China's Shifting Perception of U.S. Strategy: The Resurgence of the 'Decline of U.S. Hegemony' Theory and Its Implications for Middle Powers

Executive Summary

A debate is spreading in Chinese academic circles, spurred by the 250th anniversary of America's founding, that treats the structural and irreversible decline of U.S. hegemony as a foregone conclusion. Chinese scholars like Zuo Xiying characterize the tariff and alliance cost-shifting policies of a potential second Trump administration as 'predatory hegemony,' judging that these very responses accelerate the decline. This discourse is gaining traction alongside the September 24 U.S.-China summit in Washington, but it is uncertain whether the 'strategic stability' framework will take root as a genuine management mechanism or lead to a gradual hardening of China's stance toward the U.S. A series of U.S. Navy operational setbacks and a softening of American public perception of the China threat are lending credence to the decline theory. The South Korean government needs to simultaneously absorb the collateral benefits of a d ente phase and pursue supply chain dualization for long-term competition, while establishing a flexible quarterly reassessment system for follow-up U.S.-China negotiations.

I. Analysis of the Current Situation

China's Perception of U.S. Strategy: The Resurgence of the 'Decline of U.S. Hegemony' Debate

1. Background and Developments

Spurred by the 250th anniversary of America's founding, a debate has reignited in Chinese academic circles over the trajectory of U.S. national power. The core of the debate is to determine whether the decline of U.S. hegemony is a temporary phenomenon or a structural, irreversible process [2]. That this debate has resurfaced amid intense geopolitical competition and simultaneous economic, technological, and political transformations suggests it is more than a simple academic discussion [2].

According to an EAI Global NK Commentary, since the second half of 2025, Chinese academia has judged the collapse of the post-war U.S.-led international order to be 'inevitable' [3]. China examined U.S. national power based on four pillars: political influence, economic strength, military power, and technological level. The resulting analysis concluded that 'U.S. hegemony is structurally weakening from within' [3]. Zuo Xiying (左希迎), who led this discussion, characterized a potential second Trump administration's imposition of tariffs and shifting of defense costs and responsibilities to allies as a 'shift from benevolent hegemony to predatory hegemony' [3].

A noteworthy aspect of the Chinese academic assessment is the view that the Trump administration's response itself accelerates the decline. The argument has been raised in Chinese academic circles that 'while acts of predatory hegemony may delay the weakening of U.S. hegemony in the short term, in the long term they will not only fail to prevent its decline but may even accelerate it' [3]. This is followed by the assessment that the Trump administration's isolationist and protectionist policies have significantly weakened major powers' trust in the United States [3]. This assessment leads to the projection that even if a Democratic administration returns to power in the U.S. after 2028, it will not be easy to restore its damaged leadership of the international order [3].

2. Current Situation

The timing of this reignited debate coincides with President Xi Jinping's visit to the United States. President Xi held a summit with President Trump in Washington on September 24. This is his first state visit in 11 years, since 2015 [17]. It is the third summit meeting between the two leaders within a year, following President Trump's visit to Beijing last May [14]. Le Monde assessed the visit, stating, 'China now has the upper hand.' It cites as evidence the fact that President Trump accorded President Xi exceptional treatment, including an airport welcome, a state dinner, and a private tea [14].

Channel NewsAsia assessed that a 'grand bargain' would be difficult to expect from this visit. Instead, it predicted that Beijing would focus on adding substantive content to the 'strategic stability' framework for managing long-term competition [17]. Foreign Affairs also points out that the two countries had already agreed to a 'constructive relationship of strategic stability' at the Beijing summit in May. This is significant as it is the first shared definition of the relationship by the two leaders in over a decade [5].

However, skepticism within the United States is also considerable. Many observers in Washington dismiss this framework as 'empty words' [5]. The U.S. defense journal Defense News reported that the U.S. Navy is experiencing a series of setbacks, including a destroyer power outage in the South China Sea and morale problems aboard the aircraft carrier USS Lincoln. It also noted the observation that Chinese military analysts are welcoming these developments [15]. On the other hand, The Economist pointed out that China 'is not yet ready for a post-American world.' It cites as evidence the fact that despite the Trump administration's missteps surrounding the Iran war, President Xi failed to use economic leverage over the conflicting parties to exert mediating influence [18].

