Conflict in Sino-Vietnamese Relations in the 1880s: Autonomy and Subordination for Balance, by Choi Eun-ho, National Museum of China

Architecture of the East Asian Order: From Ancient World to Future Complexity: Young People of Sarangbang Embrace Beijing

Master's Candidate, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

Category: EAI Sarangbang Excursions
Published: June 30, 2026

Master's Candidate, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

I. Introduction

Vietnam is often cited alongside Joseon and Ryukyu as a prime example of a tributary state of China. However, the policies implemented by the Qing Dynasty towards these three states in the immediate pre-imperialist era differed significantly. While these policy differences stemmed partly from the varying times of their subjugation, they also arose from differing Qing perceptions of these states. This paper aims to elucidate Qing diplomacy towards its tributary states during the 1880-1883 period by examining Qing policies towards Vietnam, and secondarily, to reveal the unique characteristics of Vietnam within Qing foreign policy. Due to Annam's lack of cooperation, Qing's indifference, and ultimately, the mutual estrangement between the two nations, direct collaboration between them did not occur until 1880.

The periodization used in this paper is as follows: 1880 marks the date when Zeng Jize, the Qing envoy to France, sent his first protest to French Foreign Minister Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire regarding the Tianjin Treaty of 1874. 1883 marks the complete termination of the suzerain-vassal relationship between Qing and Annam with Admiral Courbet's capture of Hwaseong and the subsequent signing of the Li-Fournier Convention. This paper broadly divides the period between Qing's intervention in 1880 and the official end of Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1883 into three parts. First, it examines the prevailing perceptions of Annam, tributary states, and protectorates within the Qing court through the figure of Zeng Jize. Second, it elucidates Vietnam's security perceptions and the essence of its policy of balance through secret correspondence between Dang Hieu Chieu and Nguyễn Văn Tường. Third, it argues that the Sino-Vietnamese relationship was highly flexible, using the case of Annam's final envoy mission to Qing as evidence, and posits that Qing's policy toward Annam was pragmatic in nature. Furthermore, the introduction of this paper dedicates a significant portion to reviewing existing literature and primary sources to assess the achievements and limitations of current research on this period.

1. Introduction to Primary Sources

The primary sources relevant to this period can be broadly categorized into those from Vietnam, China, and France.

First are the Vietnamese sources. The "Complete Mirror of Vietnamese History, Revised Edition" (欽定越史通鑑綱目), commonly used in studies of Sino-Vietnamese relations, ends with the Tây Sơn rebellion (1789) and is therefore not applicable to this study. The most useful source for this period is the "Veritable Records of Đại Nam" (大南寔錄), which covers the entire history of the Nguyễn Dynasty. The "Veritable Records of Đại Nam" was initiated by Emperor Gia Long in 1811 and consists of the "Former Compilation" (前編), chronicling the history of the Nguyễn family during the Southern and Northern Dynasties period, and the "Main Compilation" (正編), recording events after the unification of Đại Nam. Among these, the "Collection of Historical Materials on Sino-Vietnamese Relations from the Veritable Records of Đại Nam" (大南實錄清越關係史料彙編), which contains only texts related to Sino-Đại Nam relations, was published as part of the Southeast Asian Regional Studies Project (東南亞區域研究計劃) by Academia Sinica in Taiwan. Unfortunately, this collection is not held in the Seoul National University Library, so this study utilizes the original "Veritable Records of Đại Nam."

