Between Training and Real Combat: Military-Police Integration in China's Maritime Control Demonstrated by the Huangyan Island Joint Exercise
Executive Summary
The joint naval and air exercise conducted by China's Southern Theater Command around Huangyan Island on September 27 was a scenario-based operation integrated with the China Coast Guard's (CCG) boarding, interception, and forced towing drills held on the same day. This demonstrates that a military-police integrated control model, where military power backs the CCG's 'law enforcement' from behind, has entered an institutionalization phase. The first simultaneous deployment of the replenishment ship *Qinghaihu* and the WZ-7 drone signifies not a one-off show of force, but the acquisition of capabilities for sustained presence and constant surveillance in the relevant waters. The discrepancy between the CCG's nominal civilian status and its military reality forms the core structure of gray-zone tactics that trap opposing states in a dilemma. The dual-track structure—where the pursuit of strategic stability confirmed at the US-China summit runs parallel to intensified coercion on the ground—suggests that summit diplomacy fails to alleviate practical competition in the South China Sea. South Korea must recognize this case as part of a pattern linked to the issue of structures in the West Sea Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ), and proceed to formulate legal counterarguments and assess risks in multilateral maritime cooperation.
I. Issue Analysis
Issue Analysis: Joint Naval-Air Exercises at Scarborough Shoal and Military-Police Integration
1. Background and Developments
Scarborough Shoal is a feature over which China has maintained de facto control since 2012. It is located within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)[12]. China refers to it as Huangyan Island. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague ruled that China's nine-dash line claim had no legal basis. China did not recognize this ruling[3][6].
Following the ruling, the situation in the South China Sea solidified into a confrontation of physical force on the ground, regardless of legal principles. In July 2026, there was an incident at Second Thomas Shoal where the CCG, carrying weapons, boarded a Philippine vessel[3]. On September 2 of this year, China's Southern Theater Command expelled three Philippine light aircraft over Scarborough Shoal using JL-10 trainer jets equipped with PL-5 missiles[3]. The deployment of trainer jets is interpreted as a low-cost, sustained gray-zone tactic tailored to low-speed targets[3].
The direct trigger for the current issue occurred at Ren'ai Jiao (Second Thomas Shoal). On September 25, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) claimed that the CCG and the Chinese Navy obstructed a resupply mission to a grounded warship through dangerous maneuvers[11]. Although there was no collision, a hazardous situation was created, according to the Philippine side[11]. The *Global Times* describes the event in the exact opposite terms, asserting that the Philippine resupply attempt was an "illegal" act conducted without prior approval, and that the CCG merely blocked it[10].
2. Current Situation
On September 27, China's Southern Theater Command conducted a joint naval and air exercise in the waters and airspace around Huangyan Island[4][7]. The Southern Theater Command defined this as a "necessary response" to acts by a "certain country" that undermine regional peace and stability[7]. It stated that the purpose of the exercise was to "test and strengthen combat capabilities to safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests"[7][8].
On the same day, the CCG conducted a separate parallel exercise. This was a law enforcement and control drill centered on boarding, interception, and forced towing[9]. The *Global Times* reported this alongside the Southern Theater Command's exercise, using the phrase "strengthening law enforcement and control in the relevant waters through military-police cooperation"[9]. An expert cited by the *Global Times* noted that the exercise was "highly combat-oriented" and that if foreign forces cross the line, the Chinese military "can transition from training to real combat at any time"[1].
The exercise confirmed the first deployment of two assets: the Type 908 comprehensive replenishment ship *Qinghaihu* (hull number 885) and the WZ-7 high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) reconnaissance drone[1]. The *Qinghaihu* is an asset that enables sustained replenishment in the open ocean, while the WZ-7 supports constant surveillance capabilities. The simultaneous deployment of these two assets suggests a transition from one-off shows of force by the Chinese military to a posture of sustained presence and constant surveillance in these waters[1].
Notably, this exercise took place immediately after a multilateral joint sail on the sidelines of the ADMM-Plus. The multilateral sail was conducted in the waters between Zambales and Scarborough Shoal, within the Philippine EEZ[12]. However, Philippine media outlets assessed that the participation of ASEAN member states was not prominent[12]. The close timing of China's military-police joint exercise in the same waters immediately after this multilateral sail demonstrates that Beijing is targeting not only bilateral disputes but also multilateral cooperation involving extra-regional states as objects of deterrence.
