Reinterpreting Eurasian Alignment After the SCO Summit: An Anti-Western Bloc or Asynchronous Hedging?

Executive Summary

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek from August 31 to September 1 highlighted the importance of multilateral diplomatic platforms centered on China. However, the summit revealed not the formation of a unified anti-Western bloc, but rather an asynchronous alignment among three key axes: Russia-China, Iran, and India. The Russia-China axis is deepening its strategic partnership, which has become structural since the war in Ukraine, under its own momentum. Iran, facing U.S. sanctions, desperately needs the political shield the SCO provides. India, in contrast, is primarily widening its hedging options in reaction to U.S. tariff pressure amounting to 50%. This current dynamic, characterized by varying speeds of cohesion along each axis, is most likely to persist for the next six to twelve months. Key variables to watch are tangible progress on the Russia-Iran nuclear power agreement and the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, as well as the implementation of the China-India border agreement. South Korean companies and the government should avoid misinterpreting this as a monolithic bloc. Instead, they should establish a differentiated monitoring system for each axis and a trigger-based response framework. The India axis, in particular, should be approached as an opportunity for expanded cooperation rather than a threat.

I. Situational Analysis

The SCO Summit: A Eurasian Anti-Western Alignment of China, Russia, India, and Iran

1. Background and Developments

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, from August 31 to September 1 [1][4]. This year marks the 25th anniversary of the SCO's founding [1][13]. This summit was not an isolated event. It followed last year's SCO summit in Tianjin and the Victory Day parade in Beijing [2][5]. The Tianjin summit was the largest in SCO history, attended by leaders from over 20 countries and heads of 10 international organizations [5]. The Bishkek meeting was the third stage in this series of multilateral diplomatic events [2].

Over ten heads of state gathered in Bishkek, including Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif [4][9]. The summit took place four and a half years after Moscow's invasion of Ukraine and six months into the U.S.-Iran war [9]. The SCO comprises Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, four Central Asian states, and Moscow's ally Belarus [13].

The prototype for this alignment is not new. Since 2017, Russia has pursued a 'Greater Eurasia' strategy through the Eastern Economic Forum, expanding nuclear and energy cooperation not only with China but also with India and various Southeast Asian nations [12]. At the time, however, Russia's approach to Asia was seen as largely intermittent and opportunistic [12]. The current situation is different because Russia's dependence on Asia has become structural following the war in Ukraine.

2. Current Situation

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin held a separate bilateral meeting before the summit [4][16]. According to Xinhua News Agency, Xi assessed that the world faces increasingly uncertain and unpredictable geopolitical changes but stated that the pursuit of 'peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit' would continue [15]. The two countries reaffirmed the deepening of their strategic partnership [15].

Japan's Nihon Keizai Shimbun described the summit as being held "under the shadow of new U.S. sanctions on Iran" [11]. For the newspaper, a key point of interest was the extent to which Iran, the SCO's newest member, could receive a tangible protective shield from this multilateral body amid U.S. sanctions [11]. At the summit, Prime Minister Modi held his first meeting with President Pezeshkian in two years. India stated its support for all efforts to stabilize the situation in West Asia [14].

Germany's Deutsche Welle (DW) framed the Modi-Putin meeting against the dual backdrop of the aftermath of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran and U.S. tariff pressure on India over its imports of Russian crude oil [7]. The United States imposed an additional 25% tariff on India for importing Russian crude, bringing the total tariff rate to 50% [5]. DW assesses that while India continues to participate in the SCO, it has resisted attempts to turn the organization into an anti-Western bloc [7].

3. Key Actors and Positions

Chinais the architect of this series of diplomatic events. Through the three-stage platform of the Tianjin SCO summit, the Bishkek SCO summit, and the Beijing Victory Day parade, it seeks to construct an alternative narrative to the U.S.-led order [2][5]. However, China's real interests lie more in individual bilateral channels than in the multilateral cause. The negotiations with Russia over the 'Power of Siberia 2' pipeline are a prime example [2]. It is also making separate progress in border negotiations with India. An eight-point agreement was reached at the Special Representatives' meeting in Beijing on August 25, and the possibility of Xi Jinping visiting New Delhi in September has been raised [8][10]. However, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not officially confirmed this, and differences in perception regarding the western and eastern sectors of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) remain unresolved [8].

Russiais leveraging partnerships with non-Western countries as a virtual survival strategy amid the protracted war in Ukraine. Both the nuclear power agreement with Iran and the pipeline negotiations with China have the clear pragmatic goal of securing alternative markets and funding sources blocked by Western sanctions [2]. Putin also held a separate meeting with Modi, reflecting the reality that the Indian market is a key buyer of Russian energy [7].

Iranas the SCO's newest member, is seeking a breakthrough from U.S. sanctions on the multilateral stage [11]. The nuclear power agreement with Russia is a tangible outcome of this alignment [2]. Pezeshkian's meeting with Modi can be read as an attempt to secure support regarding the situation in West Asia [14].

Indiaoccupies the most complex position at this summit. Modi attended the Tianjin SCO summit but skipped the Victory Day parade in Beijing [5]. This is interpreted as a reflection of India's consideration for its relations with the U.S. and Japan as a member of the Quad, as well as its different stance from China on historical interpretations [5]. In Bishkek as well, India appeared to prioritize bilateral frameworks, such as with Uzbekistan, over the SCO's multilateral structure itself [2]. While U.S. tariff pressure is pushing Modi closer to Russia [5][7], India is simultaneously advancing border negotiations with China on a separate track [8][10]. This suggests that India's actions are not about joining an anti-Western bloc but about selective hedging among the U.S., China, and Russia.

United Statesis not a direct actor in this alignment but is the source of the pressure. New sanctions on Iran, tariffs on India, and the establishment of a counter-multilateral framework through the Quad form the backdrop for this summit [3][11]. Since its first in-person leaders' meeting in 2021, the Quad has elevated infrastructure cooperation to a strategic agenda item, functioning as a symmetrical counter-axis to the SCO's consolidation [3].

4. Key Issues

The first issue is whether the SCO is consolidating into a genuine anti-Western bloc. Contrary to the summit's multilateral pretext, tangible outcomes emerged from individual bilateral channels, such as the Russia-Iran nuclear power agreement and the Power of Siberia 2 negotiations [2]. This shows that the SCO is less a unified body for strategic implementation and more a political stage for bilateral negotiations.

The second issue is the India variable. India's participation expands the scale of the potential anti-Western bloc, but it also exposes the limits of its cohesion. India appears to be using the SCO as leverage against U.S. tariff pressure while simultaneously pursuing energy cooperation with Russia and border negotiations with China [5][7][8].

The third issue concerns the continuity and discontinuity with Russia's past 'Greater Eurasia' concept. While the approach in 2017 was opportunistic and intermittent [12], the current cooperation among Russia, China, and Iran has been structurally entrenched by Western sanctions over the Ukraine war, suggesting a different intensity and durability of alignment. However, the India variable remains a factor constraining the completeness of this bloc.

II. In-Depth Analysis

The SCO Summit: A Eurasian Anti-Western Alignment of China, Russia, India, and Iran

1. Analysis of Root Causes

At the Bishkek summit, the three axes of Russia, China, and Iran are each leveraging the SCO in response to different pressures.

Russia's motivation is clear. With the war in Ukraine now in its fourth and a half year, the loss of the European market has become a structural reality [9]. An alternative is needed to fill this void. The 'deepening of the strategic partnership' reaffirmed at the Xi-Putin meeting is not mere rhetoric; it stems from the pragmatic need to secure alternative markets and security partners [15][17].

China's motivation is the long-term strategic competition with the United States. Xi's assessment that "the world faces increasingly uncertain and unpredictable geopolitical changes" serves as an indirect counter-logic to the tariff and technology control pressures from Washington [15]. Rather than confronting this pressure alone, China seeks to distribute the burden through multilateral platforms.

Iran's motivation is the most desperate. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun notes that the summit was held "under the shadow of new U.S. sanctions on Iran, the SCO's newest member" [11]. Held six months after the U.S.-Israeli military action against Iran, this summit is effectively Iran's only diplomatic lifeline [9]. Iran's pursuit of pragmatic interests through bilateral channels, such as the nuclear power and pipeline negotiations with Russia, also stems from the recognition that the SCO's multilateral framework alone cannot guarantee its security.

India's motivation is different from that of the other three countries. What brought India to Bishkek was not a desire for anti-Western solidarity but U.S. tariff pressure. The additional 25% tariff imposed for importing Russian crude oil brings the total tariff rate to 50% [5]. This is not an ideological choice but a reaction to trade pressure, and the Modi government has opted for a hedging strategy, using this as leverage to keep channels open with Russia and Iran [7].

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: Since its inception, the SCO has faced the inherent constraints of its consensus-based principle and the heterogeneity of its member states. The anti-Western orientation of Russia and China, India's non-aligned tradition, and the hostile relationship between Pakistan and India all coexist within one organization [13]. This heterogeneity was not resolved at this summit. Although the Tianjin Declaration adopted in Tianjin had a character of opposition to the U.S.-centric order [5], India separately emphasized its bilateral meeting with the Iranian president, stating only its principled position of "supporting all efforts to stabilize the situation in West Asia" [14]. The gap between multilateral declarations and the actual actions of individual countries remains a structural limitation of the SCO.

Economic Structure: Russia and Iran, under Western sanctions, desperately need alternative energy and financial channels. This need has materialized in bilateral projects like the Russia-Iran nuclear power agreement and the 'Power of Siberia 2' pipeline. China, on the other hand, is already the largest buyer of Russian energy, so the marginal utility of further cooperation is low. India faces both the economic benefit of importing discounted Russian crude and the cost of U.S. tariffs, creating a structure where it continues selective participation rather than fully integrating into SCO economic cooperation [7].

Security Structure: The China-India border issue acts as a variable affecting the overall stability of this alignment. The prolonged standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since the 2020 Galwan Valley clash entered a phase of de-escalation following the Modi-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan [8][10]. While an eight-point agreement was reached at the Special Representatives' meeting in Beijing on August 25, it was limited to procedural progress, such as sharing hydrological data and improving border management [8]. Differences in perception regarding the western and eastern sectors remain unresolved [8]. As long as the border issue is not fundamentally resolved, it is difficult for China and India to unite as a genuine security community within the SCO.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

Russia's 'Greater Eurasia' concept has existed since the time of the 2017 Eastern Economic Forum [12]. At that time, Russia sought to expand economic cooperation, including nuclear technology exchange, not only with China but also with Japan, India, and various Southeast Asian nations [12]. However, Russia's Asia policy during this period was assessed as being "marked by intermittent and opportunistic aspects" [12]. Major U.S. international affairs research institutions also viewed Russia as fundamentally a European country and were relatively indifferent to these moves [12].

The current situation is decisively different from this 2017 precedent. Whereas Russia's Eastern policy then was about developing Asia as an 'additional' option while maintaining relations with Europe, it is now an 'alternative' strategy premised on the loss of the European market. The structural rupture of the Ukraine war has raised Russia's dependence on Asia to a level that is difficult to reverse. The deepening of relations reaffirmed by Xi and Putin in their separate summit meeting has the character of a long-term, entrenched partnership, different in nature from the opportunistic approach of 2017 [15][16].

India's hedging behavior also has precedents. Since the border détente with China began on the occasion of the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, India has consistently pursued a dual track, maintaining its Quad cooperation with the U.S. while also keeping channels open with China and Russia [8][10]. Prime Minister Modi's attendance at the Tianjin summit but absence from the Beijing Victory Day parade is a symbolic illustration of this dual track [5]. The reasons cited for his absence from the parade include India's inability to narrow differences with China on historical interpretation and the need to consider its relations with the U.S. and Japan as a Quad member [5]. This pattern was repeated in Bishkek. Prime Minister Modi placed more substantive weight on his individual bilateral meetings with Iran and Russia than on the SCO's multilateral sessions [14][7].

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is whether there is tangible progress in the China-India border negotiations. The eight-point agreement is merely a procedural management mechanism, not a fundamental resolution [8][10]. If Xi's visit to New Delhi for the BRICS summit in September materializes and leads to a substantive agreement at the leaders' meeting, it could create space for India to move toward a more active role within the SCO framework. Conversely, if the visit is canceled or the meeting remains at a ceremonial level, India's policy of selective participation will likely continue.

The second variable is the intensity of U.S. trade pressure on India. If the tariffs, which reach 50%, are not eased but are sustained or increased [5], India's incentive to expand cooperation with Russia and Iran will grow. Since this is a reaction to pressure rather than an ideological shift, a change in Washington's policy toward India could paradoxically lead to greater SCO cohesion.

The third variable is the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions on Iran [11]. If the SCO fails to provide Iran with a tangible economic and security buffer, Iran will become more reliant on individual bilateral channels with Russia, such as the nuclear power agreement and pipeline negotiations. In this case, the SCO is likely to remain more a stage that provides a pretext for bilateral deals than a multilateral platform.

The fourth variable is the future direction of Russia's relations with Europe. If end-of-war negotiations for Ukraine advance and discussions on normalizing Russia-Europe relations resume, the possibility of a return to the opportunistic, 2017-style approach to Asia cannot be ruled out. It is still too early to conclude that the current close alignment has become structurally entrenched.