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Challenges to Universal Modernity in Japan and Korea Before and After the Sino-Japanese War: Historical Philosophy of Modernity and Western Consciousness
The Young Ones of the Love Room Wander in Search of Their True Nature: The Young Ones of the Love Room Embrace Kyushu
- 84 -
Glover Garden
Kyushu National Museum
Choi Eun-ho
Master's Program, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University
I. Introduction
1. Introduction and Historical Background
This paper compares and analyzes the critiques of modernity and alternative world order concepts developed by representative international political thinkers from Japan and colonial Korea during the period surrounding the Sino-Japanese War. The international political crisis pointed out by E.H. Carr deepened in more complex forms by the 1940s. Carr criticized that the international political science based on Wilsonianism produced orders that were merely “utopian” ideals and “ideologies,” forgetting the power elements, as seen in the League of Nations. He was also skeptical of the claim that international law possesses moral superiority, believing that international law actually functions merely as a tool to justify the maintenance of hegemony. Carr's critiques resonate strongly with the concerns of contemporary Axis powers' intellectuals.
In Germany, Carl Schmitt recognized that the modern worldview espousing liberalism and rationalism had reached a stage. He viewed the mechanistic state theory, starting from Hobbes and Kant, as producing a nomos lacking sovereignty and political domain domestically, while internationally giving rise to an expansionist maritime nomos. Furthermore, this domestic nomos, combined with the trend of liberal globalization, showed signs of the mechanistic state theory transitioning into a principle of world order through the mechanism of Wilsonian international law across borders. In response, Schmitt urged the internal recognition of an area of exception to rediscover the sovereign and advocated a return to a land-based nomos defined by delineable territories externally. He considered this transformation as the last resort to prevent the world from disintegrating into disorder and to rescue human free will, which was fading within mechanical determinism. Moreover, he argued that the new international order to be established after World War II should be based on the principle of sanctuaries for regional great powers that cannot be infiltrated by other forces, namely the principle of Grossraum. This Grossraum was to be bound by geographical proximity and ideological homogeneity, similar to the Monroe Doctrine.
- 84 - In this context, Schmitt interpreted Germany's Führer as the manifestation of the sovereign he longed for, viewing World War II as a fateful war to halt the gradual encroachment of self-destructive modernity. While it is problematic to reduce Schmitt's international political thought simply to the value-biased term "totalitarianism," it is also undeniable that positioning him within the dichotomy of the individual and the whole contained a certain openness that could justify the preeminence of the former.
At the same time in Japan, the Kyoto School, led by Nishida Kitarō, was developing its own unique international political thought. Nishida's metaphysical concerns were concretized through what is called the "historical philosophical turn," shifting the focus of interest from epistemological concerns of the philosophy of nothingness to the historical and political agenda of how to define Japan's identity in the cultural struggle with the West. By the 1930s and 1940s, it became evident that Japan's Westernization, which began with the Meiji Restoration, was an irreversible trend. The influence of the West accumulated since the Meiji era was not merely a matter of technical introduction or instrumental acceptance of systems. Japan experimented with parliamentarism through Taisho Democracy, and at the cultural level, the spread of Western "individualism" was raising concerns among intellectuals. While Western civilization had been viewed as a new civilizational standard to replace the Confucian civilization of China and a target for imitation to be steadily achieved, by the 1930s and 1940s, the recognition that serious contradictions were inherent in Western civilization spread. Western parliamentary systems failed to realize the public interest enhancement or rational discussions among individuals as initially promised, instead degenerating into theaters for organized interest groups like zaibatsu to enforce their own interests. Externally, just as Schmitt was critical of the spread of mechanistic international law, the Japanese Empire also clashed with the Lytton Commission of the League of Nations over the Manchukuo issue and ultimately moved towards denying Wilson's liberal international order through its withdrawal from the League of Nations. Thus, to contemporary Japanese people, Western modernity appeared to be failing both domestically and internationally. In this context, the European-influenced modernity deeply infiltrated into Japan was not seen as something to imitate or complement, but rather as something to transcend, perceived as a poison. At this juncture, Nishida's historical philosophy, which grappled with the issue of "the subject's self-identity in the arena of historical change," provided a timely framework to meet the intellectual needs of the time. The Kyoto School sought theoretical resources in Nishida's logic of nothingness to transcend the West, and this, intertwined with the historical background of World War II, unfolded as a historical philosophy aimed at rescuing the world from crisis by replacing the defects of the Western international political order with Japanese principles.
2. Previous Research The theory of modern transcendence has long been excluded from research due to its problematic political actions during World War II, and when studied, it has often remained within one of two restrictive frameworks. On one hand, their thoughts have been dismissed as merely justifications for the expansionism of the Axis powers, while on the other hand, they have been categorized within deterministic discourses that claim such ideas could only arise due to the international political structure of the time or material and environmental conditions. Therefore, the international political philosophy of the Kyoto School has not been fully illuminated, except by some researchers in Japan due to its intermediate identity that is neither European nor non-European. Similarly, Western consciousness has received little attention outside of domestic academia due to its peripheral position as colonial Korea. Even from an international political perspective, the theory of modern transcendence and the international political thought of the Kyoto School remain the exclusive property of the Japanese IR school. In domestic academia, research on the international political thought of modern transcendence is virtually nonexistent, and studies on the Kyoto School have been limited primarily to the fields of history and philosophy. A representative study dealing with the Korean reception of modern transcendence is a monograph in which Korean and Japanese historians have added annotations to texts on the modern transcendence of Korean intellectuals. Furthermore, this paper aims to avoid existing historicist narratives or historiographical approaches. This does not mean disregarding the historical context entirely. Understanding the surrounding conditions that shaped these thinkers' concerns is essential; however, this contextualization is limited to clarifying their issues. Specifically, it aims to depict the discursive environment in which they lived to illustrate the conditions that influenced the formation of their thoughts, while also inferring ontological concerns through the geopolitical landscape they faced. In other words, this study distances itself from value-judgment discussions that trace the genealogy of their conclusions to question responsibility or deterministic/reductionist approaches that explain that such conclusions could only arise from the environmental factors they faced.
- 85 - Consequently, the international political philosophy of the Kyoto School has not been thoroughly illuminated, except by a few researchers within Japan due to its intermediate identity that is neither European nor non-European. Similarly, the Western recognition has received little attention outside of domestic academia due to its peripheral position as colonial Korea. From an international political perspective, both the theory of modern transcendence and the international political thought of the Kyoto School remain the exclusive domain of the Japanese IR school. In domestic academia, research on the international political thought of modern transcendence is virtually non-existent, and studies of the Kyoto School have been limited primarily to historical and philosophical fields. Representative of studies addressing the Korean reception of modern transcendence is a publication where Korean and Japanese historians have added annotations to texts of Korean intellectuals' modern transcendence theories. Furthermore, this paper aims to avoid existing historical narratives or historiographical approaches. This does not mean to completely disregard historical context. Understanding the surrounding conditions that shaped these thinkers' concerns is essential; however, this contextualization is limited to clarifying their problem consciousness. Specifically, it aims to depict the discursive environment in which they lived to illustrate the conditions that influenced the formation of their thoughts, while also inferring ontological concerns through the geopolitical landscape they faced. In other words, this study distances itself from value-judgment discussions that trace the genealogy of their conclusions to question accountability or deterministic/reductionist approaches that explain how such conclusions could only arise from the environmental factors they encountered.
3. Problem Awareness This paper begins with the awareness that the task of comparing the Kyoto School and Western consciousness holds academic significance in two aspects. First, within the common historical condition of the interwar period, these thinkers shared the awareness that they needed to recognize the limitations of liberal modernity and seek alternative world orders to replace it. Second, despite a time lag of nearly a century, the crisis of modernity they faced resonates strongly with the global crises that contemporary international politics confronts today. While modernity and the modern international order, namely the Westphalian-Hobbesian state system, remain intact, transnational cooperatives such as the EU, UN, and WTO are in a state of stagnation. Additionally, with the rise of China, the discourse of liberalism/nationalism is being circulated within a dichotomous framework of Western/non-Western. In particular, figures from the Chinese school of international relations, such as Zhao Tingyang, Yan Xuetong, and Qin Yaqing, exhibit remarkable similarities to the Kyoto School in both substantive aspects and developmental methods. This suggests that the issues faced by interwar international political thinkers remain unresolved and that their legacies are still being represented in contemporary discourse. The concerns of Western consciousness encapsulate Korea's timeless dilemma of how to maintain the individuality of small nations amid the proliferation of new universalist international order theories in the 20th century.
- 86 - Although the positions of colonial Korea and contemporary middle-power Korea cannot be considered equal, the international political studies of the periphery contain the potential to represent the universal concerns of non-great powers. Of course, realistically discussing the contemporary implications of modern transcendence and Western consciousness exceeds the scope of a single paper. Therefore, this paper will aim to compare and analyze the two solely around the keyword of the historical philosophy of modernity.
Thus, both the Kyoto School and Western consciousness recognized that they had reached an international order based on Western modernity and liberalism. However, they did not stop at criticism but set the respective international orders as targets to be transcended, proposing alternative international orders to replace them. In this process, they positioned the contemporary international order as a historical stage along the axis of temporality, while also asserting that the new spatial concepts to replace it must align with the new spirit of the age. In other words, the critiques of modern transcendence by the Kyoto School and Western consciousness can be understood as both grounded in historical philosophical issues. Based on this awareness, this paper seeks to explore the symposium on modern transcendence and the historical philosophy of Western consciousness. However, readers interested in international political thought may raise a question regarding this paper: Is not the philosophy of spatiality a more suitable avenue than the philosophy of temporality for exploring international political thought? Especially for modern readers accustomed to theories that assign only secondary importance to temporality, such as Waltzian structural realism or Keohane-Nye institutional liberalism, this approach may feel even more unfamiliar. Therefore, this paper emphasizes that spatiality and historical philosophy are inextricably linked. The spatial concepts we commonly use sometimes carve out temporality, and conversely, temporality is also concretized and organized through spatiality, thus spatiality and temporality can only be understood in relation to each other. Nevertheless, it can be seen that temporality generally holds precedence over spatiality in historical philosophy. In this context, unlike Schmitt, the symposium on modern transcendence and Western consciousness tend to view spatial concepts instrumentally as specific manifestations of temporality rather than theorizing them consciously. This is likely because spatiality emerged through history, which is a derivative of ontology, thus positioned as a derivative of a derivative. Therefore, another task of this paper is to excavate the spatial imagination that is sporadically embedded in the writings of modern transcendence and Western consciousness and elevate it to a position equivalent to temporality rather than a secondary element, reconstructing it as an organic whole.
More specifically, this study examines how the scholars of modern transcendence and Western consciousness diagnosed the crisis of the interwar international order and how they sought to overcome it by constructing alternative world orders. They all identified the Western modernity as the source of the crisis and argued that the downfall of liberalism was an inevitable outcome while setting the direction of world history through their unique historical philosophies. This study will answer the following questions: What are the problems of the progressive historical philosophy of modernity? What is the actual direction in which world history develops, and who are the agents of history? Does a singularity, that is, the end of history, exist? In the final part, it will explore what methods and specific forms are necessary to achieve such endpoints. Thus, the crisis of modernity is raised in two dimensions, and as an attempt to overcome it, each presents a new concept of space and time.