In terms of public opinion, a shift is perceptible. According to a survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Americans' perception of China is softening. The proportion viewing China as a threat has decreased, public support for Taiwan has weakened, and responses favoring engagement over containment have increased [10]. This is a clear reversal compared to public opinion toward China, which hit a low point in 2024 [10].

3. Analysis of Key Actors

Chinese Academia and Strategic Communityis consolidating its discourse in a direction that treats the decline of U.S. hegemony as a fait accompli. Chinese scholars, represented by Zuo Xiying, recommend a cautious management approach, 'safeguarding their country's core interests' rather than seeking full-scale confrontation with the U.S. [3]. This is based on the judgment that a premature head-on collision during a power transition phase would not be advantageous for China. For the Chinese leadership, this discourse serves as a foundation for its negotiating leverage with the U.S. and, domestically, as a basis for legitimizing the endurance of long-term competition.

The Trump Administrationseeks to delay the trend of hegemonic weakening through tariffs and shifting burdens to allies, but Chinese academia points to this as a factor that actually accelerates the decline [3]. Nadia Schadlow, a former national security strategist for Trump, was the architect of the 2017 strategy that defined China as a strategic competitor. In a recent interview, she assessed that 'China has enormous leverage over the United States.' She reports that the perception is spreading in Washington that 'the U.S. has to play catch-up' [1]. This indicates that the theory of U.S. superiority over China is wavering even within the Trump administration.

Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)points out that at the time of the October 2025 Xi-Trump summit, the United States perceived its status as a trade-deficit country as leverage. Treasury Secretary Besant's remark, 'What do we have to lose if China raises tariffs?' is a case in point [6][12]. However, PIIE counters that China still holds resources and supply chain elements that the United States needs [6][12].

U.S. Congress and Security Communityis concerned about the weakening effectiveness of 'strategic ambiguity' regarding the Taiwan Strait issue. The Diplomat analyzes that while the Trump administration is inviting skepticism about its commitment to defending Taiwan, the policy of strategic ambiguity itself has not yet been completely abandoned [13]. This is directly linked to the military dimension of U.S.-China strategic competition, particularly discussions on deterrence posture in the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific.

Western China Expert Groups, including Kevin Ruddbelieve that even after the summit, the fundamental questions of managing competition, reducing conflict risk, and exploring areas for cooperation have not been resolved [11]. Orville Schell, in a similar context, assesses that Trump and Xi 'are failing to stop the downward spiral in U.S.-China relations' [16].

4. Key Issues

The first issue is defining the nature of the decline of U.S. hegemony. Chinese academia is leaning toward defining it as a structural and irreversible process [3]. In contrast, many observers and policymakers in the U.S. view it as a temporary adjustment phase or dismiss the theory of Chinese superiority over the U.S. as an exaggerated narrative [18].

The second issue is the extent to which this discourse is reflected in China's actual strategy toward the United States. Despite its perception of hegemonic decline, China is pursuing a course of managed competition rather than full-scale confrontation with the U.S. [3][17]. This is also evident in President Xi's U.S. visit, in the form of 'substantiating strategic stability rather than seeking a grand bargain' [17].

The third issue is the implication of this debate for phases of military tension, such as in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The U.S. Navy's recent operational setbacks and the declining credibility of its strategic ambiguity policy [15][13] are serving as factors that both provide empirical evidence for the Chinese academic theory of hegemonic decline and heighten concerns about the regional deterrence posture.

As this debate is unfolding alongside the U.S.-China summit on the multilateral stage of the UN General Assembly, it is also intertwined with the foundation of trust in the multilateral order itself. The trend of China treating the decline of the U.S.-led order as a fait accompli suggests the possibility that China will more proactively engage in setting alternative norms and agendas in multilateral organizations, including the UN, in the future. From the perspective of middle powers, including South Korea, it is necessary to closely watch how the changes in mutual perception between the U.S. and China could simultaneously have ripple effects on the military competition in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and on discussions about reorganizing the multilateral order.

