President Lee Jae-myung’s UN General Assembly Call to Resume U.S.-North Korea Dialogue and South Korea’s Response Strategy
Executive Summary
In his address to the UN General Assembly, President Lee Jae-myung urged the immediate resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue, but President Trump made no mention of North Korea in his own speech at the same venue. The Trump administration's diplomatic resources are focused on the Iran nuclear negotiations and its political agenda following the November midterm elections. At the South Korea-U.S. foreign ministers' meeting, the U.S. side confirmed that there has been no concrete progress toward resuming dialogue with North Korea. With North Korea insisting on the recognition of its status as a nuclear-weapon state as a precondition, it is uncertain whether the South Korean government's proposed approach of prioritizing a nuclear freeze over denuclearization will lead to the actual resumption of negotiations. Prior to the resumption of talks, South Korea needs to pursue a three-pronged response: continuing its messaging diplomacy, managing the narrative around the nuclear freeze approach, and coordinating agendas with the U.S. on extended deterrence and combined exercises in preparation for full-fledged summit discussions. A key task is to establish a preliminary framework now to prevent a recurrence of the dynamic that sidelined South Korea, as seen during the 2019 Hanoi Summit.
I. Analysis of the Current Situation
President Lee Jae-myung’s UN General Assembly Speech and Call to Resume U.S.-North Korea Dialogue: An Analysis of the Current Situation
1. Background and Developments
Since taking office in June 2025, President Lee Jae-myung has pursued a different path from the hardline North Korea policy of the preceding Yoon Suk Yeol administration [17]. In an interview with The New York Times, President Lee proposed “unconditional dialogue with a nuclear-armed North Korea” [17]. This can be interpreted as a shift in North Korea policy from pressure to dialogue.
U.S.-North Korea dialogue has remained effectively severed since the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi Summit [3][6]. A meeting at Panmunjom in June of the same year also ended without substantive results [3]. Since his reelection, President Trump has repeatedly made overtures to Chairman Kim Jong Un, emphasizing their personal friendship [3][6]. On August 16, 2026, the White House also made a statement stressing “communication” with North Korea [3].
In response, Chairman Kim Jong Un has repeatedly rejected these overtures, stating, “We have already gone as far as we can in negotiations with the United States” [3][6]. North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has characterized Trump’s dialogue proposals as having an “impure intention to induce mental and psychological laxity” [6]. However, this response is seen less as an outright refusal and more as a strategic silence, with Pyongyang not having withdrawn its precondition of being recognized as a nuclear-weapon state [3].
Related discussions have also continued through South Korea-U.S. diplomatic channels. Just before attending the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to discuss the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue [19]. However, the U.S. side reportedly stated that “as of now, there have been no concrete developments” [19]. During the meeting, Minister Cho also conveyed South Korea’s willingness to make a substantive contribution to restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz [19].
2. Current Situation
President Lee Jae-myung departed for New York on September 21 to attend the high-level meeting of the UN General Assembly [20]. On September 19, the Presidential Office moved to contain the fallout from a U.S. media report. When The New York Times reported President Lee’s press conference remarks as a rejection of President Trump’s request for cooperation in the Middle East, the Presidential Office immediately clarified, “It was not a rejection” [9][11]. An official from the Presidential Office explained, “We will continue to review specific ways to contribute, based on our principled position of not getting involved in wars or combat” [11].
During the high-level session of the 81st UN General Assembly, President Lee stated that dialogue between the United States and North Korea must be “resumed without delay” [7]. He also expressed his commitment to laying the foundation for peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula [7]. The Peruvian news outlet RPP reported Lee’s remarks with the phrase, “so that dialogue between the two sides can be resumed without delay” [7].
In his speech at the same venue, President Trump made no mention of North Korea. Yonhap News reported that while Trump addressed various issues such as Iran and Cuba, he did not touch upon North Korea or Korean Peninsula-related matters at all [12]. The focus of Trump’s speech was on the Iran nuclear negotiations. He warned Iran to choose between “a deal or annihilation” [15][18]. He also predicted that a deal with Iran would be reached shortly after the U.S. midterm elections in November [15][16].