- 87 - If the theory of modern transcendence is schematized as a dichotomy of the individual and the whole, it can be said that the public sphere did not develop in a way that recognizes the individuality of colonies or non-great powers. The question of what the pluralistic spatial consciousness presented by Western consciousness between Western-style totalitarianism and Japanese-style Orientalism was will also be a core issue of this paper.
II. Modern Transcendence: The Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a Replacement for Western Modernity
While Schmitt started from sovereignty theory and legal philosophy, the Kyoto School (Nishida Kitarō) began from epistemology. That is, despite having very different starting points, both ultimately produced similar spatial order concepts such as the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere or Grossraum. This convergence can be explained by the fact that while Schmitt was a relatively consistent thinker with a singular problem awareness, the Kyoto School was a collective composed of multiple thinkers. Consequently, the Kyoto School underwent a continuous process of shifting core concepts and problem awareness according to changes in its members and the zeitgeist. The turn of the Kyoto School can be seen as having undergone three major inflection points. The first is Nishida Kitarō's awareness of the unity of subject and object. The second is the turn that shifted the problem of identity's sameness in the actual world from an epistemological and ontological perspective to the problem of historical space. The third is the process in which the second generation interpreted Tanabe Hajime's "logic of species" in a nationalistic manner, strongly infusing nationalism into the Kyoto School. In this flow, the ideological turn of the Kyoto School took a direction that gradually moved from the universal and abstract level of individual/whole to a more concrete and specific political order. This trajectory explains certain differences that emerge between the endpoints of Schmitt and the Kyoto School. Schmitt started from a relatively concrete political problem awareness from the beginning, and neither Grossraum nor Reich, as his ideological endpoints, explicitly elevated Germany as the subject of historical mission. In that sense, it can be said that Schmitt did not culminate in complete particularity.
Before entering the main text, it is necessary to briefly outline the reasons for distinguishing the Kyoto School into first and second generations and their historical background. Although they are often grouped together as the same Kyoto School, there are considerable differences between the first and second generations in both their areas of inquiry and problem awareness. Following Heisig's classification, this paper considers Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime as the first generation of the Kyoto School. Although there are significant ideological differences between these two thinkers, they share the commonality of primarily remaining within the metaphysical realm. In contrast, the second generation can be understood as a group that "social-scientized" or "international-political-scientized" Nishida's philosophy. They were primarily composed of individuals who directly studied under the first generation, and among them, the so-called "Four Heavenly Kings of the Kyoto School" all participated in the 1942 symposium on "Transcending Modernity." This symposium, as is well known, was an event hosted by the Japanese military, but contrary to common belief, its purpose was to check the expansionist course of the army against the Japanese navy, which was facing defeat in the Pacific War. Even after the defeat, the navy sought alternative discourses to preserve the Japanese national essence and thus collaborated with the Kyoto School.
Analyzing Nishida Kitarō, who did not directly participate in the symposium on modern transcendence, as part of the analysis may be subject to criticism. However, Nishida's philosophical system forms the ideological foundation for understanding not only modern transcendence but also Western consciousness. Of course, equating Nishida's position with that of the symposium participants should be avoided. This paper does not regard the symposium as part of Nishida's philosophy but seeks to understand the issues embedded in Nishida's philosophy as a possible outcome that could be reached under the historical conditions of World War II, that is, organically in the extension of Nishida's philosophy.
- 88 - Including Nishida Kitarō, who did not directly attend the symposium on modern transcendence in the analysis, may be subject to criticism. However, Nishida's philosophical system forms the intellectual foundation for understanding both modern transcendence and Western recognition, making it indispensable for analysis. Of course, equating Nishida's position with that of the symposium attendees should be avoided. This paper does not consider the symposium as part of Nishida's philosophy but seeks to understand the problem consciousness inherent in Nishida's philosophy as a possible outcome that could be reached within the historical conditions of World War II, that is, organically in line with the extension of Nishida's philosophy.
There is room for criticism in including Nishida Kitaro, who did not even attend the roundtable discussion, as an object of analysis while discussing the conception of international order in the Overcoming Modernity theory. However, Nishida's thought system cannot be excluded from the analysis, as it forms the intellectual foundation for understanding the Overcoming Modernity theory and, indeed, the thought of Seo In-sik. Of course, any identification of Nishida's stance with that of the roundtable participants must properly be avoided. Accordingly, this paper does not regard the roundtable as a part of Nishida's philosophy but seeks instead to understand it organically on the extension of Nishida's philosophy: as one possible outcome the problem-consciousness inherent in Nishida's philosophy could have reached under the historical conditions of the Second World War.
1. Nishida Kitarō's Historical Philosophy
To position Nishida Kitarō's later philosophy within the historical lineage of political philosophy, it can be said that he grappled with the concept of "empire." The recurring question when approaching the empire politically is how to establish the relationship between the universal and the particular. For example, Cicero's and the concept of the world elevates the actual political entities of Rome and China to a universal position, providing legitimacy to the existence of particular empires through a coherent logical system. This discourse tends to depict an organic ideal that harmoniously encompasses the diverse identities already existing within the empire. Furthermore, this particular empire is described as being embedded within a more comprehensive worldview or metaphysics, and by proclaiming it as the most harmonious political entity with nature, its significance is explained both domestically and externally. For Cicero, Stoicism played this role, while in the pre-Qin era, the normative worldview of the Mandate of Heaven served a similar purpose.
In Nishida's case, since his philosophical concerns began with the relationship between the universal and the particular, the process of transferring this to the international political dimension culminating in "empire" may seem like a natural conclusion at first glance. This is because it touches upon the classical imperial question of how individual nations coexist and integrate within a single political order. However, upon closer examination of Nishida's philosophical system, it can be said that the concept of empire is rather a non-intuitive conclusion. This is because Nishida's concerns were not about the "universal encompassing the particular" characteristic of imperial discourse, but rather about the "universal for the sake of preserving the particular." Regardless of what the conclusion may be, Nishida's political thought possesses a unique relationship between the universal and the particular that distinguishes it from traditional top-down imperial thought.
76) Kosuke Shimizu, “Chapter 5: The Transcendental Whole and ‘Inclusiveness’ The Discourse of the Big 4”, The Kyoto School and International Relations - Non-Western Attempts for a New World Order, 2022
When discussing the universal, we often imagine it as a reasoning that subsumes the particular under the general. A close example is the general concept of fruit, which is a concept that encompasses empirical particular entities such as apples, grapes, melons, and strawberries. However, according to Nishida, such top-down conceptualization is merely a "dead, fixed" generality that constrains the vitality of the particular. Therefore, "truly general must be the inner constraint of the particular." However, if all entities constantly change and lose their fixity without limiting themselves, the world would reach a state of disorder. Thus, Nishida sought to discover the "logic" as the driving force of invariability that binds them together. He attempts to explain the "absolute contradiction of generation and existence" by simultaneously considering the seemingly conflicting two dynamics of "the pulsation of life and the pursuit of logos." Now, let us trace back Nishida's philosophical journey to examine how the theory of modern transcendence reached a morally misguided conclusion justifying the Pacific War.
Order, 2022
- 89 - When discussing the universal, we often imagine the general as "a form of inference that subsumes the particular under the general."[77] As a familiar example, the general concept of fruit is an umbrella-like concept that subsumes empirically particular entities such as apple, grape, melon, and strawberry. According to Nishida, however, such top-down conceptualization is merely a "dead, fixed" universal that constrains the vital force of the particular. Therefore, "the truly universal must be the inner binding force of the particular."[78] Yet if every individual were perpetually changing and lost fixity by not self-limiting, the world would descend into disorder. Therefore, Nishida sought to discover a "logic"—an immutable dynamic force—that binds them together. Like Fichte, he attempts to explain "the self-identity of the absolute contradiction between becoming and being"[79] by simultaneously considering these two seemingly conflicting dynamics: "the vital impulse of life and the pursuit of logos."[80][81] Let us now trace back through Nishida's philosophical journey and examine why the Overcoming Modernity theory reached a morally deviant conclusion justifying the Pacific War.
For Nishida, the historical philosophical interest begins with "pure experience." His most core concern was that the moment the subject and object separate, concrete "experience" cannot be sufficiently explained. For instance, consider the experience of enjoying a work of art, walking in a quiet forest, or immersing oneself in study to reach a state of unity with the object. At that moment, when I become aware of myself experiencing myself, I separate from myself. Pure experience becomes contaminated by the objective. Therefore, Nishida posited a transcendent place where pure experience occurs, in a state where the subject and object have not yet differentiated, that is, in a dimension of nothingness. The reason this dimension is named the place of nothingness is that the moment a predicate describing something appears, it separates from the rest.
77) Heo Seong, The Two Faces of Modern Japan: Nishida Philosophy, 2000 p.116
In terms of internal structure, Nishida's life can be misunderstood as a concept similar to Kant's thing-in-itself. This is because there is room to understand it as a principle or essence that drives humans from within. However, while Kant's thing-in-itself precedes the recognition of the object (phenomenon), in the discussions of Fichte and Nishida, it is rather the recognition that constitutes the empirical world. If Kant's goal was to find essence at the epistemological level, Fichte and Nishida's interest lies in ontology. They argue that the world we experience is formed from the activity of consciousness, and the process of the self establishing itself constitutes the world. This rejects Kant's dualism of phenomenon/essence and foregrounds monism. Nishida states, "If one thinks from the beginning to distinguish between recognition and practice like Kant, certainly one way of solving the problem will be obtained. However, it is not clear how the world will relate to each other. I want to think of it all as one." (Heo Seong (2000) p.128) 79) Heo Seong, The Two Faces of Modern Japan: Nishida Philosophy, 2000, p.130
because there is room to understand it as a principle or essence driving humans from within. However, whereas Kant's thing-in-itself precedes
the subject's cognition (phenomena), in discussions stemming from Fichte and Nishida, cognition constitutes the empirical world.
If Kant's aim was to discover essence at the epistemological level, the interest of Fichte and Nishida can be seen as lying in ontology.
They argue that the world we experience is formed through the activity of consciousness, and that the self brings self-
Nishida states, "If one begins by distinguishing recognition and practice from the outset, one will certainly achieve a solution to a problem in one way. However, it is not clear how the world will relate to each other. I want to think of that as one." (Heo Sung (2000) p.128) 79) Heo Sung, The Two Faces of Modern Japan: Nishida Philosophy, 2000, p.130
theory to the forefront. Nishida says: "If we proceed by distinguishing cognition and practice from the start, as Kant did,
then certainly one sort of problem resolution will be obtained. But how everything in the world will relate to each other
remains unclear. I would like to gather it all together and think it through." (Heo Woo-seong (2000) p.128) 79) Heo Woo-seong, The Two Faces of Modern Japan: Nishida's Philosophy, 2000, p.130
80) Ibid. p.120
81) The difference between the existing universal-particular relationship and that of Nishida can also be confirmed in terms of the logical concept of the law of identity. The law of identity is the principle of non-contradiction A=A, and Fichte defines this as the act of the self establishing itself.
