It's Not About Defense Spending: Colby's Calculus of a 'Selective NATO'
Executive Summary
At the November NATO Future Initiative meeting in Poland led by Elbridge Colby, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, top defense spenders such as the United Kingdom, France, and the three Baltic states were excluded, while several countries with relatively smaller defense budgets were included. This has prompted analyses suggesting that the U.S. criteria for evaluating allies is shifting from budgetary contributions to policy alignment. This shift aligns with the criteria for reviewing U.S. forces stationed in Europe that Colby presented in Brussels last August, as well as his remarks to Asian allies in Manila, and is interpreted as part of a broader change in global alliance management that is not confined to Europe. While overinterpretation should be avoided given that the meeting itself is highly informal and functions as a non-binding working group, there are indications that a similar logic of selective engagement is operating in actual budget execution. Indo-Pacific allies, including South Korea, need a response strategy that prioritizes demonstrating alignment through concrete cooperative actions rather than merely increasing defense spending.
I. Issue Analysis
Colby-Led 'Selective NATO' Meeting: Fallout over the Exclusion of the UK, France, and the Baltic States
Dismay Among the Baltic States
When the invitation list for the NATO Future Initiative meeting to be held in Poland in November was made public, the Baltic states were the first to react. Estonia's public broadcaster, ERR, reported on the news, quoting Tony Lawrence, a researcher at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS). He downplayed the exclusion, stating that not participating in this informal meeting is "not a major tragedy" because no decisions are made in this format [8]. Paradoxically, this reaction reveals the underlying tension within the Baltic states, as their immediate response was an attempt to downplay the symbolic significance of the exclusion rather than addressing the exclusion itself.
The Latvian media outlet Delfi reported that a "sharp judgment (skarbs spriedums)" had emerged within Lithuania [7]. Norway's Aftenposten reported, "Norway is included, but heavyweights like the UK and France are excluded" [4]. A common thread across European media coverage is that the line between invitation and exclusion was drawn regardless of defense spending levels or influence within NATO.
There is a clear context behind the Baltic states' dismay. In August, Estonia defined an arson attack on a drone manufacturer as Russian "sabotage," prompting expressions of solidarity from NATO and EU leadership [13]. Foreign Policy reported that the Latvian president warned of "Putin's growing appetite for risk" [10]. For these countries bordering Russia, exclusion from discussions on the future of NATO is not a mere matter of protocol. It could be perceived as a signal that their position in the priorities of collective defense commitments is wavering.
Colby: The Organizer Identified by Lithuanian Media
The figure who organized this meeting is Elbridge Colby, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Lithuania's public broadcaster, LRT, citing Politico, reported testimonies from "six diplomats familiar with the preparations for the meeting." According to them, the meeting will essentially function as a "working group for the future of NATO" [1]. Colby is introduced as a figure who has served in the State Department, intelligence agencies, and think tanks [8].
Colby's latest move is not an isolated incident. According to an EAI analysis, on August 27, he briefed NATO allies in Brussels on the direction of the review of U.S. forces stationed in Europe. The reduction criteria for this review are set to reflect "not only the scale of defense spending, but also the extent to which the country guarantees the use of U.S. military bases and airspace, and how much it has cooperated with U.S. foreign policy, such as during a war with Iran" [3]. In a speech in Manila on August 10 of the same year, Colby warned Asian allies "not to take the United States for granted" [6]. His words and actions, unfolding simultaneously in both Europe and Asia, share a single, consistent theme: an attempt to shift the metric of alliance management from budgetary totals to policy alignment.
Norwegian, Latvian, and Lithuanian media outlets, citing Politico, view this invitation list as a concrete implementation of that policy. Norway, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Germany, and the Netherlands were included, while the UK, France, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were excluded [1][4][7].
The White House's Different Calculus: Funding Flows to Latin America
The Washington Post reported on another development occurring around the same time: the Trump administration cut tens of millions of dollars in military aid earmarked for European and Middle Eastern countries, redirecting it to conservative governments in Latin America. This decision was reportedly made in defiance of opposition from Democratic leadership on the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees [11]. With the NATO meeting invitation list and the reallocation of aid overlapping, interpretations are gaining traction in Europe that the regional priorities of U.S. resource allocation are being restructured.
The UK had already shown signs of distancing itself from the White House on other issues. British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband stated that the UK would not rescind its policy of banning direct contact with Russian authorities, in relation to Trump's invitation of Putin to the G20 [9]. While this is not directly linked to the exclusion from the NATO meeting, it provides context showing that the UK is not fully aligning itself with the Trump administration's approach to Russia.
Tensions Within the EU: Kallas Draws a Line
Discussions on readjusting security governance are also underway at the EU level in tandem with this issue. Following a meeting of defense ministers in Brussels, Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stated, "The EU's security protocols should complement NATO, not duplicate them" [12]. The Turkish media outlet Hürriyet reported that General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, warned that "the EU's defense efforts must not compete with the Alliance" [14]. Neither statement is directly linked to the NATO Future Initiative meeting. However, it is worth noting that at a time when U.S.-led selective group operations are becoming visible, moves to reaffirm relations with NATO are simultaneously emerging within the EU.
The Core of the Issue: A Signal of Shifting Criteria
The core issues of this matter can be summarized into three main points.
First is the ambiguity of the exclusion criteria. The excluded countries—the UK, France, and the three Baltic states—are all significant defense spenders within NATO. Their exclusion cannot be explained by the conventional logic of "defense burden-sharing." A previous EAI analysis pointed out that the review of U.S. forces stationed in Europe would reflect foreign policy cooperation "in addition to the scale of defense spending" [3]. The current invitation list can be interpreted as a case demonstrating that this criterion is indeed in operation.
Second is the difference in interpretation regarding the nature of the meeting. A diplomat from an invited country explained that this gathering is not intended to divide NATO as a whole, but rather to prepare proposals for the entire alliance to review later. Conversely, other diplomats worry that the very attempt to divide NATO into "good allies" and "bad allies" could pose risks for the United States as well. While an Estonian expert sought to downplay concerns by noting that no decisions are made at this meeting [8], the very possibility that an informal group without decision-making authority could preemptively shape the agenda for the entire NATO alliance acts as a burden for the Baltic states.
Third is the conspicuous timing. The fact that the three Baltic states, which are closest to Russia, were excluded from discussions on the future of NATO at the very moment when allegations of sabotage against Estonia emerged and NATO and the EU expressed solidarity [13] is a factor that fuels security anxieties in these countries. This is why the Latvian president's warning of an "increased appetite for risk," as reported by Foreign Policy [10], is read in conjunction with this exclusion.
II. In-Depth Analysis
Colby-Led 'Selective NATO' Meeting: Fallout over the Exclusion of the UK, France, and the Baltic States
From Budget Sheets to Loyalty Checklists
The question raised by this invitation list is simple: Have the criteria for categorizing NATO allies changed? The answer is largely "yes." The excluded countries—the UK, France, and the three Baltic states—all meet or exceed the defense spending target relative to GDP. On the other hand, while the included countries—Norway, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Germany, and the Netherlands—are also among the top spenders, the common denominator of this combination is not their spending amount.
The report reviewing the realignment of U.S. forces stationed in Europe, previously analyzed by EAI, details the logic of this transition. It notes that the reduction criteria will reflect "not only the scale of defense spending, but also the extent to which the country guarantees the use of U.S. military bases and airspace, and how much it has cooperated with U.S. foreign policy, such as during a war with Iran" [3]. The same report also mentions that whether a country supported the United States during the Iran-Israel war was considered a variable in reduction decisions [3]. The Washington Post confirms this trend from a different angle, reporting that the Trump administration cut tens of millions of dollars in military aid earmarked for European and Middle Eastern countries and redirected it to conservative governments in Latin America [11]. Although funding and invitations are different instruments, they operate on the same principle: the unit of alliance management has shifted from the "alliance as a whole" to the "policy alignment of individual governments."
The fundamental cause of this shift lies in the perception of resource constraints within the United States. The EAI analysis points to the Trump administration's National Defense Strategy—which "codified the premise that the United States lacks the capacity to respond to multiple threats simultaneously"—as the starting point [6]. It explains that the underlying policy environment is shaped by the assessment of Steve Myrow, former White House economic advisor, who argued that the cost of the United States providing security and economic public goods as a "benevolent hegemon" has been excessive [6]. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's proposal to differentiate tariff rates by classifying countries into green, yellow, and red categories is the economic version of the same logic [6]. The fact that the same impulse to classify is repeating across the distinct domains of security and trade suggests that this invitation list should not be dismissed as a one-off incident.
Why These Six Countries in Particular?
An examination of the list's composition reveals a geographical logic. Among the six included countries, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Germany, and the Netherlands are all located along the Northern-Central European axis. Excluding Poland and Finland, which border Russia, the rest function relatively as buffer zones. In contrast, the excluded Baltic states are on the front lines directly bordering Russia, while the UK and France are European nuclear powers with some of the strongest political voices within NATO.
This combination implies two things. First, the United States may have been wary of drawing countries with independent nuclear capabilities and foreign policy lines, like the UK and France, into the binding conclusions of a "U.S.-led working group." According to Lithuania's public broadcaster LRT, the meeting is set to operate essentially as a "working group for the future of NATO" [1]. Excluding great powers with veto capabilities from the working group stage makes drafting the initial proposals much easier. Second, paradoxically, the closer a country is to the front line with Russia and the more urgent its security needs—such as the Baltic states—the less say it has in discussions on "future initiatives." Estonian expert Tony Lawrence's attempt to downplay the significance of their absence by noting that "no decisions are made" at this informal meeting [8] is, conversely, an indirect acknowledgment that decision-making power is being consolidated elsewhere.
Structurally, this is where the decision-making style of NATO as a multilateral organization clashes with the minilateral approach preferred by the United States. NATO is an institution that has maintained the principle of consensus. The U.S. method of first gathering a specific small group to build a framework and then demanding endorsement from all member states effectively bypasses the egalitarian procedures of the formal institution. While EU High Representative Kaja Kallas's emphasis that "the EU's security protocols should complement NATO, not duplicate them" [12] and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Alexus Grynkewich's warning that "the EU's defense efforts must not compete with the Alliance" [14] are ostensibly separate issues, they both reflect tensions surrounding the dispersion of authority within multilateral structures. The formation of Colby's small group reproduces this tension along the U.S.-Europe axis.
The Ghost of 2003: Revisiting 'New Europe'
For European diplomats observing this exclusion controversy, a certain memory naturally comes to mind. During the 2003 Iraq War, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously distinguished between "Old Europe" (France and Germany, which opposed the invasion) and "New Europe" (Eastern European nations that supported it). At the time, the United States also preferred bilateral consultations with individual countries, forming a "coalition of the willing" outside the multilateral framework of NATO. The structure of Colby's meeting formally resembles this precedent. However, there is a crucial difference. While the dividing line in 2003 was a single issue—support or opposition to a specific war—the current classification is based on multi-layered criteria encompassing defense spending, base access, and foreign policy alignment. Consequently, there is a much higher likelihood that this will become a permanent framework for alliance operations rather than a one-off issue.
Another reference point is the method of pressuring NATO during the first Trump administration. At the time, Trump publicly singled out individual countries at summits to criticize their failure to meet defense spending targets. In contrast, Colby's meeting employs a quiet approach of closed-door invitations and exclusions. Rather than public shaming, it uses the "silent signal" of exclusion to prompt allies to gauge their own standing. This is far more difficult for allies to handle. While public criticism can be met with public refutation, exclusion from an informal working group leaves no proper official channel for protest. The "sharp judgment" within Lithuania reported by the Latvian media [7] can be seen as reflecting the frustration stemming from this lack of recourse.
Three Key Variables to Watch Moving Forward
The first variable in how this issue unfolds is the form in which the working group's conclusions are presented to the full NATO membership. A diplomat from an invited country explained that this small group is "not trying to divide NATO, but rather to prepare proposals for the entire alliance to review later." If this explanation is accurate, the key will be whether the excluded countries exercise their veto during the consensus-building process for the submitted proposals. If the UK and France block the draft at the final approval stage, Colby's working group initiative may end up having little practical effect beyond symbolic friction.
The second variable is the intersection between the final output of the review of U.S. forces stationed in Europe and this meeting. According to the EAI analysis, the draft reduction options to be submitted to the Secretary of Defense are scheduled for November 6 [3]. Coincidentally, this overlaps with the timing of the meeting in Poland. If the two tracks share the same criteria—namely, base access and foreign policy alignment—the current invitation list could be read as a leading indicator of troop relocation priorities. Conversely, if the two tracks proceed separately, the possibility that this exclusion remains a merely symbolic event cannot be ruled out.
The third variable is the level of Russian military pressure. The expressions of solidarity by NATO and the EU regarding the arson attack on Estonia's drone manufacturing facility [13] and the "increased risk appetite of Putin" mentioned by the Latvian president [10] show that the security needs of the Baltic states are indeed escalating. The longer front-line states are marginalized in policy discussions, the greater the pressure on the United States, paradoxically, to reaffirm its security commitments to them. It is highly likely that a contradictory phase will persist, where the opposing signals of exclusion and strengthened security commitments are required simultaneously.
What Asian Allies Should Watch Closely
The reason this issue does not remain confined to Europe lies in the dual role of Colby. He is the very individual who, in Manila in August of the same year, told Asian allies "not to take the United States for granted" [6]. While using different instruments—an invitation list in Europe and a public speech in Asia—the sender and the core message are identical. This indicates that the yardstick measuring the value of an alliance by policy alignment rather than budgetary totals is operating globally, regardless of the region.
The implication of this case for U.S. allies in Asia, including South Korea, is that defensive responses such as simply increasing defense spending are insufficient to satisfy Colby's restructuring criteria. The EAI analysis of Colby's remarks in Manila pointed out that "rather than focusing on total spending increases, a response prioritizing expanded investments in missile defense and unmanned systems, alongside establishing a permanent channel to verify the effectiveness of extended deterrence, is required" [6]. This NATO case reinforces that assessment. The clearest signal left by this exclusion controversy is that the trend of establishing concrete cooperative actions and policy alignment—rather than the scale of spending—as the criteria for evaluation is hardening simultaneously in both Europe and Asia.
III. Recommended Response Strategies
Colby-Led 'Selective NATO' Meeting: Fallout over the Exclusion of the UK, France, and the Baltic States
Comprehensive Assessment and Strategic Direction
It is inappropriate to dismiss this issue as a one-off protocol controversy. It is reasonable to assume that the criteria presented by Deputy Assistant Secretary Colby in Brussels last August when explaining the review of U.S. forces in Europe—namely, looking "not only at the scale of defense spending, but also the extent to which the country guarantees the use of U.S. military bases and airspace, and how much it has cooperated with U.S. foreign policy, such as during a war with Iran" [3]—are directly reflected in this invitation list. The fact that the same individual told Asian allies in Manila on August 10 "not to take the United States for granted" [6] further demonstrates that this trend is not confined to Europe.
From the perspective of the South Korean government, there are two key assessments. First, the shift in the U.S. alliance management criteria from budgetary totals to policy alignment is not unique to NATO but is a principle already being applied to the Indo-Pacific region. Second, if this trend becomes institutionalized, the ROK-U.S. alliance may also be re-evaluated based on "how aligned it is" rather than "how much it spends." The case reported by the Washington Post, where military aid for Europe and the Middle East was redirected to Latin America [11], suggests that this re-evaluation is already operating at the level of budget execution. Therefore, South Korea's response should focus on "demonstrating alignment through concrete cooperative actions" rather than "reassurance through increased defense spending."
However, overreaction must also be avoided. As Tony Lawrence, a researcher at Estonia's ICDS, pointed out, this working-group-style meeting itself is closer to an informal consultative body where "no decisions are made" [8]. Actual binding decisions must go through formal procedures such as NATO summits or councils. If South Korea attempts an excessive policy shift based on this case, it risks appearing to preemptively capitulate to U.S. pressure for selective management.
Short-Term Action Plan (1–3 Months)
The actual outcomes of the meeting in Poland should be the primary target of monitoring. Given that it operates in the form of a working group [1], how the proposals emerging from this meeting are subsequently rediscussed at the level of the entire NATO alliance will be the primary indicator of its practical impact. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense need to ascertain the agenda and conclusions of this working group through informal channels via the embassies in Belgium and the United States.
At the same time, in preparation for the possibility that the United States might replicate the query format regarding policy alignment previously sent to South Korea, it is necessary to prepare internal reference materials that preemptively organize the level of guaranteed access to USFK bases and airspace, as well as the operational achievements of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). This is a practical measure to respond immediately when queries from the U.S. side are received, not an issue to be submitted preemptively.
Colby's public remarks, publications, and congressional testimonies should be collected periodically to track and distinguish the gap between his personal policy views and the official stance of the administration. The fact that he has a career spanning the State Department, intelligence agencies, and think tanks [8] suggests the need to distinguish whether his remarks represent the views of a specific group within the Department of Defense or a consensus of the entire administration.
Medium-Term Action Plan (3–12 Months)
In ROK-U.S. extended deterrence consultations (NCG) and Special Measures Agreement (SMA) negotiations, an approach that preemptively proposes concrete alternative packages—such as investments in missile defense and unmanned systems, and enhancing base survivability—rather than focusing on the total spending increase framework is necessary. This aligns with the direction previously suggested by EAI in its analysis of Colby's remarks in Manila. The conclusion of the previous analysis was that the response should be approached through concrete action units of "demonstrating cooperation" rather than a total-sum-centric response [6].
It is necessary to reassess South Korea's position within existing minilateral frameworks, such as ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation and the Quad. As this NATO case demonstrates, the United States tends to prefer preempting agendas through trusted small groups rather than the entire multilateral institution. While it is important to manage South Korea's position to ensure it belongs to the "included group" within the NATO-IP4 (South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) linkage framework, it must also be considered that if this operates in a way that excludes specific countries, it could conversely undermine multilateral trust in the region.
It is necessary to accumulate reference cases on how the excluded European nations, particularly the Baltic states, the UK, and France, respond to this situation. The difference between the "sharp judgment" within Lithuania [7] and the reporting stance of the Norwegian media [4] shows that the difference in temperature between the excluded and included countries is already operating as a rift within Europe. Whether this rift is mended in subsequent formal NATO procedures or becomes permanent will serve as a significant precedent for South Korea.
Long-Term Action Plan (1 Year or More)
In preparation for the possibility that the U.S. approach to alliance management will be structurally reorganized from a "multilateral institution-centric" to a "selective minilateral group-centric" model, South Korea needs to reassess its reliance on multilateral frameworks and separately strengthen the substantive consultative capabilities of its bilateral channels. A structure must be created where, even in the unlikely event of exclusion from multilateral frameworks, bilateral trust-building can sustain the effectiveness of extended deterrence.
Furthermore, under the premise that total defense spending is no longer an absolute indicator guaranteeing status within the alliance, a mid- to long-term strategy must be established to diversify non-budgetary contribution methods, such as defense industrial cooperation, supply chain integration, and information sharing. This aligns with the shifting standard identified in previous EAI analyses, which emphasizes "concrete burden-reduction actions rather than total budget size."[3]
Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The response level should be upgraded if the following signals are detected.
The first is if the conclusions of the Poland working group are placed on the official agenda of a NATO summit. This would mark a turning point where informal consultations transition into formal processes, signifying a substantial weakening of the voice of excluded nations.
Second, if a country classification similar to the current invitation list is reflected in the draft of the November reduction options for the review of the realignment of U.S. forces stationed in Europe.[3] This would serve as an indicator confirming that the two issues are linked under the same criteria.
Third, if the United States officially sends a Colby-style policy alignment questionnaire to South Korea. This is a key trigger that would capture the moment when the precedent set for European allies[3] is applied directly to Asian allies.
Fourth, if the United Kingdom and France show official backlash against this exclusion or move to form alternative consultative bodies. If these two nuclear-armed states strengthen Europe's own security consultation framework independently of the U.S.-led working group, it would signal a shift in the geopolitical dynamics, intersecting with discussions on the EU's independent security capabilities. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas's mention of a separate EU emergency security protocol that does not duplicate NATO[12] is also a development to watch in connection with this trend.
Summary and Conclusion
The invitation list for the Colby-led meeting supports the hypothesis that the U.S. standard for evaluating allies is shifting from total spending to policy alignment. This trend is not confined to NATO but is already being projected onto the management of alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. South Korea should not view this as an exclusively European issue, but rather treat it as a leading indicator for Special Measures Agreement (SMA) negotiations and extended deterrence consultations. However, given that the Poland meeting currently remains at the stage of a non-binding working group,[8] the most realistic choice at this point is to prepare calmly through two pillars—demonstrating alignment through concrete cooperative actions and strengthening bilateral channels—rather than overreacting.
References
[1] [LRT] „Politico“: Pentagonas nepakvietė Baltijos šalių į NATO susitikimą
[2] [Atlantic Council - GeoEconomics Center] Trump Tariff Tracker
[4] [Aftenposten] Politico: Trump ekskluderer nøkkelallierte fra Nato-møte
[8] [ERR News] Ekspert ei näe traagikat, et Eesti mitteametlikul NATO kohtumisel ei osale
[9] [POLITICO] Miliband distances Britain from Trump’s G20 Putin invite
[10] [Foreign Policy] How Far Can Russia Probe NATO’s Collective Defense?
[11] [The Washington Post] Trump defies Democrats, diverts aid for Europe to Latin America instead
[12] [Daily Sabah] EU security protocol must complement NATO, not duplicate it: Kallas
[13] [Le Monde] NATO and EU allies support Estonia after 'sabotage' blamed on Russia
[14] [Hürriyet Daily News] NATO commander warns EU defense efforts must not rival alliance
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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