17th Century Dutch Merchants and the Tokugawa Shogunate: A Trade of Fear

The Young Men of the Sarangbang Wandering in Search of True Scenery: The Young Men of the Sarangbang Embracing Kyushu

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Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: May 18, 2026

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Kwon Sung-jun

Department of Political Science and International Relations, Yonsei University

I. Introduction

1. Statement of the Problem The relationship between 17th-century Dutch merchants and the Japanese Tokugawa Shogunate is arguably one of the most fascinating cases in early modern East Asian diplomatic history. Since the Dutch East India Company (VOC, Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) first set foot in Hirado in 1609, the Dutch have occupied a unique position in Japan. While academic circles offer differing interpretations of this dynamic, some emphasizing the 'domestication' of the Dutch and others the 'absolute superiority of Japan,' neither perspective adequately explains the 'necessity' and 'fear' that Japan held for the Dutch. This study seeks to overcome these limitations by examining the Deshima Diaries (1633-1660). Specifically, by analyzing the repeated Japanese officials' inquiries about the 'decrease in raw silk imports' recorded in the diaries, this paper argues that the relationship between 17th-century Dutch merchants and the Tokugawa Shogunate was not merely a 'subordination through hierarchy' nor an 'absolute superiority of Japan,' but rather a case of 'institutionalization of mutual dependence' where mutual fear and necessity became institutionally entrenched.

To elucidate the relationship between 17th-century Dutch merchants and the Tokugawa Shogunate of Japan, this study poses four core questions. First, how did the spatial perception of the Dutch in the 17th century form and drive a continuous outward expansionism beyond their national borders? While existing studies treat the construction of the Dutch maritime empire as a historical inevitability, they have not paid sufficient attention to the individual and concrete spatial perceptions of merchants—the horizon within which they made judgments and the thoughts they harbored daily. Second, why did Dutch merchants refer to the Shogun as "Your Majesty Emperor" and claim to be subjects, and why did this form of address persist not only in official VOC documents but also in private diaries? Third, why did Japan, while pursuing a policy of seclusion, continue to welcome foreign merchants, and moreover, why did Japan, despite being the world's largest silver producer at the time, not consider expanding outwards on its own? Finally, what was the ultimate view of the 17th-century Dutch towards Japan?

- 40 - 2. Literature Review Adam Clulow's The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch encounter with Tokugawa Japan (2014) argues that while the Dutch were politically 'subordinated' to the Shogunate, they maintained a monopoly as the sole European traders in Japan, thus preserving their economic dominance. Clulow substantiates this claim through three stages. First, he views the 1627 Pieter Nuyts envoy incident as the first 'strategic retreat' for the Dutch. Nuyts attempted to meet the Shogun in Edo but faced strong resistance from Inoue Masashige and was ultimately forced to withdraw. The second stage involves the 1638 Shimabara Rebellion. Facing the largest peasant uprising in Japan's Edo period, which occurred in southern Kyushu from December 17, 1637, to April 15, 1638, the Tokugawa Shogunate ordered the Dutch to attack Portuguese ships during the suppression of the rebellion. The Dutch complied, bombarding Portuguese vessels. Clulow interprets this as voluntary military cooperation by the Dutch, signifying that the VOC had become 'an instrument of Japan.' The third stage is the forced relocation of the VOC factory from Hirado to Dejima in 1641. Clulow argues that this forced relocation symbolizes the Dutch transition from being Japan's 'diplomatic and commercial partner' to a 'controlled entity.' He further contends that through this process of domestication, the VOC became economically stronger. After the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639, the Dutch became the sole European power mediating trade between Japan and China, securing continuous high profits through their monopoly. Clulow terms this 'The Domesticated Monopolist.'

Meanwhile, Ron Toby, in State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan (1991), presents a completely different interpretation. According to Toby, Tokugawa Japan in the 17th century established a 'Japan-centered diplomatic order,' and all countries trading with Japan, including the Netherlands, were part of this order. Toby argues that the policy of seclusion originated entirely from Japan's own volition. The reason Portugal and Spain were perceived as threats by the Tokugawa Shogunate was not their military power but their propagation of Christianity; the Shogunate decided to expel Christianity and subsequently expelled the Portuguese and Spanish. Toby attributes the survival of the Dutch in Japan to their 'usefulness.' The Dutch presence in Japan, serving as a source of information about the outside world, a conduit for silver exports, and a mediator of trade with China, was a result of Japan's 'choice,' not its 'necessity,' according to Toby. Toby also asserts Japan's absolute superiority over the West, arguing that the Dutch being confined to prison-like accommodations, forbidden from free movement, and required to bow before the Shogun demonstrated Japan's absolute power.

- 41 - Japanese scholar Yuko Shimizu, in Kinsei Nihon to Ruson—'Sakoku' Keiseishi Saikō (Early Modern Japan and Luzon—Rethinking the History of the Formation of 'Seclusion'), re-examines early modern foreign relations from the perspective of Christian proselytization and intercultural exchange. Unlike Clulow or Toby, Shimizu's approach analyzes not only the post-'seclusion' period but also the process of forming the seclusion policy itself as an interaction between Japan's political decision-making and the imperial expansionist logic of Spain and Portugal. She points out that the term 'seclusion' itself is a later historical interpretation, emphasizing that the Tokugawa Shogunate very precisely selected and controlled its diplomatic partners. However, her discussion did not extend to the perspectives of the Dutch or the actions of the VOC.

While Clulow demonstrated the simultaneity of Dutch political subordination and economic monopoly, and Toby asserted Japan's agency and absolute superiority, both arguments have limitations. First, they fail to explain the specific reasons for Japan's 'need' for the Dutch. Clulow explains 'why Japan did not expel the Dutch but embraced them,' but this is a superficial explanation. Toby emphasizes Japan's 'choice,' but this is also not a complete explanation. The Deshima Diaries present a more complex situation. Furthermore, neither author adequately analyzes the 'anxiety' of Japanese officials recorded in the Deshima Diaries. The repeated questions from officials in the Deshima Diaries about 'why less silk arrived' cannot be dismissed as mere threats; they should be seen as expressions of the desperate anxiety of Japanese officials.

Clulow also emphasized the Dutch fear, interpreting the fear experienced by the Dutch by pointing to Japan's uncertain power, unpredictable punishments, and restrictions on freedom. However, Japan can also be seen as having felt a degree of 'fear.' The statement from 1644, 'If the Dutch were to leave, the economic situation would become unbearable,' suggests that neither scholar fully captured the structure of the relationship created by bidirectional fear.

This study aims to contribute by addressing the aforementioned limitations in the following ways. First, by analyzing the Deshima Diaries, it seeks to confirm how Japan's 'necessity' was concretely structured. Specifically, by analyzing the issues of silk supply, price increases, and the tone and context of repeated questions, it aims to show that these were not mere 'threats' but expressions of 'desperate anxiety.' Second, it will analyze the dual function of the rituals of 'hofreis'1) and Edo jo-hyeon-sik2). Ostensibly, these rituals symbolize the Dutch 'subordination' as described by Clulow, but they also served a political function of excluding other Europeans. Finally, it proposes a new concept, 'the institutionalization of mutual dependence,' created by bidirectional fear. This offers a different level of analysis compared to Clulow's 'domestication' and Toby's 'absolute superiority of Japan.'

1) A ceremonial journey undertaken by the VOC factory chief to the Shogun's palace in Edo.

2) A ceremony during the hofreis in Edo where the envoy respectfully approaches the Shogun (entering the palace, bowing, presenting gifts, and departing).

- 42 - II. Dutch Spatial Perception and Expansion: The Logic of the State-Corporation Nexus

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In the early 17th century, a world map shows the Netherlands located in the low-lying regions of Northwestern Europe. Situated in the Rhein-Meuse Delta3), the Netherlands possessed geographical conditions optimized for maritime activities and riverine trade, characterized by extensive wetlands, canals, and dikes.4) It is noteworthy that the Netherlands was both a coastal nation and a land-based country connected to continental Europe. Its land base provided direct access to the economic networks of the European continent, while its coastal nature offered a foundation for maritime expansion across the Atlantic and the North Sea. These geographical conditions enabled it to act as an intermediary for both maritime and continental trade, a fundamentally different starting point compared to island nations like Japan. Nevertheless, examining a world map from the early 17th century, the geographical conditions of the Netherlands and Japan appear superficially similar. Both possessed geographical conditions suitable for maritime activities and had strong naval capabilities. However, by the 18th century, the Netherlands had become the center of global maritime trade, leveraging its continental European economic network, while Japan, under the policies of the Tokugawa Shogunate, did not venture beyond its islands.5)

Looking at a world map in the early 17th century, the Netherlands can be seen located in the lowlands of Northwestern Europe. Situated in the Rhein-Meuse Delta region, the Netherlands, with its vast wetlands, canals, and dikes, possessed geographical conditions optimized for maritime activities and waterway trade. What is noteworthy is that the Netherlands was both a coastal nation and a land-based country connected to the European continent. The foundation on land provided opportunities for direct access to the European continent's economic network, while its status as a coastal nation provided a base for maritime expansion through the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea. These geographical conditions enabled it to act as an intermediary for maritime and continental trade, serving as a fundamental point of departure distinct from Japan, an isolated island nation. Nevertheless, examining a world map in the early 17th century, the geographical conditions of the Netherlands and Japan appear similar at first glance. Both possessed geographical conditions suitable for maritime activities and were equipped with powerful naval forces. However, by the 18th century, the Netherlands had become the center of global maritime trade based on the economic network of the European continent, while Japan, under the policies of the Tokugawa Shogunate, did not venture beyond its islands.

Why did the trajectories of these two countries differ so greatly despite similar geographical conditions? This question cannot be answered by simply citing 'trade.' Trade is fundamental to any society with merchants, and Japan also engaged in trade, albeit limited. To understand the active external expansion of the Netherlands, one must understand the spatial perceptions of the Dutch, the political and economic structures that underpinned them, and the unique historical conditions created by war.6) The external expansion of the Netherlands was not based on geographical superiority but was a strategic choice made under pressure from the political-economic structure rooted in the European continent and the religious wars.

1. The Eighty Years' War and the Escape to the Sea To understand the external expansion of the Netherlands, one must first understand the historical event of the Eighty Years' War (1652–1648)7), which began in 1568. The Eighty Years' War was not merely a religious or independence war; it was a resistance against increasingly centralized state power and an event that gave birth to a new form of state.

3) Commonly referred to as the Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt delta, including the Scheldt River. 4) Encyclopedia Britannica. n.d. “Netherlands.” https://www.britannica.com/place/Netherlands (accessed December 5, 2025).

https://www.britannica.com/place/Netherlands (accessed December 5, 2025).

5) Tonio Andrade, How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization

in the Seventeenth Century (Columbia University Press, 2005).; The Tokugawa Shogunate implemented a policy of seclusion (鎖國) from the mid-17th century onwards, severely restricting contact with the outside world. In 1639, it expelled the Portuguese, and the Dutch were confined to the island of Dejima in Nagasaki.

mid-17th century onwards, severely restricting contact with the outside world. In 1639, it expelled the Portuguese, and the Dutch were confined to the island of Dejima in Nagasaki.

expelled Portugal and confined the Dutch to the island of Dejima in Nagasaki.

6) Israel, Jonathan. 1995. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806.

Oxford University Press

7) Also known as the Dutch Revolt.

- 43 - In 1556, the Habsburg dynasty of Spain came to rule the Netherlands, and the cities and provincial nobles of the Low Countries began to face pressure from centralized royal power.8) Philip II sought to apply the model of Spanish absolutism to the Netherlands. High taxes, the pursuit of religious uniformity, and the deprivation of local autonomy provoked resistance from Dutch cities and provincial nobles, which manifested in the Iconoclastic Fury of 1566.9) Two years later, in 1568, an armed rebellion began under the leadership of William the Silent, Prince of Orange.10) The early stages of the armed rebellion were not favorable. The Spanish army under the Duke of Parma overwhelmed the rebels, and by 1585, the Spanish forces had retaken almost all of the southern Netherlands.11) Major cities such as Brussels and Antwerp fell into Spanish hands. The seven northern provinces (Seven United Provinces) continued to resist, but the situation was not favorable.12) One of the reasons the northern Netherlands was able to achieve independence in this situation was due to the 'sea.' While the Spanish military was superior to the Dutch in land operations, the Dutch surpassed the Spanish in naval power.

Ultimately, the reason the Spanish Empire could not completely conquer the Netherlands was that the Dutch could "escape by sea."13) When the Spanish Armada was defeated by the English in 1588, Dutch independence was effectively secured. The defeat of the Armada signified not only a reduction in Spanish military power but also that the sea could be both a 'space of escape' and a 'space of power projection.'

In 1581, Dutch cities issued the "Act of Abjuration"14), renouncing their allegiance to King Philip II of Spain. This was more than a mere political statement; it was a spatial redefinition of the Netherlands, declaring that it was no longer 'part' of the Spanish Empire and was now an independent republic. The state of independence was not stable. Spain continued to control the southern Netherlands, and the northern republic also faced periods of existential threat. This continued until the signing of the Twelve Years' Truce (1609-1621).

8) Israel, Jonathan. 1995. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806.

Oxford University Press.

9) Discovering Belgium. 2020. “1566 Iconoclasm – When Belgium's Churches Were

Attacked.” https://www.discoveringbelgium.com/1566-iconoclasm/ (accessed December 10, 2025).

10) Motley, John Lothrop. 1855. The Rise of the Dutch Republic: A History. Vol. 1. New

York: Harper & Brothers.

11) Israel, Jonathan. 1995. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806.

Oxford University Press.

12) ibid.

13) Van Duzer, Chet. 2013. Sea Monsters on Medieval and Renaissance Maps. London:

British Library.

14) Act of Abjuration (Plakkaat van Verlatinge)

- 44 - 2. Specificity of State Structure15)

Although the Dutch Republic declared independence in 1581, it was a loose confederation rather than a territorial state with a strong central government. The seven provinces—Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, Groningen, and Friesland—each possessed its own autonomy, and decisions at the federal level were made by the States General, an assembly of these provinces. However, the authority of the States General was not strong, and each province could reverse previous decisions and reject decisions of the States General at any time.

When the Dutch Republic declared independence in 1581, it was a loose confederation, not a territorial state with a strong central government. The Seven United Provinces each maintained their autonomy, and cities within each province also held considerable self-governance. Each province had its own States, and the States General (the government of the United Provinces), an assembly of these States, made decisions at the federal level. However, this state apparatus was very weak. Each province could reverse its decisions at any time and reject decisions of the States General without its consent. Furthermore, the core of this state structure lay not in the 'provinces' but in the 'cities.' The Dutch Republic was a union of city-states, and major cities like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Utrecht wielded actual power. These cities were run by self-governing bodies called regents (rulers), composed of merchants and citizens, and these regents were not nobles. Considering that power in other European countries resided with the nobility, the Dutch Republic was, in the literal sense of the word 'republic,' a republic of merchants.

This political structure was advantageous for overseas expansion compared to other countries. The cities had a strong incentive to protect and support their merchants, and since there was no royal authority seeking territorial expansion, the regents of each city could focus on supporting the trade expansion of their merchants. Moreover, the city-based power structure enabled faster decision-making. In a centralized state, numerous bureaucratic procedures, including royal approval, would be required, whereas in the Netherlands, the Amsterdam city council could directly approve shipbuilding funds and negotiate directly with merchants. This offered a significant advantage in terms of efficiency compared to centralized states. Furthermore, considering the multiple cities within the Dutch Republic, risk diversification was possible, allowing other cities to attempt different approaches if one city's expedition failed. The possibility of such diverse attempts meant that the Netherlands did not have to rely on a single centralized strategy like Portugal, but could pursue multiple strategies simultaneously.

15) Data on the specific structure of the Dutch state is referenced from Israel, Jonathan. 1995. The Dutch

Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- 45 - 3. New Spatial Perception

The fundamental reason the Dutch were able to venture overseas was their perception of the sea as a conquerable space. While this perception may seem commonplace today, it was an innovative way of thinking in the 16th century. At that time, Europeans perceived the sea as a space of fear.16) For Europeans, the sea was a realm of God, an uncontrollable space for humans, and even the Portuguese initially navigated cautiously along the coast.17) However, from the late 16th to the early 17th century, the Dutch began to perceive the sea as a controllable space, underpinned by the new technology of navigation.18) The development of navigation was driven by the emergence of sailing guides (rutters) and professional navigators called pilots.19) Innovations in cartography also occurred during this period. Figures like Jacob van Deventer began creating maps using new mapping techniques. Deventer used the new triangulation technique to show accurate distances, reducing the Dutch fear of unknown spaces.20)

4. The Birth of the VOC: The Fusion of State and Corporation

The VOC, established in 1602 by the Dutch Republic as a joint-stock company, was not merely a commercial enterprise.21) The VOC charter, approved by the States General on March 20, 1602, granted powers that far exceeded those of a private company—the right to maintain an army, the right to conclude treaties with local rulers, and a 21-year monopoly on trade.22) The establishment of this unique company was the result of the consolidation of several pre-existing East India trading companies. From the 1590s onwards, merchants in various Dutch cities began expeditions to the East Indies to counter the Portuguese monopoly, establishing East India companies in each city. However, the competition among these Dutch companies led to price reductions and decreased profits, while also presenting an opportunity for the Portuguese.

British Library.

17) Diffie, Bailey W. and Winius, George D. 1977. Foundations of the Portuguese Empire,

1415–1580. University of Minnesota Press, pp. 1–50.

18) Campbell, Tony. 2023. "Mediterranean portolan charts: their origin in the mental..."

Map History Archives. https://www.maphistory.info/PortolanOriginsTEXT.html (Accessed:

December 10, 2025).

19) Matteo Valleriani, ed. 2017. The Structures of Practical Knowledge. Springer, pp. 1–50. 20) Harley, J. B., and David Woodward, eds. 2007. The History of Cartography, Volume

3: Cartography in the European Renaissance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

21) "Charter of the Dutch East India Company (VOC)" (States General of the United

Netherlands, March 20, 1602).

22) EBSCO Research Starters. 2018. “Dutch East India Company is Founded.”

https://www.google.com/search?q=https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/dutch

-east-india-company-founded(Accessed:https://www.go

ogle.com/search?q=https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/dutch-east-india-com

pany-founded(Accessed: December 10, 2025)

- 46 - it was also difficult to counter naval power.23) Thus, the States General, which could be considered the Dutch government, unified them to create a single organization called the VOC. Because a large-scale company was necessary to counter Portugal, a monopoly was also granted.24)

The VOC cannot be considered a mere commercial company. It should be called a Company-State25) for the following reasons. First, as a commercial company, the VOC's objective was to buy spices, cotton, silk, etc., from the East Indies and sell them in Europe for profit. It also possessed warships as a military organization, employed soldiers, and acted as an administrative body, creating laws and collecting taxes in conquered territories. Furthermore, as a colonizer, it continuously built cities such as Batavia26), Ambon27), and Banda28). These functions were integrated within a single organization, and the States General supported the VOC's activities rather than controlling them. This was because the more territory the VOC conquered and the more trade it controlled, the greater the profit the Netherlands could gain.29)

This Company-State structure originated from the political situation of the Dutch Republic. Wary of central power infringing on regional autonomy, the Dutch did not desire a strong central military organization and thus delegated the task of colonial construction to the VOC; ultimately, a merchant company came to build an empire.30)

This characteristic of the VOC, combined with the Dutch perception of space, led to external expansion. Improved navigation and cartographic techniques enabled the Netherlands to perceive the sea as conquerable space, and the Dutch likely viewed the sea as a field of infinite possibilities. Once space is considered conquerable, it becomes economically irrational not to conquer it. The VOC's conquest of colonies with the goal of maximizing profits, and the resulting issues of massacres and slave trade, can be seen from a modern economic perspective as decisions based on 'cost-benefit analysis.' However, at its core lies a change in the Dutch perception of space. Japan remained an island nation, maintaining internal stability and thus being relatively safe from external oppression and violence, but in the long run, it suffered from the pressures of 19th-century Western imperialism. The Netherlands, however, eventually ventured out into the world and built a vast empire.

23) ibid. 24) ibid.

25) The concept of 'Company-State' does not simply mean an organization that is 'state-like' or 'quasi-governmental,' but rather a political entity that actually exercised sovereignty in the context of the early modern period

(polity) and a corporate sovereign.; Stern, Philip J. 2011. The

Company State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British

Empire in India. Oxford University Press.

26) The Dutch colonial name for present-day Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. 27) The center of the Maluku Islands and a key strategic point for the spice (clove) trade. 28) The only place in the world where nutmeg was produced.

26) The Dutch colonial name for Jakarta, the current capital of Indonesia. 27) It was a key strategic point for the spice (clove) trade as the center of the Maluku Islands. 28) The only place in the world where nutmeg was produced.

29) ibid.

30) Israel, Jonathan I. 1995. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–

1806. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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III. The Mutual Trap of Fear: Beyond the Argument of Asymmetry

Clulow described the relationship between the Netherlands and Japan in the 17th century as "silent coercion" in The Company and the Shogun.31) According to Clulow, Japan unilaterally subjugated the VOC, and the Netherlands had no choice but to accept this for economic gain. The situation in the early 17th century, within the historical context of the impact of Portuguese missionaries' activities and the spread of Christianity on Japanese society in the late 16th century, and the persecution of Christians by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, led to a situation where the Dutch had to comply with Japan's strict controls, Hofries rituals32), and the prohibition of Christian proselytization, despite these being difficult for the Dutch to accept. Clulow argued for Japan's systematic control over the Netherlands, moving beyond a simple narrative of "Europe attempted to open Japan but failed." The forced relocation of the VOC headquarters to Dejima in 1641, the introduction of Hofries rituals, and the strict surveillance of their daily lives were all used as evidence to demonstrate Japan's political dominance. Clulow's central argument was that although the Netherlands, as the sole trading partner connecting Japan and Europe after the expulsion of the Portuguese, enjoyed economic privileges on the surface, it was actually under Japan's absolute control.

In State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu, Toby views Japan under the rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate during this period not as isolated but as an active agent that deliberately designed and managed its own-centered diplomatic order. The argument is that the Shogunate controlled information and trade through exchanges with limited partners such as Joseon, Ryukyu, China, and the Netherlands, while excluding Christian forces, and that the Netherlands was merely one of the information and commercial channels chosen by Japan according to its needs.

While Clulow's and Toby's perspectives of 'subjugation' and 'Japan's absolute superiority' appear plausible at first glance, examining the Dejima diaries written by the VOC's Japan factory managers reveals a more complex reality. The diaries of VOC factory managers in Japan from their forced relocation from Hirado to Dejima until 1960 record that Japan also felt a different kind of anxiety than the Netherlands, and it was this mutual fear that sustained the relationship between the Netherlands and Japan. Clulow's and Toby's arguments focus solely on the power dynamics at the political level, overlooking the economic interdependence. This is akin to ignoring economic power in international relations today while considering only military strength. The principle that 'economic interdependence shapes political power relations' was already at play in Dejima in the 17th century.

In the 17th century, Dejima was a space where both sides recognized and managed their interdependence amidst the conflict between political power and economic necessity. The relationship was maintained not as a simple dynamic of control and submission, but within a delicate balance created by mutual needs. Therefore, the repetitive questions from Japanese officials recorded in the Dejima diaries, the specific processes of price setting, and the institutionalization of Japanese-Dutch relations necessitate a re-examination of the previous 'asymmetry' argument. 31) Clulow, Adam. 2014. The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with

Tokugawa Japan. New York: Columbia University Press.

32) Clulow argued that the Hofries ritual symbolized the subjugation of Japan to the Netherlands. 33) Prior to the forced relocation to Dejima, it was called the Hirado Diary.

- 48 - process, and the institutionalization of Japanese-Dutch relations, the previous argument of 'asymmetry' needs to be re-examined.

1. Japan's Absolute Control System in 1641 Immediately after the forced relocation of the VOC headquarters to Dejima in 1641, the Dutch described Japan as possessing overwhelming power. According to the records of Jan van Elseracq34), the first factory manager at the time, Dutch merchants had to live in conditions akin to a prison. They lacked freedom of movement, their every action was under the surveillance of Japanese officials, and the expression of Christian faith was absolutely forbidden.

A record from November 1641 states: "We must ensure that no Christian worship is observed here and that the Japanese do not convert. This is the strictest order from the Shogun and the authorities. Thousands of people, regardless of status, have died from torture."35) This record demonstrates not only the extent of control under which the Dutch were at the time but also how seriously Japan perceived and managed the infiltration of Christianity.

The policy of absolute prohibition of Christian expression was established against the backdrop of Japan's history of Christian persecution, which had already resulted in numerous sacrifices. In 1587, Toyotomi Hideyoshi banned Christian missionary activities, and during the era of Tokugawa Ieyasu, this policy was further strengthened, with a renewed ban on Christianity in 1614. Christianity was not merely seen as a religion but as a pathway for Western intrusion, perceived as a threat to Japan's political stability. As Christian missionaries rapidly spread Christianity throughout Japan, the Shogunate feared that Christianity could be used as a tool for imperialist aggression. For decades prior to the complete expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639, Japan systematically persecuted Christians. Thousands of Christians were killed through extreme methods such as torture, burning at the stake, and drowning.36)

35) Jan van Elseracq, Dagregister, November 1641, The Deshima Diaries 1641–1660, p.

78.

36) The Dejima Diary (dated 1638, thus more appropriately called the Hirado Diary) records the involvement of the Dutch

in suppressing the Shimabara Rebellion. According to the record, the approximately 37,000 rebels, most of whom were Catholic and had barricaded themselves in Hara Castle,

were all beheaded after the suppression, regardless of age or gender. The diary also records the incident in 1640 where 61 members of a Portuguese delegation to Japan were executed, and only 13 survived and were sent back to Macau. It documents the fear that any hint of Christianity or violation of the ban could lead to immediate execution.

were all beheaded without exception. In 1640, 61 members of the Portuguese delegation who came to Japan were executed

Regarding torture, François Caron describes it in his book A True Description of

the Mighty Kingdom of Japan and Siam (Caron first arrived in Hirado in 1619 as an assistant cook for the VOC and later served as the head of the Hirado factory). Caron recorded three main methods of torture. The first is 'anatsurushi' (hanging from a hole), where the prisoner's body is tied and hung upside down, with their head placed in a pit filled with filth. To prevent the prisoner from losing consciousness or dying too quickly due to blood rushing to their head, a small hole was made in the temple to allow blood to drip out slowly. The prisoner was left in this state for several days to induce mental breakdown and apostasy.

As a result, Christian faith in Japan went underground, and public religious activities virtually ceased. Even after the VOC headquarters was forcibly relocated to Dejima in 1641, the memory of this religious suppression remained vivid. Elseracq's mention of "thousands of people having died from torture" indicates that the Dutch were aware of Japan's firm and ruthless stance on Christianity. Furthermore, the phrase "the strictest order from the Shogun and the authorities" signifies that these pronouncements were decisions made by Japan's highest ruling class. The Tokugawa Shogunate's orders were relayed to local officials throughout the country, and the governors in Nagasaki faithfully executed these commands.

The second method is 'Unzen Hells.' Using sulfurous hot spring water from Mount Unzen near Nagasaki, the prisoner's body was slowly doused with boiling sulfurous water or they were made to inhale sulfurous gas, causing their skin to rot and inflicting agonizing pain. The third method is 'minoodori' (straw coat dance), where the prisoner was dressed in a straw coat and set on fire, forcing them to dance in agony.

The prisoner was tied and hung upside down in a pit filled with filth. A small hole was made in the temple to allow blood to drip out slowly, preventing the prisoner from losing consciousness or dying too quickly. The prisoner was left in this state for several days to induce mental breakdown and apostasy.

- 49 - As a result, Christian faith in Japan went underground, and public religious activities virtually ceased. In 1641, even after the VOC headquarters was forcibly relocated to Dejima, the memory of this religious suppression remained vivid. Elseracq's mention of "thousands of people having died from torture" indicates that the Dutch were aware of Japan's firm and ruthless stance on Christianity. Furthermore, the phrase "the strictest order from the Shogun and the authorities" signifies that these pronouncements were decisions made by Japan's highest ruling class. The Tokugawa Shogunate's orders were relayed to local officials throughout the country, and the governors in Nagasaki faithfully executed these commands.

The prisoner's body was tied and hung upside down in a pit filled with filth. A small hole was made in the temple to allow blood to drip out slowly, preventing the prisoner from losing consciousness or dying too quickly. The prisoner was left in this state for several days to induce mental breakdown and apostasy.

To prevent the prisoner from losing consciousness or dying too quickly due to blood rushing to their head, a small hole was made in the temple to allow blood to drip out slowly. The prisoner was left in this state for several days to induce mental breakdown and apostasy.

2. The Beginning of Repetitive Questions and Japan's Anxiety Paradoxically, within this strict control system, Japanese officials' anxiety began to arise. While politically exercising absolute power, they could not be economically secure. Unlike political power based on military and administrative strength, economic necessity is based on market mechanisms and the utility of goods. Therefore, even if Japan completely controlled Dutch merchants politically, if it had a weakness in the distribution of economically necessary goods, its value and bargaining power as a trading partner would diminish.

The second method is 'Unzen Hells.' Using sulfurous hot spring water from Mount Unzen near Nagasaki, the prisoner's body was slowly doused with boiling sulfurous water or they were made to inhale sulfurous gas, causing their skin to rot and inflicting agonizing pain. The third is 'minoodori' (straw coat dance), where the prisoner was dressed in a straw coat and set on fire, forcing them to dance in agony.

Using sulfurous hot spring water from Mount Unzen near Nagasaki, the prisoner's body was slowly doused with boiling sulfurous water or they were made to inhale sulfurous gas, causing their skin to rot and inflicting agonizing pain. The third is 'minoodori' (straw coat dance), where the prisoner was dressed in a straw coat and set on fire, forcing them to dance in agony.

The third is 'minoodori' (straw coat dance), where the prisoner was dressed in a straw coat and set on fire, forcing them to dance in agony.

described as 'dancing' and burned to death in a manner of mockery; Caron, François.

1935. A True Description of the Mighty Kingdoms of Japan and Siam. London: The

Argonaut Press.

37) Guilder (Dutch Guilder): The legal tender of the Netherlands used from the 15th century until the introduction of the Euro in 2002.

currency

38) Leiden University Press, "Silk for Silver: Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, 1637-1700", Tonkin

silk trade records.

39) Jan van Elseracq, Dagregister, June 1643, The Deshima Diaries 1641–1660, p. 145.

- 50 - If, as Clulow argues, Japan controlled Dutch merchants purely through political control and 'quiet coercion,' Saburōzaemon's tone should have been angry or at least condescending. However, what Elseracq recorded was 'anxiety,' and the statement that he was 'genuinely concerned about the economic situation' suggests a demeanor not typically shown by those in a position of superior power. The same question was repeatedly raised in September and November of 1643 as 'still the same concern,' and reiterated in January, March, and May of 1644.40) Furthermore, considering that these questions came from different officials, it indicates that this anxiety was not Saburōzaemon's personal concern but a systematic concern of the Japanese authorities as a whole.

3. Formation of Structural Economic Dependence and Mutual Fear Following the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan, the primary trade routes that Japan had with China underwent changes. Before the Portuguese expulsion, Japan could choose from various trade intermediaries, including the Portuguese and Chinese. Japan possessed bargaining power in selecting trade intermediaries. However, after the Portuguese were expelled from Japan, Japan began importing Chinese goods exclusively through the Dutch. The Netherlands became Japan's sole Western trading partner, enjoying an official channel and 'monopoly' for supplying Chinese goods to Japan. If the Dutch did not supply sufficient raw silk, Japan had no alternative.

The supply of the main commodity, raw silk, depending on a single supply chain was, in modern economic terms, 'supply chain concentration.' Hypothetical scenarios existed in the minds of Japanese officials: the possibility of the Dutch ceasing the supply of raw silk, the possibility of the Dutch drastically increasing prices, and the possibility of the Dutch losing interest in the Japanese market and moving to other regions.

By mid-1644, Pieter Antonisz Overtwater41) recorded the economic predicament of the Japanese authorities. 'They replied that my reasons were valid. However, it was due to the high prices last year. Those high prices had to be paid for all the silk imported thereafter. As a result, the Chinese imported a huge amount of silk in the winter, and they also had to pay the same high prices, suffering enormous losses.'42) According to this record, the price of raw silk was set high in 1641, and Japan purchased a large quantity of raw silk at that price. Subsequently, market conditions changed, and the market price of raw silk fell, or demand decreased. Consequently, Japanese merchants and authorities sold the raw silk purchased at a high price at a lower price, recording substantial losses. This signified a decrease in Japan's economic influence and a simultaneous increase in the influence of the Dutch merchants, who were the suppliers.

40) ibid.

41) Overtwater served as the head of the VOC factory in Japan from October 1642 to August 1643, and then resumed the position from November 1644 to November 1645.

42) Pieter Antonisz Overtwater, Dagregister, 1644, The Deshima Diaries 1641–1660.

- 51 - In 1644, Saburōzaemon stated: 'If you Dutch leave, what will happen to our economy? We will be in great trouble.'43) This is an explicit admission by a Japanese official that Japan's economy would collapse if the Dutch left, indicating that the relationship, which began with Japan's absolute superiority from November 1641 to November 1644, had transformed into a relationship of interdependence over the three-year period. Economic dependence had altered the power dynamic.

From these records, it can be inferred that while Japan threatened the Dutch, the Dutch also held bargaining power over Japan, and the threat of the Dutch leaving was implicitly present. Under Japan's absolute political superiority, if Japan continued to impose economic losses on the Dutch, the greatest threat the Dutch could pose was 'leaving.' This threat had little realism when the supply chain was diversified, thus diminishing their bargaining power, but when the supply chain became unified, this threat became a reality for Japanese officials.

Japan's political and military superiority over Dutch merchants, coupled with the Dutch merchants' economic superiority, formed a 'mutual deterrence.' Because both sides recognized that neither could defeat the other, extreme actions were restrained. At Dejima, Japan possessed the threat capability of expelling the Dutch, while the Dutch also had the threat capability of leaving.

At this point, it is necessary to examine the proportion of trade through the VOC relative to Japan's total economy (GDP) in the 17th century. Firstly, although there is no clear data for GDP measurement at the time, Japan's total size in 1637 is estimated to be approximately 945 million international dollars.44) Based on this, calculating the proportion of the VOC's trade volume in 1637, which was 427,249 guilders, confirms that the proportion of trade with the VOC in Japan's total GDP at that time was an extremely negligible 0.01%.46) Nevertheless, Japanese officials' anxiety was not absent.

First, it must be considered that the trade with the VOC was not evenly distributed across all regions of Japan. Trade with the VOC was concentrated in Hirado, Nagasaki, and their surrounding areas, and in these regions, trade with the VOC held a significant proportion, unlike its proportion in Japan's overall GDP. In 1637, the total trade value of the VOC in Hirado (420,000 guilders) may seem negligible compared to the annual revenue of the entire Tokugawa Shogunate (approximately 7 to 7.5 million koku of rice revenue47)), but 43) Pieter Antonisz Overtwater, Dagregister, November 1644, The Deshima Diaries 1641–

1660.

44) In 1990 US dollars; using the standard used in Saito and Takashima's paper.

45) Osamu Saito and Masanori Takashima. 2015. "Estimating the shares of secondary- and

tertiary-sector output in the age of early modern growth: the case of Japan,

1600-1874," RCESR Discussion Paper Series No. DP15-4. Tokyo: Hitotsubashi

University.

46) The Hirado trade value in 1637, 427,249 guilders, converted to USD based on the gold-silver exchange rate (approximately 2.5-3g of silver per guilder at the time) is about 100,000-150,000 USD, corresponding to about 0.011-0.017% of the GDP (900 million USD). This calculation is a conservative estimate, and the actual proportion may be lower.; ibid.

of the GDP (900 million USD) corresponds to about 0.011-0.017%. This

calculation is a conservative estimate, and the actual proportion may be lower.; ibid.

47) Howell, D. L. (Ed.). (2023). “Economy, Environment, and Technology”. The New

Cambridge History of Japan (pp. 227–440). part, Cambridge: Cambridge University

- 52 - While the annual revenue of the Tokugawa Shogunate was approximately 7 to 7.5 million koku of rice, the VOC's trade in Hirado, with a total trade value of 420,000 guilders in 1637, had a significant impact on the local economy. The lord of Hirado and the merchants in the Nagasaki region, particularly silk merchants, exerted considerable influence as direct sources of income. Although Hirado and Nagasaki were cities with populations of only about 50,000 to 100,000 people,48) trade with the VOC through these cities sustained the livelihoods of a significant portion of the merchant class.49) Especially after the expulsion of the Portuguese in 1639, local merchants and city officials relied solely on trade with the Netherlands as a source of normal revenue.50)

The nature of raw silk, a commodity imported into Japan through the VOC, must also be considered. As Overtwater described, the impact of raw silk on Japan's political economy cannot be underestimated.51) In the 17th century, silk imported in large quantities into Japan was not merely a 'commodity' but a symbol of status and a means of conveying political messages for Japan's ruling class—high-ranking officials of the Tokugawa Shogunate and wealthy merchants.52) During the Tokugawa Shogunate, high-quality silk was the primary material for kimonos and was used as a means of expressing social status and wealth in a hierarchical society.53) Furthermore, silk was a major item among diplomatic gifts and gifts bestowed by the Shogunate upon the daimyo throughout the country.54) If the supply of raw silk imported through the VOC were to be cut off, a shortage of raw silk would not simply mean a lack of luxury goods but a symbolic weakening of power—a halt in the provision of gifts from the Tokugawa Shogunate to the daimyo.55) These factors explain the anxiety shown by Japanese officials during the price negotiations of 1641-1642. The commercial losses incurred by the import of raw silk translated into anxiety for the officials about whether they could continue to receive silk supplies.

Press.

48) Clulow, Adam. 2014. The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with

Tokugawa Japan. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 42-45.

49) Reinier H. Hesselink, Prisoners from Nambu: Reality and Make-believe in

Seventeenth-Century Japanese Diplomacy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002),

pp. 112-145.

50) Adam Clulow, "The Domesticated Monopolist: The Dutch East India Company and

the Shogunate in Seventeenth-Century Japan," Journal of Early Modern History Vol. 14,

No. 3-4 (2010): 291-331.

51) Pieter Antonisz Overtwater, "Dagregister," September 20, 1644, The Deshima Diaries

1641–1660, p. 223.

52) Screech, Timon. 2002. The Lens Within the Heart: The Western Scientific Gaze and

Popular Imagery in Later Edo Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp.

123-167; Jansen, Marius B. 2000. The Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge: Harvard

University Press. pp. 34-40.

53) Dalby, Liza. 1993. Kimono: Fashioning Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press.

pp. 145-178.

54) Jurgis Elisonas, "Christianity and the Daimyo," in John Whitney Hall, ed., The

Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 4: Early Modern Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1991), pp. 360-407.

55) Mary Elizabeth Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp.

78-92.

- 53 - The structural vulnerability of Japan's financial system in the 17th century also increased the importance of trade with the VOC.56) Although Japan was the world's largest silver-producing country in the 17th century, producing approximately 150 tons of silver annually,57) the supply of vast amounts of silver simultaneously caused serious monetary problems.58) Excessive silver production created the risk of inflation, which the Shogunate needed to control.59) Trade with the VOC functioned as a mechanism for consuming silver in this context.60) The process of Japan paying silver to the Netherlands and purchasing raw silk served as an automatic balancing mechanism for regulating the excess supply of domestic silver. If the Dutch were to leave, Japan could face increased domestic inflationary pressure unless it found a new channel for regularly exporting silver abroad.

The political status and economic interests of the Nagasaki officials must also be considered. Nagasaki magistrates like Baba Saburōzaemon depended significantly on revenue from VOC trade and commercial regulations.61) If the VOC withdrew from Japan, the personal income of these officials would also decrease significantly.62) The reason Saburōzaemon displayed a demeanor that appeared 'anxious' rather than 'angry' in the June 1642 record was not due to concern for the national economy but fear for the maintenance of his position and the security of his income.63)

In addition to the aforementioned factors, considering the 'supply chain risk' of the Netherlands being the sole official trade channel after the expulsion of the Portuguese, the Japanese officials' fear stemmed from situations affecting the stability of the regional economy and financial system, the supply of symbolic expressions of power, and the personal status of officials. The anxiety recorded in the Dejima diaries and the repeated questions about the supply of raw silk reveal these structural vulnerabilities.64) The fear of Japanese officials was not simply a recognition that 'Dutch trade significantly impacts the economy' but a practical awareness of crisis: 'Japan is dependent on the Netherlands as a single supplier, so if they withdraw, a chain reaction beyond our control could occur.'65) This structural vulnerability ultimately enabled the mutual deterrence that occurred in 1644 and 1645, and this

56) Atelier Japan, "Japanese Silver: Trading over time" (2024).

" through the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," Journal of World History Vol. 13,

No. 2 (2002): 391-427

58) Tashiro Kazui, "Foreign Relations during the Edo Period: Sakoku Re-examined,"

Journal of Japanese Studies Vol. 8, No. 2 (1982): 283-306; Yoshida Tora, Edo Jidai no

Kahei Seido [Edo Period Monetary System] (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1951), pp.

145-178.

59) Sakudo, Yozo. "The Development of Capitalism in Japan," in Terence K. Hopkins and

Immanuel Wallerstein, eds. 1980. Processes of the World-System. Beverly Hills: Sage.

pp. 109-139.

60) Flynn and Giráldez. 2002. "Cycles of Silver," Journal of World History (Vol. 13, No.

2: pp. 391-427).

61) Overtwater, "Dagregister," 1642-1645, The Deshima Diaries, p. 225. 62) Hesselink, Prisoners from Nambu, pp. 122-135.

63) Jan van Elseracq, "Dagregister," June 1642, The Deshima Diaries 1641–1660, p. 145. 64) Refer to Section 3.2.

65) Pieter Antonisz Overtwater, "Dagregister," November 1644, The Deshima Diaries 1641–

1660, p. 228.

- 54 - through this, the two countries moved toward the institutionalization of compromise. 4. Hofreis Ritual and the Institutionalization of Compromise

"It is true that the Dutch suffered losses for two consecutive years. However, they should not despair and should have faith that they will make profits in the future, as they have for a long time in Hirado."

In his log from October to November 1644, Overtwater recorded that the Japanese merchants and authorities wanted lower prices for raw silk this year because they had incurred losses by purchasing large quantities at high prices. What is important here is that both sides proceeded with negotiations through repeated procedures. This suggests that the relationship between the Netherlands and Japan had become institutionalized—that both sides agreed on the basic framework for negotiation. In the negotiation process, Overtwater did not fully achieve his demands. The prices offered by the Japanese authorities were "320 tael for Grade 1 and 280 tael for Grade 2." Overtwater expressed dissatisfaction with these prices. "There was a 40 tael difference between Grade 1 and Grade 2. However, I protested these prices... but my protest was not heeded, and I had to accept the prices."

What is noteworthy here is that this was not a "negotiation" but a unilateral price setting by Japan. Although a negotiation process was formally followed, it was effectively a unilateral price setting by Japan. The reason Japan strongly pushed for prices, despite fearing the Netherlands' departure, suggests that Japan's fear was based on deeper structural issues beyond price negotiations. What was important to the Shogunate was not maximizing profit in individual transactions, but permanently anchoring the Netherlands within the order Japan had established. Through unilateral price setting, Japan conveyed two messages: "You must accept our terms," a statement of political superiority, and "We need you," a concealment of economic dependence. Ultimately, unilateral price setting was not intended to make the Netherlands leave Japan, but was an act to establish a hierarchy wherein the Netherlands could only remain in Japan under the conditions set by Japan. The Netherlands remained in the Japanese market, accepting losses, which gave Japanese officials the impression that they could sufficiently control the Netherlands. Consequently, economic dependence could be "sealed" with political superiority.

This paradoxical relationship is further discussed in Overtwater's subsequent record. Overtwater wrote that the reason he had to accept the prices set by Japan was "because the Netherlands needed the Japanese market, and the Japanese authorities knew that the Netherlands could leave."

- 55 - Both sides recognized that maintaining the current relationship was better than extreme choices—withdrawal or expulsion. However, this interdependence was superficially presented as Japan's unilateral superiority, allowing both sides to conceal the instability of the relationship. This was precisely how mutual fear was institutionalized in the form of Japan's price coercion. The Hofreis ritual best exemplifies this structure of mutual fear and interdependence. Hofreis means "court journey" in German, and the head of the Dutch factory was required to go to Edo annually to meet the Shogun and present gifts. Clulow interpreted Hofreis as a ritual symbolizing the subordination of the Netherlands. ²³ And looking at early records, especially Elseracq's records from 1641-1642, this interpretation is not necessarily incorrect. The Hofreis ritual itself was described as a very humiliating experience for the Dutch. The Hofreis process was characterized by extreme surveillance and restrictions. The Dutch could not move freely, guards followed the merchants on their way to Edo, and even in Edo, they could not leave their designated accommodations. Through Hofreis, Japan was clearly subordinating the Netherlands, and Clulow interpreted it as a ritual for establishing political hierarchy.

However, Hofreis also implied that by undergoing the ritual, the Dutch merchants became vassals of the Japanese Shogun. By pledging loyalty to the Shogun, VOC merchants gained a special status, unlike other European countries. Looking at the Hirado records, where Portuguese and Dutch merchants competed for the opportunity to perform Hofreis, it can be seen that they recognized the possibility of gaining special status through Hofreis. Now, only the Netherlands could have an audience with the Shogun and officially trade within Japan. As Japan's sole Western trading partner, the Netherlands could also restrict European access to the Japanese market, leading to immense economic profits for the Netherlands.

5. The Duality of Power and the Stabilization of Mutual Restraint

The fundamental limitation of Clulow's "asymmetry" argument is that it understood power as monolithic. According to him, Japan had a monopoly. However, in reality, while political power was overwhelmingly held by Japan, economic power was held by both sides. Overtwater had to comply with the decisions of the Japanese authorities politically. Everything, from the price of raw silk, trade duration, sales methods, warehouse locations, and even the building materials for the trading post, was determined by the Japanese authorities, and Overtwater had to accept the prices Japan insisted on, despite his protests.

At the same time, however, Japan could not completely suppress the Netherlands due to its economic needs. Without raw silk, Japan's economy would have been hit hard, and merchants and authorities would have suffered significant losses. Excessive suppression could have led the Netherlands to consider the option of leaving, so Japan had to entice the Netherlands to continue trading with Japan. Ultimately, while Japan's political power was overwhelming, economic power also made the Netherlands indispensable to Japan, showing a dual structure of power.

1660.

- 56 - became indispensable to Japan, showing a dual structure of power. While the Netherlands was politically weak, it was economically indispensable.

The negotiation records from 1644 illustrate how the delicate 'mutual deterrence' between the Netherlands and Japan operated. At that time, Japan was the sovereign state with the final decision-making power in trade, but the Netherlands possessed a practical threat by being able to withdraw from the trade itself (Exit option) if conditions were unfavorable. Both sides were aware of the mutual losses that would result from the other's extreme choices, and this awareness formed the basis for finding a point of compromise. The repetition of such compromises made the process and procedures of negotiation predictable, leading to the 'regularization of negotiations.' This process did not stop at mere psychological threat. As both sides sought to avoid the waste of resources and economic losses resulting from extreme actions, the sufficient threat capability actually led to a balance of mutual restraint.

By 1645, the bidirectional tension between the Netherlands and Japan entered the stage of "institutional formalization." According to the "Deshima Diary," the relationship between the Japanese authorities and the VOC factory head evolved beyond unilateral threats and submission into a practical relationship acknowledging mutual necessity. Negotiations were conducted at fixed times each year, price fluctuation ranges were limited within predictable parameters through repetitive procedures, and the Dutch right to object was effectively considered in Japan's final decision-making process. This institutionalization guaranteed systematic control for Japan and a stable trading environment for the Netherlands, maximizing the benefits for both sides. Consequently, the institutional framework of relations between the Netherlands and Japan in the 17th century was not the result of unilateral coercion by one party, but a product of a sophisticated balance achieved through prolonged mutual interaction.

The remarks by Inoue Masashige (井上政重) in the 1645 records show that the Edo Shogunate's perception of the Dutch evolved from that of a controlled entity to a strategic partner. Inoue, who, as Ometsuke (大目付)67) and Chikugonokami (筑後守)68), oversaw foreign policy and religious control, stating, "You are indispensable" to the Dutch factory head, was a strategic approval by the Japanese government of the utility value provided by the Dutch and indicated the nature of the relationship between the two countries.

The value mentioned by Inoue was built around the practical axes of information and economy. Japan acquired information to understand the global power dynamics by understanding European affairs and trends in international trade networks through the Netherlands, while goods, including raw silk, became a driving force for meeting Japan's domestic economic demand and supporting the Shogunate's financial stability. The Netherlands served as a window providing political insight and economic benefits to the Shogunate. Considering these points, Inoue's remark, "I now understand why you are so valued,"70) can be assessed as an attitude that acknowledged mutual necessity, rather than a unilateral threat or demand for submission.

their main task was to monitor the daimyo, and they possessed extensive information gathering and surveillance powers. In the first half of the 17th century, the Ometsuke were also responsible for the persecution of Christians and the management of foreign trade through Nagasaki.

68) This means 'Governor of Chikugo Province (present-day southern Fukuoka Prefecture).' By the Edo period, unlike before, it served as a form of honorary title or rank bestowed by the Shogunate to uphold the formality and prestige of samurai, independent of actual ruling power.

69) Pieter Antonisz Overtwater, Dagregister, 1645, The Deshima Diaries 1641–1660, p.

250.

- 57 - "I can now understand why you are so valued"70) by Inoue is not a unilateral threat or demand for submission, but an expression of mutual necessity.

IV. Dutch Perceptions of Japan in the 17th Century

Dutch merchants who arrived in Japan in the early 17th century entered the Japanese market based on the VOC's vast empire-building experience. However, the mechanisms they had experienced in other regions of Southeast Asia—coercion through military superiority, territorial control through fortification, etc.—did not work in Japan.71) From the establishment of the first trading post in Hirado in 1609 until their forced relocation to Dejima in 1641, and even thereafter, Dutch merchants had to constantly redefine their position within the order established by the Tokugawa Shogunate. In this process, the Dutch began to refer to the Shogun as "Your Majesty Emperor."

The initial expectations of the Dutch for the new Japanese market were very high. The VOC anticipated extensive expansion and aimed to become Japan's main commercial partner, surpassing competitors like Portugal and Britain. However, facing strong resistance from Shogunate officials like Ii Naosuke, the Dutch realized that the future they had envisioned was not easy. Experiencing the Nuith Incident in 1627 and the Shimabara Rebellion from 1637 to 1638, the VOC was ultimately forced to relocate to Dejima.

The Dutch adoption of the title "Your Majesty Emperor" and the deferential etiquette towards the Shogun signified, on one hand, the Dutch political subordination, and on the other hand, it functioned as a strategic choice. The title "Your Majesty Emperor" was used not only in official VOC documents but also in the private diaries of factory heads (Deshima Diaries), demonstrating the VOC's recognition of the Shogunate's authority. During their stay at the Dejima headquarters, the factory heads attended the annual Hofreis (Edo audience ceremony), bowing to the Shogun and presenting gifts. These rituals symbolized the political superiority of the Shogunate, and in Edo, Dutch merchants lived under surveillance in conditions akin to imprisonment.

However, this identity as vassals was also the result of a strategic choice by the VOC. By becoming vassals of the Shogun, the Netherlands could exclude other European powers, including its main competitor, Portugal. Political subordination through the Hofreis ritual was ostensibly a procedure confirming Japan's political supremacy, but it simultaneously granted the Dutch a monopoly on trade within Japan.

70) ibid.

71) Clulow, Adam. 2014. The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with

Tokugawa Japan. New York: Columbia University Press.

- 58 - After the complete expulsion of Portugal from Japan in 1639 due to its Christian missionary activities, the Netherlands became the sole European power to dominate the intermediary trade between Japan and China. The logs of VOC factory heads reveal that the Shogunate, realizing that "the Nagasaki regional administrators were completely unaware of the corruption and unfair actions, and were committing these acts in their name," accepted political subordination as a price for economic privileges.

However, this did not mean the complete subordination of the Netherlands to Japan. Shogunate officials repeatedly inquired about the import volume of raw silk, expressing anxiety to the factory head Elseracq. If Japan had purely suppressed the Netherlands based on political superiority, the officials' attitude would have shown commanding superiority, but instead, concern and anxiety about the domestic economic situation could be discerned. The raw silk imported to Japan at that time was a huge cargo by contemporary standards. Japan purchased it in large quantities expecting high profit margins, but in reality, the profit margins were lower than expected, inflicting substantial losses on the Japanese authorities. The subsequent repeated inquiries by Japanese officials were desperate attempts to recoup these losses.72) After expelling Portugal, Japan had no alternative supply chain to procure raw silk if the Netherlands did not supply it. The possibility of the Netherlands drastically raising prices or withdrawing from the Japanese market occupied the minds of Japanese officials. The expression of this anxiety was manifested by the Nagasaki magistrate.

It is also noteworthy that the VOC representatives had a detailed understanding of Japan's multi-layered power structure. The Dutch understood the structural conflict between high-ranking officials in the Edo central government (Raetsheeren) and the Nagasaki regional administrators (Regent) and utilized it for their own benefit. In particular, when some officials, such as Raetsheeren Takimondonne, showed a friendly attitude towards the Dutch, they were seen to be maximally exploiting it.

By 1645, the price negotiations between the Netherlands and Japan were conducted at fixed times each year, and the price fluctuation range was limited within a certain range through repetitive procedures, bringing the negotiations onto a predictable track. Japan made the final price decisions, and the Dutch right to object was effectively considered in this structure. This signified the operation of mutual deterrence, as Japan had the power to expel the Netherlands, and the Netherlands also had the power to threaten to leave. Both sides therefore chose compromise to avoid the waste of resources and economic losses resulting from extreme actions. In this process, the Hofreis ritual functioned as a mechanism for institutionalizing this interdependence. Through Hofreis, Japan repeatedly confirmed the political subordination of the Netherlands, while also interpreting it as a signal that the Netherlands intended to continue the relationship with Japan. Considering this, the expression "because His Majesty the Emperor has allowed you to trade freely according to his own free will" can be interpreted not as Japan's unilateral perspective, but as an acknowledgment of mutual necessity. 72) See Section 4.3 for details.

- 59 - Ultimately, the Dutch perception of Japan shows a transition from imperial expansionism in the early stages of entering Japan to realistic adaptation. Since military power and diplomatic superiority, experienced by the VOC in other countries, did not work in Japan, the Dutch had to adapt to Japan's political order. As a result, they appear to have chosen political subordination through the title "Your Majesty Emperor" and the Hofreis ritual. However, this subordination was not solely the result of unilateral coercion; within the structure of interdependence created by economic necessity, the Netherlands also gained economic privileges, such as a monopoly on trade in Japan.

Considering these points, the Dutch perception of Japan was formed through paradoxical complementarity. The Dutch recognized Japan as a powerful nation that they could not conquer, while also understanding that Japan needed them, and within this structure of mutual necessity, they established institutional relations. They formed a relationship where they were politically subordinate to Japan but economically indispensable. This relationship was institutionalized through the annual Hofreis ritual.

V. Conclusion

The relationship between the Netherlands and Japan's Tokugawa Shogunate in the 17th century is not sufficiently explained by existing analyses of 'subordination' and 'Japan's absolute superiority' alone; it can be better understood through a new framework of 'institutionalization of mutual fear and economic dependence.' The Deshima Diary confirms that the anxiety shown by Japanese officials during the three-year raw silk negotiations was not mere intimidation but a concern stemming from structural dependence on the Netherlands. The Nagasaki magistrate's concern about Japan's economy in case the Netherlands left reveals Japan's economic vulnerability, which cannot be explained solely by Japan's overwhelming political superiority. After expelling Portugal, Japan became dependent on the Netherlands for raw silk supply, and the centralization of this supply chain fundamentally altered the nature of the bilateral relationship.

VOC factory heads also recognized the economic value of the Japanese market and sought to remain in it despite incurring losses. Avoiding mutual losses that would result from extreme choices—either Japan expelling the Netherlands or the Netherlands withdrawing from the Japanese market—was a rational choice for both sides. The most significant theoretical contribution of this paper is demonstrating that political power and economic power do not necessarily coincide in international relations of the 17th century. Japan maintained absolute superiority at the political level, but at the economic level, its dependence on the Netherlands gradually increased. The economic losses incurred from the large-scale import of raw silk were not simply a market failure within Japan but a structural crisis caused by the lack of diversification in the supply chain. The repeated inquiries by Japanese officials regarding raw silk imports were an expression of anxiety stemming from this dependence, which ultimately led to changes in the bilateral relationship. This duality of power provides an early example of the principle discussed in contemporary international relations theory, "economic interdependence shapes political power relations." Existing research has focused on political hierarchical relationships but has not sufficiently analyzed the mechanisms by which economic structures constrain political decisions.

- 60 - From 1644 to 1645, the relationship, which had been primarily characterized by Japan's unilateral control and the Netherlands' submission, shifted to one where mutual deterrence operated. Both sides recognized that they could not and did not need to completely defeat the other, leading to the restraint of extreme actions. Japan possessed the ability to expel the Netherlands, but doing so would result in losses of information and trade goods provided by the Netherlands. The Netherlands, as recorded by the VOC superior in his diary, "would remain in Japan if profits could be made," implicitly held the threat of leaving at any time if continuous losses were incurred. This bidirectional fear became entrenched in the institutional form of 'regularization of negotiations,' creating a space for compromise. After 1645, both countries conducted price negotiations at fixed times each year, and the negotiation process and price fluctuation range were also limited within a certain scope.

From 1644 to 1645, the relationship, which had previously been characterized by unilateral control from Japan and subservience from the Netherlands, transformed into one where mutual deterrence came into play. Both sides recognized that neither could completely defeat the other, nor was it necessary to do so, leading to the restraint of extreme actions. Japan possessed the capability to expel the Netherlands, but doing so would result in losses from the information and trade goods that the Netherlands provided. The Netherlands, as evidenced by the VOC governor's diary entry stating he would remain in Japan 'if profits could be made,' implicitly threatened the ability to depart at any time if losses continued. This mutual apprehension solidified into the institutional form of regularized negotiations, creating a space for compromise. After 1645, both countries engaged in price negotiations at a set time each year, with both the negotiation process and the range of price fluctuations being limited within a certain scope.

The Hofreis ritual also did not solely signify the political subordination of the Netherlands. By professing vassalage to the Shogun through this ritual, the Netherlands could gain an advantage over other European countries. The competition with Portuguese merchants for the opportunity to perform the Hofreis ritual suggests that this ritual was not merely an expression of subordination but also an acknowledgment of privilege. Hofreis was a ritual with a dual aspect: it ostensibly confirmed Japan's political supremacy, but in practice, it guaranteed the Netherlands exclusive trading rights in Japan. The Netherlands, through the annually repeated ritual, could also demonstrate its intention to continue the relationship with Japan and provide assurance to Japan that the Netherlands would not withdraw.

The relationship between 17th-century Dutch merchants and the Tokugawa Shogunate was a "trade of fear." However, this fear was not one-sided. Japan felt fear of Christian infiltration and imperialist invasion, as well as economic instability caused by the Netherlands' withdrawal, while the Netherlands feared expulsion from Japan, a powerful nation, and its attractive market. The fears of both sides found a point of compromise at the negotiation table, and from this basis, the VOC occupied a position that was politically subordinate to Japan but economically indispensable. Considering these points, 17th-century Dejima was not simply a colony, nor was it complete independence, but a space where mutual fear and economic dependence were institutionalized. In Dejima, the Netherlands and Japan built their relationship not through military strength or political power, but through economic necessity, presenting a unique model for early modern international relations. The power of institutionalized compromise, driven by mutual necessity rather than military strength or political pressure, holds significant implications even today.

- 62 -

VI. References

1. Primary Sources

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Ÿ Valleriani, Matteo (Ed.). 2017. The Structures of Practical Knowledge. Cham: Springer. Ÿ Van Duzer, Chet. 2013. Sea Monsters on Medieval and Renaissance Maps. London:

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3. Internet Resources

Ÿ Discovering Belgium. 2020. "1566 Iconoclasm When Belgium's Churches Were Attacked."

https://www.discoveringbelgium.com/1566-iconoclasm/ (Accessed: 2025.12.10.)

Ÿ EBSCO Research Starters. 2018. "Dutch East India Company is Founded."

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(Accessed: 2025.12.10.)

Ÿ Encyclopedia Britannica. n.d. “Netherlands.”

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*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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