[NATO-IP4 Forum] ④ NATO 3.0 and IP4 from Europe's Perspective

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pcFJ-SCdpaI&si=5oHZDQClWMuT-83H

Video script

Changing European Perceptions of NATO and the Trump Administration's NATO 3.0

I am Lee Seong-won from the Sejong Institute. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Park Je-kyun, Professor Jeon Jae-seong, and Dr. Boin Nam for organizing the NATO IP Hub and leading important discussions. I am very pleased that the Sejong Institute is part of this hub and can collaborate. I am actually closer to the topic of the first session, and coincidentally, there are three individuals engaged in maritime security in this session, so rather than focusing on maritime security, I have aimed to highlight the changes and adjustments in modern maritime alliances from the European perspective, focusing on three points. I thought this was the area where I could contribute. The questions I pose, which are more akin to statements than questions, are as follows: How does Europe view the changing NATO? Specifically, how does Europe perceive and prepare for NATO 3.0 as raised by the Trump administration, as mentioned earlier by Director Hong? This is the first question.

How does Europe view and respond to the Iran War? What differences exist compared to the IP4 countries? Additionally, how does Europe perceive the Indo-Pacific, which is significantly linked to the IP4 and our country? Particularly, in the context of rearmament being pursued during the Russo-Ukrainian War, I would like to share and discuss thoughts on how Europe approaches the Indo-Pacific. I have prepared slides, so those who have headaches can refer to the booklet.

This is slide 3. It addresses how Europe views NATO. The Atlantic alliance, which has lasted for 77 years, is currently diagnosed to be at a significant turning point. Of course, everyone here knows this, but heterogeneous threat perceptions, regional strategies, and asymmetric defense burdens have acted as persistent intrinsic instability factors between the United States and NATO member states. Therefore, I cannot say that this tension itself is a completely new phase. However, the issues that emerged under the Trump administration have more directly revealed the structural fault lines of existing burdens, dependencies, and trust, manifesting in political language rather than diplomatic language. It is noteworthy that this is institutionalizing the recalibration of alliance roles and costs. I will not elaborate on the U.S. vision for NATO's future, as it was discussed in the previous session. The core proposition in the National Security Strategy (NSS) states that Europe should move away from excessive threat perceptions.

It asserts that Europe will bear primary responsibility for regional conventional defense, while the United States will provide limited and decisive support. This goal is aligned with the reduction of U.S. troop presence in Europe and has established itself as a strategic principle rather than mere political rhetoric, with its core framework appearing under the name NATO 3.0. When did NATO 3.0 emerge? In fact, the concept of NATO 3.0 has been raised continuously in Europe, and it existed in the United States even a decade ago.

Rather than discussing which version is correct, I will mention that the NATO 3.0 referred to by the current Trump administration was presented by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Everichkovich at the NATO Defense Ministers' meeting in February. It originated from the awareness that there is a need to return to a Cold War-era realist deterrence defense concept to ensure the defense of the U.S. homeland and Western interests in a simultaneous battlefield environment. In June, following the Greenland incident in February and amidst ongoing conflicts, Defense Minister Haqses reiterated this concept.

He strongly criticized how Europe has become inefficient and has delegated security responsibilities since the Cold War, emphasizing that the restructuring of relationships and role-sharing is an inevitable trend. The NATO Secretary General stated at this meeting that the NATO 3.0 model has already begun through contribution coordination and role expansion, ultimately suggesting that a stronger Europe can exist within a stronger NATO. This is likely what the concept entails. I interpret this background in two ways: one is a critical awareness of Europe's chronic security dependence, and the other is an interpretation of the Trump administration's political retaliation against U.S.-led diplomatic operations. This is because, when viewed chronologically, it reflects Europe's passive stance during the Greenland incident and the Iran War. Another interpretation is that it is not merely an impulsive rhetoric but rather a consistent change in defense strategy linked to the U.S. defense strategy, functioning as a roadmap for military realignment.

These aspects indeed have a dual nature. They reflect both the transactional and coercive political rhetoric of the Trump administration and attempts to institutionalize a review of the European power structure. Therefore, the function of this concept has a complex character. However, due to the varying content and intensity of messages from different U.S. departments regarding Europe, it is challenging for Europe to systematically respond to how this will be implemented, at what speed, in what order, and when it will occur.