82) While reading this, I recalled Sartre's concepts of "gaze" and "in-itself/for-itself" and pondered what the differences are with Nishida's discussion. The biggest difference seems to be that while Sartre accepts the in-itself/for-itself dichotomy as given, Nishida conceives a much bolder project of combining the objective and subjective based on pure experience. In fact, Nishida has referred to Western existentialism as "awareness-ism."
as an act of establishing.
[82] Reading this, the author recalled Sartre's concepts of the "regard" and the "en-soi/pour-soi" (in-itself/for-itself)
and pondered how they differ from Nishida's argument. The most significant difference appears to be that, whereas Sartre begins by accepting the for-itself/in-itself dichotomy as a given,
Nishida envisions a far more audacious project of uniting the objective and subjective on the basis of pure experience.
Indeed, Nishida once referred to Western existentialism under the name "self-awareness-ism."
is what is being said.
- 90 - However, here Nishida faces an unresolved dilemma. If the subject and object were originally not separated, then I (the subject) must also change constantly and chaotically like the object. Nevertheless, we recognize that yesterday's self and today's self are the same. This is expressed as the question of how to secure the self-identity of the existence called I (我) at the personal level. For the consciousness of the subject to secure self-identity, experience must ultimately transcend time and space. However, it is difficult to avoid criticism that this form of transcendence loses specificity. To address this, Nishida shifts the focus to historical philosophy. For him, history is precisely the space and process of creating being from nothing.
Nishida connects the chaos at the personal level with the chaos at the national and state levels analogously. The above question expands into a social-level question of how nations and states secure their self-identity. At this point, Nishida distinguishes history from pure experience. While pure experience is the undifferentiated state of the subject and object, history is the work of capturing something that penetrates the heterogeneity, temporality, and individuality of various experiences. Thus, the constructed history occupies an intermediate discipline between science and art. By denying absolute will and moving towards the object, deterministic science is established, while emphasizing individuality relatively gives birth to history. Finally, if individuality is fully alive, it leads to art or religion. In the same vein, Nishida distinguishes the world into three layers: the material world, the biological world, and the historical world. Among these, the historical world is the dimension in which humans contribute to the self-creation of the world through intentional acts, and it is the space where interactions occur between the whole and the part, the environment and the individual.
So, how is history propelled? Here, the role of the present is crucial. The present is understood as being "pressed" by two forces: the weight of the past and the horizon of the future. In short, the past acts as a pressure that limits the present, while the future functions as a coercion that compels change upon the present. The present is thus requested to maintain its self-continuity while also transcending itself, resulting in the necessity and possibility of constant self-negation. In this way, history is propelled through the self-negation of the present. On the other hand, the present that performs such self-negation is a creative, singular, and non-repetitive moment, thus history is not a mere enumeration of deterministic and mechanistic causal relationships. On the other hand, the historical process is not propelled by the will of an already established subject, but rather, the subject's freedom and creativity are generated posthumously within the self-negation of the present, thus it is not a product of volitional outcomes.
In this context, Nishida faces the dilemma that the concept of pure experience cannot present empirical cases that manifest in the real world. Thus, he chose to present a "proximity to pure experience" through history, which occupies an intermediate position between the subject and object, the whole and the part. Furthermore, Nishida chose historical philosophy as a breakthrough to resolve ontological issues.
Our direct experiences are a continuous development that changes moment by moment, each with its own distinctiveness. However, natural science seeks to unify all experiences under general properties as much as possible, explaining everything from there.
This is the case. With the progress of speculation, the significance of reality is created. It is our activity that creates such significance. Whether to preserve or destroy past events depends on our future activities. I often quote the saying that the beginning of heaven and earth in the imperial chronicle starts from the beginning. The creation of heaven and earth is not a particularly ancient event but must be a creation of today. How to break the old world and create a new order, how to break through the ABCD encirclement - this is the creation of heaven and earth. (...) Rather, it is something that must be newly created and endowed through our future activities. War also creates its true significance by performing this. Preserving or destroying the past also depends on current activities. Herein lies the meaning of cosmic creation, and that is why it is said that the beginning of heaven and earth is always.
The meaning of reality is created along with the progress of speculative thought. It is our activity that creates such meaning.
- 91 - However, the later Kyoto School, rather than using the philosophy of history, which Nishida originally invoked as a tool to demonstrate empirical examples, makes it the central axis of its theory. In this process, first, the mediating and ambiguous status of the historical present, which resolved Nishida's antinomy between subject and object, is weakened, and the subjectivity of individual human groups is emphasized in historical development. Second, culture, ethnicity, and nation are invoked as carriers of the real world representing this newly emphasized subjectivity, and are defined as subjects that will carry out a world-historical mission.
2. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: A New Space for Overcoming Modernity Logic of Species and Moral Energy: The Logic of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Nishida Kitarō himself had long shared the problem consciousness of West versus East with the second generation. However, he showed reluctance to resolve this issue with a simple nativist turn and sought a breakthrough that would transcend the dichotomy of East and West itself. Nevertheless, it is difficult to consider his political thought as having reached concrete proposals.
Ultimately, by the time of the second-generation Kyoto School, Nishida's concept of nothingness (mu) was essentialized as a unique characteristic of the East or Japan, contrasted with Western being (yu). Under the judgment that Western modernity had reached a dead end, the East Asian concept of nothingness was presented as a way out. Since the attempt to attribute the concept of East Asian nothingness to the nation of Japan, rather than using it as a universal solution, might appear poorly substantiated, the second-generation Kyoto School scholars summon two lines of justification.
The first is the "logic of species" by Tanabe Hajime, a first-generation Kyoto School thinker. Originally, Nishida's philosophy had a dual structure of subject and object, which limited its connection to concrete political philosophy. Tanabe therefore emphasized the need for an intermediate term between the individual and the whole, and found it in the concept of species. Tanabe's logic of species unfolds on a tripartite structure of individual-species-genus, which is similar to the familiar three-tiered structure of international political thought: individual-nation-international. Counterintuitively, in Tanabe's system, humanity corresponds to genus, while species corresponds to culture and the nation embodying that culture. Tanabe associates the individual with freedom, while viewing species as a pair linked to the restriction of freedom. A natural antagonism arises between these conflicting logics, and the nation-state emerges from the balance of this tension. This nation-state is then established as the subject driving history. Koyama and Kosaka, borrowing Tanabe's logic of species, combine ideology and practice, defining the process by which a leading species resolves problems and creates meaning in reality as the "creation of world history."
Koyama: It is true that the significance of speculation or ideology emerges retrospectively. History is generally like that.
As speculation advances, the meaning of reality is created along with it. Creating such meaning
is our activity. Whether the China Incident will be enlivened or deadened depends henceforth on the nature of our activity.
I think that is the meaning of the phrase I quote often: "The beginning of heaven and earth is today," as found in the Chronicles of the Divine Emperor.
- 92 - The creation of heaven and earth is not some especially
ancient event; it must be a creation of today. The shattering of the old world and the making of a new order—
how to break through the ABCD encirclement and create a new world—that is the creation of heaven
and earth. (...) Rather, it is something that must be newly created and bestowed by our own vigorous activity henceforth.
(...)
or deadened also depends on present activity. Herein lies the significance of the creation of the universe, and that is why
today is the beginning of heaven and earth. (...)
Kozaka: Of course, historical issues are not discovered arbitrarily but are mediated from the past.
However, there is historical significance in willingly resolving them and unfolding into a new world. The subject of this resolution is the national ethnicity. (...)84)
The agent of that resolution is the national Volk. (...)[84]
The Law of History: Moralische Energie
The second concept invoked to add academic authority to the "subjecthood" of the state is Ranke's concept of moralische energie. Ranke believed that there are aspects of historical development and the rise and fall of individual states that cannot be explained solely by natural or objective conditions, and he termed the force that enables states and nations to realize their missions within history as "moralische energie." This moral energy can be understood in contrast to Hegel's fatalistic view of history. While Hegel presented a linear and teleological view of history, Ranke sought to find the role of human freedom amidst disorder and fatalism. For Ranke, history is a process in which human freedom constantly changes and progresses, even as it confronts nearly overwhelming forces. History exists on a continuum between the past and the future, yet its outcomes are not predetermined in any way.
Koyama: When we say France was defeated, what is the fundamental reason for France's defeat? According to Ranke, it is because moralische energie was lacking. There were gaps or conflicts in politics and culture, leading to a complete separation of culture and politics. Both culture and politics lost their healthy vitality.
Even if Paris at its peak turned to ashes, the moral energy that protects the homeland of France is what creates French culture anew.
Kozaka: What moves history in reality is not merely economics or scholarship but something more subjective, specifically the vitality of the nation. Of course, it is contented with cultural aspects.
(...) I believe the subject of moralische energie is the people. The concept of "nation" is a cultural-historical concept of the 19th century.
In the process, French culture was created anew. (...)
Kosaka: In reality, what moves history is not simply economics or scholarship, but something more
Subjektiv, subjective and, concretely, something like the life force of a Volk. Although it contains cultural elements
as its content, of course. (...)
(...) I consider that the subject of moralische Energie is the nation (people). "Volk" is a 19th-century cultural-historical concept. 84) Nakamura Mitsuo, Nishitani Keiji, The Thought of the Pacific War – Origins of the Japanese Spirit. From "The World-Historical Standpoint and Japan"
86) Nakamuura Mitsuo, Nishitani Keiji, The Thought of the Pacific War – The Origins of Japanese Spirit. "The Historical Significance from a World Historical Perspective and Japan's Modern Transcendence Symposium," (hereafter The Thought of the Pacific War), Imagin, p.219
85) Leopold von Ranke (Georg G. Iggers ed.), "Chapter 7: The Great Powers" in The theory and
practice of history, 1833.
"World history does not present such a chaotic tumult, warring, and planless succession of states and
peoples (...) There are forces and indeed spiritual, life-giving, creative forces, nay life itself, and
there are moral energies, whose development we see (...) In their interaction and succession, in
their life, in their decline and rejuvenation (...) lies the secret of history."
"World history does not present such a chaotic tumult, warring, and planless succession of states and peoples (...) There are forces and indeed spiritual, life-giving, creative forces, nay life itself, and there are moral energies, whose development we see (...) In their interaction and succession, in their life, in their decline and rejuvenation (...) lies the secret of history."
In this sense, 'nation' (people) is the key that resolves everything. Moralische Energie is neither individual ethics,
nor personal ethics, nor purity of blood. Concentrating on the culturally and politically defined nation might be
the core of Moralische Energie today, I think. (...) A people without selfhood, without self-limitation—
in other words, a people that has not become a nation—is powerless. As evidence, consider the case of the Native
Americans, who ultimately failed to attain meaning as an independent people and were absorbed into another nation-state.
