The Workers' Party of Korea's 'Hostile Two-State' Pressure and Policy Directions for the Ministry of Unification

Executive Summary

The demand from a high-ranking Workers' Party of Korea official for Seoul to reconsider its "two-state" policy is not an offer of dialogue. In substance, it is pressure on South Korea to recognize North Korea's statehood and unilaterally amend its own constitutional framework, which is oriented toward unification. This is an extension of the "hostile belligerent state" theory that has been building since the December 2023 plenary meeting, and it is occurring concurrently with Kim Yo Jong's bifurcated approach toward South Korea and the United States, military threats from Minister of National Defence Kim Song Gi, and the advancement of nuclear capabilities through the commissioning of a new destroyer. The South Korean government must not treat the territorial clause and the pursuit of peaceful unification, as stipulated in Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution, as negotiable variables. Placing this demand on the agenda could itself become the starting point for dismantling the discourse on unification. The response should be centered on three pillars: upholding the constitutional view of unification, neutralizing North Korea's dual-track strategy through ROK-U.S. coordination, and separately managing security readiness and humanitarian channels.

I. Analysis of the Current Situation

The Workers' Party of Korea's Reaffirmation of its "Hostile Two-State Theory": A Situational Analysis

1. Background and Developments

North Korea's shift in its policy toward South Korea was formalized at the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in December 2023. At this meeting, General Secretary Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean relations as "not a relationship between fellow countrymen or people of the same kind, but a hostile relationship between two states, a relationship between two belligerents at war"[3]. This signified the de facto abandonment of the peaceful unification and confederal unification discourse that North Korea had maintained since the 1990s.

This policy shift was not an impromptu remark but the result of a series of incrementally escalating policy declarations. In a policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in January 2024, Kim Jong Un stated that "the issue of completely occupying, pacifying, and reclaiming the Republic of Korea and incorporating it into the territory of the Republic in the event of a contingency should be made a fundamental task of military strategy"[3]. In a March 2026 policy speech, he used even stronger language, "officially recognizing" South Korea as "the most hostile state" and warning that he would "make them pay the price mercilessly"[3]. EAI has conceptualized this series of statements as the "hostile belligerent state theory" and has analyzed its significance along two axes: the abandonment of unification discourse and the full-fledged adoption of a policy of military occupation of the South, and the justification of a nuclear attack on the South[3].

Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, also reaffirmed this stance in late July 2025 by issuing consecutive messages to South Korea and the United States. The core of her message to the South was a declaration of severance, stating that North Korea "will not engage in relations of any form" with South Korea[8]. In contrast, her message to the United States during the same period showed a dualistic attitude, leaving open the possibility of conditional dialogue[8]. This demonstrates that North Korea is employing a strategy of dealing with South Korea and the United States separately.

2. Current Situation

According to a September 2026 NK News report, a high-ranking Workers' Party of Korea official made a statement urging Seoul to reconsider North Korea's "two-state" policy[1]. While this may appear to be a call for dialogue on the surface, it is more accurately pressure on South Korea to recognize North Korea's statehood and unilaterally amend its own unification-oriented constitutional framework. It should be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the very legal and institutional foundations of inter-Korean relations, which are premised on unification.

In the military sphere, tensions are escalating in parallel. NK News reported in August 2026 that North Korean troops had crossed the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) for the second time in several weeks[9]. In the same month, Minister of National Defence Kim Song Gi threatened to take "more powerful and resolute practical action if necessary," targeting both the ROK-U.S.-Japan "Freedom Edge" exercise and the U.S.-Japan-Australia "Orient Shield" exercise[10][11][13]. In the original text of the statement released by the Korean Central News Agency, Kim Song Gi described these exercises as "provocative trilateral multi-domain joint military exercises" and protested by specifically listing the deployment of the U.S. military's Typhon missile system in Japan and moves to deploy a Multi-Domain Task Force in South Korea[16].

Concurrently, at a commissioning ceremony for a new destroyer in Wonsan in September, Kim Jong Un stated that the vessel would be "part of the nuclear response system" and remarked, "The time has come for us to exercise our sovereignty on the sea and underwater"[15]. The fact that the hostile turn in its discourse toward the South is proceeding in parallel with the advancement of its naval and nuclear forces suggests that North Korea is not merely treating its "two-state theory" as a rhetorical declaration but is backing it with a substantive shift in its military posture.

