China's Complex Strategy Toward Taiwan in War and Non-War Situations: A Historical Perspective of the Communist Party Museum

Shin Hong-joong · Seoul National University

I. Introduction

The strategic value and political significance of Taiwan to China, coupled with the recent rapid strengthening of the naval and amphibious forces under the PLA Eastern Theater Command, have spurred active research into the impact of China's strategy toward Taiwan on the international community. Reflecting this, China's Taiwan strategy has primarily been studied within the broader theme of 'US-China maritime power competition' or through a predominantly structural approach. In this research context, Taiwan is positioned as a choke point in the US's 'Indo-Pacific Strategy' and is central to the debate on whether US-China power competition will escalate into war. That is, Taiwan has been perceived as either the first step in China's revisionist challenge to the 'Rules-based Liberal International Order' centered on the United States, or as a variable in the power balance strategies of states within the framework of 'Realism.' Research emphasizing 'Taiwan's strategic value' is also active, with the primary rationale being the significant military advantages it would provide to China as it seeks to expand its influence into the Indo-Pacific. For instance, Catlin Talmadge (2022) of MIT's Political Science department argues that if China were to gain control of Taiwan, US hegemony (or control) in the East and South China Seas would be severely threatened, and conversely, it would grant China access to maritime areas suitable for the operations of its stealthy nuclear-powered submarines, thus serving as China's objective for controlling Taiwan. Taiwan is thus a variable that determines the success or failure of US-China competition over Sea Lanes of Communications. However, the submarine operations that Talmadge extensively uses as evidence do not establish a link between securing maritime space and strengthening control over sea lanes. Underwater spaces are not suitable media for radar's electromagnetic waves; sound waves, primarily used via SONAR, are the main medium. Meanwhile, sound waves have a significantly shorter range than electromagnetic waves, and submarines, by their nature, primarily conduct 'stealth operations' to minimize detection, which limits their ability to target merchant and naval vessels sailing on the surface.

Recent research reflecting these trends includes the following perspectives from prominent domestic and international maritime strategists; Yan Xuetong (2019), Leadership and the Rise of

Great Powers, (NY: Princeton University Press); Council on Foreign

Relations (2023), Preventive Priorities Survey.; Niall Fergurson (2021.

3.21.), “A Taiwan Crisis May Mark the End of the American Empire,”

Bloomberg Opinion 21; Michael Beckley and Hal Brands (2022) Danger

Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, (W. W. Norton & Company);

(Ban Gil-ju (2020), “East Asian Offensive Maritimeism: Aggressive Realist Theory and Northeast Asian Maritime Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27(2); Lim Kyung-han (2025), “New Cold War and US-China Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Competition,” Journal of International and Regional Studies 34(1)

210) Research starting from the perspective of 'Taiwan's strategic value' and its implications for the US-China military balance after Taiwan's control includes Brenden Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge

(2022), “Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese

Control of Taiwan,” International Security 47(1); other major foreign research on China's maritime and naval strategy can be found in: Stephen Biddle

and Ivan Oelrich (2016), “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific:

Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. Air Sea Battle, and Command of

the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41(1); Eric

Heginbotham et. al, “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces,

Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017” (Santa

Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2015); Michael Beckley (2017), “The Emerging

Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can Check

Chinese Naval Expansion,” International Security 42(2). The link between securing maritime space and strengthening control over sea lanes is not established. Underwater spaces are not suitable media for radar's electromagnetic waves; sound waves, primarily used via SONAR, are the main medium. Meanwhile, sound waves have a significantly shorter range than electromagnetic waves, and submarines, by their nature, primarily conduct 'stealth operations' to minimize detection, which limits their ability to target merchant and naval vessels sailing on the surface.

If the research trends described above represent an interpretation of the Taiwan issue from an external dimension, research viewing China's Taiwan strategy from an internal dimension is synthesized in If China Attacks (2006).211) Steve Tsang argues that if Taiwan continuously crosses or approaches China's 'red line,' it could trigger 'nationalism,' and citing Yan Xuetong's assertion, suggests that the decision to use force would be made for the purpose of 'pre-empting national disintegration.' Maochun Yu expands on this by arguing that China, based on its national characteristic of traditionally using war as a means of diplomacy, i.e., 'Cultural Realism,' might resolve the Taiwan issue through force.

There is also research analyzing Taiwan from a Confucian order perspective. According to Gu Jin-young (2023), Taiwan exists within the 'Sino-sphere' (Zhonghua Quan), an sphere of influence divided into internal and external spheres. China seeks to manage entities that disrupt order through the concept of 'harmony,' applying military force to 'internal order' and appeasement and isolation to 'external order' to maintain that order. 211) If China Attacks Taiwan : Military Strategy, Politics and Economics,

edited by Steve Tsang (2006), Taylor & Francis Group

212) Steve Tsang, If China Attacks Taiwan, pp.22-38.; Maochun Yu, Ibid,

pp.40-42.; Yan Xuetong (2004) “Origins of the Policy to ‘Pay any Price

to Contain Taiwan’s Independence’,” China Strategy vol.3. According to this perspective, Taiwan belongs to the internal order of the Sino-sphere, thus China must govern Taiwan, even by military force. In Taiwan's case, being within the sphere of Chinese influence, China is compelled to respond strongly to any issues that arise. In other words, as long as the United States continues to raise the Taiwan issue, Taiwan will inevitably become the forefront of US-China conflict.213)

Meanwhile, on the ground, the narrative of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is becoming a foregone conclusion. In 2023, CIA Director William Burns stated that President Xi Jinping had instructed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared for a potential invasion of Taiwan by 2027.214) Subsequently, in 2024, US Indo-Pacific Commander Samuel Paparo warned that China would invade Taiwan in 2027 and is consistently conducting rehearsals for future military operations.215) Furthermore, war simulations are actively underway, treating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as an immutable constant and exploring how the United States should engage militarily, directly or indirectly.216)

Therefore, does China's strategy toward Taiwan exclusively presuppose a full-scale invasion using only military means? This paper argues that, contrary to the claims of existing academic and policy research, China's strategy is not solely based on the 'invasion of Taiwan' narrative consistently presented in academic and intelligence reports from various countries, including the United States. Instead, China is implementing distinct strategies tailored to different phases, commensurate with the complexity of cross-strait relations.

pp.145-147.

214) Taipei Times (2023. 2. 4.), “CIA head warns against underestimating

Xi, ”

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/02/04/200379

3705?utm_source

215) Jennifer Hlad (2025. 2.13.) “China is rehearsing for war, Indo-Pacific

commander says,” Defense One

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/02/china-rehearsing-war-indo-

pacific-commander-says/403011/?utm_source

216) A representative example is the CSIS report from 2023, The First Battle of the Next War:

Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan (2023, January).

Through research, the author argues that China's strategy toward Taiwan should be analyzed with a focus on its 'complexity,' as it is formulated and implemented in both non-war and war dimensions. While this will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, the non-war strategy is being pursued through 'gray zone operations' that mobilize non-military national capabilities, and the war strategy is focused on preparing for 'amphibious operations' through force development. Therefore, this paper will present the author's argument in the following order: First, Chapter II will clarify China's perspective on the Taiwan issue and strategy. Chapters III and IV will analyze China's gray zone operations and military operation scenarios toward Taiwan, respectively. Finally, Chapter V will emphasize the 'complexity' and 'simultaneity' of China's 'Taiwan strategy' and present the conclusion of this paper.

II. Research Framework

1. Taiwan from China's Perspective: 'Domestic Issue' of Cross-Strait Relations

In 2021, at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee, Xi Jinping adopted the <Party's Overall Strategy for Resolving the Taiwan Question in the New Era>217), clearly proclaiming China's perspective toward Taiwan. The core message is that resolving the Taiwan question is an essential task for the 'new era' of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, thus implying an approach that mobilizes politics, diplomacy, economy, military, psychological warfare, and legal warfare to navigate cross-strait relations. Meanwhile, the wording of China's Taiwan unification strategy, which was 'Process of Peaceful Reunification of the Motherland'218) until 2023, was changed to 'Great Cause of National Unification' in 2024, signifying the deletion of the word 'peaceful.'219)

What, then, is the reason for the escalating efforts by China to strengthen its control over Taiwan? This is because the importance of 'security' (referring to the concept of security in Korea) is increasingly growing for China, and Taiwan is a vital interest in this security matter. Here, security primarily refers to 'national security,' a concept presented as 'comprehensive national security'220) at the first Central National Security Commission meeting during the early period of Xi Jinping's administration. Subsequently, as the 'national security' domain is separately discussed in the <Decision> of the 20th Central Committee's Third Plenary Session in 2024, security is an increasingly emphasized area for the leadership of the Communist Party of China. Cho Young-nam (2024, 2025) analyzes this by stating that within 'national security,' the 'political security' domain, which refers to the leadership of the Communist Party and the socialist system, is the most crucial.