Might the Jewish people not also ultimately end up the same way? In this sense,
I believe the subject of world history is the national Volk.[86]
Through the two ideological resources of the logic of species and moralische energie, the second generation of the Kyoto School succeeded in "legalizing" freedom. They elevated the unique political entity of Japan, which possessed "moralische energie," to a "species," thereby establishing an ideological bridge connecting the particular and the universal. Specifically, the concept of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere originated from the awareness that Western modernity had exposed its moral limits through numerous wars. Japan, as a nation embodying Eastern nothingness, was also the only non-European power that had triumphed over European powers in the Russo-Japanese War. From this perspective, the argument was constructed that Japan possessed a moral superiority, or moral energy, capable of leading the Asian peoples. Thus, the "Incidents of the Pacific" and the "Great East Asian War" were elevated to the status of a "moral struggle" and imbued with meaning as a "struggle between Eastern morality and Western morality."
According to Koyama, the moral bankruptcy of the West originates not from the world wars triggered by modernity but from the individualism that made such wars possible. Individualism led to a lack of patriotism on a micro level and, on a macro level, formed an order that reproduced class structures between great and small powers while concealing the reality of power dynamics in modern international relations. At the domestic level, liberal competition based on an atomistic view of humanity deepened inequalities and generated class struggles. In this way, Koyama links the absence of moralische energie operating at the personal, national, and international levels under a common principle of "atomistic worldview." However, Koyama does not provide sufficient clarification regarding this atomism and halts the discussion at this point.
The international relations of modernity were dominated by atomistic thought, that is, independently existing thoughts. Each nation and state had one vote they could exercise. There was an ethic that stated that both great and small nations, as well as strong and weak nations, were equal in rights. Of course, this notion is an extension of the atomistic thought of modern society, so individualistic thought is extended into international relations. However, while this is formally the case, in reality, strong nations subjugate weak nations. This liberalism has devolved into class struggles where the strong subjugate the weak under the name of free competition, whether in international imperialism or domestic struggles; the principle remains fundamentally the same.
There was an ethic that each people and each state had, as it were, one vote they could exercise.
Both great powers and small states, strong and weak, were equal in rights. Of course, this
idea is an extension of the atomistic thought of modern society, so it represents a direct projection of individualist thought onto international relations.
But while that is true in form, in reality the strong subjugate the weak.
(...) This liberalism, within domestic society, becomes a class struggle in which the strong subjugate the weak under the name of free competition.
Whether international imperialism or domestic struggle, their principle forms one fundamental rule.[88]
and the yangban culture of the Joseon dynasty. Then, on what respective foundations are the stratum-character and the ethnic character of culture formed, and how do they relate to each other in the developmental process of culture?
86) Ibid. p.206 87) Ibid. p.224
- 94 - In this context, Japan's moralische energie, which replaces atomistic liberalism, is a new order that combines the individual, domestic, and international under the same principle. For example, at the personal level, Nishitani writes, "Since the other nations are at a much lower level, it is Japan's special mission within the Greater East Asia Sphere to awaken national consciousness among those nations and cultivate the strength to voluntarily and subjectively bear the Greater East Asia Sphere. The spiritual structure of the nation must be completely transformed."
The Difference Between Existing Empires and the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
As previously mentioned, the concept of Grossraum was explicitly mentioned in the symposium. However, the symposium attendees emphasized the distinctions between the co-prosperity sphere and Grossraum or existing empires.
Kozaka: The current issue is not merely that of a national people, but rather how deeply nations mediate among themselves.
As mentioned earlier, this ideology of "total war" provided an opportunity for socialists to shift towards pro-Japanese sentiments, but this shift did not imply an uncritical acceptance of modern transcendence. The case of Western recognition shows a unique ideological development that aims to preserve the individuality of colonial Korea while aspiring towards a new global universality.
Koyama: Is the historical necessity for the formation of things like a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere or a public sphere solely a product of the national question? What about economic issues?
Kosaka: It's not solely about the Orient, but it's a very significant turning point. Otherwise, the subjecthood of history will be eroded.
Kosaka: It's not solely about the Orient, but it's a very significant turning point. Otherwise, the subjecthood of history will be eroded.
eroded.
Suzuki: The concept of a bloc economy clearly originated from the concept of an economic sphere, that is, an autarkic economic theory for free trade.
liberal economics reached its limits, and as a result, the world experienced a great depression between 1929 and 1931. It was within this great depression that bloc economies were conceived as a means of rescuing or strengthening capitalism.
and as a result, the world experienced a great depression between 1929 and 1931. It was within this great depression that bloc economies were conceived as a means of rescuing or strengthening capitalism.
capitalism, bloc economies were conceived as a means of rescuing or strengthening capitalism.
(...) While economic relations form the foundation of the basic concept of a bloc economy, to be precise, it might be more of a necessity than a foundation.
necessity. (...)91)
Philosophy of history thus functioned as a mechanism to justify the transformation and change of the existing order in both Schmitt and the modern critique of modernity. Koyama also argued that Anglo-American liberalism is “an anti-historical force that temporalizes and eternalizes history within history, and has an anti-ethical meaning.”
Within historical reality, it solely over-temporalizes the Anglo-Saxon world order and eternalizes the old order.
It is also a battle between ethics and anti-ethics that fights from the position of historical life against an anti-historical force seeking to
establish the old order as eternal.92)
88) Ibid. p.267 89) Ibid. p.265 90) Ibid. p.286 91) Ibid. p.286 92) Ibid. p.272
- 95 - Paradoxically, the philosophy of history of the modern critique of modernity tended to reduce history to a kind of natural law by explaining the directionality of history with a quasi-normative principle called “moralische Energie.” As a result, the philosophy of history, which should be dynamic, was instead fixed as static. In this respect, the modern critique of modernity, while diagnosing the concrete problem of liberal disorder through the alternative of the nomos of the earth, contrasts with Schmitt, who avoided the naturalization of the philosophy of history by presenting it as a continuous process of inquiry rather than a completed law.
Finally, the establishment of the sphere of co-prosperity meant the establishment of a new economic order to conduct total war. This also served as an opportunity for socialist-minded individuals active in Japan and Korea to change their ways. Total war is generally understood as a short-term measure adopted in urgent situations requiring the total mobilization of resources, and is considered a temporary means to return to the existing order after the crisis is resolved. However, Suzuki's perception differs significantly from this conventional understanding. Suzuki argued that the war itself should be a field for establishing and experimenting with a new order, rather than aiming to restore the pre-war order, and in that context proposed the establishment of a planned economy as a concrete system.
Total war is a large-scale transformation where all the world's orders reach a dead end and undergo a comprehensive change.
The economic order changes from a liberal economy to a planned economy, and the structure, system, and worldview of the state also change. Everything from the 19th century collapses fundamentally.93)
As mentioned earlier, this “idea of total war” provided socialist-minded individuals with an opportunity to convert to pro-Japanese sentiment, but that conversion did not mean uncritical acceptance of the modern critique of modernity. The case of Seo In-sik shows a unique intellectual development that preserves the individual subject of colonial Korea while pursuing a new global universality.
As discussed earlier, such an "idea of total war" provided an occasion for socialists to convert to pro-Japanese stances, but that conversion did not signify an uncritical acceptance of the Overcoming Modernity theory. The case of Seo In-sik shows a unique intellectual development that aimed at a new world universal while preserving the particular—colonial Korea.
III. Seo In-sik and Social Class as a Medium for Preserving the Individual
Seo In-sik, a philosopher of history in colonial Korea, was born in Hamhung and studied at Waseda University from 1924. Since then, he was active as an activist in the Japanese headquarters of the Korean Communist Party and the Korean Communist Youth Association in Tokyo, and was imprisoned as a result. In the late 1930s, he began to be recognized as a leading debater who could counter the Japanese modern critique of modernity across the Korean intellectual scene.94) Around this time, Japan entered the Sino-Japanese War, using Korea and Manchuria as staging grounds for the conquest of China, and introduced conscription to Korea. Consequently, the Korean military, originally limited to public security purposes, was fully deployed in joint operations with the Kwantung Army. As a result, colonial Korea was reorganized into a wartime economic system, and a policy of assimilation under the slogan of “Naeseon Ilche” (unity of Japan and Korea) was promoted socially. Scholars who had been involved in Marxism in mainland Japan, such as Miki Kiyoshi, and Korean Marxists became the target of criticism.93) Ibid. p.314
94) Hong Jong-wook, Colonial/Modern Critique Study Group, Colonial Intellectuals and the Modern Critique of Modernity, Seoul National University Press, 2017
- 96 - Particularly, Seo In-sik judged the Sino-Japanese War as a major historical inflection point with "world-historical significance" and attempted to find a new breakthrough that transcended both liberalism and totalitarianism by applying Hegel's dialectical philosophy of history. This solution of Seo In-sik can be named a kind of “critique of modernity and the critique of modernity.” His main concern was that "theorists representing the highest intellect of modern Japan" were misinterpreting its world-historical significance in the urgent situation of facing the "truly significant Marco Polo incident (日支事變)" that could "determine the epoch." He defined the world history of the modern critique of modernity as totalitarianism and sought to grant subjectivity to the periphery of the colony. His advocacy of "culture" as a new decentered community replacing the "empire" originated from the objective of diluting Japanese cooperativism, which was bound to reproduce the center-periphery logic, into a pluralistic world.
Based on the above, let us examine the logical structure of Seo In-sik's philosophy of history. His philosophy of history begins with the tension between two poles: inevitable naturalness and variable historicity. He notes that the development of historical reality simultaneously entails elements of free will and determinism. These elements, referred to as "free will" and "determinism" at the historical level, can be seen as representing "liberalism" and "totalitarianism" at the political level, respectively. Subsequently, Seo In-sik found labor as a bridge that mediates these seemingly mutually exclusive elements. Furthermore, he discovered dynamics that run parallel to this logic of integration in intellect and culture. He notes two historical trends in the 1930s and 1940s. One is the acceleration of the integration of the world market, leading to the emergence of a singular worldliness and the visualization of the possibility of a fusion culture. The other is the imminent collapse of the existing order due to World War II, signaling the advent of a new order. Against this backdrop, he reviewed the alternative world orders proposed by intellectuals of the modern critique of modernity and offered his critique.
1. The Tension Between Natural Science and Historical Science: Beyond the Opposition of Necessity and Freedom
The starting point of Seo In-sik's philosophical inquiry into history was to resolve the antagonism between necessity and contingency, the two driving forces of history. He pointed out that historians have thus far focused only on the aspects of necessity and contingency in history, failing to transcend them. For example, in "Collected Essays on the Philosophy of History," he outlines the history of philosophical inquiry into history and recent trends (as of 1938) by dividing the development of the philosophy of history into three stages. The first is the so-called "early philosophy of history," represented by Comte and Hegel. In this stage, through the concept of "absolute spirit," rationalism was extended to the realm of history, and an attempt was made to discover a single, inevitable law of development encompassing all historical progress. The second is the middle philosophy of history, represented by Dilthey and Windelband. Abandoning the ambition to find a linear law of development, they approached history from an epistemological perspective and sought to establish a rational methodology comparable to that of natural sciences. The third stage is the metaphysical (prophysikalisches)95) period led by Heidegger, Nishida Kitaro, and Miki Kiyoshi. 95) This “prophysik” literally refers to the realm preceding natural science (physik). Seo In-sik seems to have had in mind the empiricism prior to the division of subject and object in Nishida's philosophy. In other words, what Seo In-sik means by physik here is not metaphysics, the contemplation that transcends form, but rather the ultimate goal of becoming form.
or the ultimate goal of actualization, but rather the process of becoming form.
