[NATO-IP4 Forum] ② The NATO-IP4 After the Ankara NATO Summit Viewed Through the Intersection of US-China-Russia Summit Diplomacy

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJCBV-b55oA&si=RFkdpht-EFK96ARZ

Video script

Hello, how are you? I am Jeon Jae-woo, who was just introduced. Before I begin my presentation today, I would like to note that the current situation and the dilemmas mentioned by the Korean director earlier overlap significantly with my presentation. However, I believe there may be slight differences, so I will quickly move past the overlapping parts and focus on the areas where I can contribute more.

Strategic Implications of US-China-Russia Diplomacy and NATO Summit

The topic assigned to me is NATO's IP after the NATO summit in the context of US-China-Russia summit diplomacy. I have approached this as a question that ties together the series of summit diplomacy that took place in the middle of this year. Ultimately, I pondered how to connect the US-China summit in May, the China-Russia summit held ten days apart, Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang, and the NATO summit in Ankara in July. As a core argument and analysis, I applied the concept of 'strategic priorities.' This is not just a general term but a conceptual one. To explain briefly, it is not a list of strategic goals but rather a framework that is hierarchically organized by priority or has an irreversible directional quality. In the main text, I did not include a specific explanation of this concept.

However, I feel that a brief explanation is necessary for the presentation. There are several theorists regarding these strategic priorities, with Donald Neacsu being a representative example. You can consider him as one example. In his case, he establishes a hierarchy of strategic interests based on categories such as existential interests, vital interests, major strategic interests, and peripheral interests. Each of these interest categories is distinguished by the intensity of interest, which I may not have translated correctly, but in English, it is referred to as 'intensity of interest.'

Existential interests refer to interests that are at risk due to direct attacks on the state or nuclear threats, jeopardizing the very physical existence of the state. Naturally, the response is one where compromise is absolutely impossible, meaning it is the highest national interest that must be defended with all the state's capabilities. Vital interests, on the other hand, do not involve immediate destruction of the state, but if strong measures, including military force, are not taken, they can cause severe and critical damage to the state's security and economy. Major strategic interests refer to issues that are important for the state's well-being or economic prosperity but are not as critical as vital interests. Peripheral interests relate to humanitarian issues, the spread of values and ideologies, and cultural symbolism.

When applying the concept of strategic priorities using these terms, I considered how to evaluate or analyze the Ankara summit. Higher interests can delay, coincide, or instrumentalize lower interests or goals. However, the reverse is not possible. If one sacrifices higher interests for lower ones, it can be assessed as a miscalculation or failure rather than a strategy. This framework consistently underpins my overall analysis throughout the presentation.

South Korea's Strategic Priorities and the Ankara Agenda

So, what are South Korea's top priorities? Personally, I set South Korea's strategic priority as not getting entangled in the frontline of great power conflicts. This is not a conclusion based on ideology or confirmation bias, but rather a priority based on constant conditions that do not easily change, such as geopolitical factors. Naturally, I believe this is an interest that is at least above the level of vital interests directly related to the survival of the state.

Therefore, the litmus test for evaluating today's presentation is whether it contributes to this goal. The analysis of the outcomes from Ankara will overlap significantly with what has been mentioned earlier, so I will summarize it quickly. There are four common outcomes that have been confirmed. First, the initiation of negotiations for the Korea-NATO procurement framework agreement has provided South Korea with a foothold for entering a market worth 15 trillion won annually. Second, the expansion of multinational cooperation projects. This includes new participation in defense industry, rare earths, and raw materials projects, in addition to existing ammunition and space sectors. Third, sharing directions for strengthening standard interoperability. In particular, President Yoon Suk-yeol proposed elevating the Korea-NATO defense partnership to 2.0.

NATO referred to South Korea as a 'close partner.' Fourth, comprehensive support of 100 million dollars for Ukraine. However, the provision of lethal weapons was excluded. These seem to be the extent of the results. However, I believe there were slight nuances in the statements and differences in emphasis that make it difficult to categorize these as common outcomes. South Korea used language such as 'market entry,' while NATO emphasized language related to 'industrial deterrence for allies,' focusing on the internalization of alliance capabilities.

