The Inter-Korean Border Redrawn by Kim Yo-jong: The 'Borderization' of the DMZ Has Begun
Executive Summary
Kim Yo-jong’s consecutive statements should not be viewed as targeting only the individual DMZ landmine incident. Rather, they represent a structural consequence of applying the 'two hostile states' theory—formalized during the December 2023 Plenary Meeting—to the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) issue as a whole. By redefining the MDL as a national border, North Korea has framed its landmine laying and fence construction as sovereign border management activities. Under this framework, admitting responsibility or participating in border negotiations would contradict their premise that border demarcation is not open to negotiation. North Korea's stance of blocking contact channels with the South is highly likely to persist for the time being. Consequently, businesses and the government need to re-evaluate risks near the MDL through the lens of an interstate border dispute rather than the framework of the Armistice Agreement.
I. Analysis of the Current Issue
North Korea's Strategy toward the South through Kim Yo-jong's Statements: Reaffirming the DMZ Landmine Incident and the 'Two Hostile States' Theory
1. Background and Developments
A landmine explosion in the western sector of the DMZ in September resulted in serious and minor injuries to three South Korean soldiers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced its interim investigation findings on September 28, stating that there was a very high probability that North Korean landmines were the cause of the explosion [1]. On the same day, Minister of National Defense Kang Shin-chul defined the incident as a 'clear violation of the Armistice Agreement' during a session of the National Assembly's National Defense Committee [19].
North Korea's response was swift. On September 29, Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), issued a statement titled 'The Instigators of the Provocation Must Be Prepared to Pay the Price for Their Self-Staged Farce' [8]. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) released this statement on September 30 [1][8]. Compared to the 2015 wooden-box landmine incident, where North Korea issued a denial statement under the name of the National Defense Commission's Policy Department four days later, both the speed of the response and the status of the spokesperson have been elevated [1]. The Hankyoreh interpreted this as an attempt to preemptively block the spread of allegations holding North Korea responsible and to continue its border fortification work [1].
This statement is an extension of the policy shift formalized during the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK in December 2023. At the time, General Secretary Kim Jong-un defined inter-Korean relations as 'relations between two hostile states, two belligerents in a state of war' [3][5][7]. In his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in January 2024, he went so far as to present a policy to 'completely occupy, subjugate, and reclaim the Republic of Korea' in the event of war [3][7]. This policy shift, which effectively discarded the discourses of peaceful unification and federal unification, was not an impromptu declaration but a gradually accumulated policy stance [7].
2. Current Situation
Kim Yo-jong issued another statement on October 2. This time, she targeted President Lee Jae-myung's expression of intent the previous day to take 'practical measures to reduce military tensions' [9]. Kim mocked it as 'the climax of a farce too good to watch alone' [9]. The original text of the statement released by the KCNA begins with 'An enemy is indeed an enemy,' followed by the expression 'grave conclusion' reached through Seoul's 'new self-staged farce' [16].
In the same statement, Kim Yo-jong declared, 'We will not allow even the slightest space or leeway to get entangled or deal with South Korea in any form' [9]. According to a TASS report, Kim specified that Pyongyang would not discuss military sovereignty issues with Seoul and ruled out any possibility of border demarcation negotiations [17]. She also completely denied any possibility of the North Korean military crossing the border, stating, 'Our soldiers have never crossed the border even once' [11].
The dispute over the facts is expanding into a clash of differing technical bases. The Hankyoreh pointed out that because the South uses GPS while the North uses the Russian satellite navigation system, the baseline for the MDL itself is being applied differently by each side [11]. In June, the United Nations Command (UNC) determined that North Korea's installation of fences and laying of landmines near the MDL took place north of the line and thus did not violate the Armistice Agreement [11]. This determination could potentially be cited by North Korea as a basis for its rebuttal in the current dispute.
On October 1, the Ministry of Unification announced that it would maintain its policy stance of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula, despite the assessment that the explosion was caused by North Korean landmines [15]. In domestic politics, while ruling and opposition parties agreed on condemning North Korea during a National Defense Committee hearing, their evaluations diverged regarding the timing of the government's investigation and its response methods [20][21].
