[The 10th EAI Academy] V. An Age of Mistrust: The Dynamics and Challenges of Improving Japan-South Korea Relations

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=APGlmeLkKfc

■ Son Yeol_EAI Distinguished Research Fellow, Professor at Yonsei University.

Video Transcript

The South Korea-Japan relationship, much like the South Korea-U.S. and South Korea-China relationships, is a crucial bilateral tie. It is also frequently a source of significant political controversy. Even in the 21st century, the relationship is often described as one between 'close yet distant neighbors,' but in reality, it is rare for neighboring countries to get along well. South Korea's relationship with China has not always been amicable, and in Europe, countries like the United Kingdom and France, or France and Germany, were constantly at war until the formation of a unified European Union (EU).

In Asia, too, many countries such as China and Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia, and India and Pakistan have complex relationships. Maintaining good relations with neighboring countries is inherently difficult. While the U.S.-Canada relationship has also become somewhat strained recently, this may be an exceptional case. Therefore, we first need to consider that it is not particularly unusual for the South Korea-Japan relationship to be called one of 'close yet distant neighbors.' Second, when President Kim Dae-jung visited Japan in 1998, he remarked in a speech to the Diet that it would be foolish to render meaningless 1500 years of exchange and cooperation because of an unfortunate history of less than 50 years. However, this statement can be seen as inaccurate, as the two countries were not always on friendly terms throughout those 1500 years.

In the past, there were times of cooperation and times of conflict, and a considerably long history of mutual jealousy and animosity. In that sense, the current South Korea-Japan relationship can be seen as an extension of the past. However, a distinctive feature of the South Korea-Japan relationship compared to other bilateral ties is that emotional confrontation and distrust stemming from historical issues negatively affect security and economic cooperation. This conflict and hesitation to cooperate, in turn, create a vicious cycle that makes resolving historical issues even more difficult. This originates from the problems of imperialism and colonialism in the modern era.

The Vicious Cycle in South Korea-Japan Relations and Pathways to Improvement

This vicious cycle also serves as a cause that hinders the resolution of historical issues. Looking back over the past 15 years or so, we have been experiencing this vicious cycle. Therefore, what I want to discuss with you today is, first, how this vicious cycle in South Korea-Japan relations has specifically unfolded and how it can be conceptualized. Second is what must be done to break free from this vicious cycle and move toward improving relations.

Traditionally, there has been a conflict between the argument that resolving historical issues must come first to improve South Korea-Japan relations, and the argument for gradually resolving them through future-oriented cooperation rather than tackling them directly. In other words, there has been a debate between the two countries over where to place the priority in policies for improving relations. Let's look at the next page.

This graph shows the results of an EAI public opinion poll on which issues the new government should prioritize in its diplomacy toward Japan. I compared the results from 2021 and 2025 (last year). In the poll before the 2021 presidential election, we asked what the next government's Japan policy should be, and in the 2025 poll, we asked the same question before the new government's inauguration. Four years ago, in 2021, the response that resolving historical issues—namely the 'comfort women' issue or the forced labor issue—should be the priority was more prevalent than future-oriented cooperation. Although it was a close margin at 40% versus 35%, public opinion still favored prioritizing the resolution of historical issues.

However, in the poll just before last year's presidential election, the results completely reversed. The response for resolving current historical issues decreased by about 10%, while the response for pursuing future-oriented cooperation increased by 15%. Now, more people believe that pursuing future-oriented cooperation over functional cooperation should be the priority for the new government's Japan policy. I imagine that more than half of you here today share the same thought. So, there are contentious points about what should be done first to improve relations. With that, I will pose four questions and conclude today's lecture with the answers to them. First, we need to systematically examine the vicious cycle in South Korea-Japan relations, or the obstacles to improving relations, that has existed so far.

Second, relations have actually been improving since 2020, and this trend continues to this day. The years 2019 and 2020 are considered the worst period in South Korea-Japan relations since the normalization of diplomatic ties. Japan unilaterally declared export controls on materials for South Korea's semiconductor manufacturing process, and South Korea retaliated by removing Japan from its white list. This even spread to security issues, with the South Korean government considering the termination of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan.

Underlying this situation was the confrontation between South Korea and Japan related to the forced labor ruling. Historical issues flared up, leading to economic confrontation, which then escalated into security confrontation. This chain reaction pushed South Korea-Japan relations to their worst point. However, since then, there has been a steady trend of improvement over the past six years. So, the second question is: what are the main drivers of this improving trend? The third question is: what are we trying to achieve by improving relations? Is improving South Korea-Japan relations enough? The same goes for improving South Korea-U.S. relations and South Korea-China relations.

The president visited China in early January, emphasizing the restoration of South Korea-China relations in his meeting with President Xi Jinping. Are South Korea-China relations improving? Are they shifting toward a friendly relationship? The same applies to South Korea-Japan relations. There must be a path beyond simply improving relations to achieving practical cooperation, and then strengthening that cooperation to realize the national interests of both countries. The third question is what needs to be done for this. Lastly, from this perspective, we need a discussion on what the current government should do, what its immediate tasks are, and what its strategy and future direction should be. I will proceed with today's discussion along these four general points. Let's move on.

Changes in the fundamental nature of the Korea-Japan relationship

The basic nature of the South Korea-Japan relationship can be described in several ways. First, while an asymmetry in national power existed between the two countries, it is gradually changing into a symmetrical relationship. In the past, it was an asymmetrical relationship, but now it can be seen as moving toward a symmetrical one. If you look at GDP, military indicators, and defense spending, they are very close. When I visited Japan at your age, the GDP ratio was 1 to 8, but now South Korea's is about $1.9 trillion and Japan's is about $4.4 trillion, a difference of just over double. In terms of per capita GDP, Japan and South Korea are almost the same. Therefore, as the asymmetry in national power between the two countries shifts toward symmetry, the fundamental nature of the relationship will naturally change.