Other important sources are the travelogues of Phạm Thận Duật (范慎遹) and Nguyễn Thuật (阮述), who were appointed as envoys to Qing in 1880 and 1882, respectively. Phạm Thận Duật served as Minister of Justice (刑部尚書) and the chief envoy, while Nguyễn Thuật, holding the title of Vice Minister (侍郎加參知銜), served as the deputy envoy. Their joint work, "Daily Itinerary of the Envoy to Qing in the First Year of Kiến Phúc" (建福元年如清日程), written after their visit to Tianjin, is notable. Nguyễn Thuật's "Diary of a Journey to Tianjin" (往津日记) is also well-known. This diary was passed on to Professor Rao Zongyi of Hong Kong by Professor Paul Demiéville and was first presented at the 7th International Congress of Orientalists held in Bangkok in August 1977. Today, both these works are included in "A Collection of Vietnamese Han-Chinese Envoy Records" (越南漢文燕行文獻), jointly published in 2010 by Fudan University Press and the Institute of Hán Nôm Studies (Viện nghiên cứu Hán Nôm).

Research Plan, 2000

154) Gong Min and Ruan Shu, "Academic Connections Triggered by the Diary of a Trip to Jin"—Focusing on the Correspondence between Jao Tsung-i and Dai Miwei at the University of Hong Kong's Jao Tsung-i Academy, 2011

Wei and Jao Tsung-i, 2011

155) Collection of Vietnamese Han Literature Records of Missions to China, Fudan University Press, 2010. This collection compiles correspondence, essays, memoirs, and reports on border situations. The latter is a collection of historical materials compiled by the historian Shen Yunlong, exceeding 1600 pages. Next is the Complete Works of Li Hongzhang (李鴻章全集). Materials concerning Annam in the 1880s are included in Volume 33 of the Complete Works of Li Hongzhang. The fourth source is the Collection of Documents on Sino-French Negotiations with Vietnam (中法越南交涉檔)156) compiled by Guo Tingyi (郭廷以) and Wang Yujun (王聿均). This collection of documents, gathered under the auspices of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, in 1962, appears to include all documents related to negotiations from 1875 to 1911. Unfortunately, this text is not part of the collection at Seoul National University Library. The final source is all documents from the "Vietnam" section, dated between 1880 and 1885, including those concerning Ruan Fushi (阮福時), Tang Jingsong (唐景崧), Tang Tingshen (唐廷庚), and Fan Shenyu (范慎遹), found in the archival retrieval system157) of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Historica, Taiwan. The Institute of Modern History, Academia Historica, Taiwan, has digitized approximately 60% of its diplomatic documents, which span from the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China era. Although I cannot read classical Chinese and thus could not thoroughly examine all materials on the website, I was able to locate a letter158) from Ruan Fushi (Emperor Tự Đức) to the Governor-General of Liangguang requesting the maintenance of Qing troops, and a letter159) from Tang Tingshen conveying to the Governor-General of Liangguang the content of a secret conversation with an Annamese official (Nguyễn Văn Tường).

153) Xu Wentang and Xie Qiyi, "Collection of Historical Materials on Sino-Vietnamese Relations from the Veritable Records of Đại Nam," Southeast Asian Regional Studies Project, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, 2000.

154) Gong Min, "The Academic Connections Sparked by Nguyễn Thuật's 'Diary of a Journey to Tianjin' - Centered on the Correspondence between Paul Demiéville and Rao Zongyi in the University of Hong Kong's Rao Zongyi Academy," 2011.

https://archivesonline.mh.sinica.edu.tw/detail/2804b68c9023714a7565eb

65d759603a/?seq=1

159)