They, on the one hand, evaluated Dilthey's epistemological approach as complacent in the face of the global crisis of the 1930s, elevating the study of history to the level of ontology. On the other hand, they broke with Hegel, abandoned the search for rational laws, and focused on finding contemporary individuality in fluid and discontinuous aspects, such as Bergson's philosophy of life. However, Seo In-sik does not fully agree with any of these three approaches and maintains a reserved stance toward all of them. According to him, a more fundamental and unresolved issue underlies the ground on which these philosophical discussions of history unfold. This is the tension between nature and history that has persisted since Kant.
- 97 - In this context, they not only attempted to elevate the study of history to the level of ontology by considering Dilthey's epistemological approach complacent in the face of the global crisis of the 1930s but also broke with Hegel, abandoned the search for rational laws, and focused on finding contemporary individuality in fluid and discontinuous aspects, such as Bergson's philosophy of life. However, Seo In-sik does not fully agree with any of these three approaches and maintains a reserved stance toward all of them. According to him, a more fundamental and unresolved issue underlies the ground on which these philosophical discussions of history unfold. This is the tension between nature and history that has persisted since Kant.
As is well known, Kant completed the dichotomy of subject and object by attributing the possibility of objective knowledge to the universal conditions of human existence in finite space and time, that is, to the a priori realm. As a result, the realm of the object was defined as a realm governed by universal and timeless causal relationships, contrasting with the realm of the subject, which changes in time, i.e., the realm of history. In other words, Kant solidified the dichotomy of nature versus history by understanding nature as a world of necessity governed by causal laws. In response, Seo In-sik argues that the legitimacy of nature's ahistoricity, as posited by Kant, is being eroded by scientific discoveries of the 20th century. On the one hand, Darwin's theory of evolution and advances in astronomy have shown that stars and living organisms also have their own historicity and change over time, thereby undermining the premise that nature functions as a timeless, universal condition of existence. On the other hand, it has been discovered that certain laws also exist in human behavior. Thus, the Kantian framework, which posits nature alone as the sanctuary of necessity and separates history as a realm of disorder, can no longer be maintained. There is an intersection between human normativity and physicochemical naturalness, and this intersection plays a crucial role in the mode of existence of human history. For example, a commodity is a physically existing object, and while its value has a substantial form determined by labor (labor theory of value) or the mathematical laws of economic science (market theory: supply and demand theory of value), it also has a normative dimension that acquires value only through the mediation of human social sentiment. Thus, Seo In-sik's central task was to combine the necessity of nature and the contingency of history, which Kant had separated. In "The World-Historical Significance of the Present" (1939), he states.96)
The statement that history is the unity of possibility and chance, necessity and contingency implies that it is precisely the moment of chance that signifies it. Moreover, in this sense, history is also destiny. However, the assertion that history is a moment of chance does not negate its necessity. Necessity is not something other than chance; rather, the totality of chance is necessity. Historical reality is contingent in its individual instances, yet it is necessary in its totality. Necessity signifies the state prior to the individual contingencies. To borrow his expression, "The aim of modern historical consciousness is to reach the object of history through the conduit of history as a subject."
And in that sense, history is also destiny. However, the statement that history is
a moment of contingency in no way denies its necessity. Necessity is not something other than contingency;
the synthesis of contingencies is precisely necessity. Historical reality is contingent in its individual instances,
yet is necessary as the total series. Necessity stands opposed to each individual contingency even as it
signifies the state prior to becoming. To borrow his expression: "What the modern historical consciousness aims for as its milestone is to pass through history as subject and arrive at history as object."
l Sugawara Jun, "Kōyama Iwao's Philosophy of World History: Discussions with Suzuki Shigetaka" in Sugawara Jun, Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 4: Facing the 21st Century, Nanzan Institute for Religion & Culture, pp.176-194, 2009
96) Hong Jong-wook, Colonial/Modern Transcendence Research Group, The Modern Transcendence Theory of Colonial Intellectuals, "The World Historical Significance of Modernity," 2017 97) The term "keiki" means succession, that is, to occur in succession or to happen consecutively.
- 98 - It is to unify all their various contingencies as the moments of self-realization and to carry out their overall process of succession through their own principles. (...) However, without active action, necessity cannot be transformed into chance, nor can necessity be realized in reality.
carries through its own iron law through the entire process of succession. (...) Yet contingency can be transformed into necessity,
In this section, we can understand why Western recognition was so dissatisfied with the diagnosis of the Kyoto School. Western recognition perceived the Second Sino-Japanese War as a significant turning point that concluded the period from the 16th century to the mid-20th century and opened a new world-historical phase. Furthermore, he held the conviction that "transforming chance into necessity and realizing necessity is solely the active action of humans." In this regard, Western recognition and modern transcendence share a common thread. However, the core principles of the world-historical era that he identified and his problem consciousness regarding that era differed from those of the theorists of modern transcendence. While the theorists of modern transcendence also questioned liberalism, they did so by essentializing only certain characteristics of modern Europe. They believed that by witnessing the historical moment when Japan could become an active agent in world history, it could become an active actor rather than a passive participant in world history by "realizing" that it was a turning point. The consciousness of a limited national community encapsulated in the slogan of "moralische energie" could only be established on the premise that the subject of world history could be specified. In contrast to the theorists of modern transcendence, for whom culture constituted the basis of the nation-state, for Western recognition, "culture" was divided into national culture belonging to specific "nations" and universal culture or general culture belonging to universal "classness." He categorized the types of culture by discussing class culture and national culture.
and without acts full of hardship, even necessity can turn into contingency.
In this passage, we can understand why Seo In-sik was so dissatisfied with the Kyoto School's diagnosis. Seo perceived the Sino-Japanese War as a pivotal inflection point that would conclude the period from the 16th century to the mid-20th century and open a new world-historical phase. Furthermore, he held the conviction that "transforming contingency into necessity and actualizing necessity into reality is solely the province of human active conduct." On this point, Seo In-sik and the Overcoming Modernity theorists are in line. However, what he grasped as the core principle of the world-historical era to which he belonged, and his problem-consciousness regarding that era, differed in texture from that of the Overcoming Modernity theorists. The Overcoming Modernity theorists also took issue with liberalism, but that never went beyond essentializing a few features of modern Europe. They believed that by witnessing the moment when world-historical significance was transforming, and by "becoming aware" of the fact that it was an inflection point, Japan could become an active agent rather than a passive vehicle of world history. The self-awareness as a limited national community, encapsulated in the slogan "moral life force," could only be established on the premise that the subject of world history could be specified. Thus, whereas for the Overcoming Modernity theorists culture formed the bedrock constituting the nation-state, for Seo In-sik the concept of "culture" was bisected into national culture, belonging to a particular "people" or "state," and human culture or general culture, belonging to a universal "stratification." In discussing "types of culture," he typologizes stratificational culture and national culture as follows.[98]
Today's world culture, when viewed transversely, is composed of two layers or fewer, but when viewed longitudinally, it is formed by more than two nations. They belong to a single cultural form of the so-called civic culture, which has the same character as the conceptual form of the citizen class, but as national culture, they each possess distinct traditional differentiations. (...) Even within contemporary civic culture, one can distinguish between the emotional and intellectual French culture and the spiritual and mystical German culture. Conversely, within a single national culture, one can also discover various historical cultures that differ in their historical character. Even within "Japanese culture," one can distinguish between the ancient court culture, the medieval warrior culture, and the modern merchant culture, and similarly, in Korea, one can distinguish between the Hwarang culture of Silla, the monk culture of Goryeo, and the yangban culture of Joseon. Then, what are the foundations upon which the layers of culture and ethnicity are formed, and what kind of relationships do they have in the development of culture?
Viewed longitudinally, it is formed of two or more peoples, and they share the same
character as the ideological form of the citizenry, belonging to the category of so-called civil culture as the culture of that single era,
yet as national cultures they possess respectively different traditional particularities. (...) Within modern civil culture as well, one can distinguish between the sensuous, intellectual French culture and the spiritual, mystical German culture.
And just as one can distinguish multiple national cultures within the culture of a single era, conversely,
one can also discover multiple epochal cultures with different historical characteristics within a single national culture.
Within the same "Japanese culture," one can distinguish the ancient tenjobito (courtly) culture, the medieval martial culture, and the early modern
l Hong Jong-wook, Colonial/Overcoming Modernity Study Group, Colonized Intellectuals' Theory of Overcoming Modernity, Seoul National University Press, 2017
chonin (townspeople) culture;[99] and, within Korean culture, one can distinguish the Hwarang culture of Silla, the Buddhist monastic culture of Goryeo,
and the yangban (scholar-official) culture of the Yi dynasty. Then on what grounds
are the stratificational and national characteristics of culture formed respectively, and what mutual relationship do they have in the developmental process of culture?
Subsequently, Seo In-sik directs attention to the point that each particular culture is also essentially rooted in the universal principles of historical development. He seems to emphasize that the particularity of differing national cultures among states is in fact nothing more than an outer husk, and that stratification is fundamental.
98) Seo In-sik Collected Works, History and Culture, "Types and Stages of Culture," Yeokrak, 2006
99) For the meaning of tenjo (殿上) and chonin (町人), see Hong Jong-wook, Colonial/Overcoming Modernity Study Group (2017).
- 99 - Since the cultural form of an era reflects the particular structure of social life in that era, the society
It is self-evident that the will to live of the social strata that control it holds decisive significance for the culture of that era. (...) The developmental administration of cultural history, from the perspective of epochal history (...)
If we can understand this, we can also arrange it into a series of markers based on strata, and order it into the various stages of history. However, while stratification distinguishes its developmental stages,
If we can understand this, we can also arrange it into a series of markers based on strata, and order it into the various stages of history. However, while stratification distinguishes its developmental stages,
However, while stratification distinguishes its developmental stages, the ethnic character of culture is nothing more than a marker indicating its spiritual type.
However, while stratification distinguishes its developmental stages, the ethnic character of culture is nothing more than a marker indicating its spiritual type.
However, he argues that although ethnic character and stratification are currently in an antinomic relationship, they must ultimately be transcended through the synthesis of Hegelian dialectics.
If culture in its true sense is originally a product of theoretical reason, it presupposes a universal personality as its corresponding subject
and its developmental trend is oriented towards the world, is it not? The marker that determines the culturality of culture lies in objectivity, rationality, and universality, which have completely departed from human nature. The various forms of expression
are, as seen in myth and language, forms of expression prior to the separation of knowledge and action, where conceptualization lies dormant within symbolism. However, cultural forms, as seen in mathematics and science, are products of intellectual conceptualization after the separation of knowledge and action. While the former forms the subjective aspect of social life as a community bond of life-to-life,
are, as seen in myth and language, forms of expression prior to the separation of knowledge and action, where conceptualization lies dormant within symbolism. However, cultural forms, as seen in mathematics and science, are products of intellectual conceptualization after the separation of knowledge and action. While the former forms the subjective aspect of social life as a community bond of life-to-life,
are, as seen in myth and language, forms of expression prior to the separation of knowledge and action, where conceptualization lies dormant within symbolism. However, cultural forms, as seen in mathematics and science, are products of intellectual conceptualization after the separation of knowledge and action. While the former forms the subjective aspect of social life as a community bond of life-to-life,
are, as seen in myth and language, forms of expression prior to the separation of knowledge and action, where conceptualization lies dormant within symbolism. However, cultural forms, as seen in mathematics and science, are products of intellectual conceptualization after the separation of knowledge and action. While the former forms the subjective aspect of social life as a community bond of life-to-life,
as it forms the subjective aspect of social life as a community bond of life-to-life, it cannot shed the subjectivity attached to life. The latter, however, being constructed through the objectification of intellect, possesses its own objectivity, completely detached from life.
as it forms the subjective aspect of social life as a community bond of life-to-life, it cannot shed the subjectivity attached to life. The latter, however, being constructed through the objectification of intellect, possesses its own objectivity, completely detached from life.
