[Global NK Commentary] What Are We Missing in the Discussion on the Deletion of the Clause Regarding North Korean Residents?

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Recently, the Ministry of Unification announced a plan to delete the clause that uniformly considers 'members of overseas organizations operating in accordance with North Korea's line' as North Korean residents in the amendment to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act.[1]It stated through the media that it plans to actively support this process.[2]The amendment presents issues such as the ambiguity of the regulation, dual regulation with other laws, and conflicts with the constitutional status of citizens, as well as the failure to reflect changes in the times as major points of contention. The Ministry of Unification agrees with the need to expand the autonomy of civilian exchanges and create conditions for revitalizing exchange and cooperation.[3]This marks a change that reexamines the foundation of the system for the first time in 36 years since the enactment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act in 1990.

Discussion on the Deletion of Article 30 After 36 Years

One point that must be clarified in this amendment discussion is that the media often describes the amendment as focusing on abolishing the obligation to report contacts with pro-Pyongyang Korean officials, which may lead to a simplistic understanding of Article 30 as a legal provision specific to pro-Pyongyang organizations. However, Article 30 does not directly define the specific organization known as the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon). The law stipulates that 'members of overseas organizations operating in accordance with North Korea's line' are deemed North Korean residents, and the criteria for application are based on whether one is a member of the organization, not on nationality. Therefore, even if one holds South Korean nationality, they may be subject to the law if confirmed as a member of the organization. The key issue is who qualifies as a member, but the legal criteria for this judgment are not clear.

Another distinction to be made is that abolishing the obligation to report contacts is a completely different issue from changing the legal nature of Chongryon. Even if Article 30 is deleted, the fact that Chongryon is an organization of ethnic Koreans in Japan that has maintained close ties with North Korea does not change, and there will be no change in the application of related laws, including the National Security Law. The abolition of the obligation to report contacts with Chongryon members, who were deemed North Korean residents under Article 30, does not mean that illegal acts will be permitted or exempted. As before, if there are acts that violate relevant laws such as the National Security Law, the legal responsibilities will still apply.

However, if the current amendment discussion focuses solely on the pros and cons of regulatory relaxation, it may overlook the truly important questions. In this article, 'pro-Pyongyang Korean community' is used to encompass the Chongryon organization, Korean schools, Chosen University, and the Korean community in Japan that has maintained relationships with them.

Of course, while the Chongryon organization and the pro-Pyongyang Korean community are closely connected, they do not align perfectly. Within the pro-Pyongyang Korean community, individuals' nationalities, educational experiences, and political orientations vary widely. So, does the pro-Pyongyang community still resemble what it was at the time of the enactment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act in 1990? The significance of deleting Article 30 begins with this question.

Can the Changed Chongryon Society Be Explained by the 1990 System?

I conducted in-depth interviews with young people who have studied or worked at Korean schools and Chosen University in Japan from January to April 2026. This research was not aimed at confirming the official stance of the Chongryon central organization, but rather to examine how changes in North Korea's policy toward the South are affecting the perceptions of unification and identity among young people who have experienced these institutions.

The changes confirmed locally could not be sufficiently explained by the assertion of 'increased number of South Korean nationals within Chongryon,' which is presented as one of the justifications for this institutional improvement. While there are young people who maintain their Chosen nationality and show interest in South Korean culture and actively engage in exchanges with South Korean society, there are also cases where individuals have acquired South Korean nationality while still maintaining an orientation toward North Korea. There are not a few instances where nationality is chosen for practical reasons such as ease of further education, employment, and overseas movement. In the past, nationality or organizational affiliation was accepted as a criterion for gauging an individual's political orientation or identity, but this is no longer a valid standard.

One of the changes confirmed in the interviews was that the perceptions and educational environment within the Chongryon society have been rapidly changing since North Korea's 'Hostile Two-Nation Theory.' Some interview participants recalled the formalization of the Hostile Two-Nation Theory by Chairman Kim Jong-un in December 2023 with expressions such as 'shock,' 'confusion,' and 'betrayal.' For a generation that has long regarded unification as a matter of life and death and has been educated around the concept of a national community, a sense of loss regarding the 'motherland' has emerged, and some have been confirmed to change their nationality from Chosen to South Korean. In contrast, the younger generation has shown a variety of responses, trying to understand the policies and intentions of the North Korean authorities amidst confusion, or interpreting them as a strategic change in policy toward the South rather than a renunciation of unification.

These changes have also been confirmed in the educational environment. At Chosen University, the second verse of the school anthem, which includes 'national unification,' is no longer sung, and in some Korean schools, the use of the Korean Peninsula flag during sports events and the 'Unification Train' event held at the end of sports events have been reported to have been discontinued.[4] Geography education, which used to encompass the entire Korean Peninsula, is also being adjusted to focus on North Korea, and it has been confirmed that textbooks have changed accordingly. While there are differences depending on the region and school, and this is not a direct confirmation of the Chongryon central organization's official policy, it can be said that these cases demonstrate that changes in North Korea's policy toward the South are affecting at least some pro-Pyongyang educational environments and the daily lives of their members.

Changes in identity are also clearly evident. Many participants expressed a deep concern by asking themselves the question, 'What country do I belong to?' while revealing their orientation toward North Korea. Young people who have accepted both North and South as parts of their identity have been experiencing greater confusion following the changes in North Korean policy, and it has also been confirmed that the younger the age group, the more they tend not to perceive the unification issue as their own.