Earlier, in a September 21 interview with The New York Times, President Lee stated, “Aiming for denuclearization in the current situation will achieve nothing” [1]. His position is that a nuclear freeze should be pursued before the denuclearization of North Korea [1][17]. Coming amid talk of a possible U.S.-North Korea summit in November, this remark sparked debate among experts in South Korea. Concerns were raised that the freeze-first approach could inadvertently lead to a de facto recognition of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal [1].
3. Key Actors and Their Positions
The Lee Jae-myung Administrationhas adopted a North Korea policy based on unconditional dialogue and a phased, pragmatic approach [17]. It has proposed a realistic path of exchanging a nuclear freeze for sanctions relief, rather than immediately pursuing the goal of denuclearization [1][17]. On the UN General Assembly stage, it sought to secure a voice on Korean Peninsula issues by urging the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue [7]. At the same time, it is taking a cautious stance on the U.S. request for cooperation in the Middle East, adhering to the principle of non-involvement in combat while leaving the door open for discussion [9][11].
The Trump Administration’s priorities are aligned with the Iran nuclear negotiations and the political calendar of the midterm elections [15][16]. The omission of North Korea from the UN speech reflects this allocation of priorities [12]. While President Trump has repeatedly made overtures to Kim Jong Un based on their personal friendship [3][6], working-level officials at the State Department maintain a restrained position, stating that “there have been no concrete developments” [19]. The administration’s official goal for North Korea remains the principle of ‘complete denuclearization’ [3].
North Koreais taking a wait-and-see approach, refraining from an official response in Chairman Kim Jong Un’s name [3][6]. While reiterating its position that negotiations “have already gone as far as they can” [3][6], it has not withdrawn its stance of demanding recognition as a nuclear-weapon state as a precondition [3]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also expressed a hardline policy toward the U.S. on several occasions [6].
4. Key Issues
A gap exists between the Lee Jae-myung and Trump administrations regarding the priority of the North Korea issue on their agendas. President Trump’s UN speech, which focused on Iran and excluded North Korea [12][15], reveals a difference in temperature with the South Korean government’s emphasis on the urgency of resuming dialogue. This gap is further supported by the U.S. side’s statement at the foreign ministers’ meeting that there have been no concrete developments [19].
The question of setting the goal—a freeze or denuclearization—also remains a point of contention. President Lee’s remarks in his New York Times interview cast doubt on the feasibility of the denuclearization goal [1][17]. This has raised concerns among domestic expert groups that it could lead to the recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state [1]. With the U.S. administration’s official goal remaining ‘complete denuclearization’ [3], this difference in goal-setting is an area that will require future coordination between South Korea and the United States.
Concerns have also been raised that if a U.S.-North Korea summit actually materializes, South Korea could be excluded from the discussion process [3][6]. There is talk of the possibility of a repeat of the experience surrounding the 2019 Hanoi Summit, where South Korea was left in a position of being notified after the fact [3]. President Lee’s call for the resumption of dialogue in his UN speech can also be read as a diplomatic move to preempt such a dynamic of exclusion [7].
II. In-Depth Analysis
President Lee Jae-myung’s UN General Assembly Speech and Call to Resume U.S.-North Korea Dialogue: An In-Depth Analysis
1. Analysis of the Issue’s Root Causes
Underlying President Lee Jae-myung’s call at the UN General Assembly for the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue is a structural dilemma facing the South Korean government. With direct dialogue channels between Washington and Pyongyang severed for over six years, South Korea, despite being a direct party, lacks a formal path to the negotiating table [3][6]. President Lee’s remarks can be seen as an attempt to publicly highlight this dynamic of exclusion on the international stage.