Europe's Rearmament and Response to Security Gaps

How is Europe responding to this? This slide covers the conceptual aspects of NATO 1.0 to 3.0 mentioned earlier. When examining how Europe is responding, we will look at the directionality and organizational asset allocation, meaning that the conceptual significance of NATO 3.0 and changes in the organizational structure, as well as the linked changes in asset allocation, are occurring organically, and we will see how Europe is responding to this. I will not elaborate on these changes here. The goal of the current European security discussions, as you know well, is to maintain deterrence, operational sustainability, and nuclear credibility in a situation where U.S. defense is presumed to be reduced. There is a so-called European NATO initiative, which involves the transfer of operational command within NATO, European member generals playing key roles within the organization, and efforts to complement U.S. military assets with their own forces, gradually filling security gaps resulting from the reduction of regional defense posture. However, as you know, the highest command within NATO has been held by the U.S. thus far, exercising practical final decision-making authority over core intelligence infrastructure, access, and deployment of forces in wartime, so there are clear limitations to these organizational changes going beyond symbolic changes to actual operational transitions in the short term. Therefore, the premise of the current European discussions differs in that it is not about a radical U.S. withdrawal but rather a perspective of gradual responsibility and role expansion managed and controlled over at least a decade. Europe discusses burdens with the U.S., but what Europe refers to is clearly burden sharing, while what the U.S. refers to is burden shifting. There is a difference in the underlying principles. Europe is also pursuing fiscal policies, such as the Readiness 2030 initiative.

Last year, it was announced, and the SAFE Fund was issued, along with the implementation of the linked omnibus legislation. Europe is simplifying bureaucratic and administrative regulations related to defense procurement, investment, and licensing at an unprecedented speed, which is very encouraging, but there are still institutional blind spots in the implementation phase. Furthermore, while we often discuss defense procurement, we need to consider how the SAFE Fund has been utilized and how NATO standardization has progressed. In fact, the arms being sold in Eastern Europe are largely unrelated to the SAFE Fund. They are purchasing weapons by depleting their own national defense budgets, and given that these countries are geographically very close to the threat from Russia, transactions are occurring outside the applicability of the SAFE Fund, which we need to keep in mind.

Therefore, the question I would like to pose is whether Europe and the U.S. are speaking the same language regarding NATO. There is a significant gap in the conditions and timelines for implementation. Europe acknowledges the necessity of rearmament, but the U.S. does not accept immediate reductions as a precondition. The so-called 'no surprise' policy means that the pace of U.S. reductions must align with the time it takes for Europe to fill the gaps. There is a red line regarding reductions that must match the pace and scale of European augmentation. One of the most frequently asked questions I received last year was whether rearmament is feasible. To put it briefly, while rearmament has clearly begun in terms of directionality, the timeline set forth in the white paper for 2030 does not indicate any possibility of achieving independent defense capabilities that could effectively replace the U.S.

Therefore, partial rearmament may be possible, and while I will not elaborate on this, if the existing agenda was focused on a Europe without the U.S., meaning finding ways to keep the U.S. more engaged for a longer period, it seems that there is a gradual shift towards a discussion of an unavoidable future of deterrence execution without substantial U.S. support, despite the significant costs involved. Moreover, it is true that the influence of the U.S. within the NATO system remains unparalleled, and replacing its role is practically difficult. Europe appears to be progressing slowly under the objective of reducing dependence on the U.S. and strengthening its defense capabilities. These four countries mentioned by Porife are the critical core nations, but I am not sure about the timeline in which these four countries could replace the U.S. In any case, these countries are currently being discussed as capable of handling deterrence. I will speak quickly. The second question is how Europe has responded to the Russo-Ukrainian War and the Iran War.

Response to the Iran War and Europe's Dilemma

How has Europe responded? From Europe's perspective, I define the Iran War as a conflict that was neither desired nor chosen, and one that could not be controlled. Therefore, Europe has refrained from direct intervention. The requests from the U.S. were twofold. First, there was the risk of escalation and deepening involvement in a war initiated unilaterally by the U.S. and Israel. The Iran War had uncertain strategic objectives, lacked prior consultation in the preparation and execution of the war, and was perceived as a conflict that transcended NATO's scope, leading to a rejection of involvement. The spectrum of national responses regarding the use of bases is as you can see. Secondly, the timeline in which Europe took the lead and issued joint statements and formed coalitions extended until July. In fact, as there are ongoing delays now, this timeline has not been updated. The core point is that while it has the character of a symbolic political consultative body, the details remain uncoordinated, and specific decisions on what actions to take have not been finalized.

Comparing this to the IP4 countries, the nature of remaining at the level of political support without substantial military contribution was similar. In comparison to Europe, if the focus of discussions on passive intervention was on the scope of European alliance treaty activities, the IP4, as Dr. Oh pointed out, was constrained by domestic political or legal systems. The aspect of U.S. pressure being combined with demands for trade tariffs and defense cost-sharing for stationed troops was not significantly different. The dilemma faced by Europe was finding a balance between alliance cohesion with the U.S. and upholding international order norms, which is not easy. However, from Europe's perspective, while currently managing the Russo-Ukrainian War on the eastern front, there is insufficient capacity to engage in diplomatic operations, and there is no remaining political, economic, or military will and influence to expand involvement in another war on the southern front. From the U.S. standpoint, both Europe and the IP4 appear to align with U.S. interests but exhibit a reluctance to share risks, which could lead to perceptions of a biased alliance.

Europe's Perception of the Indo-Pacific and Engagement Possibilities

Lastly, how does Europe perceive the Indo-Pacific? This is linked to the IP4, as I mentioned last year when the Indo-Pacific strategy was released, and the EU's rearmament plan was also announced last year. In fact, these two documents have very different objectives, making linear comparisons difficult, but there are similarities and differences. Both documents emphasize Europe's normative role in a rules-based order, maintain coherence in European grand strategy, and recognize the Indo-Pacific as a major theater for Europe. While there are differences in degree, there is also a commonality in viewing China's military modernization and aggressiveness with caution and considering it a minimal threat.

However, the fields differ slightly. If you look at the language, there are clear differences in geographical focus, threat perception, and policy approaches. While they are similar on a macro level, there are indeed subtle differences that I will not elaborate on due to time constraints. So, is Europe's engagement in the Indo-Pacific sustainable? With the massive discourse of rearmament as a policy orientation and substantial budget investments, is engagement in the Indo-Pacific feasible?

From a pessimistic perspective, there are clear limits to the capacity for continuous military engagement, and the nature of training has remained at a low-intensity response level and symbolic in nature. This does not mean it is meaningless; I believe that Indo-Pacific engagement is important. However, when considering how credible Europe is in the security domain, the visibility and recognition of Europe as a security partner in the Indo-Pacific region are very low. While European values have been highlighted in areas such as green transition, sustainable development, and digital governance, actual engagement as a security partner has not materialized in the Indo-Pacific countries. This has been a limiting factor for Europe's engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the perception of the threat posed by China varies significantly within Europe.

Implications for Korean Diplomacy from Europe

While we refer to Europe, it comprises numerous countries with different national interests, and their engagement with China varies greatly, making it impossible to discuss threat perceptions regarding the Indo-Pacific without mentioning China. In this unaligned situation, maintaining sustainable and consistent engagement becomes challenging. Nevertheless, the narrative of threat interlinkage remains strong, and within the context of U.S. alliance policy amid the Russo-Ukrainian War, the industrial expansion of defense networks and the presence of influential and reliable partners in this region suggest that selective engagement with influential countries in the Indo-Pacific can continue and will likely persist. To summarize, the implications of Europe's response to the situation for Korea suggest that Europe's dilemma may now be a diplomatic concern for Korea. Under the name of modernizing the Korea-U.S. alliance, the question of whether it is appropriate to align with the narrative of threat interlinkage is a significant discourse.

In fact, I cannot deny that threats are interconnected, as from Europe's perspective, the emergence of North Korea means that their threat has advanced eastward, which is their perception and cannot be denied. However, we need to consider how we interpret and construct the narrative of threat interlinkage, and we must create our own narrative. Simply contrasting the differences between the previous and current administrations—where accepting it is seen as very conservative and rejecting it as very progressive—is problematic, and we need our own narrative. Regarding the modernization of the Korea-U.S. alliance, we need to define what our own modernization of the Korea-U.S. alliance entails, and if we are to continue with the IP4, we need to articulate the necessity of the IP4 as we understand it and what we aim to achieve.

Korea-NATO Cooperation and Europe's Strategic Environment

Regarding NATO cooperation, as Director Ha mentioned earlier, how should we approach the Korea-NATO Defense Partnership 2.0 and the IP4 at the summit? How do NATO-Korea cooperation and NATO-IP4 cooperation differ? These are questions we need to consider, and regarding NATO defense, while we have focused on the success stories worth 50 trillion won in last week's meeting, we have not emphasized the failure stories worth 14 trillion won. Additionally, we will examine Europe's strategic environment.

In terms of NATO cooperation, as mentioned by Director Ha earlier, how should we approach the Korea-NATO Defense Partnership 2.0 and the IP4 at the summit? How do NATO and Korea's cooperation differ from NATO-IP4 cooperation? These are points we need to reflect on. Furthermore, regarding NATO defense, we discussed last week that while we are focusing on the success stories worth 50 trillion won, we have not emphasized the failure stories worth 14 trillion won. Additionally, we will look into Europe's strategic environment.

If we do not supply the weapons systems that they need based on intuitive judgment and principled responses, prioritizing rapid delivery and performance, there is a concern that Europe may exclude Korea from the NATO alliance solidarity. During my visit to Eastern European countries last week, they showed a tendency to prefer weapons that they need, which have already been tested for reliability in the region, rather than a sense of solidarity with NATO. While Korea possesses good weapons, there is a need to appeal to whether they can be used immediately and how much Korea considers their strategic environment. Regarding the Iran War, this can be considered from the perspective of securing strategic materials.

A response based on intuitive judgment and principles is necessary, but it seems that Europe has not been able to execute this properly. Korea needs to examine whether it can make such judgments. In discussions related to retirement, there is a perspective that adjustments are being made through selective engagement with influential countries while maintaining value in defense, defense cooperation, and relationships with partner countries. Korea needs to think about how to materialize the Indo-Pacific strategy, going beyond merely mentioning it. The strategic matrix centered on alliance management, risk management, and strategic autonomy presented by the moderator recently was very impressive. I believe it is time for us to develop our own strategic narrative.

Korea currently has rhetoric in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific regions, but lacks a coherent narrative. A careful approach is needed to complement this. This concludes my presentation.