Around the same time, CCG movements were also detected near the Taiwan Strait. On September 29, the CCG conducted patrols in the waters east of Taiwan. The *Global Times* reported this as a "warning signal to separatist forces"[15]. The simultaneous operations of military and CCG assets in both the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait support the view that China is utilizing its coast guard forces as a tool of coercion across the region.
3. Key Actors and Positions
China's Southern Theater Command and Ministry of National Defense: They define the exercise as a "necessary response to safeguard sovereignty"[7][8]. They point to the Philippines' resupply activities and the multilateral joint sail as "acts by a certain country that undermine regional peace and stability," using them to justify the exercise[7].
China Coast Guard (CCG): The CCG conducted parallel drills on the same day as the Southern Theater Command without issuing a separate statement. It frames its law enforcement actions—such as boarding, interception, and forced towing—as part of "strengthening law enforcement and control in the waters near Huangyan Island"[9]. While adopting a format distinct from military exercises, the CCG shared the timing and location, revealing a structure where military power backs the CCG's law enforcement activities.
*Global Times* and State-Run Media Commentators: They make external warning messages explicit by defining the exercise as "preparing for a transition from training to real combat"[1]. Regarding the Ren'ai Jiao incident, they prioritize the frame that the CCG blocked the Philippines' "illegal resupply attempt"[10].
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG): The PCG counters that the resupply mission was a "lawful humanitarian and replenishment operation." It claims that the dangerous maneuvers of the CCG and the Chinese Navy created a risk of collision[11]. Although the Philippines holds legal legitimacy under the Hague ruling, its effective means of response remain limited due to the disparity in physical power on the ground.
ASEAN Member States: Despite the multilateral joint sail on the sidelines of the ADMM-Plus, assessments suggest that their actual participation and voice were limited[12]. This reaffirms that a cohesive ASEAN-wide response to South China Sea issues remains structurally difficult.
United States: No evidence of strong, separate US intervention in this matter has been confirmed. Given that this occurred immediately after the US-China summit, it appears that the leaders' pursuit of strategic stability and the intensification of coercion on the ground are proceeding on separate tracks.
4. Key Issues
First is whether joint military-CCG exercises are becoming institutionalized. The key question is whether the Southern Theater Command and the CCG performing different missions in the same waters on the same day was a one-off coordination or is solidifying into a routine operational model.
Second is the legal implications of the "administrative control" narrative. State-run media claim that control around Huangyan Island and Ren'ai Jiao extends beyond the 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone. The subject of analysis is the logic used to justify de facto jurisdiction that is unrelated to the concepts of territorial sea and contiguous zone under UNCLOS.
Third is China's approach to responding to multilateral maritime cooperation. The timing of the exercise immediately after the ADMM-Plus sail suggests that China is targeting the participation of extra-regional states as an object of deterrence, moving beyond the management of bilateral disputes.
Fourth is the decoupling of summit diplomacy and coercion on the ground. The fact that maritime coercion in the South China Sea continued immediately after the US-China summit demonstrates that maritime issues are practically excluded from the management agenda between the two leaders.
II. In-Depth Analysis
In-Depth Analysis: Between Training and Real Combat—The Fundamental Structure of Military-Police Integration Demonstrated by the Huangyan Island Joint Exercise
1. Root Causes: Why Now, and Why This Combination?
The superficial trigger for this exercise was the resupply clash at Ren'ai Jiao. However, the scale and composition of the exercise cannot be explained merely as a response to a single incident. The Southern Theater Command deployed naval and air assets, while the CCG separately conducted parallel drills on boarding, interception, and forced towing[9]. Both institutions performed their respective missions in the same waters on the same day. This resembles a pre-planned, scenario-based exercise rather than a reactive response to an incident.
The root cause lies in China's very concept of maritime jurisdiction. China has maintained de facto control over Scarborough Shoal since 2012[3][6]. However, a gap remained between de facto control and constant law enforcement capabilities. The September 2 incident, in which trainer jets were deployed to deter the approach of light Philippine aircraft, was also an attempt to bridge this gap[3]. This joint exercise can be read as an effort to narrow that gap simultaneously across the air, maritime, and replenishment domains.