3. Key Actors and Positions
Kim Yo-jong (Vice Department Director of the WPK Central Committee)has come to the fore as the primary sender of messages to the South in this situation. The tone of her statements is harsher and the response speed is faster than in the 2015 precedent [1]. Kim's statements go beyond merely refuting the facts; she has also explicitly raised the possibility of military retaliation. She warned that if the South goes beyond warning shots and fires at North Korean soldiers, North Korea will retaliate 'immediately and mercilessly' [10][14]. At present, there appears to be no incentive for North Korea to seek post-incident solutions, such as an apology or measures to prevent recurrence [6].
The North Korean Leadership as a WholeIn the strategic context of the North Korean leadership, this issue is closely linked to the physical work of border fortification. Landmine laying and fence installation are projects actively underway in the border areas [1][19]. Kim Yo-jong's denial of responsibility is aimed at preemptively blocking international and domestic disputes over the legitimacy of these activities [1]. DW reported an analysis by a Kyung Hee University professor suggesting that by amending its constitution in March this year, North Korea is attempting to extend its control over the border areas, which had remained a de facto uninhabited zone for over 70 years [18].
South Korean Military Authorities (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ministry of National Defense)defined the landmine explosion as a violation of the Armistice Agreement and hinted at corresponding measures against North Korea [19]. The United Nations Command (UNC) also aligned with the JCS in determining it as an Armistice violation [6]. However, the issue raised by the North regarding differences in the baseline for setting the MDL is likely to remain a point of contention in future factual disputes [11].
South Korean Ministry of Unificationofficially reaffirmed its policy stance of peaceful coexistence despite the incident [15]. This is interpreted as an attempt to maintain its North Korea policy on a separate track from the military authorities' determination of an Armistice Agreement violation.
President Lee Jae-myungpublicly expressed his commitment to taking practical measures to ease tensions [9]. However, this message was immediately met with ridicule from Kim Yo-jong [9]. This exchange reaffirmed that Seoul's proposals for dialogue are not being received in Pyongyang as signals for negotiation.
4. Key Issues
At the factual level, the key issues are the actor responsible for laying the landmines and the baseline for determining the location of the MDL. The South concluded that it was a violation of the Armistice Agreement caused by North Korean landmines [1][19]. The North completely denied this, defining it as a 'self-staged farce' [8][16]. Because the baseline for the MDL itself is set differently by each side, objective verification is structurally difficult [11].
At the strategic level, the issue is whether this statement is a signal that goes beyond a simple response to an incident. EAI analysis has pointed out that North Korea is running a hardline stance toward the South and a conciliatory signal toward the U.S. on separate, parallel tracks [3][5]. Kim Yo-jong's declaration ruling out discussions on military sovereignty and border demarcation [17] is close to a reaffirmation of the existing policy of not recognizing South Korea as a partner for unification discussions or military negotiations [3][7]. Rather than a temporary reaction to a specific incident, this can be seen as an example of how the 'two hostile states' theory, accumulated since late 2023, operates in concrete matters in the border region.
At the practical level, the issue is the possibility of restoring dialogue channels. Despite the Ministry of Unification's announcement that it would maintain its peaceful coexistence stance [15], the North explicitly reaffirmed its position of 'not allowing even the slightest space or leeway' [9]. The likelihood of dialogue channels being restored in the short term appears low at present.
II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue
The Structural Origins of Kim Yo-jong's Statements: The Convergence of the 'Two Hostile States' Theory and DMZ Fortification
1. Root Cause: Redefining Statehood and the Physical Solidification of the Military Demarcation Line
Kim Yo-jong's complete denial of responsibility for the landmine incident and her simultaneous refusal to discuss military sovereignty are not separate issues. Both positions stem from a single logic. At the December 2023 Plenary Meeting, Kim Jong-un redefined inter-Korean relations as 'relations between two hostile states' [3][5][7]. The practical implication of this declaration is not mere rhetoric; it is the transformation of all technical matters surrounding the border into issues of sovereignty between states.
