Between Autonomy and Independence: The Collapse of the Tributary Order and the Politics of International Law

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Dejima

Memorial Hall of the Sino-Japanese War

Kim Hee-sun

Ewha Womans University, School of International Studies, Major in International Studies (International Politics, International Law)

I. Introduction: A Transitional Period Between the Tributary Order and the International Legal Order

The late 19th century in East Asia was a period of great transition, marked by the disintegration of the existing international order and the establishment of a new international legal system. For centuries, the traditional Sinocentric (Hwaje) order, which served as the fundamental norm of Joseon diplomacy, structured the world into a hierarchy of civilization and barbarism with China at its center, and Joseon positioned itself as 'Little China' within this framework. In this order, diplomacy was not an 'exchange of legal rights and obligations' but a ritual and etiquette to reaffirm the civilized order. In other words, for Joseon, international relations were not a legal or institutional space but a relational order based on culture, morality, and etiquette.

This worldview was also reflected in Joseon's concept of 'autonomy (自主)'. The autonomy referred to by Joseon was not a concept equivalent to 'state sovereignty', but rather closer to the meaning of 'each attending to their own affairs (各守其事)', an autonomy permitted within the Tianxia order. This aligns with the practical perception described by the Qing Tsungli Yamen: "Joseon is a tributary state, but only pays tribute; all state affairs are autonomous." Because the tributary and investiture relationship that Joseon traditionally maintained with Qing was not a legal subordinate relationship but an order of civilizational hierarchy and mutual recognition, Joseon did not need to assert itself as an independent state while exercising diplomatic autonomy. Thus, 'autonomy' was a relational concept, premised on a world structurally different from the modern international legal concepts of 'independence' or 'sovereignty'.

The French Expedition (1866) and the American Expedition (1871) in the mid-19th century exemplified the complexity of this perception of order. At the time, France and the United States, in their dealings with Joseon, sought to ascertain Joseon's relationship with Qing and its subordinate status. They argued that if Joseon was a subordinate state, responsibility would fall upon the suzerain state. In response, Qing's Zongli Yamen replied, "Joseon is indeed a subordinate state, but only pays tribute; all state affairs are autonomous." However, Joseon strategically utilized its subordinate status in foreign diplomacy to reject the treaty demands of France and the United States. These events demonstrate that 'autonomy' was used in a completely different sense from international legal independence, namely, as autonomy within subordination. That is, while neither Joseon nor Qing saw the combination of 'subordinate state-autonomous state affairs' as a contradiction, Western international law

- 20 - language understood 'subordinate state' and 'independence' as mutually exclusive statuses, making a direct translation of the same concept structurally incongruous.

Meanwhile, viewed more broadly, the mid-19th century was a historical turning point where Western imperialism, led by Britain, dismantled existing non-Western imperial orders. Through the Opium Wars and the Treaty of Nanjing system, Qing accepted a legal order based on treaties, sovereignty, and territory, leading to the rapid collapse of the Sinocentric order. In this vacuum, Japan, through the Meiji Restoration, actively adopted Western international law and redefined itself as a 'modern sovereign state.' Japan adopted treaty-making capacity, non-interference in foreign affairs, and the legal status of an independent state as key indicators of its new national identity, and these changes profoundly influenced Japan's perception and strategy towards Joseon.

However, the majority of Joseon officials tended to absorb and reinterpret these changes within the language of the traditional order rather than translating them into the language of modern international law. Particularly in many discussions surrounding treaty-making, there was a strong tendency to interpret treaties not as legal contracts specifying rights and obligations, but as an extension of the etiquette-based order. As Joseon's diplomatic thinking, based on the traditional order, clashed with Japan's diplomatic strategy, which had internalized modern international law, the same terms—'autonomy' (自主) and 'independence' (獨立)—came to be understood with entirely different meanings.

Here, 'clash' does not mean 'fought on the ground' but refers to a state where diplomatic options conflicted because the same phrase, operating within different normative systems, produced 'different legal effects.' Article 1 of the Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan (1876), which states, "Joseon is an autonomous state, possessing equal rights with Japan," was interpreted by Joseon as 'confirmation of autonomy within the tributary order' and by Japan as 'stipulation of Joseon as an internationally independent state, excluding Qing's suzerainty.' In other words, although the wording was the same, the world it connected to (the tributary order) was different, resulting in the clause becoming a contradictory mechanism simultaneously implying 'maintenance of relations' and 'dismantling of relations.' As this divergence in meaning accumulated, it later escalated into a core issue in the Sino-Japanese competition over Joseon's status, culminating in the declaration of Joseon's status as an 'independent and autonomous state' in Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, a stage where international legal language solidified political conclusions.

Notably, 'autonomy' was a flexible concept that could be used without contradiction even within the East Asian investiture order, allowing Joseon to assert autonomy while maintaining the relational order. Conversely, Japan sought to solidify this flexibility by translating it into the international legal concept of 'independence,' aiming for the political effect of redefining Joseon-Qing relations.

After the Imjin War, Japan-Joseon negotiations were generally mediated by the Tsushima domain, and direct engagement by Japan's 'central power (the Shogunate)' with resident officials in Joseon or the dispatch of regular envoys was limited. Consequently, although intercourse was formally termed 'neighborly relations (Gyorin)', asymmetry accumulated in the practical structure due to the mediator (Tsushima). For instance, the concentration of information delivery, translation, and ritual adjustments in the hands of the mediator led to structural information asymmetry, leaving room for the interpretation of terms (titles, relationship definitions) to eventually favor the Japanese side in the long term. The moment the mediator held the 'right to choose expressions (translation, document format, ritual phrases)', the initiative in interpreting the original text accumulated with each conflict, laying the foundation for later fixing the 'legal meaning' of treaty texts in a Japanese manner.

- 21 - This was a product of the vigilance towards Japan that persisted after the Imjin War, and as a result, intercourse between Joseon and Japan, while formally equal, was practically unilateral and restricted. Both countries adopted compromise interpretations to maintain superficial balance despite differing linguistic perceptions. For example, the title 'Daegun' (大君) was a subordinate title for the King in Joseon, but in Japan, it was perceived as a title indicating an equal or superior status. Such linguistic compromises became the basis for the later divergence in understanding 'autonomy' and 'independence.' This asymmetrical intercourse structure was directly projected onto the diplomatic language used by Joseon and Japan in the late 19th century—Joseon's 'autonomy' and Japan's 'independence.' Although the two terms were superficially similar, they reflected different worldviews and political objectives.

The phrase 'Joseon is an autonomous state' stipulated in Article 1 of the treaty was interpreted by Joseon as a confirmation of autonomy within the existing order, and by Japan as a declaration negating Qing's suzerainty and defining Joseon as an internationally independent state. Both countries interpreted the same term within entirely different worldviews, and this conceptual disconnect was the origin of the repeated conflicts in the subsequent Joseon-Japan-Qing triangular relationship. The phrase 'Joseon is an autonomous state' in the treaty served as a confirmation of autonomy within the existing order for Joseon, and for Japan, it meant the negation of Qing's suzerainty and a declaration of Joseon as an internationally independent state. Both countries interpreted the same term within entirely different worldviews, and this conceptual disconnect was the origin of the repeated conflicts in the subsequent Joseon-Japan-Qing triangular relationship.

