[Global NK Interview] The Evolution of the North Korean Nuclear Threat and the Tasks of the US-ROK Alliance

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yrE6AyLXqrI&si=MTEfzA395nBGO_X5

Proposal for a Paradigm Shift in US Policy toward North Korea

Jeon Jae-sung: Professor Cha, thank you for joining us. You have made significant contributions to the study of Korean issues and the strengthening of the US-ROK alliance, leading academic and policy debates for many years. Your recent article in Foreign Affairs has garnered considerable attention here, as it suggests a fundamental shift in North Korea policy. Our readers in Korea are eager to hear directly about your ideas, the new paradigm, and what it means for the future. Could you please summarize your views briefly?

Victor Cha: Yes, thank you, Professor. I am pleased to be part of this interview. To put it simply, looking at the current level of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, it is estimated that North Korea possesses about 50 nuclear warheads and has enough fissile material to produce more than 50 additional warheads. Considering the number and types of delivery systems, as well as the stated goal of mass-producing nuclear weapons, the so-called denuclearization policy—where 'we' refers to the United States, South Korea, Japan, and to some extent China and Russia—can be deemed a failure. We have not succeeded in denuclearizing North Korea. However, we may have succeeded in slowing the pace of that progress somewhat.

However, North Korea has now reached the stage of being a small nuclear-armed state, and I believe it aspires to become a nuclear power on par with France or Britain, or even larger. In that sense, our policy of focusing solely on denuclearization has not succeeded. Therefore, we need to adjust our policy and seek alternative approaches. My argument is not to abandon denuclearization. I believe the United States should never abandon the goal of denuclearization. However, the goal of denuclearization should not obstruct intermediate measures and negotiations designed to reduce threats to the United States and the number of adversaries the United States faces today.

This is designed to prevent the potential for a nuclear crisis and the first use of nuclear weapons, and to somehow sever the ties between Russia and North Korea. To me, these are the most immediate threats posed to the United States by North Korea's nuclear program. My main point is that focusing solely on denuclearization at the expense of these other factors would be a mistake and would be detrimental to the security of the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

New Strategic Environment and Policy Realism

Jeon Jae-sung: From the perspective of the alliance, there are many pressing issues that the Trump administration's foreign policy needs to address right now. Therefore, I wonder if your proposal reflects a realistic adjustment to the current strategic environment. Given the multitude of crises facing the current US administration, it seems you are trying to offer a way to keep North Korea on the policy agenda rather than allowing it to be crowded out. Can we interpret it as an effort to maintain North Korea on the agenda through more realistic interim proposals?

Victor Cha: The motivation for writing this piece at that particular time was that, even though North Korea had been overshadowed by issues like Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, and Venezuela, it always has the potential to suddenly emerge as a top priority. This could happen if North Korea conducts a seventh nuclear test or additional long-range missile tests, or if President Trump himself wants to make it an agenda item because he wishes to meet with Kim Jong-un.

The timing of this piece also coincided with a period when there was a possibility of an encounter with the North Korean leader ahead of President Trump's trip to Asia. In that respect, I thought it was important to consider under what conditions the United States should re-engage with North Korea. In that sense, I agree with your question. While the North Korea issue has not been a top policy agenda item, it always has the potential to unexpectedly become one. I also do not believe that there is systematic thinking occurring within the US government regarding North Korea at this time.

Today, within the US government, there is a tendency for everyone to defer to the president, as this issue is fundamentally a presidential matter, and only the president can discuss and formulate policy on it. Therefore, I sought to reset North Korea policy from an outsider's perspective, reset our objectives—starting with resetting our objectives—and clarify what we should negotiate going forward.

Discussions and Critiques of US Policy, and Negotiation Strategies

Jeon Jae-sung: You have been a prominent scholar and analyst on Korean issues. I wonder if this type of proposal, such as the interim approach, is widely shared within the US policy community. Additionally, as you mentioned, even if President Trump does not read the article, do you think he would be inclined to think in this way if he has the opportunity to meet with Kim Jong-un?

Victor Cha: I do not expect President Trump to read the article, as I understand he is not particularly fond of reading. However, there is a possibility that his close aides will read it and convey its contents to him. In fact, I know that this article has been shared with his aides. At the level of the Washington policy community, this article has sparked considerable debate and discussion. When I drafted the piece, I sent it to several former negotiators who had worked on North Korea negotiations in both Democratic and Republican administrations.

While they raised individual concerns about specific details, they generally agreed with the gist of the argument and some even assessed that it was beneficial for someone to make this argument. I believe that anyone who has actually been involved in negotiations with North Korea on denuclearization would understand this argument well. However, at the same time, saying that we should temporarily set aside the issue of denuclearization is seen as a kind of taboo. Therefore, the most criticism I received came from those who did not read the article properly and took it at face value.