218) Chinese: 祖國和平統一進程

219) Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (2025), "Prospects and Tasks for the Defense Policy Environment," p.54; Yew Lun

Tian and Laurie Chen (2024, March 5), “China drops 'peaceful

reunification' reference to Taiwan, raises defence spending by 2024-03-05/” Reuters,

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-drops-peaceful-reunificati

on-reference-taiwan-raises-defence-spending-by-2024-03-05/

220) Scope of 'Security': Includes political, territorial, military, economic, cultural, social, scientific and technological, cyber, environmental, resource, nuclear, overseas interests, space, deep sea, polar, and biological security.

221) Cho Young-nam (2025), "The Current Status and Prospects of Chinese Politics in 2024: Focusing on the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," "2024 China Political Report," Korea National Diplomatic Academy Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security; Cho Young-nam (2024), "Much Ado About Nothing? An Analysis of the

CCP’s Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee," The

Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 36(4) Furthermore, Taiwan, historically along with Hong Kong and Macau, has been recognized as territory within 'inner China' or 'China proper' since the past. Taylor Fravel views China's consolidation of control over Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau in terms of 'territorial disputes within the mainland.' Indeed, major Chinese leaders such as Sun Yat-sen have emphasized that securing control over territories corresponding to the 'mainland' and recovering these regions are essential to completing the modern task of 'the unification of the Chinese nation.'222) Among these, Taiwan is considered central to China's national interests, both in terms of physical area (as shown in Table 1) and importance. It is the only mainland territory where China has sought to consolidate its control through the use of regular military force in the context of armed conflict, as evidenced by the First (1954-1955), Second (1958), and Third (1995-1996) Taiwan Strait Crises.

222) Taylor Fravel (2008), "China's Territorial Disputes (Original title: Strong

Borders, Secure Nation)" (Seoul: Kim & Kim Books), pp.89-92. Table 1 Comparison of Mainland China Disputes (1949-2005)

Area Importance Score Use of Force Dispute Area Agreement Compromise

(km²) (salience score) Yes/No

1984

Hong Kong 1,092 11 - - 223)

(Joint Declaration)

1984

Macau 28 11 - -

(Joint Declaration)

Taiwan 35,980 12 - - Y * Source: Taylor Fravel (2008), "China's Territorial Disputes (Original title:

Strong Borders, Secure Nation)" (Seoul: Kim & Kim Books), p.85

The importance of Taiwan to security is expected to remain a top priority for China, and under the overall leadership of the Communist Party, efforts to strengthen control are likely to continue or intensify. This can be inferred from the fact that the Communist Party's overall leadership principle for 'security' policies was officially discussed within the Party. While the 'principle of overall Party leadership' was a main rhetoric during the Mao Zedong era, it was deleted from the Party Constitution at the 12th National Congress (1982) after Deng Xiaoping came to power. However, Xi Jinping convened the 3rd Plenum of the 19th Central Committee (2018) to focus solely on 'political reform,' and unlike Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, who did not include it in the Party Constitution, he has revived the concept of overall Party leadership.

223) Although no force was used to consolidate control/authority over Hong Kong until 2005, large-scale protests against the "Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill" occurred in Hong Kong in 2019, which were suppressed by force. In 2020, Xi Jinping consolidated the Party's control over Hong Kong by implementing the National Security Law. For details, refer to: UK Government website (Gov.UK) "Country policy and

information note: Hong Kong national security legislation, China, April

2025" (updated 2025. 6.27.),

2. Strategy from a Chinese Perspective: The Distinction Between War and Non-War Scenarios and the Complexity/Simultaneity of Strategy

What specifically does strategy mean to China? China defines strategic planning in its 2020 publication, "Science of Military Strategy." According to this, strategic planning involves translating strategic decisions into concrete actions and deployments. Such strategic planning consists of ① development plan for military power building, ② war and non-war plans, ③ strategic resource allocation control, ④ cross-departmental and cross-field coordination, and ⑤ national defense and economic construction.226) A particularly noteworthy aspect of the "Science of Military Strategy" is the distinction made between war plans and non-war plans by defining non-war plans as "action plans and scope for carrying out military missions in non-war situations using military power." This highlights that the study of China's military strategy should recognize that the development of military power, which mobilizes national capabilities, is not solely for the purpose of waging war.

As discussed in the previous section, China considers Taiwan central to its national security and political security. Furthermore, China develops and implements both war and non-war strategies for Taiwan in a complex manner. For instance, recent reports published by US foreign policy and national security think tanks, CSIS and RAND, indicate the complexity of China's strategy towards Taiwan. First, CSIS, which analyzed 'war strategy,' evaluated in a 2023 wargame that China's scenarios for occupying Taiwan are likely to unfold in three main ways. The base scenario was that the US-Taiwan-Japan joint forces would paralyze China's military power by destroying its invasion forces before the full-scale occupation operation of Taiwan began. The optimistic scenarios involved an even swifter victory for the US, Taiwan, and Japan, while the pessimistic scenario involved China partially succeeding in occupying ports and airports but being neutralized by counterattacks from the US, Taiwan, and Japan during the subsequent control phase. However, in the Taiwan stands alone scenario, China achieved an overwhelming victory. Ultimately, CSIS recommends that US support is essential for Taiwan's survival.227)

RAND, which analyzed China's 'non-war strategy' in its 2024 report, analyzed that China is conducting gray zone operations in the "operational space between peace and war" to strengthen its control in various maritime areas. In other countries' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs), China is expanding its influence through demonstrations and displays that mix military and non-military means, utilizing not only naval and air forces but also the Chinese Coast Guard and the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia. These Chinese gray zone operations are particularly intense not only around Taiwan but also in the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands.228)

3. Objective of This Study: Analysis from 'China's Perspective' and a 'State-Centric Approach'

As reviewed in the preceding two sections, China's strategy towards Taiwan from a Chinese perspective is limited when analyzed using the approaches employed in previous studies discussed in the introduction. Therefore, Taiwan strategy needs to be re-examined from a Chinese perspective. Accordingly, it is necessary to re-examine the territorial dispute resolution strategies that China has employed towards its neighbors and the mainland (Taiwan, Macau, Hong Kong) through Taylor Fravel's (2008) research, "Strong

Borders, Secure Nation (Korean: China's Territorial Disputes)." In this study, Fravel adopted a 'state-centric approach,' and the background for examining China's strategy within this framework is as follows: First, territorial disputes, which involve conflicts between states over control of specific regions, are inherently linked to the core interest of state sovereignty. Second, as actors operating on both international and domestic political stages, the internal dynamics and pursuit of national interests within a state ultimately manifest externally. Third, by considering both the domestic political and international political benefits derived from a state's actions, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the influence a state's power has on the international community.229)

When and how does a state utilize its power? Fravel argues, based on a state-centric analysis of China's strategy, that China adopts an 'escalation strategy' when its claim strength230) in territories it consistently maintains or perceives a need to control is threatened. A state's claim strength over a specific region or territory is a matter of national pride at a minimum, and a key measure of national power at a maximum. A state primarily employs military and political measures231) as part of its escalation strategy to restore its strength and enhance its negotiating position. Therefore, based on the approaches examined above, China's actions of encircling or intentionally crossing air, sea, and land areas near Taiwan using military and non-military means can be interpreted as efforts to enhance its claim strength over Taiwan. Re-examining the Taiwan issue from a state-centric approach, or more specifically, from 'China's perspective' as limited to this paper, will provide greater coherence in understanding the complexity of China's strategy towards Taiwan.

Therefore, this paper hypothesizes that from China's perspective, Taiwan is an internal affair and a mainland dispute, and China's objective is to consolidate its claim strength over Taiwan. Furthermore, as examined in the previous section, this study will focus on the fact that China distinguishes between war and non-war scenarios for Taiwan and employs both military and non-military means in all scenarios to ultimately consolidate its claim strength over Taiwan.