Article 1 of the Treaty of Ganghwa included the phrase defining Joseon as an 'autonomous state' (自主之邦), a provision reflecting Japan's strategic calculation to incorporate Joseon into the modern international legal order while simultaneously preempting Qing's claim of suzerainty.

Conversely, the Joseon government interpreted the Treaty of Ganghwa as a means to overcome Joseon's international isolation and to restore and strengthen the existing friendly relations with Japan. The conclusion of the treaty, whether willingly or unwillingly, marked a historic event signifying Joseon's first step into international relations based on a new paradigm.

Subsequently, Japan strategically utilized the language of international law to gradually expand its influence over Joseon. First, by defining Joseon as an 'independent state,' it legally dismantled the Joseon-Qing relationship (negating subordinate status). Second, through the logic of positioning Joseon as an independent state under modern international law, it pressured Joseon to take sole responsibility for its diplomacy, thereby institutionalizing the weakening of Qing's role as a protector or patron (the isolating effect of institutionalized independence). Third, it strengthened intervention in military, financial, and diplomatic affairs through the treaty system, pursuing the completion of subjugation from protectorate to Resident-General rule, and from Resident-General rule to annexation. In this process, the concept of 'independence' used by Japan was not a language of liberation but a strategic language of international law to legitimize colonial rule.

Although, due to the power dynamics in the early 1890s (Qing's dominance), it might have appeared on the surface that 'Joseon was within Qing's order,' the interpretation of the wording and the definition of status continued to clash irreconcilably between China and Japan. This clash culminated in the declaration in Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895: 'China recognizes Joseon as a completely independent and autonomous state.'

- 22 - These changes can be seen more clearly through the actual sites we visit—Dejima, Glover Garden, the Museum of Korean-Japanese Exchange, Mojiko Retro, etc. Dejima was the space where Japan first adopted Western science, law, and knowledge; Glover Garden was the site where Japan experimented with the modern international order as a treaty port; and Shimonoseki was the international legal battleground where Japan sought to engage with Western powers on equal footing. The context in which Japan adopted the modern international legal order and used it as a basis for its external expansion, developing its policy towards Joseon, is directly linked to the history of these spaces.

Based on these site visits, this field report aims to analyze the meaning of concepts embedded in treaty texts, the background of diplomatic choices, the strategic use of international law, and the clash of worldviews between Joseon and Japan from the perspectives of conceptual history, diplomatic history, and international law. Understanding the gap between the changing worldview that Joseon failed to grasp and the international legal language actively employed by Japan is key to grasping the structural rupture of modern East Asian history. The contextual understanding gained through this field trip will serve as crucial clues for experiencing these changes concretely and directly.

II. The Clash of Interpretations of 'Autonomy' and 'Independence' and Japan's International Legal Strategy

1. Joseon's Concept of 'Autonomy' (自主): Autonomy within the Traditional Sinocentric Order

The 'autonomy (自主)' used by Joseon in the 19th century was fundamentally different from 'independence' in modern international law. Joseon's 'autonomy' was a relational concept signifying 'autonomy predicated on subordination' recognized within the tributary and civilizational order. The international order that Joseon presupposed was not a legal order based on concepts of sovereignty and territory, but a Tianxia order and a system of friendly relations (Sadae Gyorin) operating around cultural hierarchy and ritual propriety. Joseon perceived itself as part of the Sinocentric civilization and understood diplomatic actions not as an exchange of legal rights and obligations, but as a 'confirmation of positional relations through ritual (禮)'. Therefore, 'autonomy' was also a concept that confirmed an autonomous position permitted within the Tianxia order, rather than a declaration of an independent state.

Numerous historical records support this. First, when France inquired during the French Expedition (1866), "Is Joseon a subordinate state of Qing?" Qing's Zongli Yamen replied as follows: 「朝鮮雖為屬國，惟貢而已，其國事皆自主。」

(Although Joseon is a subordinate state, it only pays tribute; all its state affairs are autonomous.)

Here, 'autonomy' (自主) does not mean international legal independence but rather customary self-governance while maintaining the status of a subordinate state. Joseon strategically utilized this logic of 'subordinate state, autonomous affairs' to reject treaty demands from Western powers. In other words, Joseon's 'autonomy' was a concept of relational and moral order, not an international legal status.

- 23 - It is difficult to say that Joseon 'completely failed to understand.' Joseon practically understood at least (1) that treaties have binding force, (2) that treaty clauses become points of contention in diplomatic disputes, and (3) that the logic of 'subordinate state-autonomous state affairs' could function as a shield in negotiations with Western powers. However, what Joseon failed to sufficiently internalize was the 'redefinition of status effect' (exclusion of Qing, making Joseon solely responsible) that occurred when 'autonomy' was translated into the grammar of international law. Conversely, Japan, aiming for precisely that effect from the outset, chose the East Asian term 'autonomy' and designed the wording to connect to international legal 'independence.'

The same structure is repeated in Huang Junxian's "Joseon Strategy" (1880). "China protects it in name as a vassal, but we truly rule the country autonomously."

(China protects it under the name of a vassal state, but in reality, Joseon autonomously governs its country.)

Furthermore, in the official diplomatic documents sent by Joseon to Japan, known as "Seogye (書啓)," the concept of 'sovereignty' appears as follows.

「我東藩自主其國已久。」

(Our Eastern vassal state has autonomously governed its country for a long time.)

Here, Joseon defines itself as 'Dongpan' (East Vassal), clearly positioning itself within the China-centered investiture system. In other words, Joseon's 'autonomy' was not a language that denied the investiture relationship but signified autonomous state governance maintained on the premise of that relationship. The abstract conceptual term 'autonomy,' with its unclear conceptual boundaries, was a highly flexible concept that could be interpreted in a manner compatible with the unique investiture system of East Asia. Joseon understood and utilized this concept precisely in that direction. From Joseon's perspective, the expression 'autonomous state' (自主之邦) was merely a phrase that could be interpreted much more restrictively within the traditional order than the international legal meaning intended by Japan.

Kim Yong-gu aptly describes Joseon's concept of autonomy as follows: "Within the system of serving the great powers, the diplomatic and military regulations of outer vassal states were exercised with autonomy. The Joseon side understood Article 1 of the Treaty of Ganghwa in this sense."

In other words, the 'autonomy' spoken of by Joseon was not a declaration of modern international legal independence but an expression that confirmed the continuity and legitimacy of the existing order. Joseon merely emphasized that it was a 'being that maintains relationships based on etiquette and can handle its own affairs,' not a subordinate entity, and did not understand this as a declaration of an independent or sovereign state in international law.