Therefore, culture in its true sense can only be established by presupposing universal personality, that is, general consciousness. And if culture in its true sense presupposes general consciousness, that is, general reason, as its corresponding subject, then it is self-evident that culture, in its essence, requests and aims for worldliness, that is, universality.
Therefore, culture in its true sense can only be established by presupposing universal personality, that is, general consciousness. And if culture in its true sense presupposes general consciousness, that is, general reason, as its corresponding subject, then it is self-evident that culture, in its essence, requests and aims for worldliness, that is, universality.
Therefore, culture in its true sense can only be established by presupposing universal personality, that is, general consciousness. And if culture in its true sense presupposes general consciousness, that is, general reason, as its corresponding subject, then it is self-evident that culture, in its essence, requests and aims for worldliness, that is, universality.
However, universal personality is not concrete personality but general personality, and rational human beings are not concrete human beings but general human beings. That humans are personalities does not mean they are mere puppets of reason but possess emotions and will along with reason. They are not merely abstract beings but historical social beings. (...) It is a generally accepted theory today that the ethnic group belongs to the category of communal society along with the family, and strata belong to the category of interest society along with the individual. The former is formed by the organic principle of absorbing the individual as a part of the social organism, while the latter is constituted by the atomic principle where society is combined as the sum of individuals.
That humans are personalities does not mean they are mere puppets of reason but possess emotions and will along with reason. They are not merely abstract beings but historical social beings. (...) It is a generally accepted theory today that the ethnic group belongs to the category of communal society along with the family, and strata belong to the category of interest society along with the individual. The former is formed by the organic principle of absorbing the individual as a part of the social organism, while the latter is constituted by the atomic principle where society is combined as the sum of individuals.
That humans are personalities does not mean they are mere puppets of reason but possess emotions and will along with reason. They are not merely abstract beings but historical social beings. (...) It is a generally accepted theory today that the ethnic group belongs to the category of communal society along with the family, and strata belong to the category of interest society along with the individual. The former is formed by the organic principle of absorbing the individual as a part of the social organism, while the latter is constituted by the atomic principle where society is combined as the sum of individuals.
It is a generally accepted theory today that the ethnic group belongs to the category of communal society along with the family, and strata belong to the category of interest society along with the individual. The former is formed by the organic principle of absorbing the individual as a part of the social organism, while the latter is constituted by the atomic principle where society is combined as the sum of individuals.
The former is formed by the organic principle of absorbing the individual as a part of the social organism, while the latter is constituted by the atomic principle where society is combined as the sum of individuals.
The former is formed by the organic principle of absorbing the individual as a part of the social organism, while the latter is constituted by the atomic principle where society is combined as the sum of individuals.
In other words, communal society is a totalitarian society based on the principle of direct totality without the mediation of the individual, and interest society is an individualistic society based on the principle of abstract universality mediated by the individual.
In other words, communal society is a totalitarian society based on the principle of direct totality without the mediation of the individual, and interest society is an individualistic society based on the principle of abstract universality mediated by the individual.
In other words, communal society is a totalitarian society based on the principle of direct totality without the mediation of the individual, and interest society is an individualistic society based on the principle of abstract universality mediated by the individual.
This extremely difficult passage can be read in three layers. First, as mentioned earlier, culture is fundamentally universal. This is a cultural principle. At first glance, this might seem like the West's aspiration to transcend specific political entities and aim for global unification, but this is not the case. Rather, it is an argument to identify the difficulties in the formation of specific cultures thus far and to reconstruct them based on universal principles. Second, culture takes two forms. Specific elements like myth and language are "forms of expression" connected to communal life and are strongly subjective. In contrast, elements like mathematics and science are completely detached from humanity and life and possess independent objectivity. Third, however, human culture is not based on universal abstraction completely detached from humanity.
- 100 - Concrete human beings are beings with emotions and will, and therefore humans are products of "universally concrete historicity." The existing principles of social formation were either societies that "absorb individuals into the social organism" or societies constituted by "the arithmetic sum of individuals" based on the "atomic principle." For Seo Insik, both are objects to be transcended. For reference, these two types of societies correspond to Ferdinand Tönnies's Gesellschaft (interest society) and Gemeinschaft (communal/organic society), respectively.
2. Labor as a Mediation of Specificity and Generality, and of Naturalness and Generality
As discussed above, Seo Insik's point of departure focuses on the fact that history, which appears chaotic at first glance, and nature, which is inevitable, possessed different modes of understanding and, furthermore, different structural logics. Seo Insik finds a way to resolve the tension between natural inevitability and historical contingency. To this end, he first discusses how intellect is positioned between naturalness and historicity.100) As is well known, in Marxist social theory, the ideological superstructure and the material substructure have a mutually supportive relationship. In other words, the superstructure, which can be defined as ideology, intellect, and culture, helps maintain the substructure, which includes means of production and relations of production, while the substructure provides the conditions for organizing the superstructure. Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge also explains the process of historical development within this framework.101) The utopias of dreamers imagine a order that transcends the existing order and, through their revolutionary imagination, transcend existing ideologies, but ultimately, the situation repeats where those utopias degenerate back into ideology. Therefore, the realm of intellect is driven through this dialectic in the process of historical development.
Seo Insik is also critical of the Enlightenment's notion of trans-epochal and universally applicable science. He eloquently argues that "the methods and structures of human cognition vary, whether small or large, depending on society, ethnicity, status, and class," and further claims that "the movement of intellect originates from the movement of labor." However, since all intellect is bound by specific modes of labor, he states that "absolutely rational intellect" does not exist. He further argues that while we can share sensibilities with ancient Greeks and Germans, indicating that it is not completely severed by changes in labor modes and epochs, nor is it reducible to complete relativism, rationality is only possessed to the extent that the mode of labor is rational, in the sense that generality is embedded within the epoch.
The reason why the intellect of Aristotle or Kant possesses immortal value even today is because it contains
rationality and generality as intellect. (...) The generality of intellect is directly or indirectly connected to the production process in the substructure of the social system. We can see here that the intellect of Aristotle or Kant, while possessing generality as intellect, also possesses specificity, and while possessing rationality, also possesses irrationality.
rationality and generality as intellect. (...) The generality of intellect is directly or indirectly connected to the production process in the substructure of the social system. We can see here that the intellect of Aristotle or Kant, while possessing generality as intellect, also possesses specificity, and while possessing rationality, also possesses irrationality.
We can see here that the intellect of Aristotle or Kant, while possessing generality as intellect, also possesses specificity, and while possessing rationality, also possesses irrationality.
There is absolutely no irrational intellect, nor is there absolutely rational intellect. A certain mode of labor, on a certain technological foundation, possesses rationality in accordance with the general characteristics of labor, but when the technological foundation changes, it becomes irrational, deviating from the general characteristics of labor.
There is absolutely no irrational intellect, nor is there absolutely rational intellect. A certain mode of labor, on a certain technological foundation, possesses rationality in accordance with the general characteristics of labor, but when the technological foundation changes, it becomes irrational, deviating from the general characteristics of labor.
However, he does not remain within the existing superstructure-substructure framework but transcends this Marxist framework, positioning labor as the ultimate mediator between nature and history. While existing Marxist theory regarded intellect and ideology as derivatives or phenomena organized by the material substructure, Seo Insik delves into the internal interactions of the superstructure. On the one hand, intellect is embedded in the quasi-natural element of the production structure, but on the other hand, historicity is an additional constraint that adjusts the trajectory of intellect's movement. In other words, for Seo Insik, intellect does not float freely like a duckweed but moves within the constraints of nature and historicity. He uses the example of a fisherman to illustrate this.
101) Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, 1936
- 101 - deviates from the general characteristics of labor and becomes irrational.
However, he does not remain within the existing superstructure-substructure framework but transcends this Marxist framework, positioning labor as the ultimate mediator between nature and history. While existing Marxist theory regarded intellect and ideology as derivatives or phenomena organized by the material substructure, Seo Insik delves into the internal interactions of the superstructure. On the one hand, intellect is embedded in the quasi-natural element of the production structure, but on the other hand, historicity is an additional constraint that adjusts the trajectory of intellect's movement. In other words, for Seo Insik, intellect does not float freely like a duckweed but moves within the constraints of nature and historicity. He uses the example of a fisherman to illustrate this.
Human interaction with nature, though motivated by society, cannot help but conform to nature. For example, the motivation for fishing might be to acquire currency for a modern worker, or for self-sufficiency for a medieval peasant, but in either case, one must utilize the habits of fish, that is, the natural properties of the object of labor. Therefore, the greater the extent to which intellect is combined with productive labor, the less it can be seen as constrained by society.
Human interaction with nature, though motivated by society, cannot help but conform to nature. For example, the motivation for fishing might be to acquire currency for a modern worker, or for self-sufficiency for a medieval peasant, but in either case, one must utilize the habits of fish, that is, the natural properties of the object of labor. Therefore, the greater the extent to which intellect is combined with productive labor, the less it can be seen as constrained by society.
Human interaction with nature, though motivated by society, cannot help but conform to nature. For example, the motivation for fishing might be to acquire currency for a modern worker, or for self-sufficiency for a medieval peasant, but in either case, one must utilize the habits of fish, that is, the natural properties of the object of labor. Therefore, the greater the extent to which intellect is combined with productive labor, the less it can be seen as constrained by society.
Therefore, the greater the extent to which intellect is combined with productive labor, the less it can be seen as constrained by society.
Therefore, the greater the extent to which intellect is combined with productive labor, the less it can be seen as constrained by society.
In summary, Seo Insik identifies labor as the mediator in the opposition between naturalness and historicity. Just as the conditions of a fisherman's catch, such as the habits of fish, remain the same, the fisherman's motivation has changed from self-sufficiency in ancient times to acquiring currency due to changes in society and its norms. However, what is the structure of culture, and what is its relationship with labor?
We can see that the naturalness and historicity of culture are expressions of the naturalness and historicity of human existence,
and therefore, it can be seen that they are derived from the historicity and naturalness of productive labor, which combines humans as natural beings and humans as social beings, forming the intersection of these two modes of existence.
and therefore, it can be seen that they are derived from the historicity and naturalness of productive labor, which combines humans as natural beings and humans as social beings, forming the intersection of these two modes of existence.