II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue

China's Perception of U.S. Strategy: The Resurgence of the 'Decline of U.S. Hegemony' Debate — An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The Chinese academic theory of U.S. hegemonic decline is not a one-off discourse. It is an extension of analysis accumulated since the second half of 2025. Scholars including Zuo Xiying (左希迎) examined U.S. national power across four pillars: political influence, economic strength, military power, and technological level. Their conclusion was that 'U.S. hegemony is structurally weakening from within' [3]. The core of this diagnosis lies in the phrase 'from within.' Chinese academia points not to the rise of an external challenger but to the self-consumption of the U.S. system itself as the cause.

The policy responses of a potential second Trump administration have provided crucial material for this debate. The imposition of tariffs and the shifting of defense costs and responsibilities to allies have been defined in Chinese academic circles as a 'shift from benevolent hegemony to predatory hegemony' [3]. The implication of this conceptual shift is clear: it signifies a transition from a model where the hegemon bore the costs of maintaining its position to one where it shifts those costs onto allies and partners. Chinese academia dually interprets this shift as both a symptom and a cause of hegemonic weakening. While it may delay the decline in the short term, in the long term it 'will not only fail to prevent the decline of hegemony but may even accelerate it' [3].

An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace shares a similar perspective. It views the symbolic timing of the 250th anniversary of America's founding as a trigger for the debate within China [2]. This choice of timing is not coincidental. It reflects an intention to assess the sustainability of the American system over a long-term, 250-year timeline. At the same time, coinciding with the real-world diplomatic trend of successive Trump-Xi summits, the academic debate is functioning as a reference for the actual formulation of strategy toward the U.S.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure

What Chinese academia is focusing on is the erosion of the foundation of trust in U.S. domestic politics. The assessment is that the Trump administration's isolationist and protectionist policies have 'significantly weakened the trust of major powers in the United States' [3]. This is not simply distrust of a specific administration. It leads to the projection that even if a Democratic administration returns to power after 2028, 'it will not be easy to restore it' [3]. This means it is escalating from a policy-level distrust that can be restored by a change in government to a structural skepticism about the entire U.S. system.

Signs of such fissures are also perceptible within the United States. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey revealed that Americans perceive China as less threatening than before, support for Taiwan has decreased, and the preference for engagement over containment has grown [10]. The timing of this shift in public opinion is significant, as it was released just before the Trump-Xi summit. However, the survey also points to the existence of clear partisan divides [10]. The very fact that U.S. domestic perception of China is fragmented rather than unified can be read as circumstantial evidence supporting what Chinese academia calls 'weakening from within.'

Economic Structure

The economic basis for the hegemonic decline theory comes from a reassessment of the asymmetry in U.S.-China interdependence. The Peterson Institute for International Economics points out that the Trump administration, heading into the October 2025 summit, was confident in using its status as a trade-deficit country as leverage. Treasury Secretary Besant's remark, 'What do we have to lose if China raises tariffs?' represents this perception [6][12]. However, this analysis is countered by the argument that China still holds things the U.S. needs. The argument is that China's control over rare earth elements and key nodes in the supply chain contradicts the U.S. perception of its superior negotiating power [6][12].

Nadia Schadlow, a former national security strategist for Trump, offered a diagnosis in the same vein. She assessed that China holds 'enormous leverage' over the United States, and revealed that a belated recognition has formed within Washington that 'the U.S. has to play catch-up' [1]. The fact that an official who defined China as a strategic competitor during the formulation of the first Trump administration's security strategy in 2017 is now, eight years later, admitting to an American underestimation adds empirical weight to the Chinese academic debate on hegemonic decline.

Security Structure

On the military front, a series of setbacks for the U.S. Navy is drawing the attention of Chinese military analysts. Following reports of incidents like a destroyer's power loss in the South China Sea and morale problems on the aircraft carrier USS Lincoln, the neglect of the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding capacity has been pointed out as a long-accumulated problem [15]. Defense News reports that despite this situation, the current administration is putting forward various maritime strategy concepts [15]. This shows that in the military dimension of U.S.-China strategic competition, America's structural weaknesses are being exposed while policy correction attempts are also underway.