- 24 - Due to this perception structure, Joseon tended to understand the Treaty of Ganghwa and subsequent treaties as part of the etiquette-based order, responding by interpreting the international legal and institutional implications of the treaties within the framework of the existing etiquette-based order, rather than translating them into the language of modern international law.

Conversely, Japan actively studied Western international law and transformed it into a language of diplomatic strategy. Kim Yong-gu records as follows:

During the negotiations for the Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan in February 1876, terms from international law were widely used among Japanese intellectuals. This indicates that while international legal language was unfamiliar to Joseon, it was already being utilized as practical language for treaty drafting and diplomatic negotiations in Japan.

During the negotiation of the Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan in February 1876, terms such as the Law of Nations and international law were widely used among Japanese literati. This indicates that while international legal language was unfamiliar to Joseon, it was already being utilized in Japan as the practical language for drafting treaties and conducting diplomatic negotiations.

Ultimately, Joseon understood 'autonomy' as autonomy within the traditional international order, while Japan translated it into the same language as modern international legal independence and used it. The structure where the same word operated with entirely different meanings is precisely the essential clash between the concepts of 'autonomy' and 'independence.'

This difference in interpretation materialized not in abstract theory but in the choice of wording by the negotiating parties. During the treaty negotiations in 1876, Kuroda Kiyotaka was the plenipotentiary on the Japanese side, and Shin Heon was the plenipotentiary on the Joseon side. The wording of Article 1 they agreed upon became the starting point for later disputes over status.

2. Japan's Concept of 'Independence': Adoption of Modern International Law

On the other hand, Japanese diplomatic officials during the Meiji era systematically adopted Western international law after the Meiji Restoration and used the concept of 'independence' (獨立, dongnip) as a language of international strategy. During the Meiji era, Japan actively translated and introduced Western international law, rapidly internalizing legal concepts such as independence, sovereignty, and treaties as the fundamental language of diplomatic practice.

The term 'independence' used by Japan at this time was closer to a strategic diplomatic language consciously directed at China, rather than an abstract concept of sovereignty. From the initial stages of formulating its policy towards Joseon, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized redefining the Joseon-China relationship as a core task, rather than dealing with Joseon as an isolated issue. Japan, assuming Joseon's existence within China's tributary order, considered a plan to reposition Joseon at a lower level by first settling relations with China rather than directly confronting Joseon. This plan included strategic calculations to preempt Chinese intervention in case of emergency, which can be seen as institutionalized later in the declaration of Joseon's status in Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In other words, Japan's conception of an 'independent state' was closely intertwined with its strategy of containment against China, aimed at separating Joseon from China's tributary order.

- 25 - This line of thought was combined with a more fundamental perception of the Joseon issue in Japan: the strategic judgment that Japan must be the first mover in the competition among powers surrounding Joseon. Western powers had already deeply penetrated East Asia by securing concessions and spheres of influence in China, but for Japan, a more urgent task was to prevent Joseon from becoming a target of imperialist penetration by Western powers. Japan recognized securing influence and interests in Joseon before the full-scale entry of Western powers as its top national priority. Within this perception, Japan framed its intervention in Joseon not merely as an expansion of power but as a diplomatic and foreign policy objective of 'resolving the Joseon issue to maintain the East Asian order.'

Specifically, Russia's expansion into the Far East, anxieties surrounding maritime routes, and the so-called 'Tsushima Incident' of 1861 served as one of the catalysts for Japan to re-recognize the strategic significance of surrounding straits and islands. However, it is more accurate to view this sense of security crisis not as directly leading to a unified policy towards Joseon, but as gradually accumulating through discussions of risks and opportunities surrounding Joseon in Japanese political and media discourse and policy debates of the 1870s. In other words, the 'Joseon issue' was not simply a diplomatic agenda but a complex discourse formed by combining changes in the East Asian balance of power, the possibility of intervention by major powers, and Japan's maritime defense plans.

This discourse, combined with the theory of conquest (Jeonghanron), sometimes erupted in aggressive forms, but at the same time, it diversified into various policy paths, including treaty conclusion, expansion of trade, diplomatic intervention, and the definition of status through international legal language. Therefore, while Japan's 'resolution of the Joseon issue' often ostensibly advocated for regional order and stability, it was in reality closely intertwined with calculations of national interest aimed at securing preferential influence and rights in Joseon before the full-fledged competition among great powers began. In this respect, the expression 'Joseon issue' carried a dual nature, portraying Joseon as an object to be protected while simultaneously reconstructing it as an object to be managed and intervened in, and this perception served as the foundation supporting the subsequent expansion of the treaty system and the logic of phased intervention.

The Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan was precisely the first treaty where Japan's perception and strategy were institutionalized. Through this treaty, Japan externally declared that it had created a crack in the Sinocentric system under the pretext of the 'Joseon issue' and secured influence over Joseon ahead of Western powers. In other words, the Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan can be evaluated as the starting point for Japan to position itself as a first mover in the international competition surrounding Joseon. Crucially, Japan did not immediately put 'independence' at the forefront in the 1876 treaty text but aimed for the same effect by using 'autonomy,' which was acceptable in East Asian diplomatic parlance. In other words, 'autonomy' was a language that Joseon could not easily reject, and Japan maximized its political effect by translating its flexibility into 'international legal independence.' In short, Japan sought to achieve both acceptability of the wording and effectiveness in international politics by 'swapping Joseon's difficult-to-reject word (autonomy) for a word recognized by major powers (independence).'

This strategy was consistently maintained thereafter. Within the Japanese government, key policymakers such as Ito Hirobumi and Inoue Kowashi, along with foreign advisors like Gustave Boissonade, discussed the Joseon issue. A shared understanding emerged that a parallel diplomatic approach, involving dispatching envoys to Joseon while simultaneously confirming China's intentions, was crucial.

- 26 - The Japanese government also approached Joseon based on its own experience of having already been deeply incorporated into the modern international legal order. Following its opening in 1854, Japan successively concluded trade and amity treaties with various Western countries, repeatedly learning norms of Western international law such as treaty-making, extraterritoriality, and most-favored-nation status at a practical level. The accumulation of this experience laid the foundation for internalizing international law not merely as a diplomatic technique or formal norm, but as the fundamental language explaining state governance and foreign strategy.

Furthermore, Japan approached Joseon based on its own experience of having deeply integrated into the modern international legal order. After opening its ports in 1854, Japan successively concluded treaties of amity and commerce with various Western countries, repeatedly learning Western international legal norms such as treaty conclusion, extraterritoriality, and most-favored-nation treatment at a practical level. The accumulation of these experiences provided the foundation for internalizing international law not merely as diplomatic technique or formal norm, but as the fundamental language explaining state operations and foreign strategy.