When the human labor process is viewed as an abstract, natural-historical process that penetrates the entire human process and forms its basis,
When the human labor process is viewed as an abstract, natural-historical process that penetrates the entire human process and forms its basis, civilization corresponds to it. Conversely,
When the human labor process is viewed as an abstract, natural-historical process that penetrates the entire human process and forms its basis, civilization corresponds to it. Conversely, when the human labor process is viewed as a concrete, socio-historical process where production methods differ according to individual social forms, culture corresponds to it.
When the human labor process is viewed as an abstract, natural-historical process that penetrates the entire human process and forms its basis, civilization corresponds to it. Conversely, when the human labor process is viewed as a concrete, socio-historical process where production methods differ according to individual social forms, culture corresponds to it.
Seo Insik concludes: Intellect is embedded in labor, and labor mediates naturalness and historicity. Nevertheless, intellect possesses internal rationality within a specific mode of production. If we compare this to the whole and the particular, both natural totality and historical particularity gain existential significance simultaneously. However, on the other hand, the mode of operation of culture is the embodiment of civilization into the norms of that society. Nevertheless, for culture to persist as culture, it must embody the generality of civilization to survive as culture. It is precisely in this dynamic of generality and specificity that Seo Insik's critique of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and his vision for a way in which the particular and the whole can coexist can be understood.
- 102 - 3. From the Logic of Nothingness to the Logic of Multiplicity: Beyond the Framework of the Particular versus the Whole
Seo Insik's philosophy of history follows the dialectical development pattern of Hegel-Marx. It is a logic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, where labor resolves the antinomy between naturalness and historicity. To elaborate, the principle of naturalness and the principle of historicity are both true but are in a state of mutual tension. On the one hand, humans are located within material constraints and thus follow the principle of naturalness: "Human behavior is determined by the material environment" (thesis). On the other hand, humans are not mere natural objects but beings shaped by culture, institutions, etc., and thus also follow the principle of historicity: "Humans make history" (antithesis). The element that resolves these two conflicting and contradictory principles is labor (synthesis).
Specifically, how was Seo Insik's philosophy of history, which he envisioned for the future horizon of the 1940s, conceived through dialectics? Seo Insik identifies liberalism and totalitarianism as two enemies. If liberalism lacks stratification despite having worldliness, totalitarianism proceeds by negating worldliness by subordinating stratified culture, which unifies the world, to nationalism, a regional culture.
If we call the traditional view of history in liberalism the history of humanity, and the view of history in socialism the history of class,
can the view of history in totalitarianism be called the history of race or the history of ethnicity?
(...) The 'whole before the part' that totalitarianism speaks of is, to the end, the nation and the state that represents it.
102)
Although he does not list Japan alongside the Nazis and Italy as an example of a fascist regime here, his concern for Japan can be found in the following passage.
Today, many people place the world-historical task of modern Japan in liberating the East from the West.
However, the liberation of the East from the West does not in itself constitute world-historical significance. The liberation of the East from the West, as a mere fact, is no different from the fact of the subjugation of the East to the West; it is merely a fact of rise and fall.
However, if the liberation of the East can be sustained in inner connection with the modern task of world history, it can, of course, have world-historical significance.
Furthermore, if one penetrates the inner structural connections of world history today, anyone can connect it with the problem of capitalism in practice.
103)
In Seo In-sik's view, the two ideologies that appear to be in opposition at first glance—or, in Seo In-sik's expression, 'historical culture'—were fundamentally similar in their basic structure. Both totalitarian culture and liberal culture placed the nation as the unit of cultural formation. The difference, however, was that totalitarianism was a nationalist culture prioritizing the nation, while liberalism was a problematic individualist culture prioritizing the individual. Seo In-sik stated, 'Liberalism establishes the individual as a general personality (...) and understands the nation as a mere arithmetic sum of individuals, whereas totalitarianism establishes the nation as an indivisible organic entity and views the individual as merely a limb that can only exist through the mediation of the nation-state.'
Thus, liberalism and totalitarianism, which were formerly universalistic, became differentiated into the particular culture of the nation, failing to achieve their respective goals. Seo In-sik's proposed solution was to shift from nationality to stratification. This stratified culture would ultimately overcome the limitations of individual cultures and function as a stage for the birth of a universalistic world civilization.
102) Seo In-sik Collected Works, Vol. 1, History and Culture, "Totalitarian View of History," pp. 165, 166, Yeorak, 2006. 103) Ibid. "The Task of Modernity (2)," p. 150.
- 103 - ism is the individual as general personality (...) and the nation is understood as a mere arithmetic sum of individuals, but totalitarianism establishes the nation as an indivisible organic entity and views the individual as merely a limb that can only exist through the mediation of the nation-state.' Thus, liberalism and totalitarianism, which were formerly universalistic, became differentiated into the particular culture of the nation, failing to achieve their respective goals. Seo In-sik's proposed solution was to shift from nationality to stratification. This stratified culture would ultimately overcome the limitations of individual cultures and function as a stage for the birth of a universalistic world civilization.
Therefore, for Seo In-sik, stratification is the intermediary that connects to worldliness. From the perspectives of the individual and the whole, Seo In-sik's problematic consciousness can be seen as aligning with Nishida Kitaro. He too pondered the mediation between the whole and the individual. His 'whole' was not merely a multitude but became complete only by including the periphery, which corresponds to blind spots. Accordingly, rather than absolute nothingness, which is too universal and unifies everything within the same experience by eliminating the boundary between subject and object, he chose to move toward the whole while preserving the individual. He recognized that the advent of socialism was imminent for the attainment of worldliness and perceived stratification, which possesses this global universality, as the mediator that could connect the individual and the whole. While Tanabe Hajime and the theory of overcoming modernity defined the nation-state, which is the species driving historical modernity, as the mediator connecting 'the whole' and 'the individual,' for Seo In-sik, the mediator is 'stratification.'
The fact that historical present, in any of its typical periods, is a chaotic arena of various possibilities means that various potential futures are included in the present either in parallel or in opposition.
Therefore, the historical present must be viewed not as univocal and multidirectional, but rather as polysemous and multidirectional.
And the various possibilities that the historical present suggests in its tendency toward the future are, in terms of their existential connections, based on the social strata constituting 'modern history' and manifest as their 'ideology'; in terms of their semantic connections, they are based on the cultural strata of historical periods embedded in modern history and manifest as new 'myths' or 'utopias' through their diverse new combinations.
Concrete culture has always been stratified culture. In this sense, stratification can be said to mediate between nation and world, nature and idea in history.
And if a society of interest, in terms of its ideology, demands universal individuality, but in terms of its existence possesses a stratified composition, then in terms of world structure, it demands an atomic world where everywhere can be the center, but in reality, it cannot avoid a relationship of domination and subordination between center and periphery.
Culture, by its nature, has no borders. The free exchange between individuals and between nations forms culture, but politics does not permit multiple centers.
104) Ibid. "Types and Stages of Culture," p. 218.
However, it cannot be a simple communal society. A simple communal society is a world based on direct total labor and based on the principle of direct totality, but this requires the principle of mediated totality, which is based on mediated total labor, and while it precedes the individual, it is also mediated by the individual.
A simple communal society is a total society without individuals, and a simple society of interest is a combination of individuals without a totality; in contrast, this demands a totality mediated by the individual, and an individual mediated by the totality.
104) Ibid. "Types and Stages of Culture," p. 218.
This stratification was not merely a theoretical tool for achieving the ideal of concrete culture but was directly linked to the happiness of its actual members. Seo In-sik posits the happiness of the individual as a prerequisite for the existence of the whole.
The unity of the human and society, immanence and transcendence, is possible only in a place where immanence is transcendence and transcendence is immanence, and where the individual is society and society is the individual.
Only in a world where the many are the one and the one is the many, and where the happiness of one person presupposes the happiness of all and the happiness of all is the happiness of one person, can the conflicting dual aspects of modern humanity be resolved into a new unity.
105) Cha Seung-ki and Jeong Jong-hyun, Seo In-sik Collected Works, Newspapers and Magazines, "Anatomy of World War II," p. 84, Yeorak, 2006.
Thus, for him, the symbiotic relationship between the individual and the whole had to be a prerequisite. Did Seo In-sik then believe that Japan had the capacity to create such an order? Seo In-sik argued that the decline of European civilization was a foregone conclusion, and 'it is conceivable that the repeated internecine conflicts among the European powers will hasten their demise. Thus, they have repeatedly narrowly averted crises by making concessions whenever they faced the threat of war.'
In other words, the diagnosis that World War II was inevitable and that the order based on the balance of power in Europe had reached its limit and demanded a new order is identical to that of the theory of overcoming modernity. Of course, he opposes the assertion that Japan should be the subject constructing this new order. To predict the new order thereafter, he attempts to schematically explain the developmental process of European civilization and find the cause of Europe's collapse therein. This part is almost identical to Koyama Iwao's discussion. Modern society arose from the retreat of God in the Middle Ages, and the mechanistic worldview was bound to arise subsequently. 'What can be produced by individuals is not given as an absolute necessity independent of their will. The transformation of society into an automatic mechanism means that humans have fallen from the position of subject to that of a scarecrow.'
In other words, while Koyama Iwao speaks of a spiritual crisis as a reality, Japan lacks the practical capacity to carry out such a task, and its intellectual resources are also insufficient.
Where should we look for the principle to overcome the confusion of the present age? Some might seek the spiritual basis for the revival of the East in Eastern principles. However, the metaphysical world of the East, while it may serve as a refuge for a weary spirit, is not yet capable of providing the weapons to organize the complex reality. The principle for the revival of Europe must be sought within Europe. (...) In other words, if the breakdown of modern Europe lies in society, created by humans, transforming into an automatic machine that has transcended humanity, then its salvation must come from a principle that can re-internalize the society that has transcended humanity.
104) Ibid. "Types and Stages of Culture," p. 218.
- 104 - Furthermore, he points out that Japan's proposed task, the confrontation between East and West, is merely a mythos, an external issue, and proposes a periodization based on Marxism.
What, then, is the temporal content of world-historical modernity? It was (...) capitalism as the principle of the world. (...) If the modern task of world history is the problem of capitalism, then his modern task was the problem of Fordism. (...) The theory of East Asian cooperation, advocated today as an ideological principle, is discussed as a mere East Asian mythos.106)
106) Ibid. p. 152.
IV. Conclusion
This paper examined the theory of overcoming modernity, the problematic consciousness of modernity highlighted by Seo In-sik, and the historical-philosophical conception proposed to overcome modernity. The core issue faced by the Kyoto School was that European modernity, which Japan had actively imitated and imported since the Meiji Restoration, had gradually begun to reveal its internal contradictions. Therefore, their work proceeded in two directions. On the one hand, it was a task of 'purifying' modernity's essence, which had permeated the depths of the Japanese spirit, to prevent Japanese society from collapsing due to it. On the other hand, it was to seek a response to the unprecedented level of worldliness produced by European-centered globalization. Furthermore, according to the participants in the roundtable discussion, the contradictions inherent in the European spirit ultimately led to moral decay by giving rise to an individualistic and passive human image. In addition, although the theory of overcoming modernity roundtable discussion noted that European modernity began to unfold around the Renaissance, it emphasized that the object to be fundamentally overcome was the very structure of European history. As Koyama Iwao stressed, history, which advances by negating the self-contradiction of substantial being, was the inevitable outcome of the European spiritual structure originating from ancient Greece. Therefore, Japan argued that it could only terminate this cyclical pattern through the philosophy of Eastern nothingness, contrasted with Western being. As a prerequisite for carrying out this world-historical mission, moral vitality was required, and the participants in the roundtable discussion asserted that Japan was the only nation possessing such moral vitality. As the theory of overcoming modernity thus culminated in a nationalistic conclusion, the concept of 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' was ultimately produced as a unique spatial concept. The total war system brought about by the Pacific War demanded new methods of spatial operation, and the theory of overcoming modernity eloquently argued that Japan, possessing spiritual superiority, should lead and organize the neighboring countries.
