[Commentary] An Era of Chaos, New Visions for the Future, and Middle Power Response Strategies

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0vTIjDLGLZA&si=XIRhzvUFywaS1cnd

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The Future of the World Order and the Possibility of New Visions

Oh Inhwan: Professor, thank you very much for joining us. My first question is about the future of the global order. In a recent article you contributed to the Ideas newsletter, you pointed out that in the early 1990s, scholars and experts, including Francis Fukuyama with his 'End of History,' all presented visions for the future, but today's intellectuals are failing to offer what comes next. Following that argument, my question is this: Do you truly believe that new visions are more likely to emerge from the non-Western world? And in relation to this, do you see the emerging international order as a significantly new order, rather than a reform or reconfiguration of the existing one?

Ayşe Zarakol: Thank you. First, thank you for the invitation. It's an honor to speak with the East Asia Institute. Yes, the article you mentioned was for the Ideas newsletter. In it, I discussed how at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, Western intellectuals, albeit controversially, presented comprehensive visions for the world that followed. In that piece, I discussed not only Fukuyama, who argued, 'We have reached the end of history, so there is nothing after this,' but also Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis and Robert Kaplan. In contrast, I think there is a palpable sense of anxiety today, particularly in the West, that what has been called the 'liberal international order' is over or ending.

But in practice, apart from some philosophers sponsored by the MAGA movement or some tech companies, nobody is saying what comes next. There are attempts to save the liberal international order, a backward-looking vision of 'we can fix this,' or a tendency to fall back on 20th-century analogies to World War II or the interwar period, although these are diminishing by the day. So most of the frameworks that Western intellectuals are using tend to look at the past, not at what comes next. That was the core of what I wanted to emphasize.

And I concluded the essay by saying that if new visions emerge, they are more likely to come from the non-Western world. This is because the non-Western world, what is sometimes called the 'Global South'—though I think that's a misnomer—is not that. Not all non-Western countries are part of what used to be called the Third World, the 'Global South.' But the non-Western world, even if it benefited from the liberal international order, does not have the same emotional attachment to it. And I think not having that emotional attachment is actually helpful when thinking about what comes next. It allows for more innovative thinking.

Oh Inhwan: Yes, I also agree that the non-Western world has less emotional attachment to the liberal international order (LIO). However, recently, despite the anxiety you mentioned, David Lake and Thomas Risse, among others, have recompiled and published writings on the LIO. I believe it was published in February. They emphasize the resilience of the LIO despite several crises. They seem more hopeful about the LIO returning or being reconfigured to some extent. So, I think there is still a perceptual or emotional distance between those who support the LIO and the rest.

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes. There are writings that say so. Institutions do not disappear overnight. They are often repurposed by new regimes for new purposes. I am currently writing a popular world history book that covers from the beginning to the present. And I was just writing about the Warring States period and the Qin and Han dynasties in Chinese history. I found that in each period, even when they were against the institutions of the old order, they repurposed those institutions for new purposes. That's just one example, but I think it's generally true.

So I have no doubt that many institutions and agreements of the liberal international order, including economic aspects like the hegemony of the US dollar, will show resilience. What I am skeptical about is whether they will continue to be used for liberal purposes, or even ostensibly liberal purposes. Because it is always debatable whether the liberal international order was actually liberal. But I think it is now much more likely that some institutions and alliances will be used for illiberal purposes, and for American imperialism 2.0.

Oh Inhwan: Yes. So, you are saying that some features of the international order, such as economic aspects, may persist, but the purpose of that order may not be liberal as it was before.

Ayşe Zarakol: Exactly. It's about what shows resilience. Is it the resilience of ideas, or the resilience of some agreements, alliances, and institutions?

The US-Iran-Israel Conflict and the Structure of the New World Order

Oh Inhwan: Yes, that's good. Let's move on to the second question. This question examines the US-Iran, or US-Israel-Iran, conflict as a stress test for the emerging order. The ongoing US-Israel-Iran conflict seems to represent one of the two categories you distinguish: disorder or unorder, and you could clarify that distinction as you apply your framework. This conflict seems to encapsulate many of the fault lines you've written about—the unraveling of the post-1945 order, the loss of normative authority in the West, the agency of non-Western actors, and the question of who writes the rules. From a long-term perspective, what do you think this conflict reveals about the actual structure of the emerging order?

And regardless of the military and diplomatic outcomes, what do you anticipate will be the more lasting consequences of this conflict for the future international order, or disorder, once the immediate chaos subsides?

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes, thank you. The distinction between disorder and unorder is not one I created. Mark Leonard, the Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), has published a new book on order, and his distinction is as follows: there is order, and then there is disorder, which is a state where the memory and expectations of order still remain. So, what is happening now appears to be disorder because we still have expectations about how order should function. And at some point, there is actually no order. It's not even disorder; it's a state where no new order has formed. I think that's a useful distinction. However, I disagree with him. I don't think we are there yet.

There have certainly been periods in history when everything truly collapsed. Going back to antiquity, if you look at the collapse of the Bronze Age in Western Asia, for about 100 years, some cultural elements persisted, and then there's a gap in the archaeological record. That is perhaps disorder or unorder. I think we are still in a period of disorder, and by disorder, as I said, I mean a state where there are ideas about how things should function, and an expectation that there should be one international order. Some people, like Lake and Risse, say the order is still intact, while others say, no, it's over. So there is no consensus, and it is fragmented.

And it is quite transactional. Middle powers are hedging, and other countries are trying to set the direction for the next order. To me, that is disorder. It's not quite unorder, but the consensus has broken down, and some are still stuck in the past, while others are not. And the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, or the Iran-Israel-US war, is a good example of that. We've been living with that situation for two months, and the UK is predicting travel disruptions due to severe aviation fuel shortages this summer. At the same time, interest in this conflict seems to have waned. It has become part of the scenery, like the Gaza conflict or the war in Ukraine. In fact, these are major conflicts, not minor ones, yet they are fragmented. Because nobody can keep track of everything, people only pay attention to the conflicts that directly affect them, and we exist in a situation where we can't even track daily whether the straits are closed or open. To me, that is the very definition of disorder.

And I think this situation will continue for some time. I don't expect any consensus or a new order to be recreated in the near future. More conflicts will be added to this fragmented landscape, and every country will have to figure out how to survive in this chaotic world on its own.

Oh Inhwan: Yes, I don't know if you've read the brief memo that Director Jeon Jaesung and I wrote, but in it, we characterized the current state as 'hybrid unstable'.

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes, I fully agree with that view.

Oh Inhwan: Yes. This is not sphere of influence politics or great power politics. Trump claims a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, but by the same logic, he doesn't recognize China's sphere of influence in the Pacific or Russia's influence. So, there are two different organizing principles applied to different regions. We also largely agree with your view.

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes. People are trying to fit these old concepts onto the current situation, but I don't think they really fit. I agree.

Middle Power Survival Strategies: Korea's Opportunities and Challenges

Oh Inhwan: Yes, this is the third question. Although you briefly touched upon middle power hedging and survival strategies, the final question holds particular significance for the East Asia Institute audience. In your NSI interview, you mentioned that countries accustomed to unpredictability, like those in the Global South or non-Western regions, might be better prepared for this environment than many Western countries. In that context, Korea occupies a unique position. It is a former peripheral state that has become one of the most successful beneficiaries of the post-Cold War liberal order, yet geographically it lies on the suture line where the organizing principles of the United States and China meet in the Indo-Pacific.

Drawing on your research on stigma, hierarchy, and the agency of states that have historically been outsiders to the order defined by the West, what advice would you offer to countries like Korea, or other middle powers that must navigate this crisis or fragmentation of the order?

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes, that is precisely one of the arguments I made in that interview and in my current lectures on disorder. I believe that countries like Korea are well-positioned to navigate this period of disorder—which I suspect will last longer than we think. The historical parallel I drew in my recent book, 'Before the West,' is another long period of disorder that ended around the 17th century. That disorder was unfavorable to the old hegemons of the 16th century, primarily Asian empires from the Ottomans to the Ming, and the Habsburgs in Europe.

And when all the dust settled, the actual winners were the emerging smaller states of Western Europe, such as England and France. While it's not an exact parallel, I think periods of disorder are more favorable to emerging states than to established hegemons. Therefore, under structural pressures like AI, financialization, and climate change, the old hegemons of the 20th century, such as the United States, China, and Russia, may be more thinly spread and face greater challenges because they are larger states.

And there may be a moment when middle powers are in a more favorable position. Especially countries like Korea, which, as you mentioned, are beneficiaries of the old order but not top-tier powers, and are materially well-positioned to enter a period of disorder. At the same time, as discussed earlier, they are more open to diverse strategies because they lack the same emotional attachment. If you look at Europe, for example, there are many middle powers there, but they are so attached to the 20th-century order that it's difficult for them to think outside the box. The period of disorder is a difficult time, wherever you are. We all have to learn to live with high levels of uncertainty, volatility, and rapid change.

But I think countries like Korea are better positioned to navigate it.

Oh Inhwan: Yes. I hope Korea can leverage its historical and political position.

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes.

Oh Inhwan: Although we are on the same side as Japan on some issues, I believe there are differences between Korea and Japan in their approach to the liberal international order.

Ayşe Zarakol: There is nothing wrong with acknowledging the positive aspects of the liberal order. It's not that it must be completely rejected. However, the world is changing, and we all have to adapt. How well we can adapt depends on how well we can let go of the past.

Limitations of Mainstream International Relations Theory and the Search for New Analytical Frameworks

Oh Inhwan: Yes. Since we seem to have enough time, I will ask the fourth question as well. The final question is about what mainstream international relations theory understands correctly and what it misunderstands about the current international order's issues and status. A recurring theme in your work, from 'After Defeat' to 'Before the West' and your essays on the essentialist trap, is that mainstream IR theories like realism, liberalism, and much of constructivism are built upon assumptions derived from a relatively narrow slice of West European history. And this becomes particularly constraining at moments like the present, when the order they have normalized is unraveling.

So, where do mainstream IR frameworks help us understand the pressing issues of our time, including the conflicts in Gaza, Iran, and Ukraine, and where do they mislead us? And what are the alternative concepts or starting points, such as disorder or unorder, that could replace them?

Ayşe Zarakol: Yes, if we talk about schools of thought in international relations like realism and liberalism, those are 20th-century late forms of very old ideas that have existed not only in the West but also in Eastern philosophy, etc. If you contrast constructivism with a kind of materialism or empiricism, that too is a debate as old as humanity. What is the world made of? So I don't think there's anything wrong with the schools themselves. It's just that we shouldn't be stuck in their 20th-century late versions. We need to update them again.

And one of my arguments has always been this: the more history we know, especially beyond European history, the more we can update these theories for the 21st century. The 20th-century versions had many blind spots. When I was a graduate student—and this is something I touch upon, though not directly, in Before the West—nobody discussed the possibility that the liberal international order could end or collapse. It was like a teleology of the Western order becoming the universal international order. That 'end of history' thesis was also in international relations theory. I've also mentioned the idea of spheres of influence.

Now people try to read what Trump is doing and what China is doing through the lens of late 19th-century spheres of influence. But this is not the era of European empires, and the world is not what it used to be. Of course, I don't dispute the argument that great powers compete. They always have. But why should we read these only through the lens of a very short period of history?

There are many more sovereign states and actors now. We've also talked about middle powers, but we need to broaden our horizons. Even this discussion we've had about a long period of chaos, there was no space for it in late 20th-century international relations theory. Again, because not enough history has been studied. ■

■ Ayshe ZaraqolProfessor, University of Cambridge.

■ Hosted and Edited by:Lee Sang-junEAI Research Fellow
Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr

Video Script

The Future of the International Order and the Role of the Non-Western World

Thank you. Professor, my first question is about the future of the international order. In your recent Ideas Letter, you noted that in the early 1990s, scholars and experts could offer visions for the future, without even needing to mention Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History,” but today’s intellectuals seem unable to offer what is to come. Following up on your argument, my question is this: Do you think that new visions are more likely to emerge from the non-Western world?

And do you think that such a new order would be something quite new, rather than a reformed or reconfigured version of the existing order? >> Thank you. First of all, thank you for inviting me. It’s a pleasure to speak at the East Asia Institute. Yes, in the piece you mentioned, I was making the argument that at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, Western intellectuals seemed to have a vision, arguably comprehensive, of what was to come after. There, I mentioned Fukuyama, with his

End of History, so basically saying nothing is to come, Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, and Robert Kaplan as well. In contrast, I think there is considerable anxiety in the West, particularly in the West, that the so-called liberal international order is over or is ending.

But perhaps with the exception of some MAGA circles and some tech-funded philosophers, nobody is saying what is to come next. It’s like [chuckles] there are attempts to salvage the liberal international order, which is declining, a kind of backward-looking vision, or going back to analogies of the early 20th century or the interwar period.

So the framework that most Western intellectuals are working with tends to look to the past rather than to the future or what is to come next. That was the point I was making. And I argued in that essay that if new visions are to emerge, they are more likely to emerge from the non-Western world. Because the non-Western world, what is called the Global South, which I think is a misnomer, because all non-Western countries, like Korea, are not really the Global South.

It’s what used to be called the Third World. But let’s call it the non-Western world. They don’t have the same emotional attachment to the liberal international order, even though they have benefited from it. And I think the absence of that emotional attachment helps to think about what is to come next. It allows for more innovation.

>> Yes, I agree that people in the non-Western world have less emotional attachment to the liberal international order (LIO). But recently, as you pointed out, David Lake and Thomas Risse, among others, have written about the LIO. It was published in February, and it emphasizes the resilience of the LIO. Even though there have been multiple crises, they seem more hopeful about the return or some kind of reconfiguration of the LIO. So I think there is a perceptual or emotional distance between those who continue to support the LIO and the rest. >> Yes. But I think they write that. Institutions do not disappear overnight. They are often recycled by new regimes. I am writing a book on trade right now, covering from the very beginning to the present.

And I was writing about the Warring States period in Chinese history, the Qin and Han dynasties. And you know [laughter] each dynasty recycles the institutions of the previous order, sometimes in opposition to it.

I think that’s just one example. I think that’s generally true. So I don’t doubt that many of the institutions, the agreements, the economic aspects, certainly the hegemony of the US dollar, etc., many aspects of the liberal international order will prove resilient. What I am skeptical about is whether they will continue to be used for liberal purposes, or even for nominal liberal purposes. Because we can always debate whether the liberal international order was really liberal.

But I think it is much more likely now that many of these institutions, alliances, etc., will be used for illiberal purposes, and perhaps for US imperial-building 2.0. >> So some features or aspects of the international order, for example, the economic aspects, may remain, but the purposes of the order may not be as liberal as before.

Middle East Conflict and the Disruption of the International Order

>> Precisely. So what is resilient? Are ideas resilient, or are some agreements, alliances, institutions? >> Yes. Okay. Let me move to the second question. It is about the US-Iran or US-Israel-Iran war or conflict testing the new order. So the current conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran seems to demonstrate the disorder or un-order that you distinguish.

And you can clarify that distinction when you apply the framework. And the current conflict seems to encompass many of the fault lines you have written about, namely, the unraveling of the post-1945 order, the loss of Western normative authority, the agency of non-Western actors, and the question of who writes the rules. So, from a long-term perspective, what do you think this conflict reveals about the actual structure of the new order? And once the immediate turmoil subsides, regardless of the military or

diplomatic outcome, what more lasting consequences do you expect this conflict to have for the international order, or disorder, or un-order going forward? >> Yes, thank you. So the distinction between disorder and un-order is not mine. It is Mark Leonard, the director of the European Council of Foreign Relations, who has a new book, “Unorder.” And the distinction he makes is that we have order, and then we have disorder, and then there is a point when

there is un-order. So what is happening now looks like disorder because there are all these expectations of how order should work. And then there is a point of no order. It’s not even disorder. It’s just that, the new order has not been created. And I think that’s a useful distinction. I disagree with him. I don’t think we are there yet.

There have been periods in history when everything really collapsed. You can think of the Bronze Age collapse in ancient Western Asia, for example. For about 100 years, some cultural elements persisted, but the archaeological record is a blank. That would be a transition from disorder to un-order, perhaps.

I think we are still in a period of disorder. And that is, as I said, there are ideas about how things should work, expectations that there should be one international order. There are still people like Rainy and Rice you mentioned who say the order is still here. Others say, “No, it’s over.” So there is no consensus. It is fragmented.

And very transactional. Middle powers are hedging, and other great powers are trying to plan the path for the next order. Yes, so for me, that is disorder. It is not chaos, but the consensus has broken down, and some are still stuck in the past. Others are, anyway. So the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, or the Iran-Israel-US war, is a good example of that. We have lived with it for about two months. But almost again,

it has almost disappeared from the headlines. Something that everyone said would lead to a serious energy crisis. And it is already affecting Asia. Britain is expected to face a severe jet fuel shortage this summer, which could affect travel. At the same time, attention has shifted elsewhere. There are major conflicts, like Gaza and Ukraine, but people cannot pay attention to everything. So people have specific conflicts that they follow if they are directly affected.

It has become part of the landscape. So people have specific conflicts that they follow if they are directly affected.

The situation in Gaza and Ukraine, which has already become part of the international order, and even though they are major conflicts, it is difficult for people to pay attention to everything. So people tend to focus on the conflicts that they are directly affected by.

We are in a situation like whether the straits are closed or open. It is impossible to follow this on a day-to-day basis, and only those who really focus will know. This is what I think is the definition of disorder, and these situations will persist for a considerable period.

I don’t think any consensus or rebuilding of a new order will be possible in the near future. Rather, more conflicts will be added to this fragmented landscape, and each nation will have to figure out how to survive in this disordered world on its own.

I don’t know if you have read the short memo by Ian and John for the Council of Councils. They argue that we are in a state of hybrid and unstable order. It is not great power politics or sphere of influence politics. Because they do not support Chinese influence or Russian influence in the Pacific War. These are two different organizing principles that apply to different regions.

Middle Power Strategies and South Korea's Position

I completely agree with your point. People are trying to apply old concepts to the current situation, but I don’t think it works well. I agree. But the last question might be very important for our audience. In your NSI interview, you observed that countries accustomed to unpredictability, that is, the Global South or non-Western countries, are better prepared for this environment than many Western countries. Based on your remarks,

Korea is in a peculiar position. It was a peripheral country in the past but has become one of the most successful beneficiaries of the post-Cold War liberal order, yet its geopolitical location places it on the boundary between the organizing principles of the US and China in the Indo-Pacific. Based on your research on the stigma, hierarchy, and agency of countries that were outsiders to the Western-centric order, what would you say to countries like Korea, or other middle powers that are not?

countries that have to navigate these multiple crises or fragmentation of order. Yes, that is one of the arguments I made in that interview, and it is something I also cover in my “disorder” lectures. I think countries like Korea are well-positioned to navigate this period. I think this period of disorder will last longer than we think. In my last book, “Before the West,” I also make a comparison. This book goes back to the 17th century.

This is again a long period of disorder. That disorder was unfavorable to the great powers of the 16th century, mainly Asian empires like the Ottoman Empire and the Ming Dynasty, but also the Habsburgs. But eventually, the winners were the emerging smaller European states, like Britain and France.

Of course, it’s not an exact parallel, but I think these periods of disorder are more favorable to emerging states, non-status quo powers, rather than status quo powers. So in the competition between the US, China, and Russia, the great powers of the 20th century may face structural pressures from AI, financialization, climate change, etc.

They are bigger, they have more, they are more spread out. They have bigger challenges. There may come a moment when middle powers are in a more favorable position. Especially countries like Korea, which are beneficiaries of the old order but not the top players, are materially well-positioned to enter this period of disorder. At the same time, as we discussed, they don’t have the same emotional attachment.

So you could say they are more open to different strategies. For example, there are many middle powers in Europe too, but they are too attached to the 20th-century order to think outside the box. Of course, it will be a difficult time no matter where you are. Periods of disorder require everyone to adapt to high levels of uncertainty, volatility, and rapid change.

But I think countries like Korea are better positioned to navigate this period. Yes. I hope that Korea can leverage the advantages it has enjoyed historically and politically. We are on the same page with Japan on some issues, but between Japan and Korea, the way we approach the LIO... there is nothing wrong with acknowledging the positive aspects.

But at the same time, the world keeps moving, so we all have to adapt. How well we can adapt depends on how well we can let go of the past. The last question is about what mainstream international relations theory gets right and wrong about the current problems of the international order or the status quo.

The Limits and Alternatives of International Relations Theory

One of the recurring themes in your writings, in 'After Defeat,' 'Before the West,' and 'Essentials in Trap,' is that mainstream international relations theory—realism, liberalism, even constructivism—is based on assumptions derived from a relatively narrow European history. And these assumptions become more limiting, especially at a time like now, when the normalized order is unraveling or coming undone. So the question is:

Where do the frameworks of mainstream international relations help us, and where do they mislead us? In reading the urgent issues of our time, including the conflicts in Gaza, Iran, and Ukraine. And what concepts or starting points, such as disorder or un-order, would you propose instead?

If we are talking about our schools, that is, realism and liberalism, they are very old forms of thought from the late 20th century. They existed not only in the West but also in Eastern philosophy, etc. Or if you contrast constructivism with materialism or empiricism, that is also a very old debate that has gone on as long as people have existed. What is the world made of?

So I don’t see a problem with the schools themselves. It’s just that we should not get stuck in the late 20th-century versions of them. We need to update them. My argument has always been that if we know more history, especially beyond European history, we can update these theories for the 21st century.

There were many blind spots in the 20th-century versions. When I was a graduate student, as I talk about directly in 'Before the West,' nobody discussed the possibility that the liberal international order could end or unravel. It was like a teleology of the Western order, constantly expanding, as the universal international order.

That logic of the “End of History” was also in international relations theory. We have already mentioned spheres of influence. People are now reading what Trump is doing, what China is doing, through the lens of late 19th-century spheres of influence. But this is not European empires, and the world is not the same as it was. Again, there is no problem with claiming that great powers are competing.

Of course, they are. They always have been. But why should we read this through a very short period of history? We have now talked about many more sovereign states, actors, middle powers. We need to broaden our perspective.

Also, even the discussion of long periods of disorder that we have discussed, there was no room for that in late 20th-century international relations theory. Again, it’s because we haven’t studied enough history.