While it is true that President Trump has repeatedly made overtures to Chairman Kim Jong Un based on their personal friendship, this is a different level of activity from the restoration of official negotiating channels [3][6]. The White House’s mention of “communication” with North Korea on August 16 did not signify a resumption of working-level negotiations [3]. Kim Jong Un maintains his position that “we have already gone as far as we can in negotiations with the United States” and insists on recognition as a nuclear-weapon state as a precondition [3][6]. As long as this condition is not withdrawn, any resumption of dialogue is likely to remain at the level of formal contact [3].
President Lee’s statement in his New York Times interview that “aiming for denuclearization in the current situation will achieve nothing” [1] can be interpreted as a pragmatic approach to break this stalemate. Proposing a freeze as an initial goal instead of denuclearization [1][17] is seen as an attempt to lower the threshold for resuming negotiations. However, this has also raised concerns domestically that this approach could be perceived as a signal of de facto recognition of North Korea’s status as a nuclear-weapon state [1].
2. Structural Context
Political Structure
The Trump administration’s foreign policy priorities are focused on Iran and the war in Ukraine. In his UN General Assembly speech, President Trump devoted considerable time to Iran, warning it to choose between “a deal or annihilation” [15][18]. He also separately offered a prediction that a deal with Iran would be reached shortly after the November midterm elections [15][16]. In contrast, the North Korea issue was not mentioned at all in the speech [12]. This is structural evidence that within the Trump administration, the Korean Peninsula issue has a lower political priority than Iran and Middle East issues.
A difference in temperature is also evident in South Korea-U.S. diplomatic channels. Although Foreign Minister Cho Hyun discussed the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the U.S. side responded to the effect that “as of now, there have been no concrete developments” [19]. The fact that Minister Cho conveyed South Korea’s willingness to contribute to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz during this meeting [19] suggests a reality where cooperation on Middle East issues is intertwined with, and perhaps a prerequisite for, discussions on the North Korea issue.
Security Structure
Amid the trend of scaling back South Korea-U.S. combined exercises as a card to create conditions for dialogue, South Korea finds itself in a position of being notified virtually after the fact [3]. If summit discussions gain momentum, concerns are being raised about a potential repeat of the dynamic of South Korea’s exclusion, as seen during the 2019 Hanoi Summit period [3][6]. Compounded by the controversy over the request for cooperation on Iran, there are also signs that the Trump administration is using the Middle East issue as a pressure tactic against South Korea [3].
Economic Structure
If sanctions relief is discussed following a freeze, the effectiveness of the sanctions regime against North Korea and the international community’s coordinated implementation will be put to the test. The “freeze-for-sanctions-relief” framework that President Lee outlined in his newspaper interview [17] is a point of direct contact with the fundamental stance of U.S. sanctions policy toward North Korea.
3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases
The breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi Summit is a precedent that offers a direct comparison to the current situation. At that time, the summit between Trump and Kim Jong Un was pursued in a top-down manner without working-level agenda coordination, ultimately ending in failure. The subsequent meeting at Panmunjom also concluded without substantive results [3]. This experience serves as the basis for the current South Korean government’s emphasis on the need to “simultaneously pursue the restoration of inter-Korean working-level channels and uphold the principle of denuclearization through South Korea-U.S. coordination, prior to finalizing an agenda” [6].
There are also structural similarities to the period of inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea dialogue during the Moon Jae-in administration. In an earlier case, when hopes for resuming dialogue were high at the beginning of the Biden administration but no progress was made due to North Korea’s cynical attitude, a second meeting between President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong Un was discussed as a potential catalyst for mediating U.S.-North Korea talks [8]. This precedent, where a channel between the leaders of the two Koreas served as an indirect route to open the door for U.S.-North Korea dialogue, stands in contrast to the current situation where inter-Korean channels have not been restored even at a minimal level.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is the U.S. midterm election schedule. President Trump specifically mentioned that a deal with Iran would happen right after the November midterms [15][16]. It has also been suggested that Chairman Kim Jong Un might adopt a conditional wait-and-see strategy, awaiting a more favorable situation after the U.S. elections [6]. In this case, it is likely that substantive contact between the U.S. and North Korea would be delayed until at least after November.
The second variable is the handling of the scaling back of South Korea-U.S. combined exercises. Whether a separate process to reaffirm security commitments runs in parallel, to ensure that the reduction in exercises does not lead to a decline in the credibility of extended deterrence, will determine the stability of the future situation [6].
The third variable is whether the Iran issue and the Korean Peninsula issue become linked. The fact that the Presidential Office immediately clarified that it had not rejected Trump’s request for cooperation in the Middle East [9][11] shows that the two issues are not being treated separately. The level of specificity in South Korea’s contribution plan for the Middle East could act as a variable influencing the U.S. response to resuming dialogue with North Korea.
The fourth variable is how South Korea and the United States respond to North Korea’s demand for recognition as a nuclear-weapon state. Whether the freeze-first approach is managed in a way that does not lead to a retreat from the principle of denuclearization itself will be a factor determining the credibility of South Korea’s calls for the resumption of dialogue in the international community [1][17].
III. Analysis of Response Options
President Lee Jae-myung’s UN General Assembly Speech and Call to Resume U.S.-North Korea Dialogue: An Analysis of Response Options
1. Premises for Scenario Construction
The South Korean government’s response options diverge depending on the future direction of U.S.-North Korea relations. The fact that President Trump made no mention of North Korea in his UN General Assembly speech [12] suggests that the Korean Peninsula issue may be relegated to a lower priority in U.S. foreign policy for the next few months. On the other hand, there remains a possibility of continued low-intensity contact, such as the White House’s mention of “communication” in August [3] and the suggestion of a possible U.S.-North Korea summit in November [1]. Therefore, it is necessary to examine response options by dividing them into three scenarios.
2. Response Options by Scenario
Scenario A: Prolonged Stalemate in U.S.-North Korea Dialogue (Continued Prioritization of Iran and the Middle East by the Trump Administration)
If President Trump’s attention remains focused on the Iran nuclear negotiations and his political agenda after the November midterm elections [15][16], the Korean Peninsula issue is likely to remain excluded from the official agenda for the time being.
In this scenario, the South Korean government has two main options. The first is to continue its messaging diplomacy, consistently raising the need to resume dialogue in multilateral forums such as the United Nations. President Lee’s call in his recent speech for a resumption “without delay” [7] is an extension of this diplomatic messaging. The advantage of this option is its low cost and its ability to continuously reinforce South Korea’s presence as a party to the negotiations in the international community. The disadvantage is that it is unlikely to have a substantial impact on U.S. policy priorities. The limitation that messaging diplomacy alone is insufficient to change the U.S. agenda has already been demonstrated in the meeting between Minister Cho and Secretary Rubio, where the U.S. side stated that “as of now, there have been no concrete developments” [19].
The second option is to independently restore inter-Korean working-level channels at a minimal level. This is an approach where South Korea takes on the role of priming the pump for the resumption of negotiations, separate from U.S.-North Korea dialogue. The advantage is that South Korea can secure its position in inter-Korean relations before U.S.-North Korea talks resume. The disadvantage is the high risk that the attempt to restore inter-Korean channels will not be met with a positive response, as North Korea currently insists on recognition as a nuclear-weapon state as a precondition [3][6]. Its feasibility depends entirely on North Korea’s response, making it difficult to expect short-term results.
Scenario B: Low-Intensity Contact Continues, Followed by Full-Fledged Summit Discussions
Amid suggestions of a possible U.S.-North Korea summit in November,[1] the possibility that discussions for a summit could rapidly gain momentum following continued contact between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un through their personal channels cannot be ruled out.
In this scenario, a key option for the South Korean government is to establish a preliminary coordination mechanism before the summit agenda is finalized. Specifically, this would involve conveying to the U.S. its demand to codify an extended deterrence provision in advance and, should a reduction in U.S.-ROK joint military exercises be discussed, concurrently seeking separate security commitment assurances to prevent this from being perceived as a signal of a weakening alliance. The advantage of this approach is that it could preemptively block a recurrence of the "Korea passing" dynamic that emerged during the 2019 Hanoi summit.[3][6] The disadvantage is that if the United States prioritizes the summit's success above all else, South Korea's request for preliminary coordination could be sidelined during working-level negotiations. The precedent of South Korea being effectively notified after the fact about the decision to scale back joint exercises[3] substantiates this concern.