On the other hand, Seo In-sik read nature, implying universality, and history, implying particularity, as antinomies in Hegelian dialectics that must be overcome. Other pairs of opposites, such as nation and world, whole and individual, communal society and society of interest, were all derived from this fundamental opposition. Seo In-sik perceived the Sino-Japanese War as a significant event heralding a new world-historical change. He viewed the 'cooperativism' and 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' proposed by Japanese intellectuals to imbue this new era with world-historical meaning as limited solutions that, while professing to overcome, fundamentally failed to resolve the aforementioned antinomies. For him, the most fundamental issue of the time was the opposition between the universal and the particular, and the contradictions of capitalism manifested as its symptoms. As a colonial socialist intellectual, he was dissatisfied with the situation where the subjectivity of the periphery was sacrificed by the center, but it is evident from his writings that he was not free from the irresistible charm of universalism. Moreover, he anticipated the imminent advent of a stratified worldliness mediated by the integration of labor modes and pondered the position that particularity could occupy within it. In this context, his conclusion was that for the whole to be sustainable, this fundamental contradiction must be resolved: the problem of maintaining particularity, which is constituted by the laws of the universal but not reducible to them. In short, he sought to expose the contradiction of the theory of overcoming modernity, which assimilates the individual into the whole, by positing the individual as a prerequisite for the establishment of the whole.
105) Cha Seung-ki and Jeong Jong-hyun, Seo In-sik Collected Works, Newspapers and Magazines, "Anatomy of World War II," p. 84, Yeorak, 2006.
- 107 - [References]
Materials related to the Kyoto School and the Theory of Overcoming Modernity
l Huh Woo-sung, The Two Faces of Modern Japan: Nishida's Philosophy, 2000
l Nakamura Mitsuo, Nishitani Keiji, Ideology of the Pacific War – Origins of the Japanese Spirit. "World History
l
l
l
105) Cha Seung-ki and Jeong Jong-hyun, Seo In-sik Collected Works, Newspapers and Magazines, "Anatomy of World War II," p. 84, Yeorak, 2006.
- 105 - Furthermore, he points out that Japan's proposed task, the confrontation between East and West, is merely a mythos, an external issue, and proposes a periodization based on Marxism.
What, then, is the temporal content of world-historical modernity? It was (...) capitalism as the principle of the world. (...) If the modern task of world history is the problem of capitalism, then his modern task was the problem of Fordism. (...) The theory of East Asian cooperation, advocated today as an ideological principle, is discussed as a mere East Asian mythos.106)
106) Ibid. p. 152.
IV. Conclusion
This paper examined the theory of overcoming modernity, the problematic consciousness of modernity highlighted by Seo In-sik, and the historical-philosophical conception proposed to overcome modernity. The core issue faced by the Kyoto School was that European modernity, which Japan had actively imitated and imported since the Meiji Restoration, had gradually begun to reveal its internal contradictions. Therefore, their work proceeded in two directions. On the one hand, it was a task of 'purifying' modernity's essence, which had permeated the depths of the Japanese spirit, to prevent Japanese society from collapsing due to it. On the other hand, it was to seek a response to the unprecedented level of worldliness produced by European-centered globalization. Furthermore, according to the participants in the roundtable discussion, the contradictions inherent in the European spirit ultimately led to moral decay by giving rise to an individualistic and passive human image. In addition, although the theory of overcoming modernity roundtable discussion noted that European modernity began to unfold around the Renaissance, it emphasized that the object to be fundamentally overcome was the very structure of European history. As Koyama Iwao stressed, history, which advances by negating the self-contradiction of substantial being, was the inevitable outcome of the European spiritual structure originating from ancient Greece. Therefore, Japan argued that it could only terminate this cyclical pattern through the philosophy of Eastern nothingness, contrasted with Western being. As a prerequisite for carrying out this world-historical mission, moral vitality was required, and the participants in the roundtable discussion asserted that Japan was the only nation possessing such moral vitality. As the theory of overcoming modernity thus culminated in a nationalistic conclusion, the concept of 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' was ultimately produced as a unique spatial concept. The total war system brought about by the Pacific War demanded new methods of spatial operation, and the theory of overcoming modernity eloquently argued that Japan, possessing spiritual superiority, should lead and organize the neighboring countries.
On the other hand, Seo In-sik read nature, implying universality, and history, implying particularity, as antinomies in Hegelian dialectics that must be overcome. Other pairs of opposites, such as nation and world, whole and individual, communal society and society of interest, were all derived from this fundamental opposition. Seo In-sik perceived the Sino-Japanese War as a significant event heralding a new world-historical change. He viewed the 'cooperativism' and 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' proposed by Japanese intellectuals to imbue this new era with world-historical meaning as limited solutions that, while professing to overcome, fundamentally failed to resolve the aforementioned antinomies. For him, the most fundamental issue of the time was the opposition between the universal and the particular, and the contradictions of capitalism manifested as its symptoms. As a colonial socialist intellectual, he was dissatisfied with the situation where the subjectivity of the periphery was sacrificed by the center, but it is evident from his writings that he was not free from the irresistible charm of universalism. Moreover, he anticipated the imminent advent of a stratified worldliness mediated by the integration of labor modes and pondered the position that particularity could occupy within it. In this context, his conclusion was that for the whole to be sustainable, this fundamental contradiction must be resolved: the problem of maintaining particularity, which is constituted by the laws of the universal but not reducible to them. In short, he sought to expose the contradiction of the theory of overcoming modernity, which assimilates the individual into the whole, by positing the individual as a prerequisite for the establishment of the whole.
106) Ibid. p. 152.
- 106 - [References]
Kyoto School and Theory of Overcoming Modernity Related Materials
l Huh Woo-sung, The Two Faces of Modern Japan: Nishida's Philosophy, 2000
l Nakamura Mitsuo, Nishitani Keiji, Ideology of the Pacific War – Origins of the Japanese Spirit. "World History
l
l
After this, Western recognition draws attention to the fact that each particular culture is fundamentally grounded in the universal principles of historical development.
99) For the meanings of "denjo" and "chonin," refer to Hong Jong-wook, Colonial/Modern Transcendence Research Group (2017).
Eumsa, 2003
l Heisig, James W., Philosophers of Nothingness : An Essay on the Kyoto
School, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001
85) Leopold von Ranke (Georg G. Iggers ed.), "Chapter 7: The Great Powers" in The Theory and Practice of History, 1833.
98) Collected Works of Western Recognition, History and Culture, "Types and Stages of Culture," Yeoknak, 2006
l Sugawara Jun, "Kōyama Iwao's Philosophy of World History: Discussions with
Suzuki Shigetaka" in Sugawara Jun, Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 4: Facing
the 21st Century, Nanzan Institute for Religion & Culture, pp.176-194, 2009 l Chang In-seong, "World History and the Transcendental Subject: Koyama Iwao's Philosophy of History and Critique of Modernity," Japanese Review,
19, 272–307, 2018
l Kim Tae-jin, "The Meaning of 'Moral Life Force' in the Overcoming Modernity Theory - The Encounter between Life and Sovereignty," Japanese Studies (Ilbonhak),
52(0), 52, 89–116, 2020
l Christian Uhl, "What was the 'Japanese philosophy of history'? An inquiry into
the dynamics of the 'world historical standpoint' of the Kyoto School", in
Christopher Goto-Jones ed, Re-Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy,
Routledge, 2007
Japanese IR and the Contemporary Implications of the Kyoto School
l Thuy T. Do, "Between East and West: Japanese IR at a crossroads", The Pacific
Review, 2020
l Kosuke Shimizu, The Kyoto School and International Relations - Non-Western
Attempts for a New World Order, 2022
l Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An introduction to the Sociology of
Knowledge, 1936
Materials Related to Seo In-sik
l Hong Jong-wook, Colonial/Overcoming Modernity Study Group, The Overcoming Modernity Theory of a Colonial Intellectual, Seoul National University Press & Culture Foundation, 2017
l Cha Seung-gi, Jeong Jong-hyeon, Seo In-sik Collected Works I, History and Culture, Yeokrak, 2006 l Cha Seung-gi, Jeong Jong-hyeon, Seo In-sik Collected Works II, Newspaper and Magazine Articles, Yeokrak, 2006
- 108 - 9, 43-71, 2008
l Cho Gwan-ja, "The Possibility of World History and <My Destiny>: Seo In-sik's Philosophy of History and the Kyoto School," Japanese Studies,
- 108 - 9, 43-71, 2008
87) Leopold von Ranke (Georg G. Iggers ed.), “Chapter 7: The Great Powers” in The theory and practice of history, 1833.
Kyushu is too large, so traveling by taxi is burdensome, and bus or public transportation costs are also considerable. Especially because the airport limousine bus connects Fukuoka Airport directly to hotels in the city center, we did not rent a vehicle on the first day. I purchased the Fukuoka Airport-to-city bus ticket directly at the airport, but I understand that the 23rd group booked in advance via https://www.highwaybus.com/gp/index. We were a total of six people (including the professor). Because the difference between public transportation fares and taxi costs was not large, we chose to travel by two taxis as needed each time. After finishing our visits, we either hailed a taxi directly on the street or used Uber. If there is a faster way to catch a taxi (a local app?), it might be a good idea to look into it in advance. For chartering a bus, we used Kyukyu International Travel (https://qqtour.com/en/japan/van-6/). Our bus driver spoke only Japanese, but this may vary from driver to driver. Since a detailed itinerary is required in advance to receive a bus quote, we recommend drafting the travel plan early and contacting the company. The basic reservation time for the van was 8 hours per day (from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.), with an additional charge of roughly 5,000 yen per hour. Therefore, it would be wise to factor this in when planning the budget and schedule.
Expense Settlement Method
We used two methods: a Kakao Bank group account (joint account) and settlement after using personal cards. In the case of Kakao Bank, the bus reservation fee was divided by the number of people (1/N), and EAI deposited the professor's travel expenses into the group account. For remaining local daily expenses, one student paid in advance and we split it N ways after the trip. However, this required reorganizing the entire budget again after the trip, so I think it would be more convenient to deposit the travel expenses into the group account from the start and pay with a check card.
Other Tips
l It is advisable to register for Visit Japan Web and eSIM/roaming before departure.
l We checked ratings on Tabelog (https://tabelog.com/kr/) and Google before making restaurant reservations.
l During free time, we visited Don Quijote and the Tenjin Underground Shopping Area, both of which have many things to see, so we recommend them.
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*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.