The simultaneous deployment of the *Qinghaihu* and the WZ-7 supports this. Both assets are equipment designed for "sustained presence" rather than a "one-off show of force"[1]. The phrase "transition from training to real combat" mentioned by the Chinese expert also stems from this context[1]. The root cause is not retaliation for a specific incident, but China's direction toward institutionalizing a constant physical deterrence in these waters.
2. Structural Context: Political, Economic, and Security Dimensions
Political Structure: Integration of Command Chains between the Southern Theater Command and the CCG
China's maritime coercion has operated through a division of labor between the military and the CCG, a paramilitary organization. Following its 2018 reorganization, the CCG was integrated into the People's Armed Police under the Central Military Commission. While nominally a "law enforcement agency," its chain of command is effectively linked to the military. In this exercise, the Southern Theater Command's announcement of "testing combat capabilities" and the CCG's announcement of "law enforcement and control" clearly reveal this dual identity[7][9]. It is a structure in which the CCG's mission is backed by the language of military operations.
The terminology reported by the *Global Times* also illustrates this structure. The phrase "strengthening law enforcement and control in the relevant waters through military-police cooperation"[9] is a method of maintaining the CCG's civilian character while positioning military coercive power behind it. This is precisely why it is difficult for the Philippines or the United States to pursue a military response. Because the opponent is nominally conducting "law enforcement," a military response to it would result in handing over the pretext for escalation to the other side.
Economic Structure: Fishing Rights and Resource Access
Scarborough Shoal was a traditional fishing ground for Philippine fishermen[3]. Since 2012, their access has been virtually blocked by the constant deployment of the CCG[3]. The reinforcement of control reaffirmed in this exercise is not merely a security issue but is directly linked to economic interests surrounding access to fishery resources. The livelihoods of Philippine fishermen, and by extension, potential rights to develop subsea resources, are tied to the question of who controls these waters.
Security Structure: Asymmetry in Gray-Zone Competition
The Hague ruling granted legal legitimacy to the Philippines. However, China holds an overwhelming advantage in physical power on the ground[3]. This discrepancy between law and reality is the fundamental structure in which gray-zone tactics are repeated. While the Philippines has secured a legal basis, it lacks the physical means to enforce it on the ground. ASEAN is unable to mount a collective response due to conflicting interests among its member states[6]. The fact that the participation of ASEAN member states was not prominent in the multilateral sail on the sidelines of the ADMM-Plus also demonstrates this structural limitation[12]. The US response has remained at the level of statements[6].
3. Historical Precedents and Comparison of Similar Cases
The 2012 Scarborough Standoff and the Beginning of De Facto Control
Following the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, China solidified its de facto control over these waters. At the time, the constant deployment of CCG vessels was the primary tool. This exercise should be viewed as a phase where military backing is added in extension of that control. It represents a transition from de facto control led purely by the CCG to a military-police joint operational system.
Response Patterns after the 2016 Hague Ruling
Immediately after the Hague ruling, China reacted with large-scale maritime military exercises[6]. The pattern of denying the legal binding force of the ruling while reinforcing the fait accompli on the ground through physical force was established at this time. This exercise is a repetition of the same pattern. However, because this exercise coincided with the immediate aftermath of both the US-China summit and the ADMM-Plus multilateral exercise, its target is not limited to the Philippines. It contains a message aimed at deterring multilateral maritime cooperation involving extra-regional states.
Continuity with the 2026 Second Thomas Shoal Cases
The June 2024 armed boarding incident at Second Thomas Shoal[3] and the April 2025 landing on an uninhabited sandbar were both exercises of coercion under the guise of "law enforcement." The boarding, interception, and forced towing drills conducted by the CCG in this exercise are institutionalized versions of those cases[9]. This can be read as a transition process moving from responding to individual incidents to standardized operational procedures.
Comparison with the East China Sea and the Vicinity of Taiwan
The Ministry of Defense of Japan interprets the repeated surveys by Chinese oceanographic research vessels in the EEZ near the Senkaku Islands as intelligence gathering in preparation for a Taiwan contingency[14]. In the waters east of Taiwan, the CCG also conducted patrols, sending a message of "warning to separatist forces"[15]. This pattern is not confined to the South China Sea. The method of claiming de facto jurisdiction over specific waters by combining military and CCG assets is commonly observed in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. The Scarborough Shoal case can be seen as the most advanced instance of institutionalization among these common patterns.
Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The Scope of Management of the US-China Summit
The pursuit of strategic stability confirmed at the summit is not being applied to the situation on the ground in the South China Sea. This exercise, conducted immediately after the summit, demonstrates this. The key question going forward is whether maritime issues will be included in the management agenda at the leaders' level between the United States and China, or whether they will remain decoupled. If they remain decoupled, coercion on the ground is highly likely to continue regardless of summit diplomacy.
The Level of the Philippines' Response
Although the Philippines possesses a legal asset in the form of the Hague ruling, its physical capabilities on the ground are limited [3][6]. A key variable is whether practical cooperation among regional countries will expand, as seen in Taiwan's transfer of decommissioned coast guard vessels to the Philippines [13]. However, China has shown a pattern of immediately protesting such cooperation [13], meaning that expanding cooperation could potentially serve as a pretext for further coercion.
Whether Asset Deployments Will Be Regularized
A key point of observation is whether the deployment of the Qinghaihu and the WZ-7 is a one-off event or if it will lead to permanent deployment in the future. If these two assets are regularly redeployed to this maritime area, the "gradual expansion of administrative control" will transition from a mere declaration to a phase backed by actual capabilities. This would serve as a leading indicator suggesting that the de facto exercise of jurisdiction—which goes beyond the concepts of territorial seas and contiguous zones under UNCLOS—could be repeated in other maritime areas beyond the South China Sea.
III. Final Recommended Countermeasures
Final Recommended Countermeasures and Action Plan
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommended Countermeasures
This exercise is not a one-off show of force. It is a scenario-based joint exercise in which the Southern Theater Command and the Coast Guard performed their respective roles in the same maritime area on the same day [9]. The first-time deployment of the Qinghaihu replenishment ship and the WZ-7 drone signifies the acquisition of long-endurance presence and persistent surveillance capabilities, rather than a one-time demonstration [1]. This shows that the military-coast guard integrated control model, in which military power backs up the Coast Guard's "law enforcement" from behind, has entered the stage of institutionalization.
The danger of this model lies in the discrepancy between form and substance. The Coast Guard is nominally a civil law enforcement agency. However, its chain of command is under the Central Military Commission, and in this exercise, the Southern Theater Command's "combat capability testing" and the Coast Guard's "law enforcement and control" were announced as being bundled into the same operation [7][9]. If the Philippines or the United States responds militarily, they would hand the pretext for escalation to the other side. Yet, if they do not respond, the fait accompli of "administrative control" will progress. This very dilemma structure is the core of the gray-zone tactics designed by China.
It must also be pointed out that the pursuit of US-China strategic stability confirmed at the summit is taking place simultaneously with the intensification of coercion on the ground. The Southern Theater Command defined the purpose of the exercise as a "necessary response" to actions by "a certain country" that undermine regional peace and stability [7]. This means that the management agenda at the leadership level and the gray-zone competition at the operational level are functioning in a virtually decoupled manner. The South Korean government and businesses must design their response frameworks based on this dual-track structure. Expectations that the summit outcomes will lead to a relaxation of coercion on the ground in the South China Sea have little basis.
There are three recommended directions. First, this issue should not be confined to an isolated dispute in the South China Sea but must be recognized as part of a single pattern connected to the issue of structures in the West Sea PMZ. Second, companies in relevant industries should be notified in advance of the potential rise in route and fishing risk premiums. Third, at the government level, keeping in mind the possibility of China's pushback against multilateral maritime cooperation channels such as ADMM-Plus, the risks of multilateral navigation and cooperation projects in which South Korea participates must be evaluated separately.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plans
Short-term (1–3 months)
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries need to analyze the legal nature of this exercise and compile it into a separate internal document. In particular, they must legally clarify how the expression "control beyond 24 nautical miles" claimed by state media contradicts the concepts of territorial seas and contiguous zones under UNCLOS [9]. This can be utilized as an immediate counter-logic if a similar narrative is repeated regarding the West Sea PMZ issue in the future.
Regular briefings on South China Sea route risks should be resumed for the shipping and fisheries industries. As confirmed in the Ren'ai Jiao resupply obstruction incident [11], the China Coast Guard's "interception and forced towing" exercises have the potential to translate into actual interference with fishing and navigation. Companies in relevant industries should be advised to check alternative route options and insurance conditions for the maritime area in advance.