Another option is to elevate the "freeze-first" approach proposed by President Lee[1][17] to an official U.S.-ROK negotiating goal. The advantage is that this could avoid a stalemate in which negotiations fail to materialize because they are bogged down by the long-term goal of denuclearization, thereby creating a foothold for tangible progress. The disadvantage is that the risk of this being interpreted, both domestically and internationally, as a de facto recognition of North Korea's status as a nuclear-weapon state has already been raised.[1] If the freeze is not linked to a roadmap leading to denuclearization, this approach could face criticism that the negotiating goal itself has been rolled back.
Scenario C: U.S. Uses Pressure Card on South Korea (Linkage to Middle East Issues)
There is also the possibility of an intensifying dynamic in which U.S.-ROK consultations on the Iran issue[9][11][19] become entangled as a de facto precondition for discussions on North Korea. The fact that Minister Cho conveyed South Korea's willingness to contribute to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz[19] suggests that Middle East and Korean Peninsula issues may not be treated separately.
In this scenario, the South Korean government's options are to either decouple or link its responses to the two issues. A decoupled response would involve independently deciding on its contribution in the Middle East based on principle, without explicitly linking it to discussions on resuming U.S.-North Korea dialogue. The advantage is that South Korea can protect the autonomy of its North Korea policy. The disadvantage is that if the United States does approach the two issues as linked, South Korea's negotiating leverage could be weakened. A linked response would seek to use the contribution in the Middle East as leverage to secure a concrete commitment from the United States to resume dialogue with North Korea. While the advantage is the clear utilization of a bargaining chip, the disadvantage is that the Presidential Office has already publicly stated its "principled position of not getting involved in wars or combat,"[11] which limits the room for maneuver.
3. Feasibility and Risk Assessment
The option in Scenario A of continuing proactive diplomacy has the highest feasibility. This is because it is a low-cost option that the South Korean government can pursue unilaterally without requiring a specific response from the United States. However, the likelihood of it leading to tangible results is low. The option of restoring inter-Korean channels is high-risk, as its implementation is difficult without a change in North Korea's attitude.
The option in Scenario B of establishing a preliminary coordination mechanism is both highly feasible and necessary, as it serves as a minimum safeguard in case summit discussions actually gain momentum. The risk is that its effectiveness would be limited if the United States responds passively to South Korea's request for preliminary coordination. The option of elevating the freeze-first approach to an official goal carries a relatively high political risk. It could face criticism from domestic public opinion and the opposition for being a retreat in North Korea policy,[1] and if it fails to clearly present a link to a denuclearization roadmap, the very justification for the negotiations could be undermined.
The decoupled response option in Scenario C is justifiable in that it upholds a principle, but it carries the risk of putting South Korea on the defensive if the United States actually links the issues. The linked response option has little room for implementation in terms of policy consistency, as the Presidential Office has already publicly stated its principle of non-intervention.[11]
4. Prioritized Responses for Each Scenario
At present, Scenario A is the most likely to materialize. This is supported by the fact that North Korea was not mentioned at all in President Trump's speech[12] and the U.S. State Department's statement that there has been no concrete progress.[19] In this phase, the priority is to continue low-intensity explorations for restoring inter-Korean working-level channels while concurrently using proactive diplomacy to continuously impress upon the international community the need to resume dialogue.
At the same time, it is necessary to begin preparing now to establish a preliminary coordination mechanism in anticipation of a potential shift to Scenario B. Responding only after summit discussions have gained momentum risks a repeat of the 2019-style "Korea passing" dynamic.[3][6] Preparing in advance the demand to codify an extended deterrence provision and the work of securing security commitment assurances will be a key condition for preserving negotiating leverage upon entering a summit phase.