However, channels with the United States are not completely closed. In a closed-door briefing to the National Assembly in September, the National Intelligence Service assessed that a Trump-Kim Jong Un summit is "possible at any time"[14]. Although no specific contacts have been confirmed, the intelligence agency's judgment is that there are signs of dialogue[14]. This supports the view that North Korea is continuing its dual strategy of severing relations with South Korea while leaving open the possibility of resuming conditional dialogue with the United States.

3. Analysis of Key Actors

The Workers' Party of Korea and North Korea's Top Leadershipis promoting the "two-state theory" as part of a strategy to consolidate a bloc of "independent forces" within a New Cold War worldview. According to an EAI analysis, North Korea intends to neutralize sanctions against it by expanding cooperation with Russia and solidifying a bloc that includes China, thereby simultaneously achieving economic development and de facto nuclear-weapon state status within this bloc[6]. The framing of inter-Korean relations as a relationship between two hostile states is not a byproduct of this strategy but a key means of clarifying the New Cold War structure of ROK-U.S.-Japan versus North Korea-China-Russia[6].

Kim Yo Jongis responsible for sending separate messages to South Korea and the United States. She simultaneously manages a hardline stance toward South Korea, refusing to form any kind of relationship, and conciliatory signals toward the United States, leaving open the possibility of conditional dialogue[8]. This indicates that policies toward South Korea and the United States are being designed on separate tracks within the North Korean leadership.

North Korea's Ministry of National Defence (Minister of National Defence Kim Song Gi)defines ROK-U.S.-Japan military cooperation as a direct security threat and is leading a pressure campaign through the issuance of statements[7][10]. This hardline stance has been maintained even after the replacement of the minister of national defence in August, and the composition of the new command structure itself is interpreted as a measure to strengthen military cohesion amid a phase of pressure on South Korea and the United States[18][19].

The South Korean Governmentmaintains the position that it does not recognize North Korea as a separate sovereign state, based on the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the unification-oriented provisions of its Constitution. This was also confirmed during a diplomatic friction with China. When a Chinese statement following a 2026 ROK-China diplomatic meeting included the phrase "two states," the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially protested, stating that "it differs from our position"[4]. This case demonstrates that the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are consistently applying the constitutional view of unification in their practical foreign relations.

The United Statesis sending signals on North Korea policy that are somewhat different in tone from South Korea's. While the Trump administration is exploring the possibility of resuming dialogue with North Korea[14], it has also faced criticism from experts within the U.S. that its decision to scale back ROK-U.S. joint military exercises has raised concerns about alliance credibility[17]. Bruce Klingner of the Mansfield Foundation has pointed out that such a reduction in exercises could result in ceding a strategic advantage to Kim Jong Un[17].

Chinais treating the inter-Korean "two states" issue as a sensitive matter of principle linked to the Taiwan issue. The instance where both South Korea and China accused each other of undermining core principles shows the potential for North Korea's two-state theory to expand beyond the Korean Peninsula into a broader competition over sovereignty and unification discourses throughout Northeast Asia[4].

4. Key Issues

First, North Korea's demand to "accept the two-state theory" is pressure to re-examine the very legal basis of the unification-oriented relationship between the two Koreas. This directly conflicts with the foundation of South Korea's unification policy, which is based on Articles 3 and 4 of its Constitution.

Second, as North Korea simultaneously pursues a hardline policy toward the South and explores dialogue with the U.S., the possibility arises that South Korea could be sidelined within the framework of ROK-U.S. coordination. Concerns are being raised even within the United States that the American approach to North Korea may not necessarily align with South Korea's interests[17].

Third, amid repeated MDL crossings and statements from the minister of national defence, North Korea's "two-state theory" is moving beyond rhetoric and becoming coupled with escalating military tensions. As this is accompanied by the advancement of naval and nuclear forces, establishing a management system for the risk of accidental clashes remains an urgent task.

Fourth, as seen in the case of diplomatic friction with China, North Korea's two-state theory is also having ripple effects on ROK-China relations. How South Korea's unification discourse is recognized and managed internationally has the potential to emerge as a new point of contention on the diplomatic front.

