[NATO-IP4 Forum] ④ NATO 3.0 and IP4 from Europe's Perspective

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pcFJ-SCdpaI&si=5oHZDQClWMuT-83H

Video script

Perceptions of NATO in Europe and NATO 3.0 under the Trump Administration

I am Lee Seong-won from the Sejong Institute. I would like to thank Professors Park Je-kyun and Jeon Jae-seong, as well as Dr. Boin Nam, for organizing the NATO IP Hub and leading important discussions. I am very pleased that the Sejong Institute is part of this hub and can collaborate. I am actually closer to the topic of the first session, and coincidentally, there are three individuals who specialize in maritime security, so rather than focusing on maritime security, I have concentrated on examining the changes and adjustments in modern maritime alliances from three points of view, particularly from a European perspective. I thought this was the area where I could contribute. The questions I pose are, in fact, closer to statements. First, how does Europe view the changing NATO? In particular, how does it perceive and prepare for NATO 3.0 as raised by the Trump administration? This is the first question.

Second, how does Europe view and respond to the Iran War, and what differences does it show compared to the IP4 countries? Third, which is significantly linked to the IP4 and our country, how does Europe perceive the Indo-Pacific? In particular, I would like to share and discuss thoughts on how Europe is approaching the Indo-Pacific in the context of rearmament being pursued during the Russo-Ukrainian War. I have prepared slides, so those who have headaches may refer to the booklet.

This is slide 3. It addresses how Europe views NATO. The Atlantic Alliance, which has lasted for 77 years, is currently diagnosed as being at a critical juncture. As you may already know, heterogeneous threat perceptions, regional strategies, and asymmetric defense burdens have acted as inherent instability factors between the United States and NATO member states, so it cannot be said that this tension itself is a new phase. However, under the Trump administration, the existing burdens, dependencies, and structural fractures of trust have become more directly apparent, and it is noteworthy that the reallocation of alliance roles and costs is being institutionalized in political language rather than diplomatic language. The future vision of NATO from the United States has been discussed in the previous session, so I will not elaborate on it. The core proposition regarding Europe is that Europe should move away from excessive threat perceptions.

It should take primary responsibility for regional conventional defense, while the United States provides limited and decisive support. This goal is aligned with the reduction of U.S. military presence in Europe and has established itself as a strategic framework rather than a political rhetoric, appearing under the name of NATO 3.0. NATO 3.0 has been continuously raised in Europe and was a concept that existed even ten years ago in the United States.

Rather than discussing which version is correct, the NATO 3.0 referred to by the current Trump administration was presented by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Everichkov at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in February. It started from the awareness that there is a need to return to a realist deterrence defense concept from the Cold War era to ensure the defense of the U.S. homeland, Western interests, and Pacific deterrence in a simultaneous battlefield environment. Since February, there have been events such as the Greenland incident and the Iran War.

On June 18, the Dutch Defense Minister reiterated this concept. Criticizing Europe's inefficient and security-delegating behavior since the Cold War, he emphasized that re-establishing relationships and role-sharing is inevitable. The NATO Secretary General stated at this meeting that the NATO 3.0 model has already begun through contribution adjustments and role expansions, mentioning that ultimately, a stronger Europe can exist within a stronger NATO. Interpretations of this background diverge into two paths. The first is a critical awareness of Europe's chronic security dependency and the Trump administration's political retaliation against U.S.-led operations, which may be perceived due to Europe's passive stance in the Greenland incident and the Iran War. The second interpretation suggests that it is not an impulsive rhetoric but rather a consistent change in defense strategy linked to the U.S. defense strategy change, functioning as a military realignment roadmap.

This dual nature appears to reflect the Trump administration's transactional and coercive political rhetoric and attempts to institutionalize the review of Europe's great power capabilities. However, since the content and intensity of messages from various U.S. departments to Europe vary, it is difficult for Europe to systematically respond to how this will be implemented, at what speed and order, and when it will occur.

Europe's Rearmament and Efforts to Fill Security Gaps

How is Europe responding to this? This slide addresses the conceptual discussions from NATO 1.0 to 3.0, and now we will look at Europe's response methods. In terms of change, the conceptual significance of NATO 3.0, its organizational structure, and the associated changes in asset deployment are occurring organically, and we will examine how Europe is responding to this. The current goal of Europe's security discussions is to maintain deterrence, operational sustainability, and nuclear credibility in a situation where U.S. defense is presumed to be reduced. Through the so-called European NATO initiative, Europe aims to gradually fill the security gaps caused by the reduction of regional defense posture through the transfer of operational command within NATO, strengthening the core roles of European member states' generals, and efforts to complement U.S. military assets with its own capabilities.