However, these changes do not immediately lead to the defection from North Korea or the abandonment of unification within the Chongryon society. Some participants in the interviews still spoke of their expectations and hopes for unification, and cultural activities such as ethnic dance and music continue to serve as an important foundation for maintaining identity along with language. This aspect is symbolically depicted in the recent film 'Trophy' directed by Son Myung-a, which was released in Japan. Meanwhile, visits to the homeland, which had been suspended due to the pandemic, have resumed, and North Korea's educational aid continues, indicating that relations with North Korea are still ongoing. Thus, the pro-Pyongyang community has become much more diverse in how different generations and individuals view North Korea and the community, and the current amendment discussion needs to reflect this reality in the system.

Limitations of the System and Policy

Before conducting in-depth interviews in Japan, I also went through the contact reporting procedure for North Korean residents under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act. However, the current contact reporting procedure is designed based on exchanges centered on projects or institutions between the North and South, which does not align with the field-based academic research that requires recruiting subjects and repeated contacts. Additionally, there is a potential conflict between research ethics, which principles of anonymity and confidentiality for research participants, and the requirement to submit personal information of contact subjects. These issues need to be addressed in the future operation of the contact reporting system, regardless of the deletion of Article 30.

This institutional improvement is significant in that it reduces the psychological and administrative burdens that have affected the general public and researchers. However, caution is needed in directly linking this to the revitalization of exchanges. Some expect that this institutional improvement will lead to revitalized exchanges, but the policy environment surrounding exchanges has changed significantly from the past. North Korea has deleted unification-related clauses from its constitution in accordance with the 'Hostile Two-Nation Theory' and established new territorial clauses,[5] and Chongryon is also adjusting its organizational direction by abolishing unification-related organizations and deleting related content from its charter.[6]

Our government is trying to lower the institutional threshold for contact, but the environment surrounding North Korea and Chongryon is changing with the weakening of unification discourse and changes in the community, leading to a weakening of the social foundation for contact and a fundamental change in the basis for exchanges. In this situation, the policy assumption that relaxing the obligation to report contacts will naturally expand exchanges does not adequately reflect the realities of today's Chongryon society. Today, the pro-Pyongyang Korean community in Japan is differentiated across various levels, including the Chongryon central organization, educational environments, the younger and older generations, Chosen nationality, South Korean nationality, and Japanese nationality. The ways in which they accept North Korean policies, their perspectives on South Korean society, and their reasons for maintaining the community differ from one another. While some still consider their relationship with North Korea important, others recognize issues such as life, education, employment, and discrimination in Japanese society as more pressing.

Nevertheless, policies still tend to assume 'Chongryon' as a single homogeneous group. If, until now, Chongryon members have been uniformly deemed North Korean residents and subjected to contact reporting, the amendment may result in merely excluding them from regulatory targets. Whether maintaining or relaxing regulations, if the internal differences within the Chongryon society are not taken into account, the subjects of the policy will fundamentally remain unchanged. The deletion of Article 30 is an institutional change that corrects the uniform consideration of North Korean residents, but the policy challenges of how to distinguish contact subjects and how to form relationships with whom and in what manner still remain.

Deletion Should Not Be the End

In this regard, what the current amendment discussion is missing is the 'post-deletion' phase. While the deletion of Article 30 may reduce the institutional burden of contact reporting, there is still no sufficient policy blueprint presented regarding who to form relationships with, in what manner, and in what fields exchanges will continue after that. The future task is not to remain in the debate over whether to maintain or abolish contact reporting, but to consider what kind of long-term relationships can be formed with the changed pro-Pyongyang Korean community. This is an area that should be contemplated not only in unification policy but also in policies for overseas Koreans, education and culture, and academic exchange.

As confirmed in the local investigation, for some young people, cultural and artistic activities such as ethnic dance and music have become a part of their lives that connects them to their roots and identity before any political ideology. Future exchange policies need to focus on establishing a daily exchange foundation that allows for learning and continuing history and cultural arts centered around language while sharing the long-term goal of unification.

The deletion of Article 30 can serve as a starting point for institutional improvements that align with changes in the times. However, merely changing the system does not achieve the objectives of the policy. What is now needed is to place the question of 'who to manage' not at the center of policy, but rather 'what kind of relationships to build with whom.' By not judging individuals' perceptions and orientations solely based on their relationship with Chongryon, their possession of Chosen nationality, or their educational experiences at Korean schools and Chosen University, and by understanding the changed pro-Pyongyang Korean community as a diverse community with various lives and experiences, the significance of this institutional improvement can finally be realized.

[1] The partial amendment bill to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act proposed by Representative Lee Yong-seon and ten others aims to convert the current contact reporting system for North Korean residents into a non-repair reporting system and delete the clause regarding the deeming of North Korean residents in Article 30.

[2] Ha Chae-rim, Yonhap News. '"Free contact with Chongryon officials"… Push for the abolition of the clause regarding North Korean residents (Comprehensive)' July 10, 2026.https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260709198951504

[3] National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, 'Review Report on the Partial Amendment Bill to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act' (Prepared by Expert Kim Sa-woo, Representative Lee Yong-seon as the main proponent, Bill No. 2213708), 429th National Assembly (Regular Session), November 2025, p. 8.

[4] The 'Unification Train' is a collective march event where participants hold onto the shoulders or waists of the person in front of them and move in a train formation to the song 'The Unification Train Runs,' created in North Korea in 1961, expressing a sense of community and the symbolism of unification.

[5] Yonhap News, '[Table] Contents of North Korean Constitutional Amendment,' May 6, 2026.https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260506104300504

[6] KBS, 'Chongryon Deletes 'Unification' at General Assembly…'Struggle to Defend Ethnic Rights',' May 26, 2026.https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8570170

■ Ha Seung-hee_Research Professor at Dongguk University Institute for North Korean Studies.

■ Responsible and Edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher; Oh In-hwan_EAI Senior Researcher

    Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr