[NATO-IP4 Forum] ① The Reconfiguration of Alliances and NATO-IP4 Through the Russia-Ukraine War and the U.S.-Iran War

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Azj-HJZDzU&si=kGezOjZ2Mxz6W_eT

Video script

Yes, it's a pleasure to be here. I am Yeon Dam-lin from the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. Thank you for inviting me. To be honest, Director Hak has already covered the basic points I wanted to make. I wonder if he might have read my paper in advance to spare me the effort. After receiving the request, I rewrote my paper two or three times to ensure I was on the right track. After listening to Director Hak's remarks, I feel relieved that I seem to have found the right direction.

Fundamentally, as I studied international politics, I felt that a simple chronological explanation of the NATO IP4 was insufficient. It is necessary to discuss, from a broader perspective, what practical national strategy the United States is trying to pursue in international politics. I believe we can only grasp the true nature of the NATO IP4 by examining it within the context of the international order the U.S. seeks, and my paper grew longer out of this conviction. The main theme you proposed was from alliance fragmentation to realignment, and I concluded that from the U.S. perspective, we are in the process of an attempted alliance realignment. I believe the NATO IP4 must be viewed within that process. Finally, as a think tank, we must consider the policy implications for South Korea and what policy strategy it should pursue.

U.S. Hegemonic Strategy and Russia's Eurasian Vision

This opportunity has allowed me to study and reflect deeply on the paradigm of international politics. Is American hegemony, its superpower status, in decline, or is it transforming into a different form? I have pondered this for the 20 years I have been studying the field. Having once studied international policy in Russia, I used to think from a Russian perspective that America's superpower status was weakening.

Such ideas were frequently expressed from a Russian viewpoint, and I revisited them while studying the NATO IP4 for this occasion. Russia, under Putin's long-term rule of 26 years, has fundamentally pursued a Eurasian great power strategy. To build this strategy, a multipolar world must be established. This is Russia's position: only then can it achieve its desired great power strategy. Russia's 2024 National Security Strategy (NSS) refers not to a simple multipolar order but to a 'polycentric world.' In other words, a world order centered on various great powers is the world order Russia envisions. This is what Professor Jeon Jaesung described as the creation of a parallel regional order.

Russia's basic perception, and the goal of the Putin regime, is that it can achieve its own great power order within the Eurasian region. This inevitably leads to the question: is the parallel regional order, the polycentric world, that Russia seeks a legitimate one? We must ask this fundamental question, especially since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. If the international community cannot agree to the international order Russia is pursuing, then conversely, how should we evaluate the international order pursued by the United States? From my perspective, I saw a need to re-evaluate the international order the U.S. is pursuing. In conclusion, I came to recognize that the U.S. is not in decline but is building a new hegemonic order through a realignment of its alliance system. In this context, I will introduce three basic concepts.

America's Strategy for Building a New Alliance Order

The first is the strengthening of the 'Western Hemisphere,' a concept found in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) document. I thought this should be expanded through the concept of the 'Trump Corollary.' When conceptualized academically, I defined it as the 'Fortress Western Hemisphere' concept. It is a coincidence that a senior researcher at my institute is also conducting a research project on this topic.

I conceptualized the 'Fortress Western Hemisphere' strategy and, through the 'Trump Corollary' concept, concluded that the Biden administration, the Trump administration before it, and America's superpower status in general have been moving in this direction. In other words, I see the core of this strategic document as the intent to solidify hegemonic status in the 21st century by consolidating the Western Hemisphere as a fortress. If this 'Fortress Western Hemisphere' strategy successfully achieves America's hegemonic status, that hegemonic status will ultimately be transformed into a different form. That is why we are talking about the NATO IP4. The existing method, an alliance order based on military power, is insufficient. So, what form should the new type of alliance take? The second concept moves toward a technology-based network alliance order.

I have defined this technology-based network alliance order as 'GITI-NAO.' Through this concept, the United States will reshape its relationships with other allies after consolidating the Western Hemisphere order. My basic thesis is that the U.S. seeks to maintain its superpower status in the future by combining its order with the existing military alliance and this technology-based alliance order. From this perspective, when we consider how to view the NATO IP4, my view is that it could be a case of the NATO IP4 functioning as an institutional platform under the two larger platforms of the 'Fortress Western Hemisphere' strategy and the technology-based alliance order. Ultimately, South Korea can only achieve the strategic autonomy it seeks within this order if the South Korean government has a proper understanding of it and makes sound strategic judgments about the flow of the international order.

The Russia-Ukraine War and the Nature of Modern Warfare

I believe Dr. Jeon Ji-woo will discuss similar concepts later, but how should we view the Russia-Ukraine war and the U.S.-Iran conflict? As a Russia specialist, I have had many thoughts on the Russia-Ukraine war. When we were studying, before the war broke out, the perception was that Russia was a relatively fair actor in the international order, pursuing its national interests as a great power in Eurasia. However, that perception began to shatter when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. There was much deliberation about the international order Russia seeks to build, and the basic understanding is that, from Russia's perspective, the Russia-Ukraine war is a reaction against NATO's eastward expansion.

However, on the other hand, there may have also been a wariness about Russia becoming excessively powerful and penetrating beyond the Eurasian region into the Western Hemisphere, which can be considered America's own backyard. In any case, the basic understanding is that Russia wants to establish its own regional order in Eurasia, and NATO fundamentally had no choice but to respond to that.

The important question is how to view the Russia-Ukraine war in the process of America's hegemonic realignment. As the Director mentioned, the paradigm of warfare has completely changed. It is difficult to wage war with traditional military power alone. Many advanced technologies have been introduced, and drones and various other advanced technologies are being used in the war. After struggling initially and the war transitioning into a war of attrition, Russia is also now reading the paradigm of modern warfare well. It is continuously developing technologies applicable to modern warfare. Early this year, I filmed a video at my institute, and the thumbnail was 'The war won't end this year either.'

Russia's basic position is that once it has started a war, it must see it through to the end. The Putin regime is legitimate until 2030, and potentially until 2036. From the perspective of President Putin and the Russian political elite, they will not easily end the war unless their strategic objectives are achieved. It was not a war that was started lightly, nor is it a war that will end easily. It is highly likely to become a long-term conflict, and in the process, Russia will relentlessly pursue military reorganization and technological development by developing technologies suited to the aspects of modern warfare. One of Russia's weakest areas is space technology, specifically military satellite technology that can serve as its 'eyes.' It lacks technology like Starlink.

In fact, one of the reasons Russia is struggling is that Ukraine uses Starlink to conduct precision drone strikes or hit critical facilities. Because Russia has been under international sanctions since 2014, it has been earnestly pursuing a path of economic self-reliance since that year. It has been doing so for nearly a decade, and during that time, it also pursued the development of military satellites like Starlink. However, it was not successful. Since the Soviet era, Russia has developed by importing technology through its relationship with Europe, so it is bound to struggle now that its ties with the U.S. are severed. It is bound to struggle in developing semiconductors, AI, and drones on its own. As it has traditionally achieved technological advancement through relations with Europe, it is pursuing cooperative relationships with China and India as alternatives.

It is developing AI and drone technologies suited to the aspects of modern warfare, but there are clear limitations. However, from Russia's perspective, the challenge is how to achieve military-technological self-reliance without Europe's help. In that sense, we can predict that the war will not end easily. NATO likely has similar concerns. The era of warfare fought by traditional methods is over, and it is shifting toward a new form of warfare with advanced technologies and AI integration, so the Ukraine war may have become a testbed. The Iran-U.S. conflict is a continuation of this. NATO's biggest concern is likely how it can achieve alliance realignment through the Iran conflict in a situation where the paradigm of warfare is changing.

How South Korea Can Secure Strategic Autonomy

In that sense, both the Ukraine war and the Iran war are serving as experimental catalysts for NATO. As I mentioned, it appears they are seeking to use these wars as a battleground for advancing the development of a technology alliance. This is my personal judgment. The NATO IP4 alliance must also be viewed in this context. So, what response strategy should South Korea adopt as the U.S. realigns its alliance order? I have given this much thought, but I also wondered if the term 'NATO IP4' itself is appropriate. I will set aside the issue of terminology for now and will refine the concept after receiving comments from the discussants later. From that perspective, fundamentally,

if South Korea's relationship with the United States was a military alliance based on military power, now, amid the trend of hegemonic transition and the shift toward a technology alliance, South Korea must also evolve beyond a military alliance to a technology alliance. Only by doing so can we achieve our strategic autonomy and the strategic goals we pursue. And only then, might it be possible to achieve the current administration's goal of becoming an 'AI powerhouse'? How can South Korea best leverage its technological advantages in its cooperative relationship with NATO and the United States?

I recently returned from a trip to Central Asia, where the South Korean government is seeking to build a coalition of partner countries in its diplomacy with the region. To become a powerhouse centered on AI, we inevitably need to utilize mineral resources like the rare earth elements that go into semiconductors. Central Asia has an abundance of such minerals. The first ROK-Central Asia Summit is scheduled for September, and the Central Asian countries are fully capable of cooperating with South Korea in a middle-power partnership centered on AI. Their position is that if South Korea's role and the roles of Central Asian countries are combined in building a future 'just international order,' it could help South Korea and the Central Asian countries work together as middle powers to create a just international order.

From the South Korean government's perspective, it can leverage Korea's leading technological superiority to move toward a military alliance plus a technology alliance in its cooperative relationship with NATO and the United States. As a Russia specialist, this is a difficult statement for me to make, but since we cannot ignore the alliance order, I believe that by participating in the construction of a new alliance order and defining our relationships within it, it will help secure the strategic autonomy that the current and past administrations have pursued. I will conclude my presentation here and will speak again later if there are any comments.

Thank you.