Regarding Scenario C, the high-priority response for now is to maintain the principled position on contributions in the Middle East[11] while managing the issue through a separate channel to prevent it from being implicitly linked to discussions on U.S.-North Korea dialogue.
IV. Final Recommended Course of Action
President Lee Jae-myung's UN General Assembly Speech and Call to Resume U.S.-North Korea Dialogue: Final Recommended Course of Action
1. Overall Assessment and Recommended Course of Action
President Lee Jae-myung's remarks at the UN General Assembly are structured to advance on two simultaneous tracks. One is proactive diplomacy on the multilateral stage, calling for the resumption of dialogue.[7] The other is a messaging adjustment in a bilateral channel—proposing a freeze as the priority goal instead of denuclearization—conveyed through an interview with The New York Times.[1][17] The very fact that these two tracks overlapped in the same period defines the nature of this issue.
It is no coincidence that President Trump did not mention North Korea at all in his UN General Assembly speech.[12] The Trump administration's diplomatic resources are focused on the Iran nuclear negotiations and the political calendar following the November midterm elections.[15][16] In the U.S.-ROK foreign ministers' meeting, the U.S. side also drew a line, stating that "there has been no concrete progress to date" regarding the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue.[19] In this context, the tangible leverage South Korea can wield is limited. However, this limitation does not justify inaction. South Korea must begin now the work of opening channels that will allow it to engage in agenda-setting in the pre-negotiation phase.
The recommended course of action consists of three prongs. The first is the continuation of proactive diplomacy. Calling for dialogue on the UN stage is a low-cost measure that has the effect of impressing upon the international community South Korea's presence as a negotiating party. The second is message management to ensure the freeze-first approach is not perceived as recognition of North Korea's status as a nuclear-weapon state. As this concern has already been raised domestically following the New York Times interview,[1] the government must repeatedly clarify through external channels that a freeze does not replace the final goal of denuclearization. The third is establishing a preliminary agenda coordination mechanism in preparation for when summit discussions gain momentum. The demand to codify an extended deterrence provision and the confirmation of security commitments related to U.S.-ROK joint exercises must be sorted out in advance, before a summit is finalized.[3][6]
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Implementation Plan
Short-Term (1–2 months)
Starting from the confirmation during the meeting between Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and Secretary of State Rubio that "there has been no concrete progress,"[19] a working-level consultative body should be activated within U.S.-ROK diplomatic channels to regularly review the U.S.-North Korea dialogue agenda. The priority task for this body is to ascertain when and under what conditions the U.S. side will put the North Korea issue back on the agenda. At the same time, to manage domestic and international concerns about the freeze-first approach, the government must repeatedly affirm to both U.S. policy circles and South Korean public opinion its principle of maintaining the final goal of denuclearization.[1]
Discussions on South Korea's contribution to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz will also proceed in parallel.[19] It is necessary to determine early on whether this matter is proceeding separately from discussions on the North Korea issue or if it is being linked as a U.S. demand on South Korea. The instance of the Presidential Office swiftly clarifying in response to a New York Times report that "it was not a refusal"[9][11] shows that this issue is being handled sensitively within the U.S.-ROK relationship.
Medium-Term (3–6 months, around the November midterm elections)
There is a possibility that President Trump's foreign policy priorities will be reshuffled following the November U.S. midterm elections. President Trump himself has stated that he expects a deal with Iran immediately after the midterms.[15][16] If the Iran issue enters a resolution phase, it creates room for the North Korea issue to move up from its lower priority. At this point, the South Korean government must focus on determining whether the possibility of a November U.S.-North Korea summit is actually taking concrete shape.[1]
If there are signs that summit discussions are becoming more concrete, the work of preliminary agenda coordination must begin. Specifically, a process is needed to convey to the U.S. side in advance a proposal demanding that an extended deterrence provision be codified in the summit's outcome document.[3][6] If scaling back U.S.-ROK joint exercises is discussed again as a card to create conditions for dialogue, a separate process to confirm security commitments must be pursued concurrently to prevent this from being perceived as a signal of a weakening alliance.[3]
Long-Term (beyond 6 months)
If a U.S.-North Korea summit actually materializes, the key task will be to prevent a recurrence of the "Korea passing" dynamic seen during the 2019 Hanoi summit.[3][6] To this end, efforts to restore inter-Korean working-level channels, even at a minimal level, must be pursued concurrently. However, as long as North Korea insists on recognition of its nuclear-weapon state status as a precondition,[3][6] attempts to restore this channel are unlikely to yield short-term results. A realistic approach is to set this as a long-term task and to repeat attempts at contact whenever signs of a change in North Korea's attitude are detected.