However, the highest command within NATO is still held by the United States, which exercises decision-making authority over core information infrastructure and the mobilization of forces in wartime, so the changes within the organization have short-term limitations in terms of transitioning to substantial operational shifts. The premise of European discussions is not a radical U.S. withdrawal, but rather a managed and controlled gradual expansion of responsibilities and roles over at least a decade. While Europe and the United States talk about burden, Europe seems to refer to burden sharing, while the U.S. refers to buffeting. There is a difference in this regard. Europe is also pursuing fiscal policies, having announced Readiness 2030 last year, issued the SAFE Fund, and simplified administrative regulations for defense procurement, investment, and licensing at an unprecedented pace in Europe through related legislation. This is encouraging, but there are institutional blind spots at the implementation stage. Additionally, weapons sold to Eastern Europe are purchased by depleting their own defense budgets, largely independent of the SAFE Fund, and it is important to note that these transactions occur outside the applicability of the SAFE Fund due to the geographical proximity of the countries facing the Russian threat.

Europe is also pursuing fiscal policies, having announced Readiness 2030 last year, issued the SAFE Fund, and simplified administrative regulations for defense procurement, investment, and licensing at an unprecedented pace in Europe through related legislation. This is encouraging, but there are institutional blind spots at the implementation stage. Additionally, weapons sold to Eastern Europe are purchased by depleting their own defense budgets, largely independent of the SAFE Fund, and it is important to note that these transactions occur outside the applicability of the SAFE Fund due to the geographical proximity of the countries facing the Russian threat.

Are Europe and the United States speaking the same language regarding NATO? There is a significant gap in implementation conditions and timelines. Europe acknowledges the need for rearmament, but the United States does not accept immediate reductions as a precondition. The so-called 'no surprise' policy means that the pace of U.S. reductions must align with the time it takes for Europe to fill the gaps. There are red lines regarding reductions that match the pace and scale of European augmentation. One of the most frequently asked questions last year was whether rearmament is possible; while there is a clear directional start, I believe that within the 2030 timeline presented in the white paper, the possibility of achieving independent defense capabilities that can effectively replace the United States is unlikely.

Europe's Response to the Iran War and Comparison with IP4

Partial rearmament may be possible, and if the existing agenda focused on a Europe without the United States, that is, on ways to keep the U.S. engaged longer, there is now a growing discussion about the anxiety that performing deterrence without substantial U.S. support may become an unavoidable future despite the enormous costs. The influence of the U.S. NATO system remains unparalleled, and it is practically difficult to replace its role. Europe is gradually moving forward with the objective of reducing dependency on the U.S. and strengthening its defense capabilities. The four countries mentioned in the Porif are critical core nations, but the timeline for these four countries to replace the U.S. is uncertain. Nevertheless, it is being discussed that these countries can take on deterrence responsibilities. The second question is how Europe has responded to the Russo-Ukrainian War and the Iran War.

From Europe's perspective, the Iran War was a conflict that it neither wanted, chose, nor could control. It has refrained from direct intervention. The U.S. requests were twofold: one was to deepen the association with the war initiated unilaterally by the U.S. and Israel and the risk of escalation, and the other was that the strategic objectives of the Iran War were uncertain, there was a lack of prior consultation in the preparation and execution of the war, and it was perceived as a conflict that transcended NATO's scope, leading to a rejection logic. The spectrum of national responses regarding the utilization of bases is as you see. Secondly, the timeline in which Europe led and issued joint statements and formed coalitions was until July. In fact, there have been ongoing discussions since then, and updates on this timeline have not been made. The core essence is that while it has the character of a symbolic political consultative body, the details remain uncoordinated, and decisions on what actions to take have not been finalized.

In comparison with the IP4 countries, the nature of remaining at the level of political support without substantial military contributions is similar. Compared to Europe, if the focus of discussions on passive intervention was within the scope of European alliance treaty activities, the IP4 was concerned with domestic political or legal constraints. There is not much difference in that U.S. pressure has been combined with trade tariffs and demands for defense burden-sharing. The dilemma faced by Europe was finding a balance between alliance cohesion with the U.S. and upholding international order norms, which is not easy. However, from Europe's perspective, it is currently engaged in the Russo-Ukrainian War on the eastern front, and it lacks the capacity to engage in operations, while there is no remaining political, economic, or military will and influence to expand involvement in another war on the southern front. From the U.S. standpoint, both Europe and IP4...