III. China's Strategy Towards Taiwan in Non-War Scenarios: Gray Zone Operations

2. China's Strategic Perspective: The Dichotomy of War/Non-War and the Complexity/Simultaneity of Strategy

What exactly does strategy mean for China? China defines strategic planning in its 2020 publication, "Science of Military Strategy." According to this definition, strategic planning is the process of translating strategic decisions into concrete actions and deployments. This strategic planning comprises ① development plan for military power building, ② war and non-war plans, ③ strategic resource allocation control, ④ cross-departmental and cross-field coordination, and ⑤ national defense and economic construction. 226) Notably, a significant aspect of the "Science of Military Strategy" is its distinction between war and non-war plans, defining non-war plans as "action plans and scope for carrying out military missions in non-war situations using military force." This distinction highlights that the development of military power through mobilization of national capabilities, as studied in China's military strategy, is not solely for the purpose of waging war.

224) "Deepening the Reform Plan of Party and State Institutions," People's Daily, www.people.com.cn; "Reform Plan of Party and State Institutions," People's Daily, www.people.com.cn; Cho, Young-nam (2025), Report on Chinese Affairs

pp. 36-43." cited

225) A notable continuity is that the <National Defense> sector was uniquely discussed in the 18th (2013) and 20th (2024) Central Committee plenums.

This sector was discussed with the Central Military Commission taking the lead. The main topic was the deepening of reforms in national defense and the military.

226) CASI (China Aerospace Studies Institute) (2022), Science of Military Strategy 2020, Air University, pp. 66-68. It is particularly noteworthy in the "Science of Military Strategy" that non-war plans are defined as "action plans and scope for carrying out military missions in non-war situations using military force," thereby distinguishing them from war plans. This implies that when studying China's military strategy, the development of military power through the mobilization of national capabilities is not exclusively for the purpose of war.

As discussed in the previous section, China considers Taiwan central to its national security and political security. Furthermore, China develops and implements both war and non-war strategies towards Taiwan in a complex manner. Representatively, recent reports published by U.S. foreign policy and national security think tanks CSIS and RAND indicate the complexity of China's strategy towards Taiwan. First, CSIS, which analyzed "war strategies," evaluated through war games conducted in 2023 that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would likely unfold in three main scenarios. The base scenario was a result where the U.S.-Taiwan-Japan joint forces would destroy China's amphibious forces, paralyzing its military power, even before China's invasion operations fully commenced. The optimistic scenarios envisioned an even swifter victory for the U.S.-Taiwan-Japan alliance, while the pessimistic scenarios suggested that China would achieve partial success in occupying ports and airports but would be subsequently neutralized by counterattacks from the U.S.-Taiwan-Japan forces during the control phase. However, in the Taiwan stands alone scenario, China achieves an overwhelming victory. Ultimately, CSIS recommends that U.S. support is essential for Taiwan's survival.227)

227) Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, Eric Heginbotham (2023), "The First Battle of the Next War," CSIS International Security Program (January, 2023).

RAND, which analyzed China's "non-war strategies," concluded in a 2024 report that China is conducting gray zone operations in the "operational space between peace and war" to strengthen its control in various maritime areas. The report indicates that China is expanding its influence in other countries' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) by employing a mix of military and non-military means, including demonstrations and displays of force by its naval and air forces, as well as its coast guard and maritime militia. These gray zone operations by China are particularly intense not only around Taiwan but also in the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands.228)

3. Objectives of This Study: Analysis from 'China's Perspective' and a 'State-Centric Approach'

As reviewed in the preceding two sections, analyzing Taiwan strategy from a Chinese perspective is limited by the preceding studies and the approaches they employ. Therefore, Taiwan strategy must be re-examined from a Chinese perspective. To this end, it is necessary to review China's strategies for resolving territorial disputes with neighboring countries and its mainland (Taiwan, Macao, Hong Kong) through the research of Taylor Fravel (2008), "Strong Borders, Secure Nation." Fravel conducted his research using a "state-centric approach." The background for examining China's strategy within this framework is as follows: First, territorial disputes, which involve conflicts between states over control of specific regions, are inherently linked to the core interest of national sovereignty. Second, as actors operating on both international and domestic political stages, a state's internal dynamics and pursuits of national interest are ultimately reflected externally. Third, by considering both the domestic and international political benefits that a state gains from its actions, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the influence a state's power has on the international community.229)

Borders, Secure Nation (Korean translation: China's Territorial Disputes)

(January, 2023)

228) Todd C. Helmus, Krista Romita Grocholski, Tyler Liggett, Ashley L.

Rhoades, Scott Savitz, Keytin Palmer (2024), "Understanding and

Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations," RAND Research

Report (May, 2024)

When and how does a state utilize its power? Fravel argues, based on his state-centric analysis of China's strategy, that China adopts an "escalation strategy" when the claim strength in territories it consistently maintains or perceives a need to control is threatened. A state's claim strength over a specific region or territory is a matter of national pride at a minimum and a key measure of national power at a maximum. In response, a state primarily employs military and political measures231) as an escalation strategy to regain control and enhance its bargaining power. Therefore, actions taken by China, such as encircling or intentionally crossing air, sea, and land areas around Taiwan using military and non-military means, can be interpreted as efforts to enhance its claim strength over Taiwan. Re-examining the Taiwan issue from a state-centric approach, or specifically the "Chinese perspective" as in this paper, would provide greater coherence in understanding the complexity of China's strategy towards Taiwan.

Borders, Secure Nation) (Seoul: Kim & Kim Books), pp. 40-43.

230) Claim strength here refers to ① the scope of territory a state occupies in a disputed space and ② the ability to exercise its rights over the entire disputed region, even if not directly under its control, and its capacity to project military power. Fravel argues that a state will consider the use of force when there is a significant change in claim strength. For further details, refer to "China's Territorial Disputes (Original title: Strong Borders, Secure Nation),"

control over the entire disputed region, even if not directly under its control, and its capacity to project military power.

Fravel argues that a state will consider the use of force when there is a significant change in claim strength.

For further details, refer to "China's Territorial Disputes (Original title: Strong Borders, Secure Nation)"

pp. 36-110.

231) 'Military measures' include increasing troop deployment in the disputed area, reinforcing defenses along the border, and recovering lost territories and negotiating power. Therefore, the actions taken by China to surround or intentionally cross the air, space, and maritime zones around Taiwan using military and non-military means can be interpreted as movements aimed at enhancing its claim strength over Taiwan. Viewing the Taiwan issue from the perspective of a state-centric approach, or specifically the 'Chinese perspective' as adopted in this paper, will lend greater coherence to understanding the complexity of China's strategy towards Taiwan.

Therefore, this paper hypothesizes that from China's perspective, Taiwan is both an internal political issue and a mainland dispute, and China's objective is to solidify its claim strength over Taiwan. As examined in the previous section, this study will focus on the fact that China distinguishes between war and non-war scenarios for Taiwan and employs both military and non-military means in all scenarios to ultimately consolidate its claim strength over Taiwan.

III. China's Strategy Toward Taiwan in Non-War Situations: Gray Zone Operations

1. Concept of Gray Zone Operations

Following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022 and President Lai Ching-te's state of the nation address in 2024, China conducted encirclement drills around Taiwan immediately after both events. These actions served as warnings to the United States and Taiwan.

strengthening combat readiness of nearby forces, and developing the combat capabilities of the parties involved in the conflict. 'Political

actions' include administrative declarations or assertions of force to incorporate disputed areas into one's territory, the construction of

infrastructure to control disputed areas such as road construction, and the holding of elections (votes) to strengthen the exercise of rights.

For details, refer to "China's Territorial Disputes (Original: Strong

Borders, Secure Nation)" pp. 63-64. c. In 2022, immediately after Pelosi's visit, China mobilized major forces from its Eastern Theater Command to conduct intense drills, including live-fire exercises, in six maritime zones surrounding Taiwan, escalating the situation to a point where it was referred to as the 'Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis'.232) Notably, by conducting drills in four maritime zones to the southeast, beyond Taiwan's key defense area in the northeast, China demonstrated its capability to breach Taiwan's 'defense line'.233) The 'Joint Sword 2024B' exercise, conducted after President Lai Ching-te's address in 2024, lasted only 13 hours but involved the largest number of naval assets (26 vessels) assembled in a single day. Furthermore, emphasizing that the issue is internal to Taiwan, China deployed 13 coast guard vessels to conduct patrol operations not only around Taiwan and its outlying islands but also around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.234)

These encirclement and coercive operations/drills by China are not new. Even after the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, China conducted high-intensity military demonstrations during the First (1954-1955), Second (1958), and Third (1995-1996) 'Taiwan Strait Crises' whenever it felt its control over Taiwan was threatened. However, before and after these military actions, China either provoked active U.S. intervention or solidified the Mutual Defense Treaty between Taiwan and the United States, which was signed before the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Moreover, during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, China could not avoid feeling the risk of large-scale direct military conflict with the United States. Particularly, the risk of military conflict has continuously escalated since the Trump administration took office in 2016. 232) Christopher Twomey (August 22, 2022), “The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis

is Just Starting,” War on the Rocks

233) Derek Grossman (2025), “The Chinese Communist Party’s Gray Zone

Tactics Against Taiwan,” Global Taiwan Institute, pp. 2-3.