Medium-term (3–12 months)
A monitoring system based on satellite and AIS data regarding the movements of Chinese structures within the West Sea PMZ should be strengthened. The four-stage pattern of the "gradual expansion of administrative control" observed in the Huangyan Dao case—namely, effective control → regularization of law enforcement → deployment of persistent surveillance assets → expansion of the jurisdictional narrative—is a sequence that could be repeated in the West Sea. It is necessary to quantitatively track the installation of new structures, modifications, and changes in the frequency of coast guard patrols.
South Korea should consider raising joint concerns about gray-zone tactics by leveraging its voice in multilateral security cooperation bodies such as ADMM-Plus. Considering the recent multilateral joint sail, where the participation of ASEAN member states was evaluated as low [12], raising issues solely by extra-regional countries has limited effectiveness. A realistic alternative is to build a coordinated voice with like-minded countries such as Japan and Australia.
Long-term (1 year or more)
The South Korean government must establish mid- to long-term response strategies based on the premise that China's "military-coast guard integration" model could solidify as a new standard for maritime dispute management. This is not an issue confined to the South China Sea, but a broader issue of China's near-seas control strategy encompassing the East China Sea and the West Sea. It is necessary to re-examine the cooperation system between the Korea Coast Guard and the Navy, and to prepare operational manuals to respond under a "law enforcement versus law enforcement" framework in times of crisis.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
Indicators should be tracked by dividing them into three broad categories.
As an asset deployment indicator, priority should be given to checking whether Qinghaihu-class replenishment ships and WZ-7-class reconnaissance drones are deployed to the West Sea and the East China Sea [1]. If these assets are spotted in maritime areas other than the South China Sea, it should be regarded as a signal that the same long-endurance presence and persistent surveillance model is spreading to other waters.
As a law enforcement language indicator, the expansion of the geographical scope of expressions related to "jurisdiction" and "control" used by Chinese state media and the Coast Guard should be tracked. Key observation points include whether the narrative of "control beyond 24 nautical miles" [9] is repeated and expanded, and whether similar expressions appear in reports related to the West Sea or the East China Sea.
As a collision frequency indicator, the frequency of boarding inspections, interceptions, and forced towing incidents in existing disputed waters such as Ren'ai Jiao and Huangyan Dao should be regularly compiled [9][11]. If the frequency increases or incidents resulting in casualties occur, this should be viewed as a trigger for transitioning from simple gray-zone competition to an accidental escalation phase.
The trigger points are as follows: First, when signs of the installation of new structures or the diversion of existing structures for military purposes within the West Sea PMZ are detected. Second, when China conducts joint naval/air force-coast guard exercises in the West Sea or the East China Sea similar to the current one. Third, when South Korean fishing vessels or research vessels experience boarding inspections or interception attempts by the China Coast Guard near the West Sea PMZ. If any of these three occur, government-level response scenarios must be activated immediately.
4. Summary and Conclusion
The joint exercise around Huangyan Dao on September 27 should be read as a process of China institutionalizing its military-coast guard integration model, which strengthens the Coast Guard's law enforcement authority backed by naval power. The simultaneous deployment of the Qinghaihu and the WZ-7 signifies a transition to a persistent presence and surveillance posture [1]. This represents an intensification of coercion taking place independently on the ground, regardless of the pursuit of strategic stability through the US-China summit.
The implications for South Korea are not limited to managing risks in the South China Sea. The tactic of the "gradual expansion of administrative control" identified in this case is a pattern that could be repeated in the West Sea PMZ. Both the government and businesses must recognize this not as a one-off news item but as a structurally repeatable sequence, and begin preparing proactive monitoring systems and response manuals starting now.
References
[2] [Sana'a Center] The Yemen Review Quarterly: April-June 2026
[4] [The Edge Malaysia] China conducts naval, air exercise around disputed shoal in South China Sea
[12] [Rappler] It’s an ADMM-Plus joint sail, but where were the Southeast Asians?
[14] [Kyodo News] Repeated surveys by Chinese research ship raise security concerns in Japan
[20] [Global Times] China, Southeast Asian nations hold marine cooperation forum in Bangkok
[21] [KCNA] Joint Exercise of Collective Security Treaty Organization Begins
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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