Think about it. South Korea's attitude toward Japan when it was eight times larger would naturally be different from its attitude now, when it is about twice as large. It's like how we treat China. When I was your age, China had a very large GDP, but its per capita GDP was among the lowest of developing countries. That China has changed dramatically. Just as the basic power dynamics of a bilateral relationship change, so too does the South Korea-Japan relationship. That's the first point. The second is economic interdependence.

In the past, Japan was the world's second-largest economy, and South Korea was a nation chasing that economic powerhouse. South Korea primarily followed the Japanese model, and when starting new industries, it learned from Japan. Samsung's founder, Lee Byung-chul, also learned from Japan, and Chairman Lee Kun-hee received semiconductor technology from Japan's Toshiba. The steel industry also built Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) with help from Japan's Nippon Steel. It was similar in many industries, including petrochemicals, semiconductors, and automobiles. In the case of Renault Samsung Motors, when Samsung started its automobile business, it modeled it after Japan's Nissan.

Samsung Motors was started around 1995-1996 as Chairman Lee Kun-hee's dream, and a factory was built in Busan. Samsung is a company that rarely fails, but it experienced a major failure in the automobile industry. Even when starting that business, it learned the technology from Japan. In other words, at that time, South Korea's development model was to learn Japan's technology, chase it, and catch up.

South Korea competed with Japan in many industries. In most sectors, such as textiles, petrochemicals, steel, electronics, automobiles, and semiconductors, South Korea caught up with Japan. This relationship of mutual pursuit and intra-industry competition has now shifted to a mutually complementary one. You probably can't think of a Japanese rival to Samsung Electronics or SK Hynix. These companies started making memory semiconductors by learning from Japan, but now Japan has lost its competitiveness, and South Korea has become the world's largest producer of memory semiconductors. However, even though South Korea produces memory semiconductors, it imports almost all the necessary materials, components, and equipment from Japan.

When Samsung or Hynix makes chips, Japanese materials, components, and equipment companies make a huge profit. This is a win-win situation, forming a single supply chain where the economies operate in a mutually complementary way. This has become a very important characteristic of the current South Korea-Japan relationship. It means that mutual interdependence has deepened considerably. When interdependence deepens, what happens to the relationship between countries? It depends on how that interdependence deepens, but in a symmetrical interdependent relationship, it is difficult to sever ties recklessly, and it is also difficult to weaponize the interdependence.

However, it's different when interdependence is asymmetrical. For example, let's consider the South Korea-China relationship. South Korea absolutely needs to export to China, but China's export share to South Korea is not high. China exports to many other countries besides South Korea, and its imports from South Korea do not account for a large portion of its total imports. In this case, if relations between South Korea and China were severed, which side would suffer more damage?

South Korea would suffer more. In other words, South Korea has greater structural vulnerability due to interdependence. This is the case when it is structured asymmetrically. When a relationship is asymmetrical, like the South Korea-U.S. relationship, one side has structural vulnerability and has no choice but to yield to the other's coercion. For example, when the U.S. demanded a 25% tariff, South Korea was in an uproar but eventually accepted the demand to invest $450 billion in the U.S. in exchange for a 10% tariff cut. This is the tariff and investment agreement between South Korea and the U.S.

Why did we do that? Because we have structural vulnerability. Japan knew this as well, which is why it carried out economic retaliation in the form of export controls against South Korea in 2019. The reason for the economic retaliation was the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling that Japanese companies must compensate victims of forced labor. The Japanese companies protested, arguing that the issue had already been resolved by the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations, yet a domestic South Korean court was ordering them to pay compensation.

Why did we do that? It's because we have structural vulnerability. Japan, knowing this, implemented economic retaliation against South Korea in 2019 in the form of export controls. The reason for this retaliation was a ruling by the South Korean Supreme Court regarding forced labor, which required Japanese companies to compensate the victims. The Japanese companies refused. This was because the issue had already been resolved by the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations, yet a domestic South Korean court had ruled that Japanese companies must compensate the victims.

Japan's position is that this is a violation of international law and the 1965 treaty. However, in South Korea, since there was a Supreme Court ruling, it could not be handled administratively. So what happens if it's left as is? If the Japanese companies do not compensate, the assets of Japanese companies currently in South Korea are set to be liquidated to make the payments. The Japanese government said, 'Just you try to liquidate those assets, and we will retaliate,' and they did. But what's important now is not that, but if you look at this, the first item is hydrogen fluoride, also known as etching gas.

It is a material used in the semiconductor manufacturing process. The second is resist, or photoresist. The third is polyimide. All are key materials for semiconductors or displays. Japan completely dominates these. But if you look at hydrogen fluoride, that red line, that's the dependency on Japan. The dependency rate was that high, but it dropped steadily over the three years of 2019, 2020, and 2021. What does that mean? It means Japan completely failed. Right? For it to be retaliation, South Korea should have failed in import substitution and been put in a difficult situation, but that didn't happen.

Second, even after three years, South Korea's dependency rate on Japan for the other items did not fall. What does this mean? It means that even with Japan's export controls, the economic interdependence is so deep that even government intervention cannot achieve decoupling. The Japanese companies that make photoresist, companies with overwhelming global production competitiveness, and those with overwhelming competitiveness in polyimide, are in a position where they cannot stop exporting to Samsung and SK Hynix. They make those exports. If the Japanese government blocks them, they export to South Korea through a third country, or they build factories in South Korea to supply the two companies.