When interpreted based on NATO's framework, I see that NATO needs to transition to actual joint procurement from the position of needing to invest more than 5% of GDP, and it is attempting to strengthen alliance capabilities against this backdrop. In other words, I believe that joint production based on procurement standards serves as a means within this series of flows. Additionally, beyond these commonalities and differences, there are currently three points on which I reserve judgment. First, what has been confirmed is the initiation of negotiations, not the conclusion, so I believe there are still aspects to be reserved. Second, the US-led NATO 3.0 framework focuses on concentrating NATO within Europe, and in actual actions, it has not officially invited IP or Ukraine as participating countries.

There is also a need to reserve judgment on whether there exists a gap between the expectations for the institutionalization of IP4 in some quarters of South Korea and the somewhat diminished status envisioned by the US administration. Third, as mentioned earlier, there is a significant gap between the opening of institutional doors and actual procurement. As seen in the case of Canada's 60 trillion won submarine project, it has been confirmed that in the actual procurement phase, commercial operability, operational performance, political and security strategic direction, and trust all play a role, so I believe we need to observe this further, which is why I have reserved judgment on these three points.

Analysis of the Substance and Limits of North Korea-China-Russia Solidarity

In conclusion, the initiation of negotiations is not the same as a conclusion, and there is a gap between market opening and actual procurement. Furthermore, we can summarize that what we refer to as the market is being interpreted by NATO in the language of alliances. Next, I will move on to North Korea, China, and Russia. I believe there was an implicit premise behind attending this NATO summit. This implicit premise is that North Korea, China, and Russia are united in threatening us, so we also need to strategically strengthen our alignment.

I thought it was necessary to examine whether this premise has any basis. I see this as a fluid relationship that can change in the current stage. The unity of North Korea, China, and Russia is also a relationship that can change, and this is my analysis up to now. At this stage, I have reached the conclusion that the closeness between North Korea and Russia has been significantly overestimated. To reach this conclusion, it is necessary to analyze the pursuit of national interests by North Korea and Russia, but in this paper, I will primarily introduce an analysis centered on the bilateral relationships between North Korea and Russia and North Korea and China. The first is the closeness between North Korea and Russia. After Russia received ammunition and troops from North Korea, I focused on whether Russia would provide countermeasures that meet North Korea's expectations.

I conducted a diachronic analysis. If you read the text, you will find it intuitively interesting as a historical point. I have previously written a detailed article on this, which I hope you will refer to later. The main content is that there is a clear pattern between them. The pattern is that significant support for North Korea has only been provided on a large scale when the vital interests of China or the former Soviet Union were at stake. Specific examples include weapons that can be classified as advanced technology at the time.

These periods are mostly represented by the late 1960s when the Vietnam War and Sino-Soviet conflicts intensified, and the 1980s when the goal was to collapse the Soviet Union. Conversely, during the 1970s, the US-China and US-Soviet confrontation phases, support for North Korea drastically decreased to almost none. However, you may feel that diachronic analysis alone is insufficient. This is because, at that time, the Sino-Soviet relationship was mostly in a period of estrangement, so it cannot be structurally applied to the current situation. So, what about the current situation? My conclusion is that we cannot overestimate the North Korea-China-Russia relationship.

This is because Russia currently has neither the intention nor the capability to pursue a balance of power against the US in East Asia. Therefore, it is practically difficult for Russia to seek to utilize North Korea as a foothold. The US's focus is currently more on China than on Russia. In this situation, while North Korea's provision of ammunition or troops has been a significant factor in the Russia-Ukraine war, it raises the question of whether the closeness with North Korea can be considered a vital interest from Russia's perspective. Additionally, while there are minor discrepancies in the North Korea-China relationship, strategic cooperation in terms of multipolarity and balancing against the US is being maintained very stably. This means that, unlike the past when Sino-Soviet conflicts intensified, North Korea's strategic maneuverability is currently difficult.

In other words, the question is whether Russia can support North Korea to the extent that it would damage its relationship with China. I raise doubts about whether Russia can act so aggressively in the power struggle with China over North Korea. Therefore, I currently judge that the transfer of advanced weapons that can exclude submarines or stealth aircraft is structurally difficult. There are also situational reasons for Russia. Russia is currently in a phase where it must decide whether to escalate its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, or it is increasingly entangled in the war due to strikes on its homeland. The second is the complex situation in the Middle East, where Russia continues to invest resources for future influence management. The third is the issue of fulfilling countermeasures to North Korea. Of course, from Russia's perspective, it will manage all three of these simultaneously. However, I question whether North Korea can be prioritized among these three issues.

In summary, despite the closeness between North Korea and Russia, I believe that while North Korea's friendly posture will be maintained, the substantive content of the closeness will be pressured to shrink and delay, as it is difficult to achieve what North Korea expects. Next, I will analyze the second axis, which is the North Korea-China relationship. As you may have seen in the news, various unusual signs in the North Korea-China relationship have been detected since the transition from 2022 to 2023. I have listed several points, and many analyses have emerged domestically suggesting that North Korea and Russia have significantly recovered by showcasing their alignment during the Victory Day celebrations in September 2025.

I believe that rather than interpreting the ups and downs of this relationship based on individual events that have made the relationship worse or improved, we need to approach it structurally, as I did with the North Korea-Russia closeness. The first key point is that China dislikes North Korea's nuclear armament. It has never preferred it, and there are various reasons for this preference. It also becomes a variable in exercising influence over North Korea.

The second point is that it can become a medium that excessively drives regional polarization. There are latent possibilities for the proliferation of issues such as nuclear proliferation, nuclear management, and regional nuclear domino effects, which China finds difficult to control alone, so from China's perspective, it is hard to favor the North Korean nuclear issue. This is one structural factor. Another structural factor in the North Korea-China relationship is the paradox of North Korea's nuclear program. It is not just that China dislikes North Korea's nuclear program; rather, North Korea's nuclear armament has solidified its value as a geopolitical buffer that China has traditionally valued, serving as a land route to block foreign powers from entering China.

In fact, by arming itself with nuclear weapons, North Korea has effectively blocked the land route. The problem is that this conclusion was not reached because China wanted it, but because North Korea needed it or perceived it as necessary, which creates a paradox. From China's perspective, there is no longer a need to provide support beyond preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime. The air has actually weakened. So how can these two structural factors be interpreted from North Korea's perspective? Looking at these two structural factors from North Korea's viewpoint, the nuclear armament that North Korea pursued to reduce its dependence on great powers has not only driven its isolation but has also resulted in a geometric increase in its dependence on China. I believe this is the fundamental background behind North Korea's concerns about asymmetry with China and its turn towards Russia.

Of course, prior to this, there would have been processes involving close relations among South Korea, China, and Russia, but how does North Korea's closeness to Russia appear from China's perspective? The North Korea-China-Russia treaty in 2024 did not explicitly declare itself as an alliance treaty. However, it includes provisions for Russia's military intervention in case of emergencies. From China's perspective, this means that Russia is intruding into the authority that China has traditionally exercised exclusively. In other words, it can be perceived as damaging China's strategic environment.

If this is the case, then structurally, if we accurately observe the situations I have outlined, the North Korea-China relationship cannot be good. There are also observable surface phenomena that sufficiently corroborate this. One of them is the inclusion of Kim Ju-ae in this context, as you may have seen the scene where Kim Jong-un took a train with Kim Ju-ae to the event. If you look back at the scene of their disembarkation, you will see that Kim Ju-ae followed Kim Jong-un immediately after he got off.

However, at that time, Chinese reports were notably few and lacked emphasis. In other words, from China's perspective, there was a tendency to downplay this. This tendency became even more pronounced during Xi Jinping's visit, as Kim Ju-ae was not even present. I believe these instances clearly demonstrate that North Korea's pursuits are not acceptable from China's standpoint.

So how can we define the nature of Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang? I would like to quote their own terminology, which they referred to as a 'strategic relationship.' It is a strategic relationship, and naturally, since this year marks the 65th anniversary of their mutual agreement, they emphasized a friendly portrayal on the surface. However, in reality, I believe this visit was characterized by managing North Korea's excessive diplomacy and reaffirming China's leadership over North Korea. Additionally, another corroborating instance is that there was no mention of North Korea's nuclear issue. Rather than interpreting this as China simply abandoning denuclearization, I believe it is a correct interpretation that China, while displeased, has removed it from the agenda because it realistically cannot promote denuclearization at this time.

In summary, the terms used after Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea have shifted from 'defense' or 'military' to 'army.' Instead of 'cooperation,' the term 'exchange' has been used. These are clearly toned-down terms. Considering these three corroborating factors and the structural factors mentioned earlier, I believe the North Korea-China relationship is currently not good. Therefore, if we summarize the North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relationships, we can conclude that the cohesion of the North Korea-China relationship is significantly overestimated.

So how should we view this? I believe that North Korea's pursuit of a 'new path' or a 'proactive new Cold War structure' is structurally difficult to achieve through these pursuits aimed at expanding strategic space. As a corollary, I would like to forecast that the visit of the Singapore Foreign Minister to Pyongyang from late May to early June indicates that North Korea's intention to deliberately define great powers as a new Cold War is not proceeding smoothly, which may lead to further engagement with Southeast Asia.

Overcoming Polarization Logic and Seeking Strategic Autonomy

I make this forecast. Whether it is correct will be seen in time. Therefore, rather than proactively engaging in the polarization of North Korea-China-Russia against the US and further extending this to NATO, I believe it is necessary to clearly recognize that these are discursively constructed images and to adopt a cautious posture to avoid incurring actual costs in response to risks that have not yet been concretely realized. Based on this perspective, returning to the Ankara agenda, I have taken a somewhat cowardly stance on the Ankara agenda. I have divided the interpretations into two. I will not elaborate on the first interpretation, which is a criticism that it has exacerbated Korea's annual crisis. I cannot completely dismiss this interpretation.

It is intertwined with the three situations I reserved judgment on earlier. Now, I will emphasize interpretation 2. This is also my personal hope. Listening to the director's remarks, I believe interpretation 2 is correct. In other words, interpretation 2 does not advocate for unilateral alignment with NATO to promote proactive polarization, nor does it seek to increase unilateral engagement. Instead, it aims to maximize our strategic autonomy by delicately balancing both on a scale.

Of course, choosing this strategic line will entail many difficult elements. I have listed three necessary elements for this strategic line. It is essential to clearly establish a political veto against involvement in conflicts as needed. In terms of participation in supply chains, if this political veto is not clearly established, there is a risk of being incorporated into a subcontracting nature. It is necessary to manage the transition points well to ensure that support for Ukraine does not lead to heightened tensions on our side. In terms of defense cooperation, it is similarly important to ensure that it does not take on an ideological or normative character, but rather is adjusted based on the actual proportional situation in East Asia. This is how I can summarize it. Most importantly, when pursuing this delicate path, the existence of internal principles is crucial, and I want to emphasize that there must be a very logical and persuasive hierarchical structure regarding strategic priorities. There should be a hierarchy that anyone can understand.

This is how I can summarize it. Most importantly, when pursuing this delicate path, the existence of internal principles is crucial, and there must be a very logical and persuasive hierarchical structure regarding strategic priorities. I want to emphasize that there must be a hierarchy that anyone can understand.

Eurasian Geopolitical Connectivity and Information Capabilities

In policy suggestions, ultimately, it is about establishing a clear hierarchy of strategic priorities, stopping at points where the veto power is alive, and practically activating the weights on the opposite side of the scale. However, this was written in the early hours of July 8-9, and since then, the president has visited Mongolia, which has shown sufficient nuances in that direction, so the engagement we commonly refer to as the New Northern Policy seems to be practically activated. Although it may seem somewhat out of place, I have included the variable of the Tumen River estuary here, as it holds significant implications for the future, even though it is a somewhat distant topic in the policy suggestions section. Lastly, I would like to mention that while the eastern and western ends of the Eurasian continent may seem very far apart, there is a case I always mention when I have the opportunity to present.

As you all know, during the Crimea crisis, Russia's arms exports to China increased exponentially. At that time, China acquired the S400 air defense system. Of course, this was also due to Russia's own military plans to transition to the S500 in 2012, but if the asymmetry between China and Russia had not deepened so significantly, such a transfer would not have been so easily achieved. I believe this became a reality in 2015 and was connected to the series of events surrounding the deployment of THAAD in 2016.

In other words, the strategic connection between NATO and East Asia is not merely an abstract ideological connection, but is concretely connected based on weapon systems. I conclude by stating that proactive information capabilities and agenda-setting capabilities are valuable in this regard.