Europe's Indo-Pacific Strategy and Engagement Possibilities

all share the same sentiments as the U.S. but exhibit an attitude of not sharing the risks, and this criticism may reflect a tendency to appear as a biased alliance. Finally, how does Europe perceive the Indo-Pacific? This is linked to the IP4. Last year, an Indo-Pacific strategy was released, and this year, a rearmament plan was introduced at the level of rationale. While the purposes of the two documents differ, there are similarities and differences. Both documents emphasize Europe's normative role in a rules-based order, maintain consistency in European grand strategy, and recognize the Indo-Pacific as a major stage. Although there are differences in degree, there are also similarities in that they regard China's military modernization and aggressiveness with caution and consider it a minimum threat.

However, the fields differ slightly. There are clear differences in language, geographical focus, threat perception, and policy approaches. While they are similar on a macro level, they are distinctly different in certain aspects. Due to time constraints, I will not elaborate further. Is it possible for Europe's engagement in the Indo-Pacific to continue? With the massive discourse of rearmament as a policy orientation and significant budget investments, is engagement in the Indo-Pacific feasible?

From a pessimistic perspective, there are clear limitations on the capacity for sustained military engagement, and the nature of training has remained at a low-intensity response level, staying at a symbolic level. This does not mean that it is without significance. I believe that engagement in the Indo-Pacific is important. However, when considering what kind of credibility Europe has with regional countries, the visibility and role recognition in the Indo-Pacific region in terms of security and defense are very low. While European values have been highlighted in areas such as green transition, sustainable development, and digital governance, actual engagement as a security partner has not materialized in Indo-Pacific countries. This has been a limiting factor for Europe's engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the perception of the threat posed by China varies significantly within Europe.

The Need for Korea's Diplomatic Strategy and Independent Narrative Construction

Although referred to as Europe, there are many countries with diverse national interests, and their engagement with China varies greatly. When discussing the Indo-Pacific, it is impossible to exclude China, and I think it is difficult to maintain sustainable and consistent engagement in an unaligned situation. Nevertheless, the narrative of threat connectivity remains strong, and in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the U.S. alliance policy, the industrial extensibility of the defense network, and the presence of influential and reliable partners in this region suggest that selective engagement with influential countries in the Indo-Pacific can continue and will continue. To summarize, the implications of Europe's response to the situation for Korea suggest that Europe's dilemma may be a diplomatic burden for Korea. Under the name of modernizing the Korea-U.S. alliance, regarding the NATO summit,

the question of whether it is appropriate to align with the narrative of threat connectivity is a significant discourse. In fact, I believe that it is undeniable that threats are interconnected. From Europe's perspective, there is an awareness that the threat from North Korea has advanced eastward, and there is no way to deny that. However, how we interpret and construct the narrative of threat connectivity is crucial; we need to create our own narrative. Simply viewing the differences between the previous and current administrations, or interpreting acceptance as very conservative and rejection as very progressive, is problematic. We need our own narrative. Regarding the modernization of the Korea-U.S. alliance, we need to consider what our own modernization of the Korea-U.S. alliance entails, and if we are to continue with IP4, we need our own narrative regarding the necessity of IP4 and what we aim to achieve.

Additionally, regarding NATO cooperation, as mentioned earlier by Director Ha, how should we approach the Korea-NATO defense partnership 2.0 and the IP4 at the summit? How do NATO Korea cooperation and NATO IP4 cooperation differ? These are issues we need to contemplate. Furthermore, regarding NATO defense, last week's meeting emphasized successful cases of 50 trillion won while neglecting the 14 trillion won failures, as well as Europe's strategic environment.

If we do not supply the weapon systems that they need with rapid delivery and performance, there are concerns that we may be excluded from the NATO alliance solidarity among European countries. However, the reality is often different. I visited Eastern European countries last week, and those countries tended to prefer weapons that they needed and that had already been tested for reliability in the region, rather than a sense of solidarity with NATO. While Korea possesses good weapons, it is necessary to actively appeal to whether they can be immediately deployed in actual combat and how much Korea considers their strategic environment. In relation to the Iran War, this can be considered from the perspective of securing strategic materials.

Intuitive and principled judgments are necessary, but it seems that Europe has not been able to make such judgments. Korea needs to consider whether it can make such judgments. Regarding retirement, it is necessary to adjust while maintaining value in rearmament, defense industry, and relationships with partner countries, through selective engagement with influential countries. Korea needs to go beyond merely mentioning the Indo-Pacific strategy and consider how to concretize the already established Indo-Pacific strategy. I was impressed by the recent article you wrote about the strategic matrix that Korea should adopt, centered on alliance management, risk management, and strategic autonomy. I believe it is a time when our own strategic narrative is needed.

Korea currently has rhetoric in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific regions, but lacks a narrative. I would like to emphasize the need to carefully develop this aspect as I conclude my presentation.