Security Interdependence and the Role of the United States

So, the dependency on Japan remains high. But they continue to do it by circumventing the Japanese government's export controls. That's how the market works. It means the interdependence network is that resilient. Right. So, between South Korea and Japan, that economic interdependence is now shifting from asymmetry to symmetry, and that interdependence is a characteristic of the current relationship, in that it's not easily severed even when the government tries to intervene. That's the second point. Third, the South Korea-Japan relationship can also be changed by security interdependence, and what is that? The bilateral alliances with the United States.

South Korea is allied with the U.S., and Japan is also allied with the U.S., right? And those alliances are the absolute core of South Korean and Japanese foreign policy. Right. Because of this, the security of South Korea and Japan is bound to be greatly shaken by changes in U.S. alliance policy. There is a scholar named Victor Cha, right? Right? His argument is that when South Korea and Japan face alliance risks from the United States, and those risks are distributed quite evenly and symmetrically, they cooperate.

But when it affects them asymmetrically, there is little incentive for them to cooperate. Do you understand? Ah, I understand the argument. Whether it's actually true or not is an empirical question, and there are many cases where it doesn't fit. But I'm explaining it through the lens of security now. This is when South Korea-Japan relations improve. What could be an example? For instance, if Trump pressures both South Korea and Japan, saying, 'You two patrol the Strait of Hormuz,' then South Korea and Japan are completely in the same boat. And if that pressure is applied equally to both countries, the incentive for them to cooperate becomes very large.

But if that's not the case, if strong pressure is put on one side and not the other, and this happens unevenly, then little incentive for cooperation arises between the two countries. It's something like that. So what this story is about is, when talking about the basic nature of the South Korea-Japan relationship as a whole, first, looking at the relationship between the two countries, there is a change where it is moving from asymmetry to symmetry. That has a significant impact on South Korea-Japan relations and cooperation. Right? Second, the South Korea-Japan economic relationship has moved from one of competition and pursuit—chasing and defending—to a stage where interdependence has deepened and is occurring in a relatively equal, symmetrical manner. Economically, that is.

The Politics of Identity and Historical Conflict

Third, a factor that greatly influences the South Korea-Japan relationship in terms of security, we might think of North Korea or China, but in reality, the important thing is U.S. security policy, U.S. alliance policy. Depending on how that alliance policy affects South Korea and Japan, the two countries may cooperate, compete, or not cooperate. And finally, there is the politics of identity. The issue of identity. In international politics, you've probably learned in school and studied through several sessions by now, but you probably have a general idea that the factor of identity is important in relations between states or in the international structure, right?

Right. You must know. What emphasizes this is so-called constructivism. So, for example, there's the concept of the security dilemma, right? There are two countries, and the other country starts a military buildup. But the leader of that country, the president, says, 'Our military buildup is all for defensive purposes.' But I don't feel it's for defensive purposes. So I also start a military buildup. To defend against you. My military buildup is also for defense. But the other country feels threatened by my military buildup. And they do more. Then I also build up my military, and this race leads to a kind of spiral of mistrust. We call that the security dilemma.

But would a security dilemma arise between the United States and Canada? This is a matter of identity. So, depending on how I view the identity of that country, or how that country views my nation's identity, the nature of the security dilemma can change significantly. The security dilemma between Israel and Iran is not simply about military capabilities, but it is accelerated by the identity of the opposing actor in that buildup—a highly demonized identity. Similarly, in the case of South Korea-Japan relations, when the two countries are in sharp emotional conflict over historical issues, Japan might say, 'China is increasingly building up its military, so we need to build up our military, not because of Korea.'

So, it actively increases its defense budget and, for its exclusively defense-oriented policy, it has only had 100% defensive weapons until now, but now it says it needs to improve its counterstrike capability. You know what that means, right? If an early missile is launched, I need to be able to strike back, so I need missiles now too. So this is a counterstrike capability, but it is actually an offensive weapon. Japan says, 'We need to do this too,' but South Korea feels threatened by it. It's becoming a major military power. You would think that when a country becomes a major military power, some countries would feel greatly threatened and others less so. It depends on their identity, on what kind of policy and identity that country has.

But this story of identity is not just about a country creating its identity in an extremist way. To a large extent, that sense of threat, that identity, is formed intersubjectively through the relationship and interaction between that country and mine. In that relational aspect, right, these things are often formed. This seems to be exactly the case when we talk about South Korea-Japan relations. So our perception of Japan, our image of Japan, and Japan's identity are constructed to a significant degree. Right?

That identity is constructed, and I construct half of it, and Japan constructs the other half, and that becomes the identity of Japan that I perceive. I have a perception of Japan's identity, and when there is a discrepancy or conflict with the identity that Japan thinks of for itself, the bilateral relationship will become difficult. Japan calls itself a 'peaceful nation,' but if we call it 'remilitarizing,' then a fight breaks out. Arguments will keep happening. In that way. Japan says, 'China is massively increasing its military power, doubling its naval power, and frequently entering Japanese territorial waters, so we need to strengthen ourselves,' but what does China say? It calls it 'new-type nationalism.'

Because it is a nationalist regime, any military buildup is unconditionally dangerous. Because it's nationalist. That's what they're saying now. China defines Japan's identity as 'nationalism,' and since calling it the pre-1945 nationalism doesn't quite make sense, it calls it 'new-type nationalism' and frames it as a dangerous regime. One must be careful. One must be vigilant. One must deter it. It is constantly creating these discourses. This is all the politics of identity, and there are considerable aspects of this in the South Korea-Japan relationship. I think you can guess. So, this concludes the introduction.

