[North Korea and the World] The Duality of the ‘Hostile Two-State’ Doctrine and the Future of North Korea Policy

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nUJlL5aCFME

■ Author: Park Won-gon _Director, Center for North Korean Studies, East Asia Institute. Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Program Manager and Editor: Lim Jaehyun_Research Associate, EAI

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhlim@eai.or.kr

Video Script

North Korea's Declaration of a "Hostile Two-State Relationship" and Its Background

This means it has created the firepower to attack South Korean territory at ranges from 60 to 420 kilometers. Thank you for tuning in to Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, we'll discuss a topic that remains controversial: What exactly should we call North Korea? Some voices say we should call it the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, while there are also strong arguments for simply using "North Korea" and "South Korea." Various opinions continue to emerge. Today, I'd like to bring some clarity to this issue. Of course, my goal is not to tell you what you should or shouldn't call North Korea. Rather, I want to explore the background that sparked this discussion: the declaration made by North Korea's General Secretary Kim Jong Un in December 2023, which established the so-called "hostile two-state relationship" and effectively abandoned unification. While I have touched on this a few times on my YouTube channel, today I want to delve deeper into the interpretive meaning of this declaration and explore what

background and intentions are driving North Korea's actions. I believe this discussion is far more important than the debate over whether to call North Korea the DPRK. Understanding North Korea's precise intentions is crucial for determining how to engage with it. First, let's revisit the declaration made by General Secretary Kim Jong Un. I believe North Korea declared this "hostile two-state relationship" for at least a few reasons, and that there are broadly two or more background factors at play. Let's start by examining the exact words used by Kim Jong Un. This is the most widely cited and discussed part of his concluding remarks at the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea on December 30, 2023: "We must face the reality that North-South relations are no longer relations between kin or people of the same stock, but are now relations between two hostile states, two belligerents in a state of war."

This, I believe, is the substance of what we call the "hostile two-state relationship" theory and was its initial declaration. This declaration has been consistently reaffirmed. It was confirmed once again at the 9th Party Congress held this February. I will quote Kim Jong Un's speech from that event verbatim as well: "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has nothing to discuss with the Republic of Korea, its most hostile entity, and will forever exclude South Korea from the category of kin." So, it has been made very clear that the relationship with South Korea is no longer one between kin. Instead, North Korea has thoroughly otherized South Korea as a hostile state and redefined it as a belligerent. By explicitly stating that it has completely excluded South Korea from the category of kin, it has confirmed that the two Koreas are no longer one nation. This is highly significant. In South Korea, interest in unification has waned, especially among the younger generation. In contrast, until this declaration, unification was the most important goal for North Korea.

It always framed everything through the lens of unification. For example, during the Arduous March, a period of non-supply from the mid-to-late 1990s when the collapse of the public distribution system led to mass starvation—with estimates of the dead ranging from 400,000 to as many as 2 million—the regime's explanation for the suffering was national division. They propagated the idea that they were suffering because of the reality of division and that unification would solve all their problems. This shows just how much the concept of unification occupied a central place in North Korea's ideological framework. However, in December 2023, Kim Jong Un declared that South Korea is no longer kin and that North Korea will no longer pursue unification. Since then, it has been working to eliminate the concept of a single Korean people. For instance, whereas maps previously showed the entire Korean Peninsula, they are now often cut in half to show only North Korea, with the South blacked out.

One of the most striking changes was the demolition of the Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification. This was a very large structure at the entrance to the highway from Pyongyang to Kaesong, and they tore it down. The Three Charters for National Reunification was a historical legacy from his predecessors, yet he eliminated it. Also, in a relatively recent biographical film about Kim Il Sung, there is a scene where he is looking at a globe. The Korean Peninsula is marked on that globe. Originally, both South and North Korea were

Failure to Control Inflow of Foreign Culture and a Self-Defensive Declaration of Defeat

marked in red, but they altered their own documentary film to show only North Korea in red. This shows they are engaged in an effort to "erase" South Korea. So why did North Korea make this choice? There is clear evidence that helps us understand. One of the most prominent examples is the "Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture," which North Korea enacted in 2020. According to this law, which refers to South Korea as a "puppet," anyone caught watching a South Korean film is subject to a very strict punishment of at least five to ten years, or even more, of correctional labor.

The law even stipulates that those who distribute such materials can face a life sentence of correctional labor. Another example is the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act, promulgated in 2023. This law reveals just how much South Korean culture is spreading in the North. For example, it bans the use of the term "oppa." Calling a man "oppa" between young men and women who are not blood relatives is a South Korean practice and is therefore forbidden. In South Korea, even married women sometimes call their husbands "oppa." This trend has apparently become popular in North Korea as well.