II. In-depth Issue Analysis

North Korea's "Hostile Two-State Theory" Pressure: An In-depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

Behind North Korea's abandonment of the unification discourse itself lies a calculation for regime survival. The Kim Jong Un regime is aware that the gap in economic power and information access between the two Koreas is widening over time. A policy of peaceful unification premised on opening and contact entails the risk of exposing this gap to its population. Therefore, the judgment that establishing a unification-oriented relationship is itself a burden on regime stability underlies this policy shift.

At the same time, North Korea is redesigning its survival strategy by integrating itself into a New Cold War framework. According to an EAI analysis, after first mentioning a New Cold War at the Supreme People's Assembly in 2021, Kim Jong Un claimed at a December 2024 plenary meeting that "the growth and leap forward of the sphere of independent forces are prominent, while the position of the sphere of hegemonic forces is rapidly weakening and declining"[6]. This reflects a worldview in which a "sphere of independent forces," rallying anti-U.S. powers, clashes with a U.S.-led "sphere of hegemonic forces"[6]. EAI's diagnosis is that declaring inter-Korean relations to be a relationship between two hostile states is an extension of this bloc strategy[6]. It can be seen as an attempt to clarify the New Cold War axis of ROK-U.S.-Japan versus North Korea-China-Russia by defining the Republic of Korea not as a kindred nation but as an enemy state[6].

If this framework is established, the tangible benefits for North Korea are specific. The analysis is that North Korea's calculation is that if a bloc including Russia and China solidifies, sanctions against it will be effectively neutralized, it can pursue development through economic cooperation within the bloc, and it can ultimately expect de facto acceptance of its nuclear possession[6]. The abandonment of the unification discourse serves as an ideological precondition for completing this bloc strategy.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: A Bifurcated Approach to South Korea and the U.S.

A prominent feature of North Korea's foreign policy is its dual strategy of clearly separating its dealings with South Korea and the United States. In late July 2025, Workers' Party of Korea Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong issued separate messages to South Korea and the United States on two consecutive days. The core of her message to the South was a declaration of severance, stating that North Korea "will not engage in relations of any form" with South Korea, whereas her message to the U.S. showed an attitude of leaving open the possibility of conditional dialogue[8]. Professor Park Won-gon has summarized this as: "They will not engage in relations of any form with South Korea, while on the other hand, they have opened the possibility of dialogue with the United States, but with conditions attached"[8].

This structure aligns with the situational assessment that South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) presented in a report to the National Assembly in September 2026. The NIS assessed that a Trump-Kim Jong Un summit is "possible at any time" and stated that while no specific U.S.-DPRK contacts have been confirmed, there are signs of dialogue[14]. The fact that a high-ranking Workers' Party official urged Seoul to reconsider the "two-state" policy at a time when the possibility of such U.S.-DPRK dialogue was being discussed suggests a connection to North Korea's intention to seek direct talks with the United States while excluding South Korea from the negotiating table. This is a framework designed to fix South Korea's position as a target of pressure rather than an equal counterpart in state-to-state relations, leaving channels with the U.S. as the only substantive negotiating venue for the unification issue or the Korean Peninsula security agenda.

Security Structure: The Normalization of Military Tensions

The hostile turn in its discourse toward the South is being accompanied by military actions. NK News reported in August 2026 that North Korean troops had crossed the Military Demarcation Line for the second time in several weeks[9]. In the same month, Minister of National Defence Kim Song Gi issued a protest statement targeting both the ROK-U.S.-Japan "Freedom Edge" exercise and the U.S.-Japan-Australia "Orient Shield" exercise. In the original text released by the Korean Central News Agency, he described these exercises as "provocative trilateral multi-domain joint military exercises" and specifically listed the deployment of the U.S. military's Typhon medium-range missile system in Japan and the move to deploy a Multi-Domain Task Force in South Korea[16]. The statement specified, "If the United States and its allies attempt a new military confrontation with us, we too will take strong and reflexive countermeasures from a position of strength"[13].

During the same period, at a commissioning ceremony for a new destroyer in Wonsan, Kim Jong Un stated that the vessel would be "part of the nuclear response system" and declared, "The time has come for us to exercise our sovereignty on the sea and underwater"[15]. Research affiliated with the Korean Association of International Studies points out that North Korea is specifying its defense enhancement plans to include not only the advancement of its nuclear and missile capabilities but also its drone industry, detection and electronic warfare systems, and space program[2]. The fact that the hostile discourse toward the South is proceeding in parallel with military force modernization suggests that the "two-state theory" is not merely a rhetorical declaration but a systematic strategy combined with the strengthening of physical deterrence.