From now on is the substantive content. Since I can't talk about everything, I'll talk about how the process of conflict between South Korea and Japan over the past 10 years, as mentioned earlier, has unfolded from the perspective of the politics of identity. You are listening to this lecture because you think this approach of the politics of identity is quite useful, right? So, it's like this. In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, right, emerged and sought to reverse the trend of Japan's relative decline. Because Japan is in relative decline, he tries to reverse that trend by recalling and reviving past glory.

When Abe came to power in 2012, he called for a 'restoration of Japan.' Doesn't that sound familiar? 'The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.' Who said that? Xi Jinping. Abe said it earlier. 'Make America Great Again.' That's the revival of America. That was Trump. In 2016. So Abe was the one who started this kind of talk. He came to power in 2012 while starting this narrative. He said that Japan's problem now is a loss of confidence, that the Japanese people are losing their confidence. This loss of confidence includes falling behind major powers like the U.S., and on the other hand, it also includes a loss of confidence regarding rising countries like South Korea and China.

He said these things are due to wrong history education. You know what that means, right? Things like a masochistic view of history. Because they have been teaching the younger generations, the youth, a history that is self-deprecating since 1945, Japan's morality is collapsing. So, 'restoring Japan's glory' means that we must restore Japan's glorious past. This is a typical example of the politics of identity, right? The argument is that Japan's identity has been wrongly educated since 1945 due to wrong history education, so a task to recover Japan's original, proper identity is needed, and such an educational and political strategy is necessary. That was Abe's stance. So what does that mean? It means he will revive Japan's glorious past, but then it clashes with neighboring countries. It clashes with our history, and it clashes with China's history. Right?

In the process of reviving its past glory, Japan tries to whitewash things that were undesirable or unfortunate for it. Things like the 'comfort women.' That's what appears as a historical conflict between South Korea and Japan, and it's the same with China. So, I call Shinzo Abe's politics of identity 'restorationist nationalism.' It's a nationalism that is restorationist, a nationalism that goes back to the past. And such things typically emerge in declining great powers. Declining great powers: Putin's Russia, Abe's Japan, Trump's America. That's it. Nationalism, restoration. When you say 'Make America Great Again,' which America are you talking about?

Trump is trying to restore the American society, politics, and economy of the 1950s and 60s, when America was at its strongest. He wants to eliminate all the different aspects that have emerged since then, mainly under Democratic administrations. Therefore, Shinzo Abe's restorationist nationalism has a great-power-ist character in that sense. Japan must take the lead. Because there was such a time in the past. Right. Japan is a country that fought a three-and-a-half-year war with the United States, the world's strongest power.

It was a great power. Right. Not just for three months. It's about Japan returning to being a great power. So, Japan's current foreign policy was also a great-power-ist policy, a policy of a great power that leads the international order. And what was South Korea's position in that? A change in Japan's image, its mental picture, due to South Korea's pursuit gradually began to appear. First, from indifference to anxiety. When Japan was the world's second-largest economy and South Korea was one-eighth its size, what interest would it have had in South Korea?

There is some interest. There are concerns that if something goes wrong with South Korea's security, it would be undesirable for Japan as a neighbor. However, beyond this, a fundamental indifference is the first change, transforming into anxiety due to South Korea's rise and Japan's relative decline. Second, that anxiety manifests as a sense of superiority, which I describe with the expression 'jajonjadae' (self-respect and self-aggrandizement). You know what that means, right?

It means to respect oneself and consider oneself great, in other words, to exaggerate. It's to go beyond one's capabilities. This trend appears as an attempt to revive the Meiji era or Japan's golden age. In particular, an attempt to savor a sense of superiority from returning to the past, especially superiority over South Korea, became apparent during the Shinzo Abe era. Through this, conflict with South Korea gradually emerged. During the same period, 'resistance nationalism' appeared in South Korea.

This is a nationalism that seeks to find its value in resistance. Resistance against whom? It is anti-Japanese resistance. The Park Geun-hye administration was inaugurated in the winter of 2012, at the same time as the Shinzo Abe administration. Immediately after the Park administration's launch, a very surprising statement was made. It was a message on the March 1st Independence Movement Day, at a time when the launch of the new government was delayed due to impeachment. Originally, after the December presidential election, a new government would be launched at the end of February after a two-month transition period, which has been the standard procedure since the 1987 constitutional amendment.

However, after the Park Geun-hye administration took office at the end of February, its first message on March 1st was, 'The historical positions of perpetrator and victim will not change even after a thousand years of history.' This means that the fact that Japan is the perpetrator will not change even after a thousand years, which can be interpreted as 'you will be the perpetrator until you die.' By using the expression 'a thousand years,' she sent a very strong message. Why did she send such a message?

Former President Park Geun-hye made many interesting remarks at the time. She also said, 'If one does not learn history correctly, one's soul becomes abnormal.' Have you heard that? 'Soul becomes abnormal' means that if you don't learn history properly, the country could be ruined. Therefore, Japan's denial of history is an act that wounds the soul of South Korea, and she sent the message that this is unacceptable. This was the message at the time of the Park administration's launch, and it led to the first meeting between the Park and Abe administrations.

You can easily imagine the situation that followed. The two leaders clashed strongly. The keyword of the Park Geun-hye administration's foreign policy was 'trust-based diplomacy.' This is a concept semantically opposite to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' keyword at the time, which was 'pragmatic diplomacy.' It means that proper diplomacy or exchange and cooperation cannot be had with a country that cannot be trusted. Japan was an object of distrust due to historical issues, so conducting trust-based diplomacy with Japan was very difficult. The Park administration held a principled and strong position that trust in Japan could only be established when Japan stopped its historical denial, and only then could South Korea-Japan relations return to normal.

That position clashed head-on with Prime Minister Abe's position. From this point, the vicious cycle process in South Korea-Japan relations began in earnest. It reached the stage where resistance nationalism was re-enacted on the forefront of South Korea-Japan relations. Next is the Moon Jae-in administration. The Moon administration was a government that came to power by negating the Park administration, that is, a government that defined everything the Park administration did as 'deep-rooted evils' and sought to liquidate them. It is not desirable for a current government to prolong the liquidation of a previous one, but the Moon administration continued its liquidation of deep-rooted evils for the first year, and later for up to three years. The Moon administration strongly emphasized an 'anti-Japanese' identity.

While the Park Geun-hye administration saw Japan's denial of history as having an abnormal effect on the Korean soul, the Moon Jae-in administration saw anti-Japanese sentiment as the core of the Republic of Korea's identity. When did this anti-Japanese sentiment become prominent? It was the March 1st Movement in 1919 when the entire nation united to ignite the flames of anti-Japanese resistance. Just like the candlelight protests where people united across classes, the March 1st Movement connects democracy and anti-Japanese sentiment. Democracy is a very important element in the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea.

Democracy is linked to anti-Japanese sentiment. The historical legitimacy is that the democratic republic began with the March 1st Movement. The debate over the founding of the Republic of Korea also began at this time: 1945, 1948, 1919, etc. This was not just a discursive battle over the founding date, but an ideological conflict and competition among domestic forces over where the identity of the Republic of Korea lies. This conflict also existed during the Moon Jae-in administration. Therefore, if anti-Japanese sentiment is the identity, how should relations with Japan be conducted?

Japan must submit, one way or another. Otherwise, it would be a denial of my own identity. It is logically very difficult to take a conciliatory approach toward Japan. Japan is an important country with a GDP twice the size of South Korea's. It is also very close to the United States in terms of security. And we rely on the U.S. for our security. If we define such an important country as a perpetrator and declare that it will not change even after a thousand years, it puts a huge shackle on our diplomatic relations with Japan. The room for maneuver becomes very narrow. Similarly, if the identity of the Republic of Korea is anti-Japanese, then saying anything even slightly wrong about Japan becomes an act of denying that identity. The Moon Jae-in administration's policy toward Japan was like that.

A typical case where the politics of identity constrains foreign policy autonomy appeared in South Korea's policy toward Japan in the context of South Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, from the launch of the Park Geun-hye administration in February 2013 to the launch of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration at the end of February 2022, South Korea-Japan relations were bound to be very difficult from the South Korean perspective. This is because our politics of identity flowed in that direction. Japan was no different; although its restorationist nationalism as a declining great power did not target South Korea, it showed an attitude of casting South Korea aside if it became an obstacle in the process of pursuing a great power restoration.

As these factors overlapped, a clash of identity politics between South Korea and Japan occurred, which escalated into a huge diplomatic problem. An hour has already passed. Then I will just read this part. Oh, should I still read it? The 'resistance theory' is the 'anti-Japanese discourse.' It completely exploded in 2019. When Japan's retaliatory measure of export controls came out and South Korea responded in kind, what happened?

On the streets, the 'No Japan' movement erupted. Gwanghwamun was filled with 'No Japan' signs; it was a kind of boycott movement. There was a story that only three Lexus cars were sold at the time, and that Asahi beer had withdrawn. 'We will never again be defeated by Japan' is a quote from former President Moon Jae-in. When I quoted this in class at the time, a student asked when we had ever been defeated. So I replied that it happened before you were born. Now I understand.

The evidence of that is that we were colonized, and we will not be defeated again. Even to your ears, this sounds like a very established statement. Japan's trade retaliation was called an 'economic invasion.' Since when has the word 'invasion' been used? It was used in the same context as the exploitation and invasion by imperial Japan during the Japanese colonial period. 'Fostering materials, parts, and equipment' meant economic independence. It was about becoming independent from Japan.

But as you saw earlier, we failed to become independent in two of the three items. We just continued to use Japanese products. Economic independence was, in fact, a failure. While there was such a resistance theory, in Japan, they argue that 'South Korea is a force obstructing Japan from becoming a normal state.' They criticize South Korea for constantly raising historical issues to morally brand Japan as a criminal state and to impose a destiny of apology on future Japanese generations. They say, 'It's a bad country.'

You understand what this means, right? That we endlessly demand apologies. They call it the 'apology-necessity theory.' Have you also heard of the 'moving the goalposts theory'? It means that to keep demanding apologies, we keep moving the goalposts to create new things to apologize for. This implies that apologizing is useless. Because they believe that South Korea fundamentally has anti-Japanese sentiment and that it is South Korea's identity. Furthermore, they claim that South Korea is an 'emotional state.' Have you heard the saying, 'South Korea is emotional, and Japan is rational'? That public sentiment takes precedence over the law?

They even say there is a 'law of public sentiment' above the Constitution. Is this the first time you've heard this? This is our story. It means that it is a country where emotion always reigns over the rule of law. This identity work by Japan defines South Korea's identity as 'emotional and immature, while Japan is rational and values the rule of law.' Through this, they argue that South Korea's scrapping of the comfort women agreement and the Supreme Court's forced labor ruling violated the 1965 Basic Treaty. They counterattack by claiming that this is fundamentally a violation of the international legal order of the international community, and therefore South Korea must rectify that state of violation.

The South Korean government was indeed put on the defensive by this approach. While South Korea seeks to resolve the issue through the lens of history, Japan frames it as a matter of law and the rule of law, leading to a clash. Which country finds this conflict most troubling? And which countries enjoy it the most? The answer is North Korea and China. Think about it: when South Korea and Japan are at odds, the countries that benefit are North Korea and China. And who is the most displeased? The United States.

Drivers of Improved Relations: The United States and People-to-People Exchange

This is because its two allies are fighting. While this conflict does not directly harm the United States, it benefits its competitor, China. Consequently, two factors have contributed to the relationship's improvement after hitting rock bottom. The first is a top-down factor involving the United States, specifically the push for trilateral cooperation. The U.S. has intervened and made diplomatic efforts, urging the two sides to stop fighting and cooperate. These efforts became particularly pronounced in 2019 and 2020, when South Korea-Japan relations deteriorated to their worst point. That is the first factor.

This is because its two allies are fighting. While this conflict does not directly harm the United States, it benefits its competitor, China. Therefore, two factors have driven the relationship toward improvement after it hit rock bottom. The first is a top-down element: the U.S. factor. Through its intervention, the U.S. has made diplomatic efforts to promote trilateral cooperation, urging the two sides to "stop fighting and cooperate." These efforts intensified in 2019 and 2020, when South Korea-Japan relations reached their lowest point. This is the first factor.

The second factor is that, decoupled from all these political issues, mutual perceptions between South Koreans and Japanese have ironically improved. I have been conducting public opinion surveys on this topic since 2013, and despite the politicians' fighting, mutual perceptions were steadily improving until the major conflict erupted. In other words, different dynamics were at play. Let's take a quick look at how this unfolded. I will spend about 15 more minutes finishing this section before we move on to the Q&A.

If we look at impressions of Japan in 2019 and 2020, negative impressions are marked in red. Starting in 2013, when the Park Geun-hye and Abe administrations came to power, three out of four South Koreans had a negative impression of Japan. This figure steadily declined to around half that level by 2019. However, after the major conflict between the two countries in 2019, the number surged back to 71.6% in 2020, before falling again this year to 38.5%.

If the 2019 incident hadn't occurred, wouldn't positive impressions have continued to rise? When there was talk that the roles of perpetrator and victim would not change even after a thousand years, the positive impression rate was 12.2%. Only one in ten people thought favorably of Japan. This figure rose to 31.7%, but then fell back to 12.3% in 2020 during the aforementioned "No Japan" movement and the period of intense conflict. This was back to the 2013 level. From there, it has climbed all the way up to 54.3%. A rate of 54.3% means that more than half of the public now holds a positive impression of Japan.

This represents being "pro-Japan." The red represents "anti-Japan," similar to how we have "pro-China" and "anti-China." A thought just occurred to me: calling historical collaborators (*chin-il-pa*) simply "pro-Japan" (*chin-il*) is a very generous term. Don't you think? If we label people who want to be on friendly terms with Japan as *chin-il-pa*, then half of South Korea's population becomes *chin-il-pa*. But the term *chin-il-pa* as we've used it has referred to national traitors. Therefore, I believe we need to change the concept of the word *chin-il*. In an era when anti-Japanese resistance formed our national identity, one could perhaps understand using the term that way. But today, while the sentiment is indeed "pro-Japan," the kind of pro-Japanese stance that amounts to national betrayal is surely very limited. So, while we may feel aggrieved that the work to identify such people must continue, I also think the term *chin-il-pa* is a name that is far too euphemistic for national traitors. In any case, this is how impressions have changed.

The two factors I mentioned earlier help explain this process. If you look at Japan, while our graph for South Korean perceptions fluctuates wildly, the graph for Japanese perceptions has a relatively small amplitude. As you can see, negative impressions were on a downward trend but then spiked last year. They are coming down again this year. For positive impressions, which we can call "pro-Korea," the trend has been uneven but upward, rising until 2023, then falling last year, and recovering again this year.

What happened last year to cause this? There was a change of president in South Korea. There were doubts in Japanese society about President Lee Jae-myung because, as an opposition leader, he had consistently made very hardline remarks about Japan. This created a strong image of him in Japanese society. Since the president was inaugurated in May and we conducted our poll in August, the perception among the Japanese public that an "anti-Japan president" had taken office was very strong. That seems to be what was reflected in the data. Over the past year, through eight bilateral summits, the impression that he is "not an anti-Japan president" has grown, and I believe this has led to the change in perceptions. In any case, when we conduct small group interviews, we will ask people why they have a positive impression, going beyond the fixed choices in this survey.

If you have a positive view of Japan, what is the reason? Your answer is merely a selection from the survey items that a few colleagues and I created. I want to dig deeper and uncover the true sources of this preference for Japan among people in their 20s, because there could certainly be other reasons. In any case, the top reason cited is the national character of the Japanese people, who are seen as kind, clean, and orderly. Do you agree? The second reason is food culture, shopping, and travel to Japan. For the Japanese side, the reasons are similar: food, shopping, and travel to tourist sites in Korea.

The second reason is popular culture, like K-pop and dramas. When we consider the factors driving the improvement in relations, the "bottom-up" factors are those at the people-to-people level, and these cultural aspects are the most significant among them. Where do these impressions come from? They arise from direct contact with Japan. It's not as if you develop a liking for Japan because you read in a textbook that its people are kind, clean, and orderly. You have to experience it firsthand, right?

Or you learn about Japanese society through direct or semi-direct, indirect experiences on social media and other platforms, coming to realize, "Oh, that's what it's like." The same applies to food culture, shopping, and travel. It's a typical pattern after visiting Japan. Has everyone here been? Can I see a show of hands? [Audience refuses] Okay. In any case, that's how it is. Similarly, one reason given for liking South Korea is that it is a liberal democracy. But how can you really know a country's political identity after a short two- or three-night trip to Japan?