If a freeze is confirmed as the actual starting point for negotiations, separate efforts will be needed to secure South Korea's participation and prevent it from being sidelined in detailed discussions on the scope and verification methods of the freeze. Should the freeze-first approach proposed by President Lee[1][17] actually be put on the negotiating table, South Korea must secure in advance a position that allows it to be practically involved in designing the freeze verification system.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is the frequency and content of public statements on North Korea by senior Trump administration officials. This will serve as a basis for determining whether the silence during the UN General Assembly speech[12] was a one-off event or a signal of a reshuffling of policy priorities.
The second indicator is the reaction of North Korean media. It is necessary to continuously monitor whether a change in attitude toward dialogue proposals can be detected in statements from the Korean Central News Agency or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The key is whether there is a shift in tone from the existing characterization of such proposals as a "sinister intention to induce mental and psychological laxity."[6]
The third indicator is the Trump administration's diplomatic schedule in the first four weeks after the November U.S. midterm elections. Whether mentions of North Korea reappear, regardless of the resolution of the Iran issue, could be a leading signal that summit discussions are being rekindled.
The fourth indicator is a change in the U.S. position on U.S.-ROK joint military exercises. If a reduction in exercises is raised again, it must be immediately assessed for any signs that this could lead to a problem with the credibility of extended deterrence.[3]
Two trigger points can be established. The first is the moment a schedule for a Trump-Kim Jong Un summit is officially announced. From this point on, the work of preliminary agenda coordination must shift to the implementation phase. The second is the moment North Korea issues an official response to discussions of a freeze. As North Korea's reaction to date has been close to strategic silence,[3] the moment this silence is broken should be managed as a signal of a shift in the negotiating phase.
4. Summary and Conclusion
President Lee Jae-myung's remarks at the UN General Assembly demonstrate the scope of proactive diplomacy South Korea can undertake amid the stalemate in U.S.-North Korea dialogue.[7] President Trump's silence[12] and the cautious attitude of the U.S. side[19] confirm the reality that this proactive diplomacy is unlikely to lead to a resumption of substantive negotiations in the short term. Nevertheless, the South Korean government needs to concurrently pursue work on three levels: managing the message of the freeze-first approach, coordinating the agenda in advance in preparation for summit discussions gaining momentum, and attempting to restore inter-Korean channels. The possibility of a recurrence of the "Korea passing" dynamic seen at the 2019 Hanoi summit[3][6] remains an issue to be managed, and it is a matter that requires preparation starting now, regardless of whether a summit materializes.
References
[2] [Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)] Understanding Trump’s UNGA Speech
[5] [Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)] What to Watch for at UNGA 2026
[8] [East Asia Institute (EAI)] [Global NK Commentary] Hoping for Another Moon-Kim Meeting
[13] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] UN General Assembly opens with Macron, Trump in NYC
[16] [TASS] Trump confident US, Iran to make deal right after November election
[17] [Hürriyet Daily News] Seoul urges nuclear freeze, eased sanctions on North
[22] [The Star (MY)] Trump says Iran deal nearing, Tehran offers Hormuz reopening
[23] [Cyprus Mail] Trump urges complete isolation of Iran
[24] [Al-Monitor] Trump says talks with Iran continue and he thinks settlement will be reached
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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