Economic and Diplomatic Structure: Bloc Formation and Fissures in the International Community

North Korea's two-state theory is having repercussions beyond the Korean Peninsula, affecting the diplomatic structure of Northeast Asia. In 2026, diplomatic friction arose between South Korea and China over the use of the phrase "two states." The South Korean side lodged a stern protest after a post-meeting statement from the Chinese side included the "two states" phrase, stating, "This is different from what we think"[4]. This shows that North Korea's two-state theory is not confined to an inter-Korean issue but is spreading into a sensitive diplomatic dispute over how neighboring countries, including China, refer to and perceive the Korean Peninsula issue. The implications of the unification-oriented territorial and national clauses stipulated in the Republic of Korea's Constitution are now extending to the wording used in international diplomatic documents.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

North Korea's two-state theory may seem superficially similar to the relationship between East and West Germany, but there are fundamental differences. Through the 1972 Basic Treaty, East and West Germany recognized each other's statehood but did not abandon the logic of "one German nation" or the ultimate goal of unification. West Germany's abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine and its Ostpolitik actually worked to expand exchange and contact, thereby reducing the systemic gap. In contrast, North Korea's two-state theory is different in character, as it promotes not the expansion of exchange and contact but complete severance and a policy of military occupation. EAI has defined this as the "hostile belligerent state theory" and analyzed its significance along two axes: the abandonment of the peaceful and confederal unification discourse, and the full-fledged adoption of a policy of military occupation of the South and justification for a nuclear attack on the South[3].

The evolution of North Korea's rhetoric over time is itself a process of accumulating precedents. It began with the declaration at the December 2023 plenary meeting that the relationship had been "completely fixed as one between two hostile states, two belligerents at war"[3]. This was followed by the January 2024 policy speech stating that "the issue of completely occupying, pacifying, and reclaiming the Republic of Korea and incorporating it into the territory of the Republic should be made a fundamental task of military strategy"[3]. By March 2026, the rhetoric had escalated to "officially recognizing [South Korea] as the most hostile state and thoroughly rejecting it with the most explicit words and actions"[3]. This pattern of phased escalation is similar to the Soviet Union's phases of intensified rhetoric against the West during the Cold War. However, unlike the Soviet-U.S. relationship, the two Koreas remain in an abnormal state of military confrontation under an armistice system, making the structural possibility of an accidental clash greater.

4. Key Variables Shaping the Issue's Development

The first variable is the direction of U.S.-DPRK relations. The National Intelligence Service assessed that a Trump-Kim Jong Un summit is "possible at any time"[14]. If U.S.-DPRK dialogue actually resumes, a scenario could materialize in which, as foreshadowed by Kim Yo Jong, South Korea is excluded while a phase of conditional dialogue with the U.S. unfolds, only to be informed of the results afterward[8]. Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the Mansfield Foundation, has pointed out that the Trump administration's decision to scale back ROK-U.S. joint exercises is raising doubts about alliance credibility, and that this trend is actually creating a more favorable situation for Kim Jong Un[17].

The second variable is the sustainability of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation and the intensity of North Korea's reaction. The level of North Korea's backlash against exercises like "Freedom Edge" and "Orient Shield"[10][11][13][16], and the frequency of actual military provocations such as MDL crossings[9], serve as indicators for gauging the risk of accidental inter-Korean clashes. The generational change in the North Korean military command also acts as a variable. NK News reported in August 2026 that North Korea had reshuffled its top military leadership, including the minister of national defence[19], while South Korea also appointed a retired general as its Minister of National Defense during this period[18]. How these personnel changes in the security leadership of both sides will affect the tone of their messages to each other and to the U.S., as well as their actual military actions, is expected to be an inflection point in the future situation.

The third variable is whether the "two states" expression becomes formalized in the international community. As seen in the case of diplomatic friction between South Korea and China[4], the issue of how neighboring countries refer to inter-Korean relations in international documents has the potential to escalate beyond mere diplomatic rhetoric into a matter that redefines the legal and institutional framework of the Korean Peninsula issue itself. This raises the need for the government, including the Ministry of Unification, to uphold the constitutional view of unification and proactively respond to the linguistic practices of the international community.