That kind of knowledge is what you learn from textbooks, legacy media, or in a classroom. The positive impressions being shared are based on much more direct experiences. As for negative impressions, the core is the history issue. For South Koreans, it's because Japan does not reflect on its history of aggression, which is seen as a flawed historical perception. Right? And for the Japanese? It's anti-Japan sentiment. However, the Japanese people also know where this anti-Japan sentiment comes from. It stems from the history issue. But what gives them a negative impression is their disapproval of the way South Korean politicians, people, or the state as a whole handles the history issue.

It's not about the historical perception itself—they aren't saying South Korea's understanding of history is wrong. Rather, they dislike being criticized because of it. They are dissatisfied with the South Korean side's handling of history-related issues, feeling that promises are not kept and that criticism and anti-Japan sentiment are too intense. It's a "You hate me, so why should I like you?" kind of reaction. Right. So you can see the fundamental gap: while it's the same history issue, we problematize their flawed historical perception, while they problematize the way and attitude with which we handle the issue. Right. So...

In this respect, this is not an unbridgeable gap between the two countries. It is possible to discuss the history issue. Japan, after all, is not denying the history itself. However, they feel that if the conversation is constantly framed by anti-Japan sentiment, then it's impossible to even start a dialogue. So that's the situation with the bottom-up dynamics. And at the heart of this is the younger generation. Our surveys show that their numbers are overwhelmingly high—both in terms of positive impressions and enjoyment of Japanese popular culture. Now, let's turn to the top-down factors. As I said before, the U.S. variable is the most important. It's very important. At the top-down level, even during the confrontation between Park Geun-hye and Abe, Obama and Biden made significant efforts to mediate.

Why do they try to mediate? The reason is very simple: because the conflict helps China. They believe things cannot be allowed to go in that direction. In 2019, when the "No Japan" movement I mentioned earlier began, leading to a vicious cycle of trade retaliations that even touched upon GSOMIA, the Trump administration also intervened. That intervention was largely one-sided, pressuring South Korea. You can probably guess why, right? Trump was a person who held a much more favorable view of Japan. Various memoirs show this was his personal preference regarding the Moon Jae-in administration at the time. Secondly, international politics inevitably involves a calculation of U.S. national interest: which side does America need more, and which side can help America more? And since Japan is bigger...

When South Korea and Japan fight, the U.S. calls for reconciliation, but it often sides with Japan in doing so. This was particularly the case under Trump in 2019. With the arrival of the Biden administration, this has been stated openly in a document, a white paper on its "Indo-Pacific Strategy." It's a very important document. It explicitly states that it is crucial for South Korea and Japan to strengthen their relations and that the United States is constantly encouraging them to do so. After that, with the trilateral summit at Camp David, the relationship between South Korea and Japan fully embarked on a path of genuine improvement.

A long time ago, Camp David was famously used to resolve Middle East issues, with leaders from the region invited to make declarations there. That was true in the 1970s and 80s, but since then, the presidential retreat has primarily been used for domestic political purposes—hosting banquets and meetings with leaders and issuing statements. It has rarely been used for foreign policy issues in recent years.

This shows how much importance Biden placed on the trilateral relationship. The idea is that South Korea and Japan must cooperate with each other and form a triangle with the United States. This is a key component of America's Asia or Indo-Pacific strategy. For this key trilateral component to function properly, South Korea and Japan must cooperate. And for them to cooperate, they must first reconcile and improve relations. This logic was very powerful. The converse is also true from the perspective of South Korean and Japanese national interests. Both countries face the advancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, and China is massively expanding its military capabilities.

So what should be done? There is no other option but to hold on to the United States. I recently published an issue briefing on our latest public opinion poll. The sentiment was, "We can't trust the U.S., but we dislike China." What is the alternative? There is none. There is only the ROK-U.S. alliance. So, for now, there is no choice but to hold on to and strengthen the alliance with a country we may not fully trust. I see this as the fundamental direction for all our citizens and our government. Why does this sentiment arise? In the face of such enormous geopolitical challenges, what is ultimately needed is an alliance.

But our alliance partner wants South Korea-Japan relations to improve. So they must improve. This top-down pressure has been constantly at work. Thus, the fact that relations entered a full-fledged thaw with events like the 2023 Camp David summit is due to two factors. First, there is the bottom-up trend I mentioned, which represents public support for the government's Japan policy, ultimately stemming from these favorable feelings. The second is the U.S. factor. We can see that these two factors have interconnected to create the current trend.

So, we have the Lee Jae-myung administration, which has taken a fairly receptive stance. Within two months of taking office in June, the government announced it would inherit the basic Japan policy position of the previous Yoon Suk Yeol administration, telling Japan not to worry. Through this, it has made efforts to alleviate the doubts of the Japanese public. However, looking at the favorability ratings earlier, this has not been enough to fully win them over, has it? Similarly, the South Korean public still holds suspicions about Prime Minister Takaichi.

Prime Minister Takaichi is a leader with strong right-wing tendencies. And she is a true devotee of Abe Shinzo. I've already discussed what Abe thought and did, haven't I? Those ideas are fundamentally in her mind. But she cannot act on them at present. Even if her inner thoughts are aligned with his, the international circumstances do not permit her to pursue such policies. She has to engage with South Korea and maintain friendly relations. Why? Because she needs allies. She needs allies even more than before. Why?

Beyond Improved Relations: Future-Oriented Cooperation

Because of the state of its relationship with China, Japan is under enormous pressure from Beijing. Right. To withstand this, the most important thing for Japan is to maintain and strengthen its alliances. In this context, antagonizing South Korea is not a wise move. So, this is where South Korea-Japan relations stand today. But as we discussed in the introduction, is improving the relationship an end in itself? Of course not. The question is what South Korea and Japan should do together to pursue their interests. It's about what kind of cooperation to pursue beyond simply improving relations.

Our two leaders created a friendly atmosphere in Kyoto, and again in Andong, much like the South Korean and Chinese leaders did in Beijing last January. But what comes next has not yet emerged. The question remains: after doing this, what's next? If we are to strengthen security cooperation, what is the next step? If we are to enhance economic cooperation, what can we do? Can we just fold our arms and let businesspeople conduct their affairs freely?

Right? So there is the question of what kind of cooperation South Korea and Japan should pursue, and I believe that is the task facing the current administration. You haven't heard much about it yet, have you? About what they will do specifically. You can just read through these details. Finally, if I may speak for five more minutes: moving beyond improved relations to future-oriented cooperation. You've heard a lot about a future-oriented South Korea-Japan relationship or future-oriented cooperation, haven't you? It's a phrase used habitually.

Whenever leaders meet for a summit, they talk about being future-oriented. So what does "future-oriented" mean? What is "present-oriented"? We have an idea of what "past-oriented" is. Resolving the current pending issues between South Korea and Japan would be a present-day task, right? But what does it mean to be "future-oriented"? The future I see—and this relates to our topic—is that the "future" in "future-oriented" refers to the time and space that the future generation will face.

When will your generation become the main actors in our society? It's a long way off. The dominant force in our society today is still the older generation. This older generation has been at the center of power for too long. If you are in your 20s and 30s, won't the time you become the main actors in our society be about 20 or 30 years from now? Right? So when is that? 2045. That's around the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea. 2045. We talk a lot about 2050, don't we?

That's exactly the time. About 25 years from now. If you add 20 years to your current age, will you be at the peak of your lives? I believe so. And that will be the era when you are the leading force, the center of our society. That is the future. The future of the future generation is when that generation becomes the central force in society, when they are between 45 and 55 years old. So, what should South Korea-Japan relations and cooperation be about? We call it future-oriented. Does being future-oriented simply mean not talking about history issues? That's not what being future-oriented is.

The Vision of a South Korea-Japan Economic Community and Future Prospects

Right? So in that sense, when we talk about being future-oriented, I find this vision quite appealing: a South Korea-Japan economic community. This is something that SK Chairman Chey Tae-won has been talking about for several years, and I thought it had some merit. Now, with all the focus on HBM and AI, this idea isn't discussed much, but a South Korea-Japan economic community means the two countries should achieve a form of economic integration. This integration would include the integration of goods markets, significant integration of capital markets, and substantial integration of population and labor markets, allowing the two countries to increase their scale. Because the world of the future is not a world of globalization, as you have studied. Right? Even if it doesn't become a world of pure survival of the fittest, it will at least be a system centered around major powers, whether you call it multipolar or something else.

In such a world, scale becomes extremely important. So what should South Korea and Japan do? If they combine, they have the potential to reach a scale of about $7 trillion. We are currently at $1.9 trillion and Japan is at $4.4 trillion, so together that's well over $6 trillion, approaching $7 trillion. That would make it the fourth-largest economic bloc in the world. Then, using that as a base, they could gradually expand linkages with like-minded countries in Asia or the Indo-Pacific to build that community. I find such a vision quite persuasive. For my generation, it's not very persuasive.

How much time would it take? My generation will work on it a little and then transition to being pensioners. For such a generation, talk of ambitious visions is difficult when South Korea-Japan relations are still in the improvement phase, and emotional conflicts still remain between us. And those conflicts mostly reside within the older generation; it's relatively less so for your generation, right? Considering these things, I believe such visions are future-oriented and are for the future generation.

So I think that is an item worth pursuing, to give one example. And here, I've listed a few points as goals for that economic community, which you can just read through. For now, I will conclude my main remarks here. To briefly summarize, the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan is one that is very susceptible to a vicious cycle. It typically starts with emotional and sentimental confrontations and conflicts, like the history issue. The negative spillover effects from there impact the economy and security. When the environment in those areas worsens, it becomes even more difficult to solve the history issue. That's the first point. However, the relationship does not fall into the worst stage of such a vicious cycle.

This is because of two very important factors. One is that the people of the two countries do not hate each other that much. Mutual affinity is continuously rising at the bottom-up level. Even if politicians fight, or harbor animosity; even if the older generation still holds anti-Japanese sentiment, and even if a sense of superiority over its former colony still exists in Japan—setting that aside, a growing number of people in both countries are experiencing each other through direct contact and building goodwill in the process. This process is very resilient. That's the first point. Second, the United States does not let the relationship hit rock bottom.

Not because it is fond of South Korea and Japan, but because it is harmful to America's regional hegemony and helps China. Whenever relations have worsened, the U.S. has invariably intervened, and through that intervention, the relationship has been prevented from falling into the worst-case scenario. This is the basic dynamic. Therefore, we are currently in an upward phase of that cycle. We are in a process of improvement. And as I just concluded, this process of improvement must be transformed into a process of cooperation. For that cooperation to be future-oriented, a very large-scale design that looks to the future is needed. There must be a vision. As an example, I mentioned the South Korea-Japan economic community. This is extremely long-term and, in a way, requires social imagination. And that imagination will not come from the older generation. The execution of that imagination is a project for the future generation, a project that your generation, not the older one, must carry out. With that, I will conclude. Thank you.