234) “Analyzing China’s Escalation After Taiwan President William Lai’s

National Day Speech,” China Power, CSIS, (October 2024). This risk has inevitably intensified with the increasing frequency of U.S. 'Freedom of Navigation Operations' as illustrated in <Figure 1> below. <Figure 1> Trend of U.S. 'Freedom of Navigation Operations' in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait 235)

* Source: Todd C. Helmus, Krista Romita Grocholski, Tyler Liggett, Ashley L. Rhoades, Scott Savitz, Keytin Palmer (2024), “Understanding

and Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” RAND

Research Report, p. 43.

Therefore, China is strengthening its control over Taiwan and its maritime control in nearby waters by employing strategies and operations significantly different from the past. Regarding issues like Taiwan, and other areas and targets affecting China's 'security', China is actively pursuing operations that are less intense than armed conflict, without resorting to war as a political tool. 235) For a detailed overview of U.S. 'Freedom of Navigation Operations', refer to the following Congressional Research Service report: Ronald O'Rourke (2025), “U.S.-China Strategic Competition

in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress,”

CRS Report, Congressional Research Service This is what China refers to as a "war without gunfire", 236) also known as 'Gray Zone operations'.

CRS Report, Congressional Research Service. China describes this as a "war without gunsmoke,"236) also referred to as 'Gray Zone' operations.

The gray zone is a competitive interaction that exists between the duality of war and peace. It is more direct than peacetime competition but does not involve military conflict. Michael Mazarr of the RAND Corporation defined gray zone operations as subtle operations between peace and war. That is, actions taken to achieve strategic objectives or improve the international environment without resorting to conflict.237) Kim Jeong-min (2024) synthesized domestic and international research on gray zone operations that has gained momentum since Mazarr's study, emphasizing that military strategies in the gray zone are primarily characterized by asymmetry, gradualism, and ambiguity. <Table 1> below summarizes the main characteristics of gray zone strategies.

236) Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson (2019), China’s Maritime

Gray Zone Operations, United States Naval Institute, (Translated: China's

Maritime Gray Zone Operations, Seoul: Park Young Sa) pp. 1-2.

237) Morris, L. J. et al. (2019). Gaining Competitive Advantage in the

Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the

Threshold of Major War. RAND. <Table 2> Characteristics of Gray Zone Strategy 238)

Category Details

- Asymmetry of Interests: Divergent interests sought by actors. Asymmetry - Asymmetry of Capabilities: Utilizes both military and non-military means

limiting the use of symmetrical means for response.

- Gradualism of Duration: Utilizing national

integrated capabilities over ample time.

Gradualism

- Gradualism of Means: Maintaining conflict levels below

the threshold where response is justifiable.

- Ambiguity of Prediction: Difficulty in determining intentions, means, timing, location, actors, and methods.

Ambiguity

- Ambiguity of Evaluation: Difficulty in determining conflict levels, violations of international law, etc.

Limitation

* Source: Kim Jeong-min (2024), “The Origin and Application of China's Gray Zone Strategy,”

“Journal of National Defense Policy,” Vol. 40, No. 3, p. 14.

Strategically, China strives to achieve the goal of 'national rejuvenation' in the gray zone. RAND (2024) analyzed that the ultimate objectives pursued by China's gray zone operations are: ① protecting economic resources in territorial dispute areas, ② deterring the capabilities of competitors in those areas, ③ strengthening control in territorial dispute areas, ④ defending against attacks on mainland China, and ⑤ reserving (securing) combat space for future battles.239) Furthermore, from China's perspective, gray zone operations are not for achieving short-term goals. Rather, China's gray zone operations are a long-term strategy requiring patience, aimed at subjugating Taiwan without a fight (bu zhan sheng).240) In other words, as summarized in the table above, China conducts gray zone operations with the goal of gradually gaining control over Taiwan over an extended period. <Figure 2> below illustrates the anticipated pattern of China's 'gradualist' actions analyzed by Taiwan's diplomatic and security think tank, Global Taiwan Institute.

was compiled and synthesized from the following research: Michael Green et al. (2017). Countering Coercion in Maritime

Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence, CSIS.;

Morris, L. J. et al. (2019). Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray

Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold

of Major War. RAND.; Jeong Gu-yeon. (2018). “Sino-US Power Transition and Changes in U.S. Maritime Strategy: Focusing on Gray Zone Conflicts.” “National Strategy,” Vol. 24, No. 3.; Ban Gil-ju. (2020). “Gray Zone Strategy of Northeast Asian Countries Towards South Korea and South Korea's Response Measures.” “Korea Military,” Issue No. 7. 239) Todd C. Helmus, Krista Romita Grocholski, Tyler Liggett, Ashley L. Rhoades, Scott Savitz, Keytin Palmer (2024), “Understanding and

Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” RAND Research

Report

<Figure 2> Stages of Gray Zone Tactics (Analysis as a Structural Framework)

* Source: Sze-Fung Lee (2024), “Decoding Beijing’s Gray Zone Tactics: China Coast Guard Activities and the Redefinition of Conflict in the

Taiwan Strait,” Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 9, Issue 6, p. 8.

Rhoades, Scott Savitz, Keytin Palmer (2024), “Understanding and

Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” RAND Research

Report

240) Isaac Kardon and Jennifer Kavanagh (May 21, 2024), “How China

Will Squeeze, Not Seize, Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs.

As part of its whole-of-nation approach, China utilizes 'layering.' This involves employing various tactics simultaneously or sequentially across multiple domains. Through this, China simultaneously or sequentially implements the 'Three Warfares Strategy'—media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare—which it pursues in the gray zone. For instance, China consistently rejects dispute resolution under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or refuses to comply with arbitral tribunal rulings as part of its defensive maritime legal warfare.243) 244) Furthermore, the Permanent Court of Arbitration is 241) T.C.Helmus, K.R.Grocholski, T.Liggett, A.L.Rhoades, S.Savitz,

K. Palmer (2024), “China in the Gray Zone,” in Understanding and

Countering China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, edt, RAND

pp.21-23.

242) This perspective is revealed in Article 7 and Article 56 of the <Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defense>:

“Defending the country and resisting aggression” is a sacred duty, and the development of national defense must be supported even in “non-war military operations.”

243) The content related to 'legal warfare' in this section primarily refers to the research report by “Jeong Hyun-wook (2025), ‘Analysis of China’s Maritime Legal Warfare and Our Response Strategies,’ INSS Strategic Report No. 324, Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS).”

244) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2014.12.7.),

Summary of the Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Jurisdictional Issues of the Arbitration Case Filed by the Republic of the Philippines, arguing that the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" cannot be used to adjudicate China's territorial sovereignty issues, as it is not a binding body.245) Furthermore, this legal warfare functions as a means to legitimize the de facto military use of the China Coast Guard and the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia.246)

A prime example is the "Coast Guard Law (海警法)" enacted in February 2021 as part of offensive maritime legal warfare. Based on this law, the China Coast Guard has been granted the authority to use weapons against foreign vessels that intrude into waters claimed by China.247) Additionally, after the "Coast Guard Armed Forces," previously managed by the State Oceanic Administration, were reorganized into the "Coast Guard Detachment of the People's Armed Police Force" by the Standing Committee of the 13th National People's Congress in 2018, the control of the Coast Guard was transferred from the State Council to the Central Military Commission.248) Consequently, the China Coast Guard has not only assumed the role of a military organization in terms of domestic law and command and control systems but has also gained an advantage in maintaining 'ambiguity' for the opposing side.

https://www.mfa.gov.cn/nanhai/chn/snhwtlcwj/201606/t20160602_8521032.htm 245) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2016.7.12.),

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on the Ruling Made by the Arbitral Tribunal Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines in the South China Sea Arbitration Case,

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/chn/snhwtlcwj/201607/t20160712_8521047.ht

m#:~:text=%E

5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E5%BA%94%E8%8F%B2%E5%BE%8B%E5%AE%BE%E5%85

%B1%E5%92%8C%E5%9B%BD%E5%8D%95,%E7%9A%84%E6%9C%89%E5%85%B3%

E4%BA%89%E8%AE%AE%E6%8F%90%E8%B5%B7%E4%

BB%B2%E8%A3%81%E3%80%82

246) The Maritime Militia refers to an organization composed of ordinary fishermen and merchant ship crews who operate during peacetime but undergo military training to provide military support missions under military command and control when necessary.