In the past, North Korea viewed the MDL as a temporary line within the Armistice Agreement system, with the contracting parties being the UNC and the North Korean military. Under the 'two hostile states' theory, however, the MDL is redefined as a national border. This is illustrated by Kim Yo-jong's statement, 'To be clear, our soldiers have never crossed the border even once' [11]. The very choice of the term 'border' presupposes a transition from the Armistice Agreement system to an interstate border system.
From this framework, landmine laying and fence construction are sovereign border management activities of a state. The moment North Korea admits responsibility, it becomes the party that caused an accident during border management—a technical error unrelated to territorial claims. However, by completely denying responsibility, the incident itself becomes a fabrication by Seoul, allowing the border fortification work to continue without external interference. The Hankyoreh's interpretation that North Korea is 'preemptively blocking allegations of responsibility to complete border fortification' accurately captures this structure [1].
The refusal to negotiate on military sovereignty is also an extension of the same logic. The moment North Korea agrees to discuss border demarcation, it accepts the premise that the border is open to negotiation. Under the 'two hostile states' theory, the border is already a fixed national boundary. Pyongyang's position is that there is no reason to negotiate [17].
2. Structural Context
Political Structure: Discarding Unification Discourse and Consolidating the Regime
The WPK's policy shift goes beyond mere tactics toward the South. In his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in January 2024, Kim Jong-un stated that in the event of war, 'the issue of completely occupying, subjugating, and reclaiming the Republic of Korea and incorporating it into the territory of our Republic should be made a basic task of our military strategy' [3][7]. In his March 2026 policy speech, he officially recognized South Korea as 'the most hostile state' [3][5]. Discarding the discourses of peaceful unification and federal unification is a decision that has altered the very foundation of North Korea's policy toward the South since the 1990s [7].
The domestic political function of this transition is clear. Discarding unification-oriented discourse also dissolves the narrative of ethnic homogeneity between the North and the South. All channels of contact with Seoul are reorganized into state-to-state diplomatic relations. Kim Yo-jong's ridicule of President Lee Jae-myung's remarks on easing tensions as 'the climax of a farce too good to watch alone' [9] and her declaration that North Korea will 'not allow even the slightest space or leeway to get entangled or deal with South Korea in any form' [9] demonstrate that this line is not a one-off rhetoric but a systematically executed policy.
Security Structure: Parallel Progress in Solidifying Physical Borders and Advancing Nuclear Capabilities
The DMZ fortification is not an isolated issue. EAI analysis points out that short-range ballistic missile launches, the DMZ landmine explosion, and range-upgrade tests for the 240mm multiple rocket launcher overlapped during the same period [3]. This leads to the assessment that border area risks have moved beyond rhetorical threats into a practical phase [3]. Border fortification, missile capability advancement, and nuclear force expansion are all efforts to physically implement the 'belligerent relations' presupposed by the 'two hostile states' theory [2].
According to the Korean Journal of International Studies, North Korea has included the drone industry, detection and electronic warfare systems, and space programs in its national defense development plan alongside nuclear and missile advancement [2]. Kim Jong-un has stated that North Korea will 'accelerate preparations for a great event to subjugate the entire territory in the event of war by mobilizing all physical means and capabilities, including nuclear forces' [2]. The hardline response to the DMZ landmine incident is a localized friction occurring at the periphery of this massive capability-building project.
Economic and Institutional Structure: De Facto Dualization of the Armistice Agreement System
In June, the United Nations Command determined that North Korea's installation of fences and laying of landmines near the MDL took place north of the line and thus did not violate the Armistice Agreement [11]. Paradoxically, this determination leaves room to be cited as a basis for North Korea's rebuttal in the current situation. The situation where the baseline for the MDL itself is applied differently—with the South using GPS and the North using the Russian satellite navigation system—can be read in the same context [11]. The border baseline, which should be under the single normative framework of the Armistice Agreement, is becoming technically dualized. This suggests that the 'two hostile states' theory is not merely an abstract declaration but is also creating a separation in practical measurement and interpretation systems.