Therefore, the 'independence' spoken of by Japan was not a neutral legal term but a diplomatic language strategy to secure dominance over Joseon. By declaring 'independence,' Japan separated Joseon from China's sphere of influence, diplomatically isolated Joseon, and ultimately laid the groundwork to legally justify a structure leading from protectorate to Resident-General rule, and from Resident-General rule to annexation. In fact, during the negotiations for the Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan in 1876, terms from international law were already widely used among Japanese intellectuals, demonstrating that international law functioned as a 'social language' and a language of governance in Japanese society. Under these conditions, Japan's strategic use of concepts like 'independence' by defining Joseon's status through treaty wording was not a superficial imitation of Western diplomatic practices but a result of utilizing international law as the core logic for realizing its foreign policy objectives.

The concept of 'independence' used in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' "Chosen Monken Bikō (朝鮮聞見備考)" and Mutsu Munemitsu's "Kenkennroku (蹇蹇録)" further clarifies this strategic character. Munemitsu recorded the following when discussing the Joseon issue.

「名義上獨立國ト爲スモ、實際ニ於テハ我邦ニ於て扶持スルノ義務アリ。」 (Even if it is nominally an independent state, in reality, our country has the obligation to support it.)

This reveals that the concept of 'independence' as stated by Japan was not a concept that guaranteed Joseon's complete autonomy, but rather a basis for indirectly ruling Joseon under the guise of protection. The Japanese government's 1894 document on domestic reforms also stipulated Joseon's independence as an 'object to be organized and guided.'

"It is the duty of the Empire to protect the independence of the Kingdom of Joseon and to regulate its domestic affairs."

(It is the responsibility of the Empire to protect the independence of the Kingdom of Joseon and to regulate its domestic affairs.)

As such, Japan's concept of 'independence,' while using language borrowed from Western international law, actually functioned as a strategic concept to separate Joseon from Qing, diplomatically isolate Joseon, and ultimately justify its protectorate status and annexation.

- 27 - Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) also lay in this vein of strategy. Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki declared Joseon's status by stating that Qing recognized Joseon's status as a 'completely independent and autonomous state' and abolished the tribute and ceremonial rites. The inclusion of the Joseon issue in Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki was not coincidental but a result of Japan and Qing attempting to frame the meaning of the war over Joseon's status in different ways.

Within Japan, there was a strong demand for the fruits of the war to be clearly materialized through the wording of the peace treaty. This was because there were concerns that if the Joseon issue remained ambiguous, the political significance of the Sino-Japanese War could be blurred. In this context, placing a clause that declaratively defined Joseon's status in the first article was a reflection of domestic political pressure to solidify the war's justification and achievements at the treaty level. Although 'independence' and 'autonomy' were nominally paired, Japan interpreted this as 'completely separating Joseon from Qing's tributary status' and preempted the justification for intervention in Joseon by declaring its international legal independence. Therefore, the 'independence' spoken of by Japan was not a neutral legal term but a diplomatic linguistic strategy to secure dominance over Joseon, which later became the justification for the Resident-General system and annexation.

On the other hand, Li Jingfang also showed a cautious attitude towards the explicit declaration of Joseon's independence in the treaty. He was concerned that placing the Joseon issue at the beginning (Article 1) of the Treaty of Shimonoseki could symbolically inflict significant damage on Qing's international standing. However, under the pressure of the war situation and the home government, it was difficult to fully uphold these concerns, and ultimately, the Joseon issue was reflected in the treaty in a way that negated Qing's existing order.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan defined an independent state as 'a state that has the capacity to conclude treaties independently, without interference from other countries.' However, Japan continuously justified its intervention by citing Joseon's lack of practical capacity to fulfill this condition.

This mode of acceptance created a fundamental rupture between Joseon's 'autonomy' (autonomy within the tributary and hierarchical relationship) and Japan's 'independence' (sovereignty in modern international law). This is precisely why the interpretations of both countries differed completely, despite the use of the same wording in the treaty.

Therefore, Japan used the international legal language of 'making Joseon an independent state' to negate the Joseon-Qing suzerainty relationship, diplomatically isolate Joseon, and ultimately secure the legitimacy of its colonization process.

Through the superficial pretext of 'Joseon is a sovereign independent state,' Japan sought to separate Joseon from Qing and incorporate it into the Japanese sphere of influence. Through the superficial pretext of 'equal treaty relations with the independent state of Joseon,' it sought to gradually intervene in Joseon's military, financial, and diplomatic affairs through treaties. And through the superficial pretext of 'guaranteeing Joseon's independence,' it sought to secure the justification for the Resident-General system through protectorate status and annexation through the Resident-General system.

- 28 - 3. Strategic Function of the 'Independent State' Clause

In the Treaty of Ganghwa (1876), Japan interpreted and utilized the clause defining Joseon as a 'self-governing region' within the framework of modern international law. The 'autonomy' as understood by Japan was synonymous with 'independence' in modern international law, a concept predicated on complete external sovereignty free from external interference. By internationally declaring that Joseon was an independent state, not subordinate to Qing, Japan negated Qing's suzerainty over Joseon and provided a legal basis for its future interventions.

Article 1 of the Treaty of Ganghwa reflects the conflict in meaning implied by autonomy and independence. It was a basic principle of etiquette that outer vassals within the tributary system would manage their internal affairs and foreign relations autonomously. The Joseon side understood this clause in this sense. However, Japan translated and interpreted 'autonomy' as having the same meaning as independence in Western international law. Therefore, while the 'independent state' clause appeared to acknowledge Joseon's autonomy on the surface, it was actually a strategic device to detach Joseon from the Sinocentric order and reconstruct it as an 'independent unit' within the modern international legal system.

More broadly, the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity (1876) clearly illustrates the conflict between Japan's intention to replace the traditional tributary and amity system with the modern international legal system and Joseon's intention to confine the bilateral relationship within the framework of the traditional East Asian international order (a normative language Joseon could not comprehend), resulting in an unresolved compromise.

The provision in the Treaty of Amity, "First, to abolish all laws and regulations that have been the cause of past conflicts and to extensively expand laws and regulations for mutual benefit and harmony, thereby ensuring the eternal peace of both sides," was interpreted by the Japanese side as a redefinition of the bilateral relationship into a modern international legal relationship. From Japan's perspective, Article 2 of the treaty eloquently demonstrated the transformation of the bilateral relationship into a modern international legal one. Japan interpreted this provision as establishing the institution of resident envoys, which was common in modern European international law. Furthermore, Japan, already considering the discriminatory nature of modern international law, likely believed it was participating in the practice of modern international law by imposing the discrimination it experienced from European powers on neighboring countries, particularly Joseon.

Both countries were exposed to various international legal situations and possessed specific knowledge of international law, as evidenced by the provisions in Articles 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17 of the Treaty of Ganghwa, which dealt with specific issues. For example, Article 12 regulated the rescue of distressed vessels and crews, Article 14 stipulated the free navigation and trade of merchant ships of both countries, Article 15 concerned customs duties and tariffs, Article 16 outlined procedures for dispute resolution, and Article 17 addressed the prevention and crackdown on smuggling. These provisions suggest a basis of knowledge of international law that went beyond the customary practices prevalent in East Asia at the time. This supports the assertion that Japan was concluding, interpreting, and acting upon treaties based on the international legal order.