The Brookings Institution points to the fissures that the Iran war has left in America's Indo-Pacific strategy. The gap between Washington's stated priority for the Indo-Pacific and its actual policy implementation is widening [9]. This shows that the United States faces the structural constraint of having to allocate resources simultaneously to two fronts: the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. The 'weakening from within' that Chinese academia argues for is also linked to this problem of resource allocation overstretch.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

China's current debate on hegemonic decline needs to be compared with the ebb and flow of theories on U.S. hegemony after the Cold War. Paul Kennedy's 'Rise and Fall of the Great Powers' debate in the 1980s and the theory of U.S. decline after the late-2000s financial crisis both lost steam after a certain period in the face of American resilience. It is assessed that a cautious perspective, conscious of this history, likely exists within Chinese academia as well. The Economist diagnosed that 'China is not ready for a post-American world,' assessing that Trump's failed intervention in the Iran war was a premature opportunity for China [18]. The point is also raised that President Xi Jinping did not show clear leadership in mediating the Middle East conflict [18]. This suggests that the Chinese academic theory of hegemonic decline may be a discourse separate from China's actual replacement capability.

A comparison with the d ente of the Nixon-Kissinger era is also valid. Foreign Affairs defines the recent Trump-Xi summit as 'the emergence of a U.S.-China d ente,' assessing that the two countries agreed to a 'constructive relationship of strategic stability' [5]. This follows a similar pattern to Nixon's 1972 visit to China, where the U.S. and China redefined their relationship within the Cold War framework, mediated by their shared concern over the Soviet Union. However, the current d ente is different in nature, as it is not cooperation to check a third party but a 'strategic stability' framework for managing bilateral competition [17].

The future task for U.S.-China relations mentioned by Kevin Rudd—the challenge of 'managing competition, lowering the risk of conflict, and finding areas of cooperation' [11]—aims for a management mechanism similar to the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations of the 1970s and 1980s. However, Orville Schell, writing in Foreign Affairs, assesses that Trump and Xi 'cannot stop the U.S.-China downward spiral' [16]. He points out that America's 20th-century diplomatic successes, such as the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan in 1945 and the founding of NATO in 1949, have set current expectations excessively high [16]. This suggests a paradoxical structure where past successful experiences make current failures in hegemonic management more conspicuous.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the continuation of the Trump administration's policy of tariffs and shifting costs to allies. If this policy persists, the self-consuming nature of what Chinese academia calls 'predatory hegemony' could become more pronounced. Conversely, if the policy stance softens, some of the arguments for the decline theory could be weakened.

The second variable is the direction of change in U.S. public perception of China. Whether the trend toward preferring engagement, as shown by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey, continues or reverts to a hardline stance amid partisan divides will determine the future stability of U.S.-China relations [10].

The third variable is the actual pace of recovery for U.S. military assets, including the Navy. As long as the effectiveness of rebuilding shipbuilding capacity and deploying forces to the Indo-Pacific remains unconfirmed, the optimistic observations of Chinese military analysts will continue to gain traction [15].

The fourth variable is whether the 'strategic stability' framework agreed upon at the Trump-Xi summit is substantiated. Channel NewsAsia predicted that the recent visit would focus on adding substantive content to the existing framework rather than on a grand bargain [17]. Whether this framework leads to concrete implementation measures or remains, as Washington skeptics suggest, 'empty words' [5] will directly influence the tone of the decline theory in Chinese academia going forward.

The fifth variable is the effectiveness of the 'strategic ambiguity' policy regarding the Taiwan Strait. The Diplomat assesses that while analyses suggest the Trump administration has undermined the credibility of this policy, the policy itself has not yet been abandoned [13]. The future direction of this policy will be a key indicator in determining the extent to which China will trust U.S. military deterrence.

This debate is directly linked to the diplomatic space for middle powers, including South Korea. Previous EAI research has pointed out that 'as a middle power with close ties to both countries in all political, military, and economic aspects, South Korea should focus its diplomatic and military capabilities on enabling both countries to interpret and perceive each other's strategies in a more positive and moderate direction' [7]. If China formulates its U.S. strategy based on the premise that the irreversible decline of U.S. hegemony is a foregone conclusion, it is highly likely that the intensity and methods of Chinese pressure on U.S. allies and partners, including South Korea, will be adjusted accordingly.