3. Comparison with Historical Precedents: Differences from the 2015 Wooden-Box Landmine Incident
The wooden-box landmine incident of August 2015 serves as a useful reference point when compared to the current issue. At the time, North Korea issued a statement of denial under the name of the National Defense Commission's Policy Department only four days after the South Korean military announced its final investigation results [1]. The status of the statement was at the level of the Policy Department, a working-level body.
In the current case, two things have changed. First is the speed of the response. The statement was issued just over a day after the JCS announced its interim investigation results [1]. Second is the status of the spokesperson. A high-ranking figure from the top leadership, the Vice Department Director of the WPK Central Committee, directly stepped forward [1]. While the evasion of responsibility in 2015 was a working-level response, this time it has been elevated to an effort by the highest level of the regime to directly intervene and redefine the political meaning of the incident itself.
During the 2015 incident, the situation was resolved through an agreement reached via high-level inter-Korean contacts, the so-called August 25 Agreement. A formal compromise was possible, with both sides exchanging expressions of regret and promises to prevent recurrence. In the current situation, however, the very grammar of such a compromise does not apply. Under the 'two hostile states' theory, expressing regret or agreeing to prevent recurrence could be interpreted as bringing border issues to the negotiating table. This is why Kim Yo-jong explicitly ruled out discussions on military sovereignty and the possibility of border demarcation negotiations altogether [17]. The 2015-style resolution model is blocked at the design stage this time.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is whether North Korea maintains its dual-track approach toward the South and the U.S. EAI analysis points out that Kim Yo-jong is keeping the possibility of conditional dialogue open on the U.S. channel [3][5]. This indicates that a hardline stance toward the South and a conciliatory signal toward the U.S. are being run on separate, parallel tracks [3]. If the possibility of resuming a North Korea-U.S. summit becomes tangible, the key will be how effectively North Korea can enforce its existing intention to exclude South Korea as a negotiating partner [3][5].
The second variable is the timing of the completion of the border fortification work. As pointed out by The Hankyoreh, if the primary purpose of this statement is to continue fortification work by blocking allegations of responsibility [1], the possibility cannot be ruled out that North Korea's tone and attitude may change once the work reaches a certain stage.
The third variable is the accumulation of determinations by the United Nations Command (UNC), the body responsible for managing the Armistice Agreement. If the UNC's past criteria regarding the compliance of activities north of the MDL with the Armistice Agreement [11] are applied to this incident, it could influence the direction of the factual dispute and the international community's assessment of responsibility.
The fourth variable is the possibility of accidental military clashes in the border region. Kim Yo-jong stated that operational guidelines to 'retaliate immediately and mercilessly if the South goes beyond warning shots and fires' have already been issued [10]. Given the nature of the border area where physical contact is frequent, if unintended firing or clashes occur, there is a constant risk that the discursive boundaries set by both sides could translate into actual armed conflict.
References
[10] [NK News] ‘Self-staged farce’: Kim Yo Jong denies North Korean role in DMZ mine blast
[12] [Daily Maverick] North Korea rejects South’s accusation over DMZ mine blast, KCNA says
[13] [Yonhap] Kim Yo-jong again rejects blame for DMZ blast, mocks Seoul's call to ease tensions
[14] [Yonhap] N. Korea denies responsibility for DMZ mine blast, warns S. Korea of retaliation
[15] [Yonhap] Unification ministry reaffirms peaceful coexistence policy despite DMZ blast
[17] [TASS] North Korea rejects military sovereignty talks with South — Kim Yo-Jong
[18] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Is North Korea pushing the limits of the DMZ?
[24] [Yonhap] S. Korea blames N.K. for DMZ mine blast; UNC cites armistice breach over active mine
[25] [Yonhap] Unification minister proposes talks with N. Korea over border line amid DMZ tensions
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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