247) Article 7, Article 56 of the "Coast Guard Law (海警法)"; National People's Congress (2021.1.22.),

“Law of the People's Republic of China on the Coast Guard”, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202101/ec50f6

2e31a6434bb6682d435a906045.shtml

248) China Oceanic Development Research Center (2022.1.24.),

“Jin Yongming: The Development History of China's Foreign-Related Maritime Law Enforcement Mechanism and the Scope of 'Jurisdictional Waters'”,

https://aoc.ouc.edu.cn/_t719/2022/0222/c9821a362769/page.htm In addition to the Coast Guard, the Maritime Militia, primarily composed of fishing and merchant ship crews, is also currently under the command and control system of the Central Military Commission for military training. The Maritime Militia serves as a means to confuse the opposing side regarding the symmetry of response. Although the military is the entity that utilizes it, questions will inevitably arise in the field regarding the appropriateness of mobilizing the military to respond to fishing and merchant ships. Ultimately, the opposing side cannot identify the perpetrator of provocations carried out by the Maritime Militia, yet is unable to respond appropriately. Through this, China is strengthening its maritime territorial claims and justifying the exploitation of seabed and fishery resources.249)

<Figure 3> Dense Formation of China's Maritime Militia Fleet

* Source: Lee Seo-hang (2017), “Beware of China’s New Fishermen Force, the ‘Maritime Militia,’”

Maritime Strategy Research Institute,

KIMS Periscope No. 76

Meanwhile, China's gray zone operations against Taiwan are expected to expand beyond the maritime domain into cyberspace and outer space in the future. As early as 2019, 249) Kim Jeong-min (2024), “The Origin and Application of China's Gray Zone Strategy,” Defense Policy Review 40(3),

pp.23-24. Chinese hackers engaged in operations to oppose the re-election of Tsai Ing-wen, while promoting a candidate from the New Party, which is relatively pro-China compared to the Democratic Progressive Party.250) James A. Lewis, who studies Chinese cyber hacking at CSIS, has raised the possibility that Taiwanese citizens' text messages, emails, and video content could be disrupted by artificial intelligence.251) Furthermore, in addition to encirclement and blockade drills using naval power, gray zone operations in outer space could occur, disrupting Taiwan's entire communication network. Taiwan is introducing satellites, including Starlink, with China's satellite jamming in mind, and has announced plans to develop its own satellites starting in 2026.252) In response, China recently demonstrated its capability to neutralize 1,400 of Taiwan's Starlink satellites within 12 hours using only 99 anti-satellite systems under central control, through computer simulations.253)

250) Paul Huang (2019. 6.26.), “Chinese Cyber Operatives Boosted

Taiwan’s Insurgent Candidate,” Foreign Policy

251) James Andrew Lewis (2023 August), “Cyberattack on Civilian Critical

Infrastructures in Taiwan Scenario,” CSIS

252) Eric Cheung (2024. 5. 4.), “Developing Taiwan’s Own ‘Starlink’

Crucial for Island-wide Emergency, Space Agency Says,” CNN

253) Stephen Chen (2025. 1.12.), “Chinese Scientists Simulate ‘Hunting’

Starlink Satellites in Orbit,” South China Morning Post <Figure 4> Logic of China's Gray Zone Operations

* Source: “China in the Gray Zone,” in Understanding and Countering

China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, edt, (2024), RAND,

p.ⅩⅡ(preface page 12).

IV. China's Strategy Toward Taiwan in a War Situation: Occupying Taiwan through Amphibious Operations

1. Conditions for the Use of Force for Taiwan's Unification

China has stipulated conditions for unifying Taiwan by force in the "Anti-Secession Law" enacted in 2005, which are: ① Taiwan declares independence (including a referendum on independence), ② external forces intervene significantly, or ③ the possibility of unification is nonexistent (or has become remote).254) Despite this, after President Lai Ching-te took office, Taiwan explicitly rejected the 'One China Principle' during the National Day (Double Ten Day) celebration on October 10, 2024, and visited Pacific island nations that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan from December 1 to 6 of the same year. Furthermore, Lai Ching-te continued his itinerary by stopping in Guam and Hawaii to hold forums or communicate with key American politicians.255)

Meanwhile, the Democratic Progressive Party presidents of Taiwan, from Tsai Ing-wen to Lai Ching-te, and active pro-Taiwan diplomatic actions by the United States are fueling China's preparations for the use of force for Taiwan's unification. Taylor Fravel (2023) argues that for China, Taiwan's unification is fundamentally a political issue, and therefore, the decision on whether to use force against Taiwan must be understood within the political context. Consequently, China's policy for Taiwan's unification targets two groups: first, the leadership of Taiwan, and second, the United States, which supports Taiwan.256) In response, China sent a strong message to separatists yearning for Taiwan's independence and external forces (especially the United States) at a symposium celebrating the 20th anniversary of the enactment of the "Anti-Secession Law" held in March 2025. The core message was that both countries facing each other across the Taiwan Strait are one China, and resolving the Taiwan issue is an internal affair of the PRC.257)

254) US Indo-Pacific Command (2023) China’s Anti-Secession Law,

USINDOPACOM J06/SJA TACAID SERIES). Source:

https://www.pacom.mil/Portals/55/Documents/Legal/J06%20TACAID%20

-%20THE%20PRC%27S%20ANTI-SECESSION%20LAW%20VER%202.pdf?ve

r=Y_3C_j58gshIVL3_iold4Q%3D%3D

255) Cho Young-nam, “Assessment of China's 2024 Political Situation and Outlook for 2025,” Pacific Report, Seoul National

University Institute of International Studies p.6

256) M. Taylor Fravel (2023) “China’s Potential Lessons from Ukraine for

Conflict over Taiwan,” The Washington Quarterly 46(3), pp.9-10. <Figure 5> (Left) Deng Xiaoping's Declaration of 'One Country, Two Systems'

* Source: Direct photograph of an exhibit inside the Museum of the Communist Party History

<Figure 6> Jiang Zemin's Diplomatic/Taiwan Unification Strategy

* Source: Direct photograph of an exhibit inside the Museum of the Communist Party History 257) Xinhua Commentary (2025. 3.15.) “Anti-Secession Law a strong,

effective deterrent to “Taiwan independence”,” Source:

https://english.news.cn/20250315/c22276521bb648d5b01d639c7bb53c90/

c.html 2. War Strategy at the Strategic/Operational Level

Although the most recently published Chinese work, "Science of Military Strategy 2020" (hereinafter referred to as "Military Strategy"), does not directly mention Taiwan, it implies China's strategy toward Taiwan by using the term "Island Operations." According to "Military Strategy," island operations are divided into blockade and landing. First, "Island Blockade Operations" refer to three-dimensional blockade using joint forces, joint firepower, and comprehensive obstacles, and "Island Landing Operations" are offensive operations against islands occupied by the enemy, involving multi-dimensional space (multi-domain) combat.258)

First, the execution aspects of "Island Blockade Operations" can be inferred from the three Chinese exercises conducted between 2022 and 2024. Notably, while 2022 was a collection of independent "joint service training" comprising air operations, rocket/missile launches, joint blockade, and ground training, 2023 evolved into full-fledged "joint exercises" consisting of all-domain joint training, precision strike training, and joint interdiction and blockade training. Furthermore, 2024 saw exercises involving the full mobilization of civilian, governmental, and military forces, including gray zone operations. Table 3 below compares and analyzes China's Taiwan blockade exercises from 2022 to 2024.

258) Science of Military Strategy 2020. p.231 <Table 3> Status of China's Taiwan Blockade Exercises (2022-2024)

Exercise

Category Content Participating Forces

Period

Large-scale Air Operations 50 aircraft

August 3 Long-range Rockets and

Several rockets, 11 missiles 2022 ~ October 10 Missile Launch

(8 days) Maritime/Joint Blockade Exercise 13 warships, 68 aircraft

Ground Training Group Army under the Eastern Theater Command

All-domain Joint Exercise

(Navy) 9 destroyers and frigates, etc.

* Maritime maneuver, air defense,

anti-submarine warfare, maritime live fire, (Air Force) 71 fighters and support aircraft, etc.

medium- to long-range air operations, (Rocket Force) 1 brigade-level unit

ADIZ penetration, etc.

April 8 Precision Strike/

(Navy) 11 aircraft carriers and destroyers, etc. 2023 ~ October 10 Joint Blockade Exercise

(Air Force) 70 fighters and support aircraft, etc.

(3 days) * Simulated precision strike,

joint encirclement exercise, (Rocket Force) Unit size unknown

carrier-based aircraft operations

Interdiction/Blockade Exercise

(Navy) 12 aircraft carriers and destroyers, etc.

* Taiwan's eastern maritime access routes

(Air Force) 91 fighters and support aircraft

interdiction, etc.

(Navy) 15 warships and

May 22 Navy/Coast Guard/Air Force

(Coast Guard) 16 vessels

(JS-A) Joint Exercise259)

(Air Force) 42 aircraft 2024

* Gray zone operations and regular

October

military exercises mixed (Navy/Coast Guard) 17 vessels each

14th

form of civilian-governmental-military exercise (Air Force) 125 aircraft

(JS-B)

Source: Lee Taek-sun and Lee Hong-jung (2024), "Evaluation of the 2022-2023 Taiwan Strait Crisis and Korea's

Preparedness Directions," National Security and Strategy 24(2), pp.112-121260)

259) The exercises conducted in April and October 2024 are referred to as <Joint Sword-2024> and are abbreviated as JS-A/B in the table above. <Figure 7> Comparison of Taiwan Blockade Exercises in 1995-1996 and 2022

It is called Sword-2024 and is abbreviated as JS-A/B in the table above. <Figure 7> Comparison of Taiwan Strait Blockade Drills in 1995-1996 and 2022.

* Source: CGTN (2022), “Chart of the Day: How is this PLA exercise

different compared to 1996?”

The "Island Landing Operations," described as part of island operations in the Science of Military Strategy, are the most complex operations in modern warfare, requiring strong mobility, air support, maritime transport, logistical support, and effective strike capabilities. How, then, can the landing operations defined in the Science of Military Strategy be interpreted in terms of operational doctrine? This has been analyzed in the 2024 research published by Christopher Yung and Zoe Haver at the U.S. Naval War College. 260) In addition, refer to the following research: CSIS (2022. 8.23.), “The Military

Dimensions of the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis,”; Li Weichao (2023. 4.

8.), “PLA Eastern Theater Command Launches Security Patrol,

Military Exercise Encircling Taiwan Island,” China’s Defense Ministry.;

David Pierson and Amy Chang Chien (2024. 5.22.), “China Launches

Military Drills Around Taiwan as ‘Punishment’,” The New York Times;

Derek Grossman (2025), “The Chinese Communist Party’s Gray Zone

Tactics Against Taiwan,” pp.1-4. It can refer to the Six Pillars of PLA Amphibious Doctrine, each of which is as follows.261)

First, ‘Dominance of the three domains (air, sea, and information).’ This reflects the view that the prerequisite for the success of an amphibious landing operation is superiority in the air, sea, and information spaces. The battlefield in cyberspace, electronic warfare, and C4ISR must also be preempted through harmony with the three domains. As information-based local wars have been positioned as a keyword in military strategy from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, this principle is a condition that precedes the remaining five principles.

Second, ‘Key-point strikes.’ This involves preemptively striking key enemy facilities such as command posts, runways, and communication networks to weaken resistance forces against the landing troops. The precision strike capability of ballistic and cruise missiles under the Rocket Force is key here.

Third, ‘Concentration of “elite strengths.”’ Accordingly, China is reinforcing its Marine Corps forces under the Navy, and qualitative and quantitative improvements are being made to airborne and special forces units specialized in amphibious operations under the Army.

Fourth, ‘Rapid and continuous assaults.’ The speed of operations must be maintained, while subsequent logistical and supply materials must be able to properly support the initial landing forces.

Fifth, ‘Integrated and flexible support operations.’ Electronic warfare support, medical support, and auxiliary operations via unmanned aerial vehicles must be flexibly integrated with the main operations.

261) Andrew S. Erickson, Conor M. Kennedy, and Ryan D. Martinson

(2024), Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-strait

Invasion, US Naval War College, pp.45-62. Sixth, ‘Psychological attacks.’ Military operations such as amphibious landings must be accompanied by ‘legal warfare,’ which emphasizes the legal justification for China’s use of force to the international community, and ‘psychological warfare’ to degrade the morale of the enemy's population and military.262)

<Figure 8> Amphibious landing operation training of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps

* Source: U.S. Department of Defense Photo Archives 2. War Strategy at the Force and Organizational Level

During Xi Jinping's second term, emphasis on 'national security,' including the Taiwan issue, increased, accompanied by political reforms. Simultaneously, Xi Jinping initiated comprehensive defense reforms. This is an extension of the Party's leadership directives and military system reforms driven by Xi Jinping to achieve the goal of a “strong military in the new era” announced at the National People's Congress in March 2013. In 2014, the Central Military Commission established a leading group263) for military reform, and in the same year, 262) The last principle is already a gray zone strategy centered on the People's Liberation Army, which is conducted during peacetime.

Training is underway. From March to October, visits were made to over 690 military units, and over 800 meetings and discussions were held by the leading group itself. Subsequently, in 2015, the leading group was convened, and in July, the ‘Proposal for Comprehensive Defense and Military Reform’ was adopted. Through this, Xi Jinping promoted the ‘integrated design of the military leadership management system and joint operations command system264),’ ‘adjustment of the CMC's four general departments system,’ ‘readjustment of the military region system,’ and ‘organization of theater joint operations command agencies,’ etc.265)

Ultimately, the core was to create a system where the Party's leadership and military orders are exercised more directly from the Party Central Committee (Central Military Commission) through the ‘theater commands’ to each unit. The military region (军区) system, which focused on army-centric regional defense, previously had each military region commander responsible for training and operations in both peacetime and wartime. However, with the reform to the theater command (战区) system, training is now led by each military unit during peacetime, and command is exercised by the ‘Joint Operations Center’ under the Central Military Commission during wartime.266) The <Figure 8> below compares the military structure of the People's Liberation Army before and after the military reforms led by Xi Jinping. 263) The leading group is an ad hoc decision-making body established to oversee the implementation of the Party's policies as well as policy coordination and decision-making. It plays a role similar to a task force (TF) typically established under the executive branch in other countries, but its authority and scope are higher. For details, refer to “Cho Young-nam (2022), The Chinese Governance System: The Party's Leadership System, Part II: Party Organizations (Party Groups and Leading Groups: 'Special' Leadership Organizations), (Seoul: 21st Century Books)”

is established under the executive branch in other countries, but its authority and scope are higher.

are higher. For details, refer to “Cho Young-nam (2022), The Chinese Governance System: The Party's Leadership System, Part II: Party Organizations (Party Groups and Leading Groups: 'Special' Leadership Organizations), (Seoul: 21st Century Books)”

System), Part II: Party Organizations (Party Groups and Leading Groups: 'Special' Leadership Organizations), (Seoul: 21st Century Books)”

System), Part II: Party Organizations (Party Groups and Leading Groups: 'Special' Leadership Organizations), (Seoul: 21st Century Books)”

Books)”

264) In the People's Liberation Army, 'joint operations' is the Chinese expression for what is generally referred to as 'combined operations' in other countries.

Chinese expression.

265) ｢Military Reform Plan Release Process Announced: Xi Jinping Held Three CMC Reform Meetings｣ (2015.12.31.), Observer Network

; ｢Xi Jinping Comprehensively Implements the Strategy of Strengthening the Military Through Reform and Steadfastly Follows the Path of Strengthening the Military with Chinese Characteristics｣

(2015.11.27.), People's Daily, (both re-cited from “Yoo Dong-won (2016), ‘China's Military System Reform and Korea's Response,’ Korean National Culture, Issue 61, pp.5-8.”)

Response,’ Korean National Culture, Issue 61, pp.5-8.”)

266) Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow (2016 April), "China's

Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms," STRATEGIC

FORUM, No. 294. pp.68-75. <Figure 9> Comparison of PLA Military Structure Before (Left) and After (Right) Military System Reform

*Source: Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow (2016 April), p.69-70.

In addition, China has developed the army-centric amphibious units, previously organized around military regions, into a unified ‘Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigades’ formation under the theater commands, as shown in <Table 3>. The Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigades reflect the elements of the six operational principles and have been reorganized into a unit structure that can flexibly integrate and operate across the three domains (air, sea, information) and cyber/electronic warfare units. Details are presented in <Table 4> and <Table 5> below. <Table 4> Comparison of Amphibious Unit Command Structure Before and After Defense Reform (~2017) Before Defense Reform (Post-2017) After Defense Reform

Under the 1st Group Army

5th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

72nd

1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division

Group Army

124th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

(Located in Hangzhou, Zhejiang)

Under the 31st Group Army

⇒ 73rd 14th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

14th Amphibious Armored Brigade

Group Army

91st Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

(Located in Zhangzhou, Fujian)

Under the 42nd Group Army

1st Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

74th

124th Amphibious Infantry Division

Group Army

125th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade

(Located in Boluo, Guangdong)

* Source: Andrew S. Erickson, Conor M. Kennedy, and Ryan D. Martinson (2024), Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a

Cross-strait Invasion, US Naval War College, p.67.

<Table 5> Basic Structure of Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigades After Defense Reform (4 Combat Battalions) (5 Support Battalions)

Assault Mechanized

Reconnaissance Artillery Anti-aircraft Communications Logistics Infantry Infantry

Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion Company*2 Company*2

Logistics, Firepower

Support MANPA C2, Medical, Support UAV, etc. 122mm

Company*1 DS Electronic Warfare Repair, Company*1

Logistics * Source: Andrew S. Erickson, Conor M. Kennedy, and Ryan D. Martinson (2024), Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a

Cross-strait Invasion, US Naval War College, p.68. By reorganizing the command structure, China has enabled the operation of modularized units while simultaneously conducting all-domain operations. Meanwhile, the completion of China's amphibious assault capabilities is being achieved by strengthening the most specialized amphibious force, the People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC).267) The 12,000 Marines, initially composed of only two brigades under the South Sea Fleet within the Military Region, began to see new organizations, including an airborne brigade, added with the establishment of the Marine Corps Headquarters (MC Head Quarter) under the Navy in 2017, when defense reforms officially commenced.268) Similar to the organizational reform of the joint amphibious forces explained earlier, the Marine Corps also transitioned to a structure where Marine brigades are organized by functional areas under each theater command. Subsequently, the Northern Theater Command has three brigades (5th/6th Marine Brigades and Naval Shipborne Aviation Brigade), the Eastern Theater Command has two (3rd/4th Marine 267) To implement 'all-domain operations,' China periodically conducts training in extreme environments such as deserts and extreme cold.

As the Marine Corps is already being utilized as a flexible force in China's main deployment areas, including Djibouti, the Navy

is considered a representative expeditionary force for China's national interests and response to crises in the future. Refer to the following sources: 王元元

ㆍ曾行贱 (2015), 有效提升海军陆战队 全域作战能力—专访寒训指挥员、南海队

Deputy Chief of Staff Li Xiaoyan (Wang Yuanyuan and Zeng Xingjian, “Effectively Im-

prove the Navy Marine Corps’s All-Domain Combat Capabilities—

Interview with Li Xiaoyan, Commander of Cold Training and Deputy

Chief of Staff of the South Sea Fleet”), 当代海军 (Modern Navy), no.

2, pp.21–23.; 安卫平 (2017. 1.13.), 海军陆战队跨越式发展之我见 (An

Weiping, “My Opinions on the Leapfrog Development of the Navy’s

Marine Corps”), 人民海军 (People’s Navy), p.3. (“Re-cited from Andrew S. Erickson,

Conor M. Kennedy, and Ryan D. Martinson (2024), Chinese Amphibious

Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-strait Invasion, p.86-87.”) 268) 胡波 (2018 March), 中国为啥必须要有一支强大的海军陆战队? (Hu Bo,

Why Does China Require a Strong PLAN Marine Corps?”), 瞭望智库

28. Accessed at: www.lwinst.com/hongguan/6577.htm. Brigades), and the Southern Theater Command has two (1st/2nd Marine Brigades and Special Operations Brigade). Each brigade's battalion structure is organized as shown in <Table 6> below.

28. Accessed at: www.lwinst.com/hongguan/6577.htm. Brigades), and the Southern Theater Command has two (1st/2nd Marine Brigades and Special Operations Brigade). Each brigade's battalion structure is organized as shown in <Table 6> below.

<Table 6> China's Marine Corps (PLANMC) Command Structure After Defense Reform

<Table 6> China's Marine Corps (PLANMC) Command Structure After Defense Reform

Marine Brigades by Theater Command

Battalion Structure per Brigade

Command Structure

1st/2nd Marine Brigades and Mechanized Infantry Battalion*2 Artillery Battalion*1 Southern Theater Command

Special Operations Brigade Medium Mechanized Infantry Battalion*1 Air Defense Battalion*1 Eastern Theater Command 3rd/4th Marine Brigades

Air Assault Infantry Battalion*1 Operational Support Battalion*1

5th/6th Marine Brigades and

Northern Theater Command Reconnaissance Battalion*1 Service Support Battalion*1

Naval Aviation Brigade

* Source: Andrew S. Erickson, Conor M. Kennedy, and Ryan D.

Martinson (2024), Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a

Cross-strait Invasion, p.88-89.

The joint amphibious brigades and navy-affiliated marine brigades mentioned above conduct assault operations using ZBD/ZTD series Armored Amphibious Vehicles, Z-8/9/18 series transport and logistics helicopters, and Type 071/072/075 landing ships.269) Landing ships, like the US Wasp-class, are platforms capable of Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Assault (OTH-AA) operations using assault helicopters, and if the Type 076 landing ship currently under development is deployed, it will be able to mobilize vertical take-off and landing (V/STOL) carrier-based aircraft using an Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) for three-dimensional operations.269) Andrew S. Erickson, Conor M. Kennedy, and Ryan D. Martinson (2024),

Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-strait Invasion,

p.90-93. It will become an amphibious force capable of three-dimensional operations.270)

<Figure 9> Type 075 Landing Ship

* Source: (Top) Eric Wertheim (2024), “China’s Amphibious Apex:

Type 075 Assault Ships”

<Figure 10> Type 076 Landing Ship

Source: Alex Luck (2024), “China Names Type 076 Amphibious Catapult

Carrier “Sichuan” At Launch Ceremony In Shanghai“

270) Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs, and Joseph S.

Bermudez Jr. (2024. 8. 1.) “China’s Massive Next-Generation

Amphibious Assault Ship Takes Shape,” CSIS. Accessed at :

https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-massive-next-generation-amphibi

ous-assault-ship-takes-shape?utm_source

V. Conclusion

China's strategy toward Taiwan is complex. In particular, analyzing China's strategy toward Taiwan, which clearly distinguishes between the domains of war and non-war, by focusing on only one of the endogenous (decision-making of the Chinese Communist Party leadership) or exogenous (structural at the international system level) approaches can lead to overlooking the complexity of China's strategy toward Taiwan.

Therefore, this paper attempts to reconstruct the Taiwan issue from China's perspective using Pyeble's state-centric approach. The primary reason for choosing this research framework is that Taiwan must be viewed as an internal affair from China's perspective for its strategy to be explained. Furthermore, as indicated in China's published military strategy documents and Party Congresses, China is approaching this issue with a complex strategy that employs both military and non-military means with a long-term perspective. The most noteworthy point is that China distinguishes between non-warfare strategy and warfare strategy, and is complexly utilizing 'gray zone operations' focused on force employment (mercenaries) and the acquisition of amphibious assault capabilities focused on force development (breeding) as methods for implementing its strategy.

Meanwhile, if Taiwan takes actions that meet the conditions for China's unification by force, thereby instilling in China the perception that its control has weakened, gray zone operations could escalate into military operations. Furthermore, in the event of an actual war and China's full-scale invasion of Taiwan, escalation (in this case, intervention by the US Indo-Pacific Command, etc.) could occur simultaneously, which is not covered in the main body of this paper.

According to China's six principles of amphibious operations, a large-scale blockade will undoubtedly precede the amphibious assault on Taiwan, and simultaneously, a large-scale precision strike using cruise and ballistic missiles led by the Rocket Force will be carried out. What scholars studying China's nuclear posture (or nuclear strategy) all warn about is the dual use of nuclear and conventional missiles by China's Rocket Force. The ambiguity of whether the missiles launched by China in the initial and middle stages of amphibious operations are nuclear or conventional missiles could become the spark that ignites a large-scale nuclear war. CSIS (2023) also analyzed through war simulations that China's invasion of Taiwan would initially involve large-scale missile launches followed by large-scale maritime/airborne assaults. It also warned that if the United States strikes the Chinese mainland (or if such a risk is detected) during its intervention in a China-Taiwan war, the clash of conventional military forces between the US and China could escalate into a nuclear exchange.

As this paper emphasizes, the international community now needs to make an effort to view the Taiwan issue from China's perspective. In other words, by considering the stance of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, which maintains the perspective that Taiwan is an internal affair, the current East Asian security can be maintained as unstable but as a status quo. However, China is increasingly creating pressure in the periphery, including the Taiwan Strait, through its gray zone operations, and the threshold for the conditions of armed unification of Taiwan remains low, while negotiation channels for peace are not functioning properly. Therefore, the so-called international order maintainers in the Indo-Pacific, including the United States and South Korea, will need to make efforts to enhance deterrence by assuming the worst-case scenario. <References> 1. Government Documents

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Participants: Ha Young-sun, Koo Jin-young, Shin Hong-joong, Lee Hae-rin, Lee Hyun, Jo Do-young, Choi Eun-ho

(7 people)

< EAI 24th Delegation's Travel Tips for the Next Cohort > 1. Transportation

Since taxi fares in Beijing are much cheaper than in Korea, it is more convenient to handle all itineraries by taxi if the group size is 10 or less, rather than renting a van separately.

In China, taxis are mainly called via mobile phone using WeChat Pay or Alipay. It is prohibited by law for more than 4 people to ride in one taxi. We recommend designating a person in charge of taxis in advance and calling a taxi to the destination for convenient travel.

2. Weather

The summer heat in Beijing is truly deadly. On our first day, when we visited the Forbidden City, we had to endure temperatures close to 43°C. To prepare for any potential safety incidents,

- Parasol

- Sunscreen - Arm sleeves - Water - Handheld fan - Cooling seat

please be sure to bring these items. Especially since Beijing is very dry and hot, there is a significant difference between having a parasol and not having one.

Inside the Forbidden City, there is almost no shade, and water is only available near the very end. We recommend planning with this in mind.

The most dangerous thing during the Beijing trip is heatstroke! Seek shade as much as possible, and it is crucial to create time or space to rest unconditionally.

3. Tickets

For almost all scenic spots in China, tickets can usually be booked 7 days before the desired visit date. The difficulty of booking tickets is as follows:

National Museum (Very, very difficult) >>>>> Forbidden City (Must enter at a specific time) >>>>>> Summer Palace, Museum of the CPC History >>>>>> Old Summer Palace, Lama Temple (Very easy)

Almost all places require your English name, date of birth, passport number, and Korean phone number for ticket booking. We recommend that the person in charge of ticketing organize this information in Excel beforehand. Additionally, you will need at least one Chinese phone number to receive an authentication code when booking tickets. Please secure this in advance as well.

3-1. National Museum of China

The National Museum of China offers free admission, but tickets are the most challenging to obtain. Foreigners can book tickets at https://pcticket.chnmuseum.cn/museum-en/#/personal/index.

There is a limit of four tickets per person for the National Museum of China. However, due to the strict booking process, it is highly recommended that each member of your group creates their own account to increase the chances of successfully booking tickets.

First, you need to create an account using an email address. Emails from the National Museum of China are often filtered into the spam folder, so it is essential to check your spam folder when creating an account. You must use a PC to create an account and book tickets. Ticket release for the National Museum of China is 7 days prior to the desired visit date. For example, if you plan to visit on June 25, 2025, tickets for that date will be released at precisely 6:00 PM on June 19, 2025 (KST).

At precisely 6:00 PM, access the website and refresh the page. You will see the date 7 days later highlighted in red with the word "Available" displayed.

For each date, there are morning (09:00-12:00 entry) and afternoon (13:30-16:00 entry) slots. Click on the slot corresponding to your desired entry time. Proceed to the next screen, enter your English name as it appears on your passport, select "Passport" under Document Type, choose Republic of Korea, enter your passport number in the passport number field, select "Free voucher type," and click "next." You will then be directed to a CAPTCHA verification screen. Complete the CAPTCHA verification and click "Submit" to finalize your reservation. A confirmation email will be sent to you.

The ticket booking is highly competitive and usually sells out within 3-4 minutes. However, since a fixed number of tickets are released daily, even if you fail to secure tickets on June 19th, you can try again on June 20th, 21st, or 22nd. (This means that if 100 tickets for the 25th are released on the 19th, another 100 are released on the 20th, and so on. For reference, all tickets for the 24th cohort were fully issued on June 23rd.)

3-2. The Forbidden City

Tickets for the Forbidden City cost 60 RMB per person. Additionally, you can purchase a maximum of five tickets at a time. (If you need to buy more than five tickets, the same person can log in again to purchase additional tickets.)

Similar to the National Museum of China, ticket reservations for the Forbidden City can be made starting 7 days before your desired visit date. For the 24th cohort, tickets were booked through the WeChat mini-program by searching for 故宫博物院 (#小程序://故宫博物院/xINTeCWIdFgaa7u). However, booking via the WeChat program is only possible for users whose WeChat accounts are registered with a Chinese phone number. If no one in your group has a WeChat account with a Chinese number beforehand or can use one, it is recommended to contact the official customer service center of the Forbidden City for inquiries. Ticket releases for the Forbidden City occur daily at 9:00 PM (KST). Therefore, if you plan to visit on June 24, 2025, you should attempt to book tickets at 9:00 PM on June 17, 2025.

The Forbidden City is a highly sought-after tourist attraction, so it is recommended to log in precisely at 9:00 PM to purchase tickets. The information required for ticket purchase includes your English name as on your passport, passport number, Korean phone number, and Chinese phone number. Furthermore, payment must be made in Chinese Yuan at the time of purchase, so ensure you have pre-loaded funds on payment platforms such as WeChat Pay or Alipay.

3-3. Museum of the Communist Party of China

Tickets for the Museum of the Communist Party of China are released at noon 7 days prior to the visit date. You can purchase a maximum of 5 tickets per person at a time.

The booking website is https://webpc.cpcmuseum.cn/Home/Index. This is not a highly competitive tourist attraction, so you can book tickets at your leisure. However, for the 24th cohort, the visit time had to be changed from the afternoon of June 25, 2025, to the morning of the same day due to an unexpected event. Be aware that such unforeseen changes may occur.

The information required for ticket purchase includes your English name as on your passport, passport number, Korean phone number, and Chinese phone number. Additionally, you will need to receive an verification code via the Chinese phone number provided during booking, so it is recommended to arrange this with someone who can receive verification codes in advance.

3-4. Lama Temple (Yonghegong)

Tickets for the Lama Temple are released 7 days prior to the visit date. You can purchase a maximum of 3 tickets per person at a time.

The booking URL is https://open.weixin.qq.com/connect/oauth2/authorize?appid=wxf25c99ef125a7d2f&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fpiao.yonghegong.cn%2Fapi%2Fweixin%2Freceive&response_type=code&scope=snsapi_userinfo&state=usertemp68502077a8f5d&connect_redirect=1#wechat_redirect.

This is not a highly competitive tourist attraction, so you can book tickets at your leisure. The information required for ticket purchase includes your English name as on your passport, passport number, Korean phone number, and Chinese phone number.

3-5. Summer Palace

Tickets for the Summer Palace are released at 10:00 PM (KST) 7 days prior to the visit date. You can purchase a maximum of 5 tickets per person at a time. The ticket price is 30 RMB per person.

The booking URL is #小程序://颐和园/DCM1MAHqSwQKM0t. The information required for ticket purchase includes your English name as on your passport, passport number, Korean phone number, and Chinese phone number.

3-6. Old Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan)

The Old Summer Palace is the easiest to book, with tickets available at any time and no purchase limit per person. Visitors aged 65 and above are eligible for free admission.

The booking URL is #小程序://圆明园门票/it855814yPUT6Vg. The information required for ticket purchase includes your English name as on your passport, passport number, Korean phone number, and Chinese phone number. Additionally, you will need to receive an verification code via the Chinese phone number provided during booking, so it is recommended to arrange this with someone who can receive verification codes in advance. 4. Field Trip Report Presentation

For the field trip report presentation, it is recommended to bring a 1-2 page A4 summary of your presentation content for more effective delivery. This facilitates smoother discussions and Q&A sessions. Furthermore, for field trips in Beijing that do not involve renting a van or bus, the report presentation may take place in a restaurant or cafe. In such settings, a printed summary can serve as a useful tool to help maintain focus and listen attentively to the presentation.

5. Restaurants

Given the unpredictable nature of situations in China, it is advisable to make restaurant reservations in advance via phone. Furthermore, the person responsible for restaurant reservations should have a SIM card or a Chinese phone number that can make calls within China to quickly handle any unavoidable changes to the reservation.