So, the law strictly forbids it. You are not even allowed to call your own biological older brother "oppa"; you must call him "orabeoni." The term "appa" (dad) is also banned because it is seen as having come from South Korea. The destructive power of language is immense, isn't it? Once a language begins to spread, its influence is profound, and South Korean language is already spreading throughout North Korean society. From the perspective of the Kim Jong Un regime, this inevitably poses a major challenge. South Korean movies, music, and dramas have become widespread, and even the words and expressions used by North Koreans are becoming significantly South Korean in style.

When North Korea passed these kinds of laws, a few things became clear to me. First, the North Korean authorities can no longer stop this flow. The regime tried to block it through various means, such as the Leader's teachings, but ultimately failed, which is why it resorted to passing such a strict law. But the fact that this law was passed and promulgated has great significance for North Korean society. This is because North Korea, not being a state ruled by law, usually does not publicize such laws even if they are created. These types of laws are rarely made in the first place. The creation of this law establishes what can be described as "common knowledge" among the people. The authorities themselves have confirmed that "I'm not the only one doing this; the people next to me are doing it too." People realize, "I'm not the only one calling someone 'oppa'; others are too. I'm not the only one watching South Korean movies; others are watching movies, dramas, and listening to music. That must be why such a strong law was created."

This allows North Koreans to understand, as a form of common knowledge, that South Korean culture is widespread in their country. The North Korean regime has a strong tendency to avoid the spread of facts that are disadvantageous or challenging to it. That is why it rarely creates or publicizes such laws. The fact that North Korea has repeatedly publicized this indicates that the authorities can no longer control the situation. This is especially true for the "Jangmadang generation," those born after the late 1990s, following the period of non-supply and the Arduous March. This generation has two key characteristics. First, their loyalty to the state and the government is weak. This is because from birth, they did not receive provisions from the state; instead, they saw their mothers earning a living for the family through economic activities in the jangmadang (markets). This naturally leads to the sentiment, "What has the state ever done for me?" and thus low loyalty to the state is a hallmark of the Jangmadang generation. The second characteristic is their

high frequency of exposure to foreign culture, especially what North Korea calls "puppet culture"—South Korean culture. This has been well-documented through numerous interviews and surveys with North Korean defectors. For the Kim Jong Un regime, which must manage this generation, it feels it has no choice but to sever all ties with South Korea. The message is, "South Koreans are not a people we should associate with anymore." It calls them the "Republic of Korea tribe" while referring to themselves as the "Kim Il Sung nation." The implication is, "We are not the same people. They are not the object of our unification." This is why, despite the harsh rhetoric, it reached a point where it had no choice but to declare that it would no longer associate with them. Therefore, I would describe the first reason for this shift in policy toward the South as a self-defensive declaration of defeat.

An Offensive Military Plan to Occupy and Retake South Korea

In other words, it has thoroughly otherized and antagonized the Republic of Korea. This decision was made based on the judgment that maintaining any meaningful relationship with South Korea poses a serious challenge to the regime's stability. The second point is that this was a self-defensive declaration of defeat made from a position of weakness. But a crucial question is: does North Korea stop there? To put it differently, as Kim Yo Jong once said, "Let's live without interfering with each other." If they are to live as completely separate entities, has their interest in military objectives—such as an invasion using armed force or an occupation of South Korea—diminished?

Is it content to simply live in peaceful coexistence or as two separate entities that do not interfere with each other? The problem is that this is not the case. There is a second reason for North Korea's policy shift, which is clearly confirmed by Kim Jong Un's statements and the regime's behavior over the past two and a half years. As mentioned, North Korea declared its "hostile two-state relationship" at the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in December 2023. Then, in a policy speech at the 10th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly on January 15, 2024, Kim Jong Un said the following: "In the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula, I believe it is important to reflect the issue of completely occupying, pacifying, and retaking the Republic of Korea and annexing it into the territory of our Republic." This is not simply about otherizing South Korea and leaving it alone. It means that if an opportunity arises, North Korea will use its military power to occupy, pacify, retake, and annex the South. The terms "retaking" and "annexing" are particularly noteworthy. "Retaking" means reclaiming land that one has lost.