They say, 'He is advocating for recognizing North Korea as a nuclear power and giving up on denuclearization.' And they criticize the article for this reason. However, that is not at all what I am trying to convey. If one reads the article properly, what I am saying is that we should still focus on denuclearization as a long-term goal, but at the same time, we need to achieve immediate objectives for the security interests of the United States and its allies. In that sense, the article has sparked considerable discussion. I have not heard significant disagreement from those who have actually negotiated with North Korea, but I have received criticism from those who lack that experience and generalize the argument.

Jeon Jae-sung: Then let’s examine your proposal in more detail. From what I have read, your proposal consists of several pillars, including strengthening homeland defense—becoming increasingly difficult considering the limitations of the GDI—transfer denial, and the need for diplomatic channels for crisis management under the broader framework of arms control, as well as strengthening the trilateral defense system among the US, South Korea, and Japan, and employing strategies to drive a wedge among Russia, China, and North Korea. All of these seem very reasonable.

Possibilities for US-North Korea/South Korea Dialogue and the Peace Paradigm on the Korean Peninsula

Jeon Jae-sung: The question then is whether North Korea will come to the table to prepare for crisis management with the United States. North Korea may believe it is in the best strategic position since 1945. In terms of nuclear armament levels, support from Russia, and the recovery of trade with China, despite significant problems in the North Korean economy, they explicitly state in their constitution that they must be recognized as a legitimate nuclear power, which can be seen as a prerequisite for initiating negotiations with the United States. In that sense, it seems very reasonable and ideal to open channels for crisis management regarding any potential nuclear war.

Does the United States have any policy leverage to bring North Korea to the negotiating table?

Victor Cha: The important point is that when we prioritized denuclearization, we did not allow for any dialogue on crisis management with North Korea. We did not even allow ourselves to engage in discussions aimed at preventing escalation to a nuclear stage. This was largely due to the concern that engaging in such dialogue would ultimately lead us into a 'rabbit hole' of recognizing North Korea as a nuclear power. However, the current reality is that North Korea possesses at least 50, if not more, nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Moreover, North Korea has explicitly rejected the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons, following the precedent set by Russia. Therefore, the risk of nuclear escalation is real.

In the early 1990s, when North Korea had one or two rudimentary bombs, that risk was not realistic. However, now the risk of nuclear escalation is real. Therefore, engaging in any form of dialogue regarding nuclear crisis management and nuclear deterrence with North Korea is the only responsible approach. This can be seen as a practical and realistic approach while maintaining the ultimate goal of denuclearization.

What I wanted to convey in my article is that we can continue dialogue and negotiations on issues arising between both sides while not recognizing North Korea as a nuclear power. There are two reasons why North Korea might be interested in such dialogue. First, North Korea is quite aware of the concerns regarding crisis escalation.

A recent example is the North Korean government's response to the South Korean government's expression of regret regarding drone activities in South Korean airspace. Of course, there may have been various reasons for the South Korean government to express such a position.

I agree with the professor that North Korea is in its most advantageous position since 1945, but I believe it is a mistake to assume that North Korea is status quo-oriented. In other words, people tend to think that North Korea, with the support of Russia and China, doesn't need anything else and doesn't need to talk to the United States. Many people say, 'Trump might want to talk to Kim Jong-un, but Kim Jong-un doesn't need to because he has China and Russia.' This is based on the premise that North Korea has a status quo mindset, but I don't think North Korea's mindset is status quo-oriented. Rather, it is revisionist, and it will always try to get more. This is precisely another reason why North Korea might come to the negotiating table with the United States, because they know that Donald Trump is a figure who says various things.

On the one hand, he talks about denuclearization, but on the other hand, he says Kim Jong-un has nuclear weapons and is a nuclear state. Therefore, from North Korea's perspective, resuming negotiations with the United States would essentially be aimed at gaining recognition as a nuclear-armed state. This is one of their goals. And if they have a revisionist orientation and seize the opportunity to meet a US president who is not as fixated on denuclearization as previous presidents, they might see it as an opportunity. So I believe there are various reasons why North Korea might return to the negotiating table. Of course, the general view is, 'North Korea has secured Russia and China, and the previous summit with Trump failed, so why would they want to meet again?'

However, precisely because Kim Jong-un is in a much stronger position now and is not status quo-oriented, he might see it as an opportunity to meet with Trump and, even if it results in a somewhat meaningless agreement, walk away saying, 'I met the US president, and they recognized me as a nuclear state.'

