[Korea's North Korea Strategy] Vol. 1: A Theoretical Discourse on the 'Korean Peninsula Individualization' Strategy: The Demise of North Korea's Security-Legitimacy Dilemma and South Korea's Mid-to-Long-Term North Korea Strategy

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RezKM0uzXlg&si=IhkJLoYTmM-gFZaR

Video Transcript

Hello. I am Oh In-hwan, the Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute. As I considered the order of presentations with the Director, I thought it might be better to go first rather than last, as I would have the burden of synthesizing the high-quality presentations of Professors Kim Taek-bin, Lee Jong-min, and Dr. Choi In-ho. I felt a bit unsure about that. Therefore, I would like to present a major idea.

The Dilemma of North Korea's Security Legitimacy and Strategic Readjustment

I have titled this 'The Strategy of Individualization on the Korean Peninsula.' It is a theory. If you provide good feedback, I will strive to elaborate further. I have prepared this in two parts: diagnosis and prescription. Over the past 30 years, in explaining North Korea's foreign policy, I would like to first mention that there has been a dilemma of security legitimacy from the perspective of someone who specializes in security, and that North Korea's efforts to address this have persisted for 30 years. However, it seems that this dilemma of security legitimacy has now been discarded. North Korea appears to be focusing on security by further strengthening its nuclear capabilities. The reason it is a dilemma is that creating a nuclear program and continuing to produce nuclear weapons for security will inevitably face continuous sanctions, and if that happens, the practical legitimacy through economic achievements shown by China or Vietnam will inevitably weaken in the medium to long term. North Korea is not unaware of this and knows it, which is why it has made significant efforts to offset this when making concessions regarding its nuclear program through the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations. Although limited, it has been in that dilemma.

However, I think that this dilemma has now been discarded, and if so, I have considered what we should do in the context of such a significant strategic readjustment by North Korea, which I refer to as the 'Strategy of Individualization on the Korean Peninsula.'

We should think of the Korean Peninsula as a single large unit. To be more specific, even if we keep the name of the Ministry of Unification, we could consider it as the 'Ministry of Korean Peninsula Strategy.' In the context of the strengthening of North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relations, it may be necessary to enhance the roles of the Ministry of Unification in managing North Korea-Russia relations or North Korea-China relations, as it has traditionally dealt with inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. relations. I believe it is necessary to set the Korean Peninsula as a single unit.

Two Changes in North Korea's Foreign Policy Premises

I will discuss the theoretical aspects later. If we look closely at the most fundamental aspect of the abandonment of the security legitimacy dilemma, I believe there were two premises. These are also the basic premises of North Korea's foreign policy and the fundamental policies we have responded to. Ultimately, North Korea sought to confirm signals regarding the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations when making concessions on the nuclear issue. When the U.S. provides some signals regarding the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations, North Korea may make some concessions on its nuclear program, and there was an assumption that if this is provided, it could lead to long-term denuclearization. The second premise is that whether it is through a communist unification, an agreed unification, or a federation, we have planned our North Korea policy with the vision of unification, but this situation has changed as it is no longer acceptable from North Korea's perspective.

As an alternative to this, North Korea has been closely aligning itself with Russia, and there has been a situation where trilateral cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia is being postponed. The concessions on North Korea's nuclear program are a matter of long-term domestic political pressure and practical legitimacy. To address this, leaders like Kim Jong-un and the elites have been continuously exploring whether the U.S. commitment is credible, and when the credibility of the U.S. commitment is assured, decisions regarding North Korea's nuclear concessions have been made. Therefore, the basic premise of the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations has not been a mere carrot; it has acted as a substitute for the weakening of nuclear deterrence security.

Domestic pressure can be seen as almost a constant, and it can be observed that North Korea's policy decisions have been significantly influenced by the credibility of U.S. commitments. Since 1994, the light-water reactor has been the most institutionalized and has shown the credibility of commitments in a technical sense. According to a paper by American nuclear physicist Chris Lawrence, if North Korea only considered compensation for energy issues in 1994 and 1995, building a fossil fuel power plant would have been much more efficient. However, North Korea continued to demand light-water reactors, which ultimately required intervention from the Western world, despite the need for continuous inspections and technical cooperation. Nevertheless, North Korea stubbornly insisted on light-water reactors.

The reason for this is that a physical commitment was necessary. From the U.S., because the U.S. could turn back at any time. From an international relations perspective, the relationship between North Korea and the U.S. is highly asymmetric, and the U.S. is a country that does not suffer significant damage regardless of what North Korea does. Thus, North Korea operates its nuclear program as a form of political hedging, but because the U.S. can withdraw at any time, it calculated that by establishing a physical and technical institutionalization like the light-water reactor, the U.S. would inevitably have to engage in the long term.

This situation lasted for about 7 to 8 years before collapsing. The collapse occurred when the U.S. raised issues related to North Korea's nuclear materials in 2002, and although there were the September 19 Agreement and the February 13 Agreement afterward, the September 19 Agreement was immediately undermined by the imposition of financial sanctions on North Korea at Banco Delta Asia in Macau. The credibility of U.S. commitments was not very high from North Korea's perspective, as the light-water reactor did not provide a decisive positive credibility of commitments, which I believe became a determining factor in North Korea's choices. Professor Victor Cha acknowledges this but argues that North Korea never intended to make concessions. If that is the case, then this nuclear and economic dual-track policy existed in 2013, and later, during the North Korea-U.S. and inter-Korean talks in 2017 and 2018, the focus shifted to economic development, only to return to nuclear issues after Hanoi. This raises questions about why such oscillations occurred over 30 years if North Korea was solely pursuing nuclear capabilities.

I believe that the accumulated crises, credibility crises, and the crisis of U.S. credibility reached a critical point in 2019. Kim Jong-un reportedly stated in his letter diplomacy that he has no intention of attacking South Korea or starting a war. He truly does not have such thoughts. As will be evident in the presentations by Professors Kim Taek-bin and Lee Jong-min, North Korea's nuclear concessions are merely revealed in the international context. From 2012 to 2016, there was a significant introduction of market economy mechanisms, and from 2013 to 2019, observing the dynamics of the elites shows fluctuations.

Theoretical Background of the Strategy of Individualization on the Korean Peninsula

If we combine our North Korea foreign policy, domestic economic policy, and the dynamics of the elites up to 2019, we can see that they have been moving together in one direction. I believe that this 30-year pendulum movement has ultimately concluded in 2019. The term 'individualization' may be somewhat difficult, but I recall that the Director mentioned the concept of 'theory of incomplete sovereignty' while explaining the theories of East Asian countries. We are all too aware that both North and South Korea are in a state of sovereign deficit, and the same applies to China and Taiwan.

Constitutionally, Taiwan has a legitimate regime that governs all of mainland China, but this is not the case in reality, and the same goes for our country and North Korea. The People's Republic of China is also in a similar situation. Japan, due to its pacifist constitution, cannot maintain a military, and thus cannot be considered a normal sovereign state. All East Asian countries are in a state of incomplete sovereignty. Because of this incomplete sovereignty, we have not been able to enter into an anarchic state among fully sovereign states.

I believe this connects significantly with the concept of 'individual' as discussed by Gilbert Simondon. In other words, it indicates that we have not yet become individuals. There is a concept of 'pre-individual quasi-stability.' Simondon does not view this as a negative concept; rather, he sees it as a state full of potential. It is a state where potential energy has not yet been manifested, and when specific shock conditions are applied, it can become individualized. There are two incompatible elements that can return to a single entity when specific conditions and shocks are applied. A concrete example from physics or chemistry is crystallization. I have included a photo later, and I believe that the state of incomplete sovereignty described by the Director is similar to the pre-individual state described by Simondon. Simondon views the pre-individual state as a state full of potential energy.

Because of this, it is not negative but positive, and it can be seen as a state that can become individualized at any time if certain conditions are met. An example of a supersaturated solution illustrates this. If we take this analogy literally, in a state of incomplete sovereignty, we can plant the seeds of decisions in the direction we desire. Therefore, when specific conditions arise, we can guide these decision seeds to become individualized in the direction we want.

To provide a more concrete example, crystallization serves as an example of individualization. In a state of supersaturated solution, many substances are in an incompatible state. In this state, various seed crystals can be introduced, and when specific external shocks or internal condition changes occur, crystals form, which can be seen as individualization. If we consider the Korean Peninsula as a single large entity, it has not yet been individualized, and crystallization has not occurred, but we are living in a state of pre-individual quasi-stability. This is an example. The most familiar example is a liquid hot pack. In winter, in a state of supersaturated solution, when a specific click is made, crystallization occurs, leading to individualization. It becomes hot ice.

The transition from a liquid state to a solid state occurs with the release of heat, which is not the creation of something from nothing but rather the manifestation of energy inherent in the supersaturated solution. It is the transformation of the liquid state into a solid state. This is what I mean by the concepts of crystallization and individualization. When a small shock is applied in the liquid state, it instantly transforms into a solid while releasing heat, and considering the principle of hand warmers that utilize the properties of supersaturated states, this can be seen as an example of individualization and crystallization from a physical or chemical perspective.

Specific Application Plans for the Strategy of Individualization on the Korean Peninsula

What would happen if we brought this to the Korean Peninsula? As I mentioned at the beginning, would it not be better to set the still incomplete Korean Peninsula as a single entity? If the Ministry of Unification has been focusing on North Korea relations or North Korea-U.S. relations until now, it may be necessary for the Ministry of Unification to take on roles related to North Korea-China relations, considering the Korean Peninsula as a whole unit, and to expand its mission to include research capabilities for North Korea-Russia relations, as well as lobbying efforts towards the U.S. and Japan.

Recently, North Korea placed its Unified Front Department under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February of this year. I thought it had been disbanded, but it has changed to the 10th Bureau, which was reduced to 10 bureaus in the 2024 Party Central Committee. I believe it is the Bureau for South Korea Relations, and its name has come under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rather than merely responding, if we view the Korean Peninsula as a single unit through the concept of individualization, and if North Korea can be seen as part of the Global South, then when we consider increasing our points of contact with North Korea, we can strategize that if we do not engage in direct dialogue with North Korea, we can consider development cooperation and AI cooperation support for the Global South, which North Korea could be included in.

This allows us to think on a macro level, and on a micro level, I view inter-Korean relations as a pre-individual tense relationship. A pre-individual relationship is one that has a stable relationship. There are two incompatible elements, but it is a state full of potential, and under specific conditions and shocks, the dynamics within the elite may change. Alternatively, if the qualitative growth of the North Korean economy stops, and if the elites feel that it is not desirable in the long term to continue with an economy that does not qualitatively grow, then changes may occur. Externally, with the diffusion and spread of AI, South Korea is continuously moving in that direction, and China is the same. If North Korea remains isolated as it is now, while it talks a lot about AI and automation, and engages in translation and gaming, it will not survive under proper international AI pressures. I thought that these dimensions could be positively described as a state full of potential.

I have about 20 seconds left, and I believe I have conveyed most of what I wanted to say. I think it is necessary to plant decision seeds in various areas.

Future Scenarios and the Importance of the Individualization Strategy

We cannot predict when and how shocks and changes will occur. It could be a change in North Korean elites, a reassessment of the North Korean economy, or external pressures from AI. There could be various structural pressures, such as the collapse or reorganization of North Korea-China relations or the reorganization of U.S.-China relations. When these shocks and changes occur, it is necessary to consider ways to institutionalize them in a direction favorable to South Korea and the entire Korean Peninsula in the medium to long term, even if not immediately. There are four scenarios: A represents the current state, and B represents a very low probability state. What we can think of more creatively is the partial recovery of the security legitimacy dilemma. In particular, it could be partially restored due to the reassessment of the elites, and there could be external pressures when a technological bifurcation occurs globally due to AI structures. At that time, we need to prepare so that it can be favorable to South Korea and the Korean Peninsula.

Rather than determining a singular form of unification, we should strive to understand individualization and the individual itself. Individualization is real, and the process of becoming individualized is the essence. It is not the case that an individual exists a priori, and that individualization or unification occurs artificially or forcibly. This is the key insight. Therefore, I believe it is important to plant many crystallization seeds that can lead to individualization and crystallization of the Korean Peninsula in the medium to long term.

With these thoughts, I will conclude my presentation.