- 29 - 4. Deepening Diplomatic Isolation and Subordination of Joseon Through International Legal Language

After defining Joseon as an 'independent state,' Japan consistently emphasized that Joseon, as a sovereign state, was responsible for its own diplomacy. This operated to systematically weaken the channels through which Joseon could rely on or expect diplomatic patronage from Qing, based on the logic that 'if it is an independent state, it must be responsible for its own diplomacy.'

Conversely, because Joseon remained within the framework of 'autonomy' in the Sinocentric order, its interpretation of the norms of the modern international legal system—particularly regarding equal treaty relations, extraterritoriality, tax exemptions, and diplomatic jurisdiction—within the practices of the traditional order led to a series of disadvantageous treaties. Japan reinforced its justification for intervention by characterizing Joseon as a state inexperienced in modern diplomatic models.

Article 10 of the Treaty of Ganghwa, concerning consular jurisdiction, was highly unequal by today's standards. However, Joseon understood it not as modern international legal 'extraterritoriality' but rather as an extension of existing amity practices (practices of personal jurisdiction), which lowered the threshold for negotiation and acceptance.

This phenomenon can be explained not simply by Joseon's lack of knowledge of international law, but by its understanding of the relevant clauses within the context of traditional East Asian international order practices. In the East Asian investiture and amity system, criminal jurisdiction over individuals was primarily exercised based on the principle of personal jurisdiction. In particular, aspects of personal jurisdiction were applied in Joseon-Japan relations, and Joseon likely interpreted Article 10 based on this, reducing it to a formalization of practice rather than modern extraterritoriality. Consequently, Joseon judged the consular jurisdiction clause in Article 10 not as an unequal clause in modern international law, but rather as an acceptable provision extending existing practices.

In other words, Joseon did not understand this clause as a 'systematic device within the modern international legal system' intended by Japan, but rather as a 'conventional exceptional measure' that had already been partially permitted within the existing etiquette order. As a result, Japan interpreted Article 10 as consular jurisdiction under modern international law, meaning the denial of foreign judicial power over its nationals, while Joseon simply understood it as a customary practice of personal jurisdiction.

This very difference in understanding led to the fundamental issue of how the nature of the treaty itself was defined. Joseon still perceived the Treaty of Ganghwa as a 'friendly treaty of amity' in the traditional sense, an adjustment of etiquette relations, whereas Japan interpreted it as a 'legal contract with clearly defined rights and obligations' under modern international law. Joseon understood the treaty wording as ritualistic rhetoric, while Japan understood it as binding legal language within the international legal order.

Ultimately, while faced with the same treaty text, Joseon interpreted it in the language of etiquette, and Japan in the language of law. This conceptual and systematic interpretive difference gave rise to the conflict between the terms 'autonomy' and 'independence' and was the fundamental cause of the structural break between the traditional order and the modern international legal system.

Through the Imo Incident and the Gapsin Coup, Japan reverted to its 1880 policy towards Joseon. It returned to a policy line of avoiding direct political confrontation with China and focusing on indirect economic and cultural penetration. The opinion paper by Iwakura Tomomi in October 1882 and the instructions given by Inoue Kaoru to Acting Consul Kondo Masuki as he left Seoul in January 1885 exemplify this policy.

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Meanwhile, Joseon's subordinate relationship deepened in this process. While the existing subordinate relationship was one of suzerain-vassal based on the etiquette of the traditional Confucian order, after the Imo Incident, China imposed a subordinate position on Joseon as viewed within the modern international legal order. Figures like Zhang Jian, Deng Chengxiu, and Zhang Peilun even argued for the annexation of Joseon into the Three Eastern Provinces on this occasion.

Consequently, Japan utilized international legal language to neutralize Joseon's 'traditional autonomy,' reorganize Joseon as an isolated unit within a new legal order, and institutionalize the process leading to intervention, protection, and annexation.

III. The Treaty of Ganghwa (1876) and the Divergence in Interpreting 'Self-Governing Region'

1. Joseon's Interpretation of 'Self-Governing Region': Autonomy within the Tianxia Order

Article 1 of the Treaty of Ganghwa states, "Joseon is a self-governing state and possesses equal rights with Japan." This article reads literally as 'Joseon is a self-governing region and possesses equal rights with Japan.'

Joseon interpreted the phrase "Joseon is a self-governing state" in Article 1 of the 1876 Treaty of Ganghwa in its traditional sense (confirmation of autonomy within the Tianxia order). That is, while viewing itself as part of the China-centered order, it recognized the clause as confirming autonomy within the tributary system, not being subordinate to any particular country. For Joseon, 'self-governing region' was still a concept situated within the extension of the Sinocentric international order, and it did not understand this clause as redefining Joseon's international legal status or dissolving its relationship with Qing. Therefore, in Joseon's reading, Article 1 of the Treaty of Ganghwa was closer to 'confirmation of autonomy within the existing order' rather than a 'declaration of status change,' and this gap became the interpretive loophole that enabled Japan's subsequent interventions.

As seen in the French and American expeditions (1866 and 1871), Joseon's 'autonomy' meant 'autonomy within subordination,' not international legal independence. When France and the United States regarded Joseon as a tributary state of Qing and sought to hold Qing responsible for treaty negotiations, Qing responded, 'Joseon is a tributary state, but all state affairs are autonomous.' However, Joseon used the 'tributary state-autonomous state affairs' logic diplomatically to reject Western treaty demands. Such instances demonstrate that the 'autonomy' used by Joseon was structurally different from modern sovereignty.

Furthermore, because Joseon understood the act of treaty-making itself as an 'extension of etiquette rituals,' it tended to interpret Western-style treaties as defining a state's international legal status and setting the scope of intervention through the lens of the etiquette order, rather than converting it into the language of modern international law. This resulted in the legal effects of the Treaty of Ganghwa being absorbed into a reinterpretation of the traditional order.

Lee Geun-gwan points out that 'to properly understand and interpret the history of the 1876 Treaty of Amity, an effort of hermeneutics to evaluate it from the perspective of the international order established in East Asia at the time of the treaty's conclusion must precede it.' The conclusion of the Treaty of Amity

- 31 - When analyzed and evaluated from the perspective of the traditional international order, the form and content of the Treaty of Amity had considerable continuity with the international legal practices established between Joseon and Japan prior to 1876. Furthermore, during the negotiation process leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Amity, Joseon was not entirely passive and merely going through the motions, but rather demonstrated defensive and sometimes proactive negotiation attitudes from the perspective of the traditional East Asian international order, and even succeeded in asserting its position on some issues.

The expression 'Joseon is a self-governing region' stipulated in Article 1 of the 1876 Joseon-Japan Treaty has often been understood as a clause inserted by Japan to unilaterally negate the tributary system. However, the way this expression was received at the time was far from this simple interpretation. Joseon at the time understood this clause not as a declaration of independence in modern international law, but as language describing its status, which it had long maintained within the Sinocentric order. In other words, 'self-governing region' was accepted as a concept expressing Joseon's existing identity, which exercised diplomatic and administrative autonomy without negating the premise of being a tributary state of Qing. Within this understanding, Joseon felt no reason to actively reject the clause, and this was an acceptance on a different level from the concept of modern international legal independence that Japan had in mind. In other words, the same treaty wording was interpreted with different meanings between Japan and Joseon, and this divergence in meaning can be seen as the potential starting point for subsequent conflicts over Joseon's status.

Joseon's perception and response in this regard provide room for re-examination of the existing conventional understanding of the Treaty of Ganghwa. Indeed, research since the 1990s has critically reviewed the perspective that understood this treaty solely as an unequal treaty unilaterally imposed by Japan. This research empirically demonstrates that Japan was not always proactive or dominant in the treaty negotiation process, and that Joseon actively negotiated within the language of its traditional order as it understood it. Furthermore, it is also pointed out that the main issue at the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Joseon and Japan was the securing of political equality between the two countries, and that the inequality often pointed out today is an evaluation reconstructed in the context of subsequent changes in the international order. This shows that the 'self-governing region' clause in Article 1 of the Treaty of Ganghwa could have been understood by Joseon at the time as an extension of the existing order, and suggests that a conflict of meaning surrounding the treaty was inevitable.

2. Japan's Modern International Legal Interpretation: Strategic Insertion of the Concept of 'Independent State'

Conversely, Japan interpreted the same clause as a provision for a fully independent state under modern international law. Japan interpreted and utilized the phrase 'self-governing region' in Article 1 of the treaty within the framework of modern international law, aiming to dismantle the suzerain-vassal relationship between Joseon and Qing and draw Joseon into the modern international legal order, thereby laying the groundwork for its subsequent continental and colonial policies. In other words, Japan used the 'self-governing region' clause as a tool to enforce a transformation of international legal status.

- 32 - Mutsu Munemitsu sought to position the issue of Joseon as a core political declaration in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, concluded after the Sino-Japanese War. Explicitly stating in the treaty text that Joseon had broken away from its tributary relationship with Qing held significant meaning in internationally legitimizing the nature and objectives of the war waged by Japan. At the same time, he premised that Joseon's 'independence' did not immediately imply the acquisition of autonomous political capacity and showed an intention to settle the Joseon issue at the level of excluding Qing's intervention through the treaty. This approach was closely intertwined with the diplomatic strategy of managing the post-war Joseon issue within Japan's sphere of influence.

Okamoto Takashi characterizes the Treaty of Ganghwa as 'an attempt to transform the traditional amity relations into Western-style modern treaty relations.' The reason Japan defined Joseon as an equal state, not a tributary of Qing, was a strategy to make Joseon an independent state under international law, thereby blocking Qing's claim of suzerainty and legally expanding its own influence over Joseon.

The most direct illustration of this Japanese intention is Article 1 of the treaty, which follows: "Joseon is a self-governing state and possesses equal rights with Japan." "Treaty of Ganghwa (Joseon-Japan Treaty of Amity)," Article 1, 1876.

Here, the 'autonomy' and 'equal rights' emphasized by Japan did not refer to traditional autonomy but to a legal status encompassing external non-interference rights and treaty-making capacity under modern international law. In other words, for Japan, the 'self-governing region' clause was a means of 'international legal reconstruction' to detach Joseon from the Sinocentric order and reposition it as an individual unit within a new legal order.

3. Conflict in Treaty Interpretation: Same Wording, Different Worldviews

Joseon's traditional worldview and Japan's modern international legal perception clashed head-on in the Treaty of Ganghwa. While faced with the same clause, Joseon interpreted it as 'confirmation of autonomy within the order,' whereas Japan understood it as having the effect of negating Qing's suzerainty and defining Joseon as an independent state. Thus, entirely different meanings were assigned to the same clause.

This difference in perception became the root of all diplomatic conflicts in the subsequent Joseon-Japan-Qing triangular relationship, and furthermore, became the starting point for the reorganization of the East Asian international order, leading to the Imo Incident (1882), the Gapsin Coup (1884), the Sino-Japanese War (1894), and the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895). This conceptual conflict was subsequently reinterpreted and adjudicated within the grammar of international law, ultimately being finalized as a 'legal conclusion' in Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895.

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IV. Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) and the International Legalization of 'Independent and Autonomous State'

The plenipotentiaries for the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Treaty of Maguan, 1895) were Ito Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu for Japan, and Li Hongzhang and Li Jingfang for Qing. Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Treaty of Maguan, 1895) was the scene where the conflict between the concepts of 'autonomy' and 'independence,' which began with the Treaty of Ganghwa (1876), was declared as an 'independent and autonomous state' status through international legal wording. Despite being the treaty ending the Sino-Japanese War, the fact that Article 1 first stipulated Joseon's status indicates that the core issue of the war was the problem surrounding Joseon's legal and international position. Placing Joseon's status at the beginning of the peace treaty was also a symbolic device to define the nature of the war as a 'redefinition of Joseon's status' prior to 'territory/indemnity.'

The important point is that this clause was not a statement that emerged from 'the negotiation table where Joseon was seated,' but a statement in which Qing and Japan 'judged and finalized Joseon's status in international legal wording.' In other words, the direct parties to the 'conflict' were not just (Joseon-Japan) but the plenipotentiaries of Qing (Li Hongzhang, Li Jingfang) and Japan (Ito Hirobumi, Mutsu Munemitsu), and Joseon was placed in a position of 'having the outcome imposed upon it.'

In the Treaty of Maguan, Ito Hirobumi agreed to place the Joseon issue as the first article of the treaty, aligning with the intention to solidify through treaty wording the fact that the issue surrounding Joseon's status was the core point of contention in the Sino-Japanese War. Simultaneously, it functioned as a political and legal mechanism to legitimize subsequent provisions such as indemnity payments and territorial concessions. This judgment was also closely linked to the public opinion within Japan demanding clear materialization of the war's achievements after the victory.

Article 1: China recognizes that the Kingdom of Joseon is a completely independent and autonomous state. Therefore, any act that impairs its independent and autonomous system, such as the tribute and ceremonial rites that the said country previously rendered to China, shall henceforth be completely abolished.

"Qing recognizes Joseon as a fully independent and autonomous nation, and abolishes the precedent and ceremonies of tribute that Joseon rendered to China."

- "Modern Korean Diplomatic Documents," Vol. 3

Li Hongzhang, in a situation where it was difficult to assert Joseon's continued suzerainty under Qing, negotiated to accept the Joseon issue as the first article of the Treaty of Maguan. He calculated that by conceding this, he could mitigate other conditions such as indemnity and territorial concessions, rather than clinging to Joseon's nominal status. This attitude was a result of recognizing that the international order surrounding the Joseon issue was already changing, and Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki was an instance where this recognition of reality was solidified into wording.

The 'autonomy' spoken of by Qing was autonomy within the traditional tributary system, while the 'independence' interpreted by Japan was a sovereign state under modern international law. Japan interpreted this as 'completely separating Joseon from Qing's tributary status' and preempted the justification for intervention in Joseon by declaring its international legal independence.

- 34 - Regarding this Japanese concept of 'independence,' Okamoto Takashi explains, 'The 'genuine independence of Joseon' mentioned by Mutsu did not mean the autonomy of Joseon. The traditional 'tributary autonomy' was terminated through war, and it included the meaning that Japan would 'protect, assist, and support Joseon's independence.' The means for this was the reform of Joseon's domestic affairs pursued solely by Japan, namely the Gabo Reforms.'

Consequently, Article 1 of the Treaty of Maguan simultaneously completed three changes for Joseon: the dismantling of the traditional concept of autonomy, for Qing the formal declaration of renunciation of suzerainty, and for Japan the securing of international legal justification for intervention in Joseon.

This was the moment when Japan's consistent international legal strategy, which progressed from 'autonomy' in 1876 to 'independence' in 1895, then to protectorate status in 1905, and finally annexation in 1910, was structurally completed.

V. Conclusion: Amidst the Collapse of the Tributary Order and the Realignment of the International Legal Order

The Joseon-Japan relations in the late 19th century were not merely a bilateral diplomatic conflict but a historical scene where different international orders clashed. Joseon used the tributary order as its fundamental diplomatic language, while Japan used the modern international legal system. Consequently, even the same words—'autonomy' and 'independence'—were interpreted within different worldviews. The phrase 'autonomous region' in Article 1 of the Treaty of Ganghwa, which was a confirmation of traditional autonomy for Joseon, served as a basis for Japan's strategic interpretation to legally redefine Joseon-China relations and position Joseon as an 'independent state' unit within the international legal system. This asymmetry in interpretation also formed the structural foundation that led to Joseon's diplomatic isolation, Japan's justification for intervention, and eventual colonization. As an 'independent state,' Joseon was, in principle, responsible for its own diplomacy, and Japan could construct a logic to justify intervention for 'protection and guidance' based on Joseon's inability or immaturity in fulfilling that responsibility.

The 'independent and autonomous state' clause in the Treaty of Shimonoseki was the culmination of Japan's imperial linguistic strategy. Mutsu Munemitsu clearly stated in his "Kenkkenroku" that "recognizing it nominally as an independent state, Japan would indirectly and directly support it," revealing that the 'guarantee of independence' for Joseon was in fact a asymmetrical subjugation device implying protectorate status. The concept of 'protection' proposed in some discussions, such as by Ooiwa Masami, demonstrates one facet of Japan's international legal imagination, which transformed 'independence' not into an expansion of autonomy but into a structure of interference and management.

While the trend of the late 19th century is often summarized as 'independence defeating autonomy,' strictly speaking, this is not a simple victory or defeat between concepts, but rather a question of which normative language was adopted as the standard for adjudicating diplomatic disputes. 'Autonomy' was a language of self-governance compatible with subordination within the tributary order, whereas 'independence' was a language of status designation in modern international law that fundamentally denied suzerainty and vassalage relations. The declaration in Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, stating that 'China recognizes Joseon as a completely independent and autonomous state,' signified that the grammar of international law, regardless of Joseon's will, was adopted as the final language for status designation. Therefore, it is more accurate to describe this period not as 'the process by which independence defeated autonomy,' but as the process by which the international legal order overwhelmed the translation rules of the tributary order

- 35 - and monopolized diplomatic efficacy.

Kim Jong-hak's characterization of this process as a 'clash of concepts of autonomy-independence' stems not from the fact that the diplomats of the time perceived it as a clash, but from the repeated confirmation in primary sources showing that the same treaty clauses were interpreted within different normative orders. Specifically, Kim Jong-hak's 'clash' designation is not based on the confrontation of a particular event, but on the accumulated pattern in primary sources where different normative languages repeatedly describe the same issue differently. Qing's Zongli Yamen documents describe Joseon as a 'vassal state' that 'manages all state affairs autonomously,' presupposing a natural order where subordination and autonomy coexist. In contrast, Japanese Foreign Ministry documents and Mutsu Munemitsu's "Kenkkenroku" define Joseon's 'independence' not as an expansion of autonomy but as an object of 'support and protection,' thereby linking the concept of independence directly to the logic of intervention.

Meanwhile, within Joseon officialdom, documents such as official letters, memorials, and the '14-Article Reform Program' understood 'independence' not as a legal severance of relations with Qing, but as a re-expression of the existing concept of 'autonomy' (self-strengthening, legitimacy) in modern language. The fact that the same treaty clauses and concepts were consistently used within different normative orders serves as the primary documentary basis for what Kim Jong-hak termed the 'clash of autonomy-independence concepts.'

For instance, Qing's Zongli Yamen described Joseon as 'a vassal state, yet autonomous in state affairs,' presupposing the coexistence of subordination and autonomy as natural. In contrast, Japanese Foreign Ministry documents and Mutsu Munemitsu's "Kenkkenroku" clearly reveal a perception of 'independence' as a prerequisite for protection and intervention. Simultaneously, Joseon officials' official letters, memorials, and the '14-Article Reform Program' understood 'independence' not as a new legal status replacing the existing 'autonomy,' but as a re-expression of the traditional concept of autonomy in modern language. Thus, the parties involved consistently thought within their own linguistic orders, but as these languages overlapped within a single document like a treaty, semantic differences that were mutually untranslatable accumulated. Kim Jong-hak's designation of 'clash' can be understood as an analytical term that conceptualizes this retrospectively revealed asymmetry between normative languages and its political effects.

This was the moment when Japan's consistent international legal strategy, which progressed from 'autonomy' in 1876 to 'independence' in 1895, then to protectorate status in 1905, and finally annexation in 1910, was structurally completed.

However, rather than equating it with the Japanese concept of 'independence,' Joseon selectively translated and reinterpreted the Japanese language of 'independence' based on its existing concept of 'autonomy.' Article 1 of the '14-Article Reform Program' is a representative example of this linguistic shift.

"Severing reliance on the Qing, establish the foundation of self-reliance and independence." (Hongbeom 14 Articles, Article 1, translation)

This was not an adoption of the Japanese concept of independence by Joseon, but rather a result of reconstructing its existing traditional concept of 'self-reliance' into a modern national identity. Petitions from figures like Kim Yun-sik repeatedly expressed sentiments such as, "It is not timely to depart from the Qing's benevolent influence and stand alone; repelling foreign powers depends on our own self-reliance." This demonstrates Joseon's tendency to re-signify 'independence' not as severance or isolation, but as a matter of legitimacy and self-strengthening combined with the traditional concept of self-reliance.

- 36 - The difference in perceptions of 'self-reliance–independence' between the two countries was not a mere translation issue, but a structural rupture between two worldviews using different languages of order. Furthermore, this rupture is not solely a problem between Korea and Japan; it holds universal significance in that it was a 'failure of translation between orders' that occurred as the traditional East Asian order clashed with modern European international law. Even when using the same words, if the historical experiences and normative structures upon which they are based differ, those words can become not a medium for mutual understanding but rather a device that amplifies conflict. This serves as a case in point illustrating this phenomenon.

From this perspective, historical research is not merely an endeavor to reconstruct past events. As E. H. Carr stated, "History is a continuous dialogue between the present and the past," and interpretations of the past are constantly reconstructed by the international order and the problematic consciousness we face in the present.

The spaces visited during this field trip—Dejima, the Korea-Japan Exchange Exhibition Hall, Glover Garden, Shimonoseki, and Mojiko—demonstrate that the transformation of the international order was not confined to abstract conceptual changes but was realized through concrete spaces and the actions of people. Dejima was the gateway through which Western knowledge and international law first entered Japan, and Glover Garden and the treaty ports were stages where Japan presented itself as a 'modern state with treaty-making capacity.' Shimonoseki and Mojiko were pianometrics where Japan, asserting itself as an equal player among the great powers, practically employed the new language of international law. Within this spatial context, Japan did not merely accept international law but transformed it into a strategic language for external expansion and empire formation. Such historical experiences offer several important implications for contemporary Korea as well.

First, the ability to accurately understand and manage the meaning of diplomatic language is directly linked to a nation's survival. Joseon's experience in the 19th century of accepting treaty clauses without fully understanding the international legal concept of 'independence' leaves us with the lesson that we must meticulously analyze and respond to the legal and political effects of every word in treaty clauses, joint statements, and international norms today. Especially since 'strategic wording' is often used in today's international community to create de facto changes in status or room for interpretation, negotiation power surrounding language is considered a strategic resource as important as military or economic power.

Second, when the ability to perceive and interpret changes in the international order is lacking, the entities that incur the greatest costs are middle-sized powers. While Joseon viewed the collapse of the tributary system and the rise of the international legal order solely as an 'internal problem' until the very end, Japan learned the new order and utilized it to redesign its policies toward Joseon. Contemporary Korea also finds itself amidst structural changes, including US-China competition, the reorganization of the Indo-Pacific order, and the rise of the Global South. During periods of order transition, when existing norms weaken and new rules are formed, delays in perception and misjudgments can directly lead to diplomatic vulnerabilities.

Third, it is essential to become actors who can actively interpret and utilize international law, rather than subjects passively subjected to it. Japan regarded international law as an 'objective norm' and simultaneously translated and reconstructed it to suit its interests, using it as a strategic language to justify its domination over Joseon. Likewise, contemporary Korea must utilize international law in various arenas, such as the WTO, FTAs, maritime law, human rights and security norms, and investment disputes (ISDS), not merely as rules to be passively followed,

- 37 - but as tools to advance its own interests and normative aspirations. This suggests that, unlike Joseon in the past, securing initiative in the interpretation and application of legal language can be a means to offset structural disadvantages.

Fourth, the issue of 'conceptual asymmetry' that repeatedly occurs in East Asian diplomatic history is a present-day challenge. Just as the conflict between 'self-reliance' and 'independence' in the Treaty of Ganghwa revealed, today, Korea, Japan, and China use similar terms such as 'order,' 'stability,' 'autonomy,' and 'openness,' but their meanings vary significantly depending on each country's historical experiences and strategic contexts. This conceptual asymmetry, where the same expression refers to different worlds, sometimes becomes a source of amplified misunderstanding and conflict. Reflecting on past 'failures of translation between orders' is also a crucial prerequisite for designing new cooperative norms and trust-building mechanisms in East Asia today.

Ultimately, a close analysis of past clashes in order can be seen not merely as historical reminiscence, but as a task of building the 'knowledge infrastructure' necessary for designing current and future South Korean foreign policy strategies. I believe this is directly linked to the 'knowledge power' emphasized in Ha Young-sun and Namgung Gon's "The Geopolitics of Transformation."

Through the study sessions over the past few weeks, I have come to think that historical research is not about recreating past events, but rather a task of seeking directions for the present and future by exploring the various choices and possibilities of the past. I thought this was a point where my current study abroad report, and my future studies in international politics and international law could converge, and this study abroad report can be seen as a reflection of such an attempt.

Through this field trip, I was able to realize and feel that the transformation of modern East Asian history was not an abstract change in documents, but a historical process revealed through specific treaty clauses and actions in actual spaces and diplomatic arenas. I believe these changes offer important insights into South Korea's foreign policy strategies, international legal responses, and worldview formation today. The changes in the international order that Joseon failed to grasp, the language of international law that Japan skillfully utilized, and the traces left by the clash of these two worldviews will serve as essential historical resources for South Korea to redefine its position in the international community and seek more proactive diplomatic strategies and legal responses today. Based on this critical perspective, this study abroad report was my small attempt to reconnect the present-day Korea with the space by revisiting the historical sites and examining the traces of language and power inscribed in those spaces.

- 38 - [References] "Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan" (Treaty of Ganghwa), 1876. "Treaty of Shimonoseki", 1895. "Hongbeom 14 Articles", 1894.

Veritable Records of King Gojong. Compiled by the National Institute of Korean History.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Joseon Mun-gyeon Bigoh (Observations on Joseon)". Diplomatic Documents of the Meiji Era, Compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Vol. 3. Compiled by the National Institute of Korean History.

Mutsu Munemitsu, 1895. "Kenkenroku".

Memorials by Kim Yun-sik and Park Young-hyo (Included in Veritable Records of King Gojong, etc.). Kim Jong-hak. 2014. "Eulbyeong Diary". National Museum of Korea.

Institute for Korean-Japanese Relations Studies. 2017. "Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan: Questioning the Meaning of Modernity". Cheong-a Publishing. Shin Heon, Kim Jong-hak. 2010. "Simhaeng Diary: The Treaty of Ganghwa Recorded by Joseon". Pureunyeoksa. Carr, Edward Hallett. 1961. "What Is History?". Panmun Book Co. Ha Young-sun, Namgung Gon. 2012. "The Geopolitics of Transformation". Seoul: Eul-yu Publishing House.

Wheaton, Henry. 1916. "Elements of International Law". London: Sampson Low, Son & Co.

Kim Yong-gu. 1994. "Man-guk Gongbeop" (All Nations' Law). Seoul: Nanam.

Kim Yong-gu. 1996. "Clash of Worldviews and Diplomatic History of Late Joseon". Seoul: Nanam. Kim Yong-gu. 2004. "Diplomatic History of the World". Seoul: Nanam.

Okamoto Takashi. 2014. "An Unfinished Project: East Asia's Modernity Surrounding Korean Independence". Sowadang.

Kang Sang-kyu. 2007. "Paradigm Shift in 19th Century East Asia and Imperial Japan". "Nonhyeong".

Lee Geun-kwan. 2004. "A Re-evaluation of the Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan (1876) from an International Law Perspective". "Seoul Journal of International Law", Vol. 11, No. 1.

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