexibility but also leaves questions about China's security commitments and mediation capabilities.

V. Conclusion

China's perception of a US-Iran war can be summarized in three points. First, the war was an unjust military action caused by American unilateralism and hegemony, and the US attempt to reshape the Middle East order ultimately failed due to misjudgment and insufficient preparation. Second, the war exposed and accelerated the reality of weakened international trust in American hegemony and its alliance network. This has led to hopeful prospects for the multipolarization of the international order and the promotion of strategic autonomy for various countries. Third, while these changes provide diplomatic space for China, China seeks to leverage these opportunities through low-cost discourse competition and selective engagement rather than fully bearing the costs of hegemony, due to domestic and international constraints.

Although China perceives the decline of US hegemony, it does not immediately seek to transform this into an opportunity to build a US-led international order. While China strongly asserts the fragility and weakening of US hegemony, it is also fully aware of its own inherent structural vulnerabilities. China seeks to build an image of a responsible great power distinct from the US by emphasizing reforms in global governance, multipolarization, UN-centeredness, adherence to international law, and sovereign equality, but it remains cautious about mediating conflicts, providing international public goods, and bearing security costs. This stems from domestic political and economic vulnerabilities, the US's hegemonic capabilities, and wariness of prematurely entering into full-fledged hegemonic competition. Therefore, China's strategy involves leveraging the space created by the relative decline of the US through low-cost diplomacy and discourse competition, while simultaneously pursuing a gradualist strategy to manage risks in core areas such as energy security, supply chain stability, and the Taiwan issue.

Ultimately, China intends to prioritize strengthening its internal capabilities to prepare for a long-term competition with the US, that is, ensuring regime security and domestic development. Whether China can emerge as a leader of the international order in the future depends not only on the further decline of the US but also on China's ability to provide international public goods, mediate crises, and translate its normative claims into consistent actions. ■

References

Editorial Department of Qiushi Magazine. 2026. “Taking the Path of Strengthening the Navy with Chinese Characteristics.” *Qiushi*, Issue 6 (March 15).

Xi Jinping. 2026. “Promoting High-Quality Development of the Marine Economy.” *Qiushi*, Issue 6 (March 15).

Liao Baizhi, Tang Zhichao, Chen Wenxin, Lu Quanquan, and Chen Qinghong. 2026. “The US-Iran War: Middle Eastern Geopolitical Games and Global Impacts.” *Journal of Contemporary International Relations*, Issue 4 (April 20).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2026. “Wang Yi on the Situation in Iran: Ceasefire and Stop Hostilities, Restore Peace to the Middle East and the World.” March 8.https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202603/t20260308_11870443.shtml

The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2026. More Just and Equitable Global Governance: China’s Principles, Proposals and Actions. June.

■Lee Dong-ryulProfessor, Department of Chinese Language and Literature, Dongduk Women's University.

■ Responsible for and Edited by: Lee Sang-junEAI Researcher
Contact: 82-2-2277-1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr