The Rise of Germany's Far-Right and Cracks in the Merz Coalition: Shaking the EU's Central Anchor
Executive Summary
Support for Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has reached a record high of 30% nationwide, widening its lead over Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s CDU/CSU alliance (18%) to 12 percentage points. Beyond its landslide victory in Saxony-Anhalt in East Germany, the AfD's growing support in West German industrial regions like Berlin and North Rhine-Westphalia demonstrates that this trend is a structural phenomenon driven by a combination of industrial anxiety and the persistent East-West divide, which remains unresolved even on the 36th anniversary of German reunification. Within the ruling coalition, deepening conflicts between the CDU and SPD over pension and labor reforms have sparked talk of a potential minority government, raising direct concerns about a leadership vacuum and a decline in the policymaking capacity of Germany, a key EU member state. Furthermore, the AfD's platform of reducing aid to Ukraine and improving relations with Russia is making inroads among conservative CDU voters, potentially acting as a variable for the stability of multilateral security cooperation, including NATO cohesion and extended deterrence discussions. President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s public warning against far-right extremism suggests that political elites have already formalized their perception of this emerging threat to Germany’s democratic system.
I. Situation Analysis
The Far-Right Breaks the 30% Barrier: A Somber Unity Day Address in Bremen
Saxony-Anhalt as a Harbinger of the National Landscape
When the AfD dominated the CDU with over 44% of the vote in the Saxony-Anhalt state election on September 6, few observers dismissed it as a mere regional anomaly [3]. This was because national polls had already shown the AfD leading the CDU/CSU alliance by 28% to 21% [3]. Less than a month later, this trend was reaffirmed. In a poll conducted by the Insa Institute for the newspaper *Bild*, the AfD reached a historic high of 30% nationwide [1], marking a 1 percentage point increase from the previous week [1]. In the same poll, Chancellor Merz’s CDU/CSU alliance dropped 1 percentage point to 18% [1], widening the gap between the two political forces to 12 percentage points [1].
Analysis showing that AfD support nearly doubled to 16% even in Berlin—traditionally a left-wing stronghold—indicates that this trend is no longer confined to East Germany [2]. *Der Spiegel* columnist Sabine Rennefanz pointed to the AfD's rise in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), warning, "Stop underestimating the AfD" [13]. This encroachment into West Germany's industrial heartland suggests that the AfD's support base is solidifying into a structural phenomenon, moving beyond mere protest votes in economically lagging regions.
German Unity Day in Bremen: A Somber 36th Anniversary
The official German Unity Day ceremony on October 3 was held in Bremen [12]. In his final Unity Day address, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier warned that German democracy is once again under threat, explicitly pointing to the danger of far-right extremism [7]. He also noted that some expectations of reunification remain unfulfilled [7]. An Infratest Dimap poll released the same day provides context for his remarks: in a survey of 1,303 voters, only 44% of respondents from East Germany said they had personally benefited from reunification [4]. Around a quarter of respondents felt that reunification had had no significant impact on them [4]. Elisabeth Kaiser, the Federal Government Commissioner for the Eastern States, argued that the next president should be a woman from East Germany, pointing out that East Germans remain underrepresented in key positions of power [7]. This highlights how the fatigue and alienation within German society on the 36th anniversary of reunification overlap with the fertile ground fueling the rise of the far-right.
Internal Coalition Cracks: The Tug-of-War Over Pension and Labor Reforms
Apart from falling poll numbers, Chancellor Merz's coalition government is facing internal policy disputes. The CDU/CSU alliance is pressuring its coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), to implement pension and labor market reforms [8]. Concerns over a potential collapse of the coalition have intensified amid speculation that the CDU might block tax reform legislation championed by the SPD [8]. Deutsche Welle (DW) reported on this, stating that "reform rows raise fears for Merz's coalition" [8]. Coincidentally, around the same time, Volkswagen announced plans to cut an additional 50,000 jobs worldwide [8]. The metalworkers' union IG Metall criticized the way Volkswagen terminated key labor agreements as "disrespectful" [8]. This situation shows how restructuring pressures in the real economy are colliding head-on with the coalition's reform agenda.
The assessment by the Swiss newspaper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (NZZ) is even more sobering. A commentary argued that a minority government is practically the only option left for Merz [11]. It also cited Merz's own description of the election results in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern as a "disaster" [11]. The commentary pointed out that CDU/CSU politics is gripped by a "culture of fear" and "taboos," predicting that the party's decline will not stop without a fundamental shift in direction [11].
Interests of Key Actors
AfDThe AfD is leveraging its victory in Saxony-Anhalt and rising national polls to accelerate its entry into mainstream politics. In Saxony-Anhalt, discussions have even reached the point of considering the application of federal execution (*Bundeszwang*) should the AfD take power [14]. The AfD is also seeking to expand its influence over the media landscape by pushing to terminate the state broadcasting treaty that regulates public broadcasting finance [9]. The public broadcaster MDR and the community radio station Radio CORAX have expressed concern over potential budget cuts resulting from this move [9].
Chancellor Merz and the CDU/CSUThe CDU/CSU and Chancellor Merz are facing dual pressures from plummeting poll numbers and internal coalition conflicts. Externally, Merz is attempting to maintain a strong profile in foreign and security policy, as demonstrated by his attendance at the Westphalian Peace Prize ceremony where he lauded NATO [10] and his announcement of ongoing consultations to expand air defense support for Ukraine [15]. Domestically, however, he faces the double challenge of disputes with coalition partners over pension and labor market reforms, alongside internal party struggles over political direction.
President SteinmeierPresident Steinmeier has taken on the role of warning against democratic crises from a non-partisan standpoint. Given the symbolic nature of his final Unity Day address before the end of his term, his warning is interpreted as a broader message to the German political establishment rather than a mere ceremonial remark [7].
The Catholic ChurchThe Catholic Church is also responding to these societal cracks. Bishop Heiner Wilmer, chairman of the German Bishops' Conference, stated that it is necessary to listen to AfD voters, emphasizing that "a format of listening without lecturing" is essential [16]. This suggests that the Church should take the grievances and needs of AfD voters seriously [16].
The Social Democratic Party (SPD)The SPD is exploring coalition possibilities with the Left Party and the Greens in Berlin [10], while simultaneously trying to maintain its ground in federal-level negotiations with the CDU over tax and labor reforms. Controversies surrounding allegations of antisemitism and links to organized crime within the Left Party are also acting as variables in coalition negotiations [10].
Intersection of Key Issues
The core of the current situation lies in the convergence of three distinct trends. First, the nationwide expansion of AfD support is spreading from East Germany into West German industrial regions [2][13]. Second, apart from falling poll numbers, the Merz coalition faces the risk of internal division over concrete policy issues, specifically pension and labor reforms [8][11]. Third, as these two trends coincide with the symbolic 36th anniversary of reunification, the alienation of East Germans and the rise of far-right support appear to be mutually reinforcing [4][7]. This directly impacts Germany's policymaking capacity as a core EU member state. Should a coalition collapse or early elections materialize, it will inevitably disrupt policy coordination at the EU level.
II. In-Depth Analysis
On the Brink of a Minority Government: The Structural Pitfalls of Merz's Path
The Mathematics of Centrist Party Decline
The figures of 18% for the CDU/CSU and 30% for the AfD are not mere polling fluctuations [1]; they signal a breakdown in the very mathematics of the German party system. Postwar German politics has traditionally operated on a system where the two major parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, alternated in power or formed grand coalitions. A situation where the combined support of these two parties falls below a majority is highly unusual. The NZZ commentary asserted that a minority government is "the only option left" for Merz [11]. This is not rhetoric, but simple arithmetic. While the coalition with the SPD stalls due to internal conflict, a pattern is solidifying where the combined support of the two non-coalition forces—the Left Party and the AfD—surpasses that of the ruling coalition.
The path of defection among CDU supporters is also clearly documented. An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted that "CDU voters are defecting to the AfD" [2]. What this analysis highlights is not just a shift in party preference, but the fact that the AfD's demands to reduce military and financial aid to Ukraine and improve relations with Russia are gaining traction among traditional conservative voters [2]. Merz himself praised NATO in his Westphalian Peace Prize acceptance speech and announced ongoing consultations to expand air defense support for Ukraine [10][15]. However, this foreign and security policy line increasingly contradicts his domestic support base, exposing a growing paradox.
Two Germanys: A Persistent Divide in Lived Experience
While it is clear that the AfD's electoral reach is no longer confined to East Germany, the Unity Day poll shows that its roots remain firmly planted in the East-West divide. In the Infratest Dimap survey, only 44% of respondents from East Germany felt they had personally benefited from reunification [4]. One in four replied that reunification had had no real impact on them [4]. This persistent gap in lived experience, unresolved after 36 years, has formed the primary foundation of AfD support. Behind the AfD's 44% vote share in Saxony-Anhalt lies the state's structural underdevelopment, with its economic output and life expectancy ranking among the lowest of Germany's 16 federal states [3].
The issue is that this structure is no longer confined to East Germany. The AfD's support nearly doubled to 16% in Berlin, and a clear upward trend was also observed in North Rhine-Westphalia, West Germany's industrial heartland [2][13]. This cannot be taken lightly, especially as it coincides with Volkswagen's announcement of 50,000 additional job cuts worldwide and IG Metall's criticism of the termination of key collective bargaining agreements as "disrespectful" [8]. The convergence of East German-style grievances over underdevelopment and West German-style industrial anxiety toward the same political party indicates that the AfD's support base is expanding beyond regional alienation into class-based and economic anxieties.
2017 vs. Today: Why the Same Warnings Are Repeating
This is not the first time the AfD has entered federal politics. Similar warnings were issued when the AfD first entered the Bundestag in the 2017 federal election [6]. At the time, an EAI commentary defined the AfD as a party that "expresses clear opposition to deeper European integration and refugee reception policies, prioritizing national interests" [6]. During the formation of the fourth Merkel cabinet, falling poll numbers and the rise of the far-right occurred simultaneously [6]. However, the EAI analysis at the time projected that "if a Jamaica coalition government emerges, there will be no major changes in Germany's European integration policy" [6]. Nine years later, such optimism is no longer viable. While the AfD was only the third-largest party in parliament back then, it is now the leading party nationwide, with discussions even turning to the possibility of the party governing state-level administrations on its own.
The question raised after the Saxony-Anhalt election—'Can a state government led by the AfD be checked through federal execution (*Bundeszwang*)?'—was a topic that did not exist in 2017 [14]. *Der Spiegel* questioned whether the federal government could actually control an AfD state government led by Ulrich Siegmund if it violated federal obligations [14]. This serves as evidence that the institutional design of German federalism did not adequately anticipate the scenario of a far-right party taking control of a state government. While the warning in 2017 was about 'entering parliament,' the warning in 2026 has qualitatively shifted to 'state-level governance' and 'the limits of federal checks.'
Public Broadcasting and the Church: Institutional Responses to Societal Cracks
The expansion of the AfD's vote share is not only shifting party support but is also altering how institutional bodies respond. The AfD is pushing to terminate the state broadcasting treaty that regulates public broadcasting finance [9]. Concerns have been raised that if the AfD takes power in Saxony-Anhalt, the state could become a testing ground for dismantling public broadcasting finances [9]. The public broadcaster MDR and the local radio station Radio CORAX have expressed concern that budget cuts could threaten their very operations [9]. Press freedom advocates have also pointed to growing pressure on journalists [9].
Around the same time, Bishop Heiner Wilmer, chairman of the German Bishops' Conference, chose a contrasting approach. He argued that it is necessary to "reach out" to AfD voters, stating that "a format where we do not lecture but listen is absolutely essential" [16]. The coexistence of pressure on public broadcasting and the Church's proposal to listen demonstrates that strategies for dealing with the AfD are not aligned even within Germany's institutional establishment. One represents institutional defense, while the other offers a contrasting prescription of embracing the support base.
EU-Wide Implications and Future Variables
The weight of this issue as an EU trend stems from the fact that Germany is not just a single member state, but a central pillar of EU policymaking. If the AfD's platform of rapprochement with Russia and reducing aid to Ukraine gains a path to power, it could directly disrupt EU coordination on Russian sanctions and military assistance to Ukraine [2]. This is precisely why the Carnegie analysis posed the question, 'Will the Far Right Change Europe’s Russia Policy?' [2]. The simultaneous existence of the Merz government negotiating expanded air defense support for Ukraine with NATO partners [15] and the AfD campaigning in the opposite direction means that the continuity of Germany's foreign and security policy has itself become a variable in the next election cycle.
The key variables shaping future developments can be narrowed down to three. First, whether the Merz coalition can resolve its internal conflicts over pension and labor reforms and reach an agreement on tax reform legislation [8]. A failure to do so could make pressure for early elections a reality. Second, whether government coalition negotiations in East German states, including Saxony-Anhalt, result in alliances among non-AfD parties or lead to prolonged deadlock [3][14]. Third, whether the AfD's support will expand further into West German industrial regions. Depending on whether the rising support in NRW and Berlin is a temporary phenomenon or a structural shift [2][13], the entire landscape of the next federal election in 2029 will be determined.
References
[1] [Die Presse] Umfrage: AfD erreicht deutschlandweit 30 Prozent – Union fällt auf 18
[2] [Carnegie Endowment] Will the Far Right Change Europe’s Russia Policy?
[4] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Germans unite in frustration with Merz and his government
[7] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] On German Unity Day, Steinmeier laments 'bitter setbacks'
[8] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Germany news: Reform row raises fears for Merz's coalition
[9] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Germany's public broadcasters under fire from far-right AfD
[10] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Germany news: Merz lauds NATO with Westphalian Peace Prize
[12] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] German Unity Day in Bremen: 'Many Strengths — One Country'
[13] [Der Spiegel] meinungHört auf, die AfD zu unterschätzen! Eine Kolumne von Sabine Rennefanz
[15] [TASS] Merz says talks underway with partners to increase air defense supplies for Ukraine
[16] [Die Presse] Chairman of the German Bishops' Conference wants to listen to AfD voters
[17] [Die Presse] The misery of pseudo-conservative parties and their empty politicians [premium]
[18] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Germany news: Bremerhaven port to receive defense boost
[19] [Der Spiegel] opinion•German Unity: What drives East and West apart? A column by Henrik Müller
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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