"Annexing" means incorporating something that should have originally been part of one's territory. Therefore, the use of these four words together—occupying, pacifying, retaking, and annexing—should be interpreted not as a lack of interest in South Korea, but as a very aggressive expression of will to use military force to make South Korea its own territory if needed—a will to achieve unification by force. Notably, Kim Jong Un is the first to use these four terms together. While Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung spoke of occupation and pacification, they never spoke of annexation and retaking in the same breath. This suggests it can be read as a very aggressive shift in policy toward the South. Furthermore, in an Army Day speech on February 8, 2024, Kim Jong Un stated that in a contingency, occupying and pacifying "their" territory is a "national policy." "Their" territory refers to South Korea's territory, and "national policy" (guksi) means the state's highest goal. Thus, he was saying that if an opportunity arises in a contingency, occupying and pacifying South Korean territory is

the nation's highest objective. It doesn't stop there. At the 9th Party Congress this February, he also said that the possibility of South Korea's complete collapse cannot be ruled out. If necessary, they will use their military force to attack and completely destroy South Korea, after which they will occupy, pacify, annex, and retake it. That is what he is saying. Therefore, when we look at North Korea's "hostile two-state relationship" theory, we should not look at only one side of it. There is clearly this aggressive dimension. Recently, there have been reports that its "borderization" work is nearly complete. We need to look closely at this borderization work. In August, Dr. Hong Min of the Hongik Institute published a significant report titled "North Korea's Southern Borderization and Military Measures." It explains the process in detail. It began with North Korea's declaration of a southern border. In the second stage, it moved to physical severance. In October 2024, it blew up the Gyeongui and Donghae railway lines.

In stage three, moving into 2025, it is carrying out fortification work. It began the practice of border management and started turning the border into a kind of fortress. In stage four, which began this year with events like the 9th Party Congress, it has legalized and made it party policy to fortify the border line between two distinct states. It amended the constitution at the 9th Party Congress, which signifies that it has clearly defined its own border. What is currently underway is a shift in the firepower posture at the border. This is the key point: North Korea is not simply fortifying its border defensively to prevent a South Korean attack. It is also very actively taking various measures to be able to attack if necessary.

This appears to be a complex national project that combines constitutional amendments, revisions to military doctrine, changes in unit organization and facilities, and the modernization of its firepower systems. To use Dr. Hong Min's phrasing, we are talking about the multiple rocket launcher batteries with considerable range that we are familiar with. As part of the borderization work, many of these batteries have been moved toward the southern border. It has deployed multiple rocket launchers with a range of about 60 km, capable of striking Seoul and the metropolitan area in a contingency, as well as other short-range firepower and long-range artillery. It has also developed a precision automated strike system and can link it with tactical nuclear weapons. This means it has created the firepower to attack South Korean territory at ranges from 60 to 420 kilometers. Why was this created? We need to think about that. For defensive purposes, there would be no need to build such things. But creating a system capable of striking virtually the entirety of South Korea up to 420 km away means that it will attack if it deems it necessary in a contingency.

Implications of the Shift in Policy Toward South Korea and Policy Recommendations

It contains the will and intent to do so. Kim Jong Un has said this on at least several occasions. He has stated that if South Korea attacks even 0.001mm or 1mm of North Korean land, they will have the legal right to attack South Korea under their preemptive strike doctrine. By saying they can attack over an incursion of just 0.001mm or 1mm, he is demonstrating a very aggressive posture. So, while it may appear on the surface to be only a fortified, defensive border, in reality, by forward-deploying nuclear-capable weapon systems, it is reorganizing the border itself into a system for executing its offensive military and nuclear strategies. It is institutionalizing offensive planning, not defensive crisis management. What do you all think? With this level of capability and these kinds of preparations, do you really think North Korea's "hostile two-state relationship" theory is simply about coexistence with South Korea? While that aspect certainly exists,

if we only emphasize that part, we risk overlooking the other, more crucial half: its intention to occupy, pacify, annex, and retake the South—what it calls a "national policy"—whenever it desires. So what does all this mean? To summarize: First, it is a strong denial of shared ethnicity. It is thoroughly otherizing, distorting, and antagonizing the Republic of Korea. Second, contrary to what some have suggested, this is not a move toward peaceful coexistence, nor has North Korea taken any steps toward recognition under international law. In December 2023, North Korea unilaterally redefined the nature of the relationship without any procedures for establishing diplomatic ties, mutual recognition, or approval. Third, this is not about peaceful coexistence. Far from respecting the other's sovereignty and territory, it is explicitly stating its intent to occupy, pacify, retake, and annex that territory if necessary. Fourth, it completely denies South Korea's legitimacy. While it calls South Korea the "Republic of Korea," it also uses other

epithets like the "puppet Republic of Korea tribe." Therefore, to reiterate, it is saying: "South Korea, you exist, but not as kin. You exist as our principal enemy, a target to be annihilated in a contingency." It is a third type of construct that is neither recognition nor denial, under which the intent and will to occupy South Korea in a contingency remain. So, what should be done? We need to understand these things clearly. The "hostile two-state relationship" theory that North Korea espouses is not just about peaceful coexistence. That is only half the story, and the other half is far more aggressive. In that case, I don't need to give you a direct answer for you to consider this: if we call North Korea the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," will they then recognize South Korea's existence and move toward peaceful coexistence? I do not believe so. I believe it is crucial that we properly assess these aspects and formulate our North Korea policy accordingly. Thank you for watching.