1c40b808b/?seq=1 Second are the Chinese sources. Official documents widely used in the study of Sino-Vietnamese relations include the "Collected Statutes of the Great Qing" (大清會典), "Draft History of Qing" (清史稿), and "Veritable Records of Qing" (清實錄). However, due to their vast volume, using compiled collections would be more efficient. The primary documents used in this study are "Collected Materials on Modern Chinese History: The Sino-French War" (中國近代史資料叢刊:中法戰爭) and "Historical Materials on Sino-French Negotiations during the Guangxu Reign of Qing" (淸光緖朝中法交涉史料). The former is a seven-volume collection compiled by Shao Xunzheng et al., which compiles diplomatic documents from France, Britain, and the United States translated into Chinese, as well as negotiation materials between Qing, France, and Vietnam, and correspondence, essays, memoirs, and border situation reports exchanged among key actors. The latter is a collection of materials exceeding 1,600 pages compiled by historian Shen Yunlong. Next is the "Collected Works of Li Hongzhang" (李鴻章全集). Materials concerning Annam in the 1880s are contained in Volume 33 of the "Collected Works of Li Hongzhang." Fourth are the "Documents on Sino-French-Vietnamese Negotiations" (中法越南交涉檔) compiled by Guo Tingyi (郭廷以) and Wang Yujun (王聿均). This collection, compiled under the auspices of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, in 1962, appears to contain all documents related to negotiations from 1875 to 1911. Unfortunately, this work is also not held in the Seoul National University Library. Finally, from the archival retrieval system of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, are all documents from the "Vietnam" section dated between 1880 and 1885, including those related to "Ruan Fushi" (阮福時), "Tang Jingxun" (唐景崧), "Tang Genggeng" (唐廷庚), and "Pham Thận Duật" (范慎遹). The archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, have digitized approximately 60% of their diplomatic documents covering the late Qing Dynasty to the Republican era. Although the author could not read all the materials on the website due to language limitations, they were able to find a letter from Ruan Fushi (Emperor Tự Đức) to the Governor-General of Liangguang requesting the maintenance of Qing troops, and a letter from Tang Genggeng to the Governor-General of Liangguang conveying the content of a secret conversation with an Annamese official (Nguyễn Văn Tường).

1c40b808b/?seq=1 Third are the French sources. The French diplomatic documents, also known as the Yellow Book (黃書), are divided into four volumes. The first covers the period from the Tianjin Treaty to the beginning of negotiations by Envoy Bourée (March 1874 - December 1882). The second covers the period from the start of Bourée's negotiations to the correspondence between Jules Ferry and Zeng Jize (December 1882 - November 1883). The third covers the period from the signing of the Li-Fournier Convention to the escalation of Sino-French relations due to the Bắc Lệ incident (May 1884 - July 1884). The fourth covers the period from the outbreak of the Sino-French War to its conclusion (July 1884 - December 1885). While these sources fully reflect the French perspective and are thus highly valuable, they have clear limitations in explaining the Sino-Vietnamese relations that this paper seeks to illuminate, and therefore will not be the primary focus of this study.

2. Previous Research

Before examining research from French, Chinese, and Vietnamese academia that focuses on Sino-Vietnamese relations after the Tianjin Treaty, a brief analysis of the research accumulated in third countries (Korea, the Anglo-American world, and Japan) is in order. In Korea, research on Sino-Vietnamese relations has been conducted by Yoo In-seon, an expert on the Lê Dynasty. Studies on Annam's foreign relations in the 19th century have primarily focused on Sino-Korean relations. Representative works in the latter category include a study by Dae-young Yoon covering the history of Korean-Vietnamese exchange from 1862 to 1945, and research led by Byung-wook Choi at the Inha University Institute of Korean Studies on the poems exchanged by Joseon and Annam tribute missions in Beijing. Within Korea, the only studies focusing on "A Collection of Vietnamese Han-Chinese Envoy Records" are those by Kim Young-jook (2013) and Kang Chan-soo (2011). However, Kang Chan-soo's research examined cases of exchange with Joseon within this collection, rather than focusing on Vietnam. Among Anglo-American research, a notable paper by Tsang and Nguyen describes the diplomacy of the envoys Phạm Thận Duật and Nguyễn Thuật as "Machiavellian." The co-authors compare the traditional envoys, including Lý Văn Phức of the Nguyễn Dynasty, with the envoys Phạm Thận Duật and Nguyễn Thuật, arguing that the latter were based on realpolitik diplomacy, departing from tradition. A book by Liam Kelley (2005) from the University of Hawaiʻi reconstructs the tributary relationship based on Chinese poems by envoys to Qing from the 16th to the 19th centuries. His research challenges the "little China theory," a Sinocentric perspective advocated by Woodside and representative of traditional Vietnamese historiography. Following the approach of Keith Taylor, he emphasizes Vietnam's distinct identity. There is also a considerable body of research from Japanese academia, including a comprehensive history of Sino-Vietnamese relations by Yamamoto Tatsuro (1975), which the author could not thoroughly review due to language limitations.