Jeon Jae-sung: This time, I will ask from South Korea's perspective. Even if good discussions take place between North Korea and the US, there is a concern within South Korea that it might be excluded from those discussions. North Korea does not want relations with South Korea recently and wants to be recognized as a state-to-state entity under the so-called 'two hostile states theory.' This means they consider South Korea a very hostile foreign country. Therefore, the progressive government is seeking opportunities to open dialogue channels with North Korea in a tentative phase, as you mentioned, but it seems very difficult.

Therefore, our government is proposing peaceful coexistence for the time being, although unification, like denuclearization, is a distant goal. That is, unification is postponed, but peaceful coexistence is emphasized as an immediate task. Here, peace, to borrow Johan Galtung's term, corresponds to 'negative peace'—a very passive peace that simply prevents military conflict—which seems to have common ground with 'Cold Peace.' Can we find common ground between the Cold Peace approach and South Korea's peaceful coexistence approach?

I think so. I believe there can be some similarities. However, as your question suggests, I see North Korea's goal as actually trying to exclude South Korea. Therefore, even if North Korea has the willingness and interest to re-engage with former President Trump, it would not be in the same manner as during the Moon Jae-in administration.: I think so. There can be some similarities. However, as your question implies, I believe North Korea's goal is indeed to exclude South Korea. So, even if North Korea is willing and interested in re-engaging with Donald Trump, it will not be in the same way as during the Moon Jae-in administration. At that time, the Moon Jae-in administration acted as a mediator, first holding bilateral talks with North Korea and then arranging a trilateral meeting at Panmunjom. I don't think North Korea is interested in that approach at all. Rather, they would consider meeting directly with the United States without consulting South Korea as a victory. And President Trump might also feel that he doesn't need South Korea this time. In his first term, he needed South Korea, and China.

But this time, it is highly likely that he will think he doesn't need to. In that sense, there may be similarities between 'Cold Peace' and 'Peaceful Coexistence,' but North Korea's strategy, if they choose to emerge from seclusion and re-engage in diplomacy, will be entirely focused on the United States. I would like to add two more points. First, I understand 'Cold Peace' as a concept that still views the relationship as somewhat adversarial. We still do not welcome their nuclear weapons, we consider them a threat, and we ultimately pursue denuclearization.

This is what we pursue, but at the same time, we must keep communication channels open to avoid escalation. On the other hand, Peaceful Coexistence, at least in the form proposed by the Lee Jae-myung administration, I think it has a somewhat milder character. This is not to say that Cold Peace is malicious. It's just that it is what it is. It's a cold peace where two adversarial forces try to ensure there are no miscalculations or escalations. The second point I would like to make is that if one of North Korea's goals is to exclude South Korea from any dialogue with the United States, then China's role is actually different from what it was during the first Trump administration.

During the first Trump administration, China viewed the North Korea-US summit with concern. As you know, Xi Jinping refused to meet Kim Jong-un until Trump announced he would meet Kim Jong-un in Singapore. However, after Trump's announcement, Xi Jinping met Kim Jong-un five or six times. And after the final summit in Hanoi broke down, Xi Jinping virtually stopped meeting Kim Jong-un. So, the meetings between Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping earlier this year in both China and North Korea were the first series of meetings since Hanoi.

Traditionally, China has viewed North Korea-US summits with concern, but considering today's dynamics, China might actually welcome and try to facilitate a North Korea-US summit. This is largely because if China can convey to Kim Jong-un that Trump wants to meet and can help make the summit happen, they can say they have done a great favor to Trump and demand a price for it. More importantly, if a North Korea-US summit can somewhat disrupt or dilute the relationship between Kim Jong-un and Putin, this would be considered desirable from China's current perspective.

Therefore, I believe that China's and North Korea's positions on the possibility of a North Korea-US summit have changed considerably compared to the first Trump administration.

Changes in the ROK-US Alliance and Military Deterrence Strategy

Jeon Jae-sung: That's a very important point, and I think it's something we need to consider more deeply. This question is about the military aspect of the Cold Peace paradigm. Some analysts in South Korea are discussing the more efficient reorganization of US Forces Korea that you mentioned. I also agree that strengthening deterrence against North Korea in the form of denial or retaliation reduces the possibility of decoupling between South Korea and the US. That is a desirable direction. However, this could also be misinterpreted within South Korea as a signal that the US commitment to South Korea is somewhat weakening. You mentioned the efficient redeployment of US Forces Korea using Kill Chain elements or new technologies.

Is there a way to reaffirm the US commitment within this cold peace paradigm?

Victor Cha: Under the Trump administration, and as Secretary Hagel has mentioned several times, it is clear that the US is moving in the direction of transferring most of the defense burden on the Korean Peninsula to South Korea. This is certainly the direction the current administration is taking as well. In that sense, the concept of cold peace reflects how the US views the situation. However, at the same time, it aims for two things. The first is to avoid preemptive threats from the South that could provoke preemptive actions from North Korea.

Indeed, the threat of a preemptive attack from South Korea could provoke a preemptive attack from North Korea. And according to their statements, North Korea's preemptive actions may not be conventional. They could involve scenarios of nuclear weapon use.

We can discuss decapitation operations or large-scale punitive retaliation, which may actually be more stable. In other words, it brings stability in terms of deterrence. Another issue is that there is a significant possibility that the traditional ground troop presence of U.S. forces may change in the future, especially in conjunction with the possibility of operational control transfer and the U.S. focus on potential Taiwan-like situations.

Therefore, the US should enhance South Korea's capabilities, strengthen the trilateral capabilities with South Korea and Japan, and even if the composition of ground forces changes to focus more on air and naval power, at least a minimal tripwire presence should be maintained. In my view, we should work more closely with South Korea on deterrence through denial and large-scale retaliation rather than focusing on preemptive strikes or decapitation operations.

Jeon Jae-sung: I have a few more questions. This is a broader question. Recently, there has been significant discussion in Korea surrounding US-ROK relations. Issues such as the transfer of operational control, strategic flexibility of US forces in Korea, and investments in the US, including submarine issues, are all intertwined. As you know, we have maintained this relationship for decades. How do you assess the current state of strategic consultations between the US and South Korea, not only regarding North Korea but overall? Are we having sufficiently deep and candid discussions about these new challenges?

Victor Cha: Looking at the joint fact sheet and trade investment framework agreement reached between the Trump administration and the current administration, it has undeniably been a tumultuous journey. It has been like a rollercoaster, with crises and agreements, followed by more crises. However, if we look at what has actually been achieved in those documents, they potentially contain transformative content for the US-ROK relationship.

Whether it is the transfer of operational control, South Korea's investment in key industries in the US, civilian nuclear cooperation, or the shipbuilding and nuclear submarine issues you mentioned, if all of these are realized, the alliance could indeed look very different. Of course, the challenge lies in achieving all of this. These are very large and unconventional matters, and implementing unconventional issues in policy is always very difficult. Therefore, I would like to say that there is significant potential for major changes that would benefit both sides. I genuinely believe it would benefit both sides, but it is certainly not easy.

And in the meantime, capable individuals on the US side, including Allison Hooker, have been working to establish and advance working groups related to the joint fact sheet with their senior counterparts. That is all positive. However, at the same time, there are some friction factors in this relationship. In particular, some trade disputes, especially the Coupang data leak incident, have had an excessive impact on the current bilateral relationship and have certainly slowed the progress of related discussions.

Future Research Directions and Analysis of Authoritarian Alliances

Jeon Jae-sung: Finally, I have one more question. You have conducted research on the nuclear armament intentions of South Korea and Japan, as well as on collective resilience against China, and now you are discussing a new paradigm regarding North Korea. As I read your article, I became curious about whether we can work on the post-interim stage of denuclearization and whether we can seek a long-term roadmap leading to ultimate denuclearization and improvement of inter-Korean relations from now on. Including this, do you have any future research plans related to policy agendas or Korea?

Victor Cha: Yes, one of the projects that CSIS has just started is a study on the resilience of authoritarian alliances. That is, it examines the factors that enable authoritarian alliances to move beyond highly personal, short-term, and transactional relationships to develop more institutionalized and long-term strategic relationships. This is, of course, related to the relationship between North Korea and Russia, and how that relationship might evolve if the Ukraine war comes to an end.

This is an attempt to derive conditions under which authoritarian alliances can develop into more long-term and strategic relationships, based on a theoretical and historical approach. I believe this is connected to the argument of 'cold peace.' As I mentioned earlier, one of the goals of the cold peace argument regarding engagement with North Korea is to somehow mitigate and dilute the relationship between Russia and North Korea. This poses problems for the US regarding the Korean Peninsula and, more broadly, the region.

When discussing the issue of North Korean nuclear submarines, this becomes even more pertinent, especially if North Korea is supporting Russia not only in Ukraine but potentially in other regions as well. Therefore, the effort to understand the vulnerabilities and strengths of this new authoritarian alliance is directly related to the discussion of cold peace.: Thank you.

■ Victor Cha_Korea Chair at CSIS, Professor at Georgetown University.

■ Translation and Editing: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher; Oh In-hwan_EAI Senior Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr

Video Script

Professor Cha, thank you for joining us. You've made tremendous contributions to the study of Korean affairs and to strengthening the US-ROK alliance, shaping both academic and policy debates over many years. Now, your recent article in Foreign Affairs has drawn a lot of attention here because it suggests a fundamental shift in US policy toward North Korea. Our audience is very interested in hearing directly from you about your thinking, the new paradigm, and what it means going forward. Could you please provide us with a summary of your view?

Limitations of Existing North Korea Policy and the Search for a New Approach

Sure, Professor Cha. I'm happy to be on this interview with you. Um, so, in a nutshell, the idea is essentially that by the measurement of where North Korea is today in terms of their nuclear weapons program, that is probably 50 nuclear warheads and enough fissile material for maybe 50 more.

Um, the size and the variety of delivery vehicles and their stated goal to mass-produce nuclear weapons. Um, our denuclearization policy, and by our, I mean the United States, South Korea, Japan, and even to an extent China and Russia, has failed. Um, we have not been able to denuclearize North Korea. We've been able to maybe slow the growth of the program, but it has now reached a point where they are a small nuclear weapon state with, I believe, aspirations to become a nuclear weapons power the size of France or

Britain, or even larger than France or Britain. Um, so, in that sense, our focus on denuclearization as a singular objective has not worked. And so we need to adjust. We need to think of some other sorts of policies. Um, my argument is not to abandon denuclearization, because I don't think the United States should ever abandon denuclearization.

Uh, but we should not let the goal of denuclearization stand in the way of intermediate steps and negotiations that are designed to reduce the threat to the United States. That is designed to reduce the number of enemies that the United States is dealing with these days.

Um, that is designed to prevent the potential for a nuclear crisis and nuclear first use. And that is designed to somehow sever or cut the Russia-North Korea tie. These, to me, are the most immediate threats to the United States from, um, from North Korea's nuclear program.

Um, and my main point is to focus only on denuclearization at the expense of these other things would be a mistake and would be detrimental to the security of the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. >> Thinking of the Trump two administrations foreign policy, uh, there are so many issues that, you know, the United States should deal with right now. So, I wonder whether your proposal reflects any realism adjustment to the current strategic environment, uh, given the crowded set of policies facing

the current US administration. It seems you're trying to offer a way to keep North Korea on the policy agenda rather than letting it being crowded out. Uh, so by having more realistic interim, uh, proposal, the US government may think that North Korea is still on the agenda.

Uh, do you think it's a fair way to put it? >> Um, I think what motivated me to write it at this particular time is that even though North Korea has not been on the mainstream policy agenda for the United States because of, uh, Ukraine, because of Iran, because of Gaza, because of Venezuela, and a number of other issues.

Um, even though it wasn't in the mainstream, it always has the potential to arise and become a front-burner issue, either due to things that North Korea does, like a seventh nuclear test, uh, more long-range testing, or because, uh, Trump wants to make it an issue.

He wants because he wants to meet Kim Jong-un. President Trump wants to meet Kim Jong-un again. And so part of the timing of the piece was, uh, because it was in the run-up to President Trump's trip to, um, uh, to the region, uh, where there might have been a possibility of an encounter with the North Korean leader. Um, and in that respect, it would be important to think about under what terms should the United States re-engage with North Korea.

So, um, I agree with the question in the sense that this has not been a top policy agenda item, but it always has the potential to become one, uh, suddenly, unexpectedly. And I don't think that there is a lot of thinking in an organized way happening within the US government today on North Korea because everybody defers to the president, cuz for this, this is really the president's issue, and only he can speak or think about policy on it.

So, I just tried to think from the outside of a way to reset North Korea policy, reset our objectives, starting with resetting our objectives and then determining what we should be negotiating on going forward. >> You've been reading scholar and analyst Korean affairs. I wonder if this type of, you know, proposal, the interim approaches widely shared among the US policy community, or is there any possibility as you said, President Trump will not read but will think in this way when, if President Trump has a chance to meet Kim

Jong-un. >> Um, well, [clears throat] I'm not expecting that President Trump will read the article because I understand he's not big on reading, but perhaps people around him will read it and will talk to him about it. Um, I know that it has been sent to people close to him. So, um, um, so in terms of the Washington DC policy community, you know, it has sparked a good bit of debate and discussion within the DC policy community. I will say that when I wrote the piece in draft form, I sent it to a number of

people who were former negotiators on this issue for both Democrat and Republican administrations. Um, and, you know, they might have had individual quibbles with one thing or the other thing, but they all generally agreed with the gist of the argument. Thought it was good that somebody was making this argument because I think, in my opinion, I think it's an argument that, um, anybody who has been put in the position of negotiating with North Korea on denuclearization would understand very well.

But at the same time, it's taboo to say, "We should put denuclearization on the side for the moment." Um, and so that's the thing I've been most criticized for is people who don't read the argument basically just have a caricature of it and they say, "Oh, he's saying accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state and give up on denuclearization." Uh, and people have criticized the article for that. Of course, that's not what I'm saying. If people read the article, what I'm saying is that we

should still focus on denuclearization as a long-term goal, but we need to accomplish certain objectives in the meantime, uh, for the security interests of the United States and its allies. So, yes, it sparked a good deal of discussion. I think for those who have done, who have actually negotiated with North Korea, I have not heard a lot of disagreement. Um, but from people outside of that circle, um, you know, there's been, and people who make, uh, generalizations about the argument, there's been

The Need for Realistic Crisis Management and Interim Negotiations

criticism. >> Well, let me hear some details of your proposal then. Uh, as far as I read, your proposal is composed of several pillars such as the defense of the homeland security, which it becomes more, you know, harder thinking of the limit of the GDI and the, uh, the trust by denial, and also the need to open a channel with North Korea, a diplomatic channel for crisis management under the big, uh, paradigm of, uh, arms control, and also a strengthening, uh, US-South Korea-Japan trilateral defense

system, and possibly, uh, driving a wedge strategy among the three countries, Russia, China, and North Korea. All are seems very reasonable. Uh, the question then is, um, will North Korea come to the table for, uh, the proposal of crisis management with the US? Because North Korea thinks that they are in the best strategic position maybe after 1945, because in terms of, you know, uh, level of nuclear arms and, uh, the level of support from Russia, uh, and the recovery of trade with China, even though, uh, there is a big problem of

North Korean economy, but in their constitution, they explicitly stated that they should be recognized as a legal nuclear weapon state, which is a pre-supposition for the opening in negotiation with the United States. So, it seems really reasonable and, uh, ideal that we should open a channel for crisis, uh, management, uh, for any possible nuclear war. Is there any, uh, policy means of leverage for the states to make North Korea to come to the table?

The Reality of North Korea's Nuclear Possession and the Risk of Escalation

The previous approach of prioritizing only denuclearization did not permit dialogue with North Korea on crisis management or preventing nuclear escalation. This was because any such dialogue could have been perceived as recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-armed state.

Today, however, North Korea possesses over 50 nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and following Russia’s example, has explicitly rejected a no-first-use policy. The risk of nuclear escalation is therefore real. This was not the case in the early 1990s, when North Korea had only one or two nuclear weapons and such a risk was not realistic.

A responsible dialogue on nuclear escalation and nuclear deterrence is now necessary. This is the most practical and realistic approach, while simultaneously upholding the goal of denuclearization.

What I argued in my article is that it is possible to continue negotiations and dialogue on confrontational issues, even with both countries possessing nuclear weapons, without formally recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. Why would North Korea be interested in such talks? I believe there are two reasons. First, North Korea is acutely aware of the dangers of escalation. One recent piece of evidence for this is as follows.

The North Korean government actually responded to the South Korean government's expression of regret regarding drone activities. Of course, there may be various reasons why the South Korean government took that step.

However, the fact that the North Korean government, which had previously refused communication with the South, acknowledged Seoul's position is a signal, in my view, of its concern about escalation over drones. As you know, the Comprehensive Military Agreement did not contain provisions on drone activity. So, North Korea's response to South Korea's stance is a sign that they understand the issue.

Second, another reason North Korea might come to the negotiating table is that it's a mistake to assume they are in their best position since 1945. I'm actually planning to write about this.

But it's a mistake to assume North Korea is content with the status quo—that because they have Russian and Chinese support, they don't need anything else and have no need to talk to the United States. Many people argue that even if Trump wants to talk with Kim Jong Un, Kim feels no need to because he has China and Russia.

This assumes a status-quo mentality from North Korea. But I don't believe their mentality is status-quo; it's revisionist. They will always be looking for more. So this could be another reason they might come to the table with the United States, because Donald Trump says different things.

On one hand, he might talk about denuclearization, but on the other, he could say Kim Jong Un has nuclear weapons. So from Pyongyang's perspective, re-engaging with the United States would be aimed at gaining de facto recognition as a nuclear-armed state. Again, this is one of their objectives, and if they are revisionist and see an opportunity with a U.S. president who wants to meet, they may take it.

If they see a U.S. president who isn't focused on denuclearization in the same way as past presidents, they may see an opportunity. So I think there are many reasons why North Korea might come to the table. The conventional wisdom is, 'They have Russia and China, and the last meeting with Trump was a disaster, so why would they want to meet again?' But I think because Kim Jong Un is in a much stronger position and is not a status-quo actor, he may see an opportunity.

He may see a chance to meet with Trump, reach a meaningless agreement, and then claim he met the U.S. president and was recognized as a nuclear power. From North Korea's standpoint, there's a concern that even with good U.S.-North Korea discussions, South Korea could be left out. This is because North Korea doesn't want to deal with South Korea these days, based on its 'two hostile states' theory.

A Comparative Analysis of Peaceful Coexistence and Cold War Peace

They want to recognize South Korea as a foreign country, a very hostile one. So, a progressive government might try to devise an interim initiative to create an opportunity for South Korea to talk to North Korea, but that seems very difficult. For now, our government has proposed the idea of peaceful coexistence, accepting that unification is a distant goal, as is denuclearization. So unification has been put on the back burner, while peaceful coexistence will be emphasized. This peace, in Johan Galtung's terminology, is a 'negative peace'—a passive peace that prevents military conflict. This seems to have commonalities with a 'Cold War peace.' Do you see common ground between a Cold War peace approach and South Korea's peaceful coexistence approach?

Yes, I think there could be some similarities. I believe North Korea's goal is to exclude South Korea. So even if they are willing and interested in re-engaging with Donald Trump, it won't be like it was under the Moon Jae-in administration, where the South Korean government actively sought a role and held bilateral talks first.

They tried for a trilateral meeting at Panmunjom. I don't think North Korea has any interest in that. In fact, I believe they would see meeting with the U.S. without consulting South Korea as a victory. And President Trump might also feel he doesn't need South Korea. For the first round, he needed South Korea. He needed China's help to make things happen.

But this time, he'll probably think he doesn't need them. So, while there may be similarities between a Cold War peace and peaceful coexistence, I believe North Korea's strategy for coming out of the shadows and re-engaging diplomatically will be to focus entirely on the United States.

Let me make two other quick points. First, I see 'Cold War peace' as the idea that the relationship remains somewhat adversarial. We still don't like their nuclear weapons, view them as a threat, and ultimately want denuclearization. That's our goal. But at the same time, we must maintain open channels of communication to avoid escalation or similar crises.

Peaceful coexistence, on the other hand, at least as the current administration has presented it, seems to have more positive connotations. I'm not saying a Cold War peace is malicious, but it is what it is: basically a cold war between two adversaries trying to prevent miscalculation or escalation.

My second point is that while one of North Korea's goals is to exclude South Korea from its dialogue with the United States, China's role is different from what it was during the first Trump administration. At that time, China viewed a potential U.S.-North Korea summit with anxiety. Before Trump announced he would meet Kim Jong Un in Singapore, Xi Jinping had refused to meet with him.

But this time, he'll probably think he doesn't need them. So, while there may be similarities between a Cold War peace and peaceful coexistence, I believe North Korea's strategy for coming out of the shadows and re-engaging diplomatically will be to focus entirely on the United States.

After President Trump announced he would meet Kim Jong Un, President Xi met with Kim five or six times. After the final summit in Hanoi collapsed, President Xi stopped meeting with him. Earlier this year, Kim and Xi met in China and North Korea, their first meeting since Hanoi. I believe that while China has traditionally been wary of U.S.-North Korea meetings, today's balance of power suggests China might actually welcome and try to facilitate one.

If China facilitates a meeting, or at least conveys to Kim Jong Un that President Trump wants to meet and a meeting takes place, Beijing will say it has done President Trump a great favor.

And it will want something in return. Also, and perhaps more importantly, China would support a U.S.-North Korea meeting today because anything that might distract from or dilute the Kim-Putin relationship would be viewed as a positive for Beijing right now. So I think the positions of both China and North Korea regarding a potential U.S.-North Korea summit are quite different now than they were in the early Trump administration.

Strengthening ROK-U.S. Alliance Deterrence and Strategic Consultation

I think that's a point we need to consider more. It's an excellent point. My question is about the military component of this 'Cold War peace' paradigm. Some analysts in South Korea talk about transforming U.S. Forces Korea to be more efficient. But I believe it's crucial to protect the U.S. homeland by strengthening deterrence against North Korea. Through deterrence by denial or by punishment, the likelihood of decoupling between the United States and South Korea decreases.

That's a good thing. But in South Korea, there could be misread signals in the 'assurance game' that the U.S. is weakening its commitment to the ROK. You mentioned elements of the Kill Chain, a reduction in USFK troops, and more efficient approaches using new technology. Within this Cold War peace paradigm, can anything be done to reaffirm the U.S. commitment?

Under a Trump administration, the United States clearly sees—and we heard this many times from Secretary Hagel—South Korea taking over the bulk of the defense of the Korean Peninsula.

This is clearly the direction the current administration is moving in. So I think the idea of a Cold War peace is premised on the United States viewing it this way. But at the same time, it tries to do two things. One is to avoid the threat of a preemptive strike that could itself trigger a North Korean first strike.

Right. The threat of a South Korean first strike could trigger a North Korean first strike. And that North Korean first strike, at least according to their doctrine, might not be conventional. It could be a nuclear use scenario.

So in that sense, I think there are ways to enhance deterrence without focusing on, as you said, the Kill Chain or decapitation strikes. Objectively, I recognize that can be quite destabilizing on the Korean Peninsula. I certainly understand why the South Korean government might favor Kill Chain and decapitation strikes to strengthen deterrence—to demonstrate massive action. But they've also said it could be preemptive, not just retaliatory.

So I see that as a risk of escalation. You can talk about decapitation strikes and massive punishment in the form of retaliation. That is stable. That is a stable basis for deterrence. The other point is that I think the traditional U.S. ground troop presence on the peninsula could change, given the potential for OPCON transition and the U.S. focus on a Taiwan contingency.

Specifically, this could mean deploying more air and naval forces to the Korean Peninsula and reducing ground forces. However, I argued in my article that some form of tripwire presence is still necessary, because that tripwire is a critical part of deterrence and the credibility of the nuclear umbrella.

So the United States needs to enhance South Korea's capabilities and strengthen trilateral capabilities with Japan and South Korea. It must maintain at least a tripwire presence, even if the ground force posture on the peninsula changes to rely more on air and naval forces. And, in my opinion, it should work more with South Korea on deterrence by denial and massive retaliation, rather than focusing on preemptive strikes or preemptive decapitation.

I have a couple more questions. There's a major discussion in South Korea these days about the ROK-U.S. relationship. It includes, as you mentioned, the OPCON transition, the strategic flexibility of USFK, and investments in the United States—all these things, like submarines.

You've reviewed decades of this relationship. How do you assess the current state of ROK-U.S. relations and the overall strategic consultation, not just on North Korea but more broadly? What is the state of the alliance? Are we having deep and frank enough discussions about how to meet these new challenges?

The Current State and Future Prospects of ROK-U.S. Relations

If you look at the joint fact sheet and the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement agreed upon between the Trump administration and the Lee Myung-bak administration, it was undeniably a very rocky road—a roller coaster of crises, agreements, and then more crises.

But if you look at what was actually accomplished in that document, it could be potentially transformative for the U.S.-South Korea relationship. The OPCON transition, South Korean investment in key U.S. industries, civil nuclear energy cooperation, shipbuilding as you mentioned, nuclear submarines—if all of this comes to fruition, it could truly be a very different-looking alliance.

Of course, the challenge is trying to achieve all of this. Because these are big, unconventional things, and when you talk about unconventional items in policy, they are always very difficult to implement. So I would say there is great potential for major changes that would benefit both sides. I truly believe it benefits both sides, but it won't be easy.

And in the meantime, you have excellent people on the U.S. side like Allison Hooker, and their counterparts at a very high level, trying to begin work on the joint fact sheet and push for its implementation. That's all positive. But at the same time, there are irritants in the relationship, particularly concerning some business disputes like the Coupang data breach, which has clearly had a disproportionate impact.

This is impacting the current relationship and has clearly slowed its momentum. Elites in South Korea and Japan need to be more clear-eyed and should study collective resilience to China's economic coercion and a new paradigm for North Korea.

So, reading your article, I was wondering: can we work on the steps that would follow the interim measures toward denuclearization? Can we find a long-term roadmap for better inter-Korean relations that spans the period from now until eventual denuclearization? And related to this, do you have any future plans for research relevant to South Korea's policy agenda?

Research on Authoritarian Alliance Resilience and Its Policy Implications

Victor Cha, the Korea Chair at CSIS, recently launched a research project on the resilience of authoritarian alliances. This study examines the factors that enable authoritarian alliances to move beyond personalistic, short-term, and transactional ties and develop into more institutionalized, long-term strategic relationships.

This research is clearly about the North Korea-Russia relationship, and it poses the question of what will become of this relationship if the war in Ukraine ends. The study explores the history of authoritarian alliances, both theoretically and historically, seeking to identify the conditions under which they can evolve into long-term, strategic relationships. This is also related to the 'Cold Peace' discussion I mentioned, because one objective of addressing the relationship with North Korea within that framework is to find ways to weaken the ties between Russia and North Korea.

This relationship creates problems for the United States on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider region. It could also become a problem for Europe, given the issue of North Korea's nuclear submarines or the possibility that North Korea could assist Russia not only in Ukraine but potentially in other areas. Therefore, the effort to understand the weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and strengths of this new authoritarian alliance connects back to the 'Cold Peace' discussion.

Thank you.