161) Kim Young-jook, "The Characteristics of Chinese Observations in Vietnamese Han-Chinese Envoy Records," 2013.

162) Kang Chan-soo, "A Study on Joseon Envoy Literature Recorded in Vietnamese Han-Chinese Envoy Records from the 16th to 19th Centuries."

163) Gabriel F. Y. Tsang and Hoang Yen Nguyen, "The Vietnamese Confucian Diplomatic Tradition and the Last Nguyễn Precolonial Envoys’ Textual Communication with Li Hongzhang," 2020.

164) Liam Kelley, "Beyond The Bronze Pillars: Envoy Poetry And The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship," 2005.

165) Woodside, Alexander Barton. "Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Nguyen and Ch'ing Civil Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century." Harvard University Asia Center, 1988.

166) Taylor, Keith Weller, "The Birth of Vietnam." University of California Press, 1983.

167) Yamamoto Tatsuro, "History of Sino-Vietnamese Relations," Tokyo, Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1975.

Research from French academia covering Annam in the late 19th century is substantial, but it tends to focus on Sino-Vietnamese border issues or the French colonial period. Nguyễn Thế Anh (1992), a leading historian of the Nguyễn Dynasty in French academia, and Yoshiharu Tsuboi (1987) examined the end of the Annamese monarchy from the Vietnamese perspective. However, both studies cover a broad period comprehensively. Philippe Truong (1998) researched Annamese tribute missions to Qing and the Vietnamese celadon pottery offered as tribute, but this study could not access his work due to accessibility issues. François Joyaux (2022) provides a comprehensive history of French Indochina, relying almost exclusively on French sources. He argues that Đại Nam in the late 19th century had lost its agency and should be viewed through the paradigm of the power struggle between China and France. He also assumes that Đại Nam was aware that it was becoming a protectorate by losing its diplomatic rights through the treaty of 1874 but deliberately ignored it, and that it constantly yearned for protection derived from China's benevolence. Aside from these, there are few secondary sources in French dealing with the early 1880s, although some records left by contemporary observers exist. These include a book published by a priest named Pène-Siefert, records from Dabry de Thiersant, who served as consul in Shanghai and Guangzhou successively from 1868 to 1871, records from naval admiral Olivier Martellière, who served as Governor-General of Tonkin, an article by a law professor named Edouard Guillon, and a historical work by a diplomat named Albert Billot. Most of these were written after the Sino-French War ended with the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin on June 9, 1885. With the exception of Albert Billot's historical work, which exhibits considerable completeness, many accounts contain distortions, and although all authors are indirectly related to the protectorate of Annam, they are often not the main actors.

1988

166) Taylor, Keith Weller, The Birth of Vietnam. University of California

Press, 1983

167) Yamamoto Tatsuo, History of Sino-Vietnamese Relations, Tokyo, Yamakawa Publishing, 1975. While French scholarship on the history of late 19th-century Annam is substantial, it is largely limited to the Sino-Annamese border issue or the French colonial period. Nguyễn Thế Anh (1992)168) and Yoshiharu Tsuboi (1987)169), considered authoritative historians of the Nguyễn Dynasty in French academia, offered perspectives on the end of the Annamese monarchy from the Annamese viewpoint. However, both studies have the drawback of comprehensively covering a very broad period. Philippe Truong (1998) researched the Nguyễn Dynasty's missions to China and Vietnamese blue-and-white porcelain offered as tribute, but this study was inaccessible to me.170) François Joyaux (2022)171) provides a comprehensive historical narrative of French Indochina, relying almost exclusively on French archival sources. He argues that in the late 19th century, Đai Nam had lost its agency and should be viewed through the paradigm of the power struggle between China and France. Furthermore, he asserts that Đai Nam was aware that it lost its diplomatic autonomy and became a protectorate through Article 2 of the 1874 treaty but deliberately acquiesced, taking for granted that it always desired protection stemming from China's benevolence. While there are few secondary sources in French discussing the early 1880s, some records from contemporary observers exist. These include a monograph published by a priest named Pene-Siefert172) and records from Shanghai and Guangzhou between 1868 and 1871. 168) Nguyen The Anh, Monarchie et fait colonial au Viet-nam.

170) Philippe Truong, "Les ambassades en Chine sous la dynastie des Nguyễn (1804 - 1924) et les bleu de Hué." Paris, 1998.

171) François Joyaux, "Nouvelle histoire de l'Indochine française," 2022.

172) Jocelyn Pène-Siefert, "La Question Tonkinoise avant et apres le traité avec la Chine," 1885.

173) Dabry de Thiersant, "La solution de la question du Tonkin, au point de vue des intérets francais," 1885.

168) Nguyen The Anh, "Monarchie et fait colonial au Viet-nam. (1875-1925) Le crépuscule d'un ordre traditionnel," Harmattan, 1992.

169) Yoshiharu Tsuboi, "L'empire Vietnamien face à la France et à la Chine," Harmattan, 1987.

176) Albert Billot, "L’Affaire du Tonkin. Histoire diplomatique de l’établissement de notre protectorat sur l’Annam et de notre conflit avec la Chine 1882-1885 par un diplomate," 1888.

de vue des intérets francais, 1885

174) Olivier Martellière, La Question du Tonkin, 1886

175) Edouard Guillon, Le conflit franco-chinois (La guerre et les traités)

d’après les documents officiels, 1885

176) Albert Billot, L’Affaire du Tonkin. Histoire diplomatique de

l’établissement de notre protectorat sur l’Annam et de notre conflit

avec la Chine 1882-1885 par un diplomate, 1888

177) Peng Qian, "Tribute and Literary Exchange: The Study of Vietnamese Envoys to China in the Qing dynasty and Guangxi," (朝貢關係與文學交流：清代越南來華使臣與廣西研究), 2014.

178) Wang Zhiqiang, "A study on Li Hongchang’s awareness and policy of Vietnamese issue (1881–1886)" (李鸿章对越南问题的认识与策略研究, 1881–1886), 2011.

179) Wang, Zhiqiang, and Quan, Hexiu, "From the 1883 voyage of the Vietnamese ambassador to China: considering the end of the Zongfan relationship between Vietnam and China." (王志强, 权赫秀, 从1883年越南)

The most extensive research on Sino-Vietnamese relations in the early 1880s has been accumulated in China and Taiwan. Feng Qian's master's thesis systematically studied the literature of envoys to Qing but did not derive political implications. From a diplomatic history perspective, the most comprehensive research is Wang Zhiqiang's work. In particular, his doctoral dissertation provides a diachronic overview of Li Hongzhang's perception and policy towards Annam and explains its influence on Joseon's policy. A co-authored paper by Wang Zhiqiang and Quan Hexiu (2011b) details the 1883 mission of Phạm Thận Duật and Nguyễn Thuật, arguing that it was the first and last attempt at trilateral negotiation. Sun Hongnian, an expert on Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Tibetan relations, has published two papers on this period, each being a brief article of approximately two and six pages, respectively. The first is a short summary of Nguyễn Thuật's mission, and the second focuses on the Western artifacts witnessed by the Annamese envoys in Qing, arguing that Annam's modernization policies were implemented through China.

180) Lai Tsung-cheng's doctoral dissertation (Taiwan) examines Sino-Vietnamese relations focusing on trade and border demarcation issues.

181) Yang Zixiang's doctoral dissertation (2014) is a rare academic work that analyzes Sino-Vietnamese relations in the late 19th century from an international relations perspective. He cites the concept of "imbalance" proposed by Brantley Womack (2006) to define traditional Sino-Vietnamese relations as imbalanced. Furthermore, he argues that Đại Nam's perception of Qing differed significantly from that of Joseon or Ryukyu, viewing China as a great power within a realist order.

182) Brantley Womack, "China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry," 2006.

In summary, there are approximately ten previous studies on Vietnam's missions to China in the 1880s. Wang Zhikang's doctoral dissertation is the only one that comprehensively references the Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty, records of missions to China, and Chinese and French diplomatic documents; however, by focusing on Li Hongzhang's diplomatic policy, it has limitations in reconstructing the overall direction of China's policy. Another significant study is Lai Tsung-cheng's (賴淙誠) doctoral dissertation180) from Taiwan, which examined Sino-Vietnamese relations focusing on trade and border demarcation issues. Yang Zixiang's (杨紫翔) doctoral dissertation (2014)181) is a rare academic thesis that analyzes late 19th-century Sino-Vietnamese relations from an international relations perspective. He cites the concept of "imbalance" proposed by Brantley Womack (2006)182) to characterize traditional Sino-Vietnamese relations as imbalanced. Furthermore, Đai Nam's perception of China differed significantly from that of Joseon or Ryukyu, viewing China as a great power within a realist order.

Vietnamese ambassador to China: considering the end of the Zongfan relationship between Vietnam and China.

Wang Zhiqiang, Quan Hexiu, From the 1883 voyage of the

The dispatch of envoys to China marked the end of the Sino-Vietnamese tributary relationship, 2011

180) Lai Tsung-cheng, Diplomatic relations between China and Việt Nam under the

Qing Dynasty: Annual Trade and Border Issues [清越關係研究-以貿易與

邊務為探討中心 (1644~1885)]. Ph.D. Dissertation. Taipei, 2006

181) Yang Zixiang, Modern Sino-Vietnamese Mutual Perceptions from an Asymmetrical Perspective: Centered on Sino-French Negotiations over Vietnam, The

Recent Sino-Vietnamese Mutual Perceptions in the View of Asymmetry

——Center on the Sino-French Negotiation Over Vietnam, 2014

182) Womack, Brantley, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry,

2006, argues that it is more effective to explain the bilateral relations between a great power and a small country as a paradigm. Nguyen Hoang Yen's doctoral dissertation published in Taiwan studies Vietnamese envoy records from 1849 to 1877. [183]

Chinese research is largely focused on three keywords. First, Chinese academia tends to portray the Qing-Vietnamese relationship as a history of solidarity in resistance to the "tragedy of Western encroachment." Sun Hongnian's research is most representative of this tendency; he argues that the Vietnamese envoy's mission to China in 1882 was an encounter with modernity, and that upon returning, the envoy proposed a model to Emperor Tự Đức that emulated China. The second keyword is "border demarcation." While border issues are rarely discussed in Korean academia when examining Sino-Korean relations, why are they given such prominence in Qing-Vietnamese relations? Primarily, it is because bandits, including the Black Flags and Yellow Flags, played a significant role in providing justification and military support for the Qing-France relationship along the Tonkin-Yunnan border. Furthermore, while trade issues were not a major point of contention in the Sino-Japanese negotiations concerning Joseon, France's justification for occupying Annam was to open a trade route to Yunnan through the Red River basin.

What is the current state of research in Vietnam? Overall, the digitalization of research in Vietnamese academia is lagging compared to other East Asian countries. For example, searching for "Li Hongzhang" on a website that aggregates Vietnamese academic journals yields only one research paper. [184] Therefore, it is difficult to gauge the achievements of Vietnamese academia on this research topic, although the footnotes cited in the few available papers from this period can indirectly measure them. Tran Duc Anh (2024) [185] reports on trade cases involving Vietnamese diplomatic missions in the 18th and 19th centuries, but the research is not conducted from a diplomatic history perspective. He primarily cites a 1885 text by Gabriel Devéria, a French expert on China and interpreter, which, by not using Chinese sources, offers limited historical contribution. The work he cites by Buu Cam (1966) [187], which studies envoys from the Nguyen Dynasty, aligns most closely with the research question of this study. Unfortunately, this text does not appear to be digitized.

University, Tainan.

184) https://vjol.info.vn/. This research compares Li Hongzhang's Self-Strengthening Movement with Vietnam's Dong Du movement.

Phạm Đức Thuận, Phong trào Dương vụ ở Trung

Quốc cuối thế kỷ XIX và Phong trào Đông Du ở Việt Nam đầu thế kỷ

XX, 2024. Lê Thị Hoài Thanh's research [188], though only eight pages long, covers the vast period from 1802 to 1885. This paper makes no mention of how treaties with France affected existing Qing-Vietnamese relations and merely organizes the ceremonial rules and formats of the envoys based on historical sources, including Devéria's aforementioned text. Nguyễn Thị Thảo et al. (1996) [189] is a biographical dictionary of Vietnamese envoys to China. This monograph provides brief biographical information on the envoys in alphabetical order, but it has the weakness of being excessively brief, with only one paragraph each for Nguyễn Thuyết and Phạm Thận Duật, and lacking footnotes to support the information. There is only one study that deals with the missions of Phạm Thận Duật and Nguyễn Thuyết, and it merely reintroduces the Wangjin Diary, which has already been cited multiple times in other studies. [190]

According to Nguyễn Hoàng Yến's 2015 overview of foreign research on Vietnamese diplomatic missions to China [191], the first foreign university research on Vietnamese envoy records was published in 1980 by Trần Kinh Hòa, a Vietnamese scholar affiliated with the University of Hong Kong, concerning Nguyễn Thuyết's Wangjin Diary. Hoàng Yến notes that a total of 57 studies on Chinese envoy records have been found, far fewer than the over 120 papers on Korean envoy records, attributing this to the lack of systematic organization of historical materials, which further complicates research accessibility. Additionally, while individual studies exist on the missions of Lê Quý Đôn [192], Đặng Huy Trứ [193], and the mission to celebrate Emperor Qianlong's 80th birthday [194], they do not align with the timeframe of the present study.

between Vietnam and China during the 18th-19th Centuries. East Asia University Journal, 3(4), 2024

186) Gabriel Devéria, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec

l'Annam-Việtnam du XVIe au XIXe siècle, 1885

187) Bửu Cầm, Các sứ bộ do triều Nguyễn phái sang nhà Thanh (Envoy

missions to China, sent by the Nguyễn dynasty). Sử địa (History and

Geography magazine.) No 2, 46-51, 1966

188) Lê Thị Hoài Thanh, Hoạt động đi sứ và tiếp sứ trong quan hệ

ngoại giao Việt Nam - Trung Quốc dưới triều Nguyễn (1802-1885),

2019

189) Nguyễn Thị Thảo, Phạm Văn Thắm, Nguyễn Kim Oanh (1996). Sứ

thần Việt Nam (Vietnamese Envoys.) Hà Nội: Văn hóa Thông tin. It provides brief biographical information on envoys arranged alphabetically, with the entries for Nguyễn Tường and Phạm Thận Duật being excessively brief, each about a paragraph long, and lacking footnotes to support the information. There is only one study on the missions of Phạm Thận Duật and Nguyễn Tường, and it merely reintroduces the Wangjin Ilgi, which has already been cited multiple times in other studies.190)

According to Nguyễn Hoàng Yến's 2015 work,

Works on Vietnamese Envoys to China,

của Phạm Thận Duật và “Vãng Tân nhật ký” của Nguyễn

Thuật/Description about the Book “Vãng sứ Thiên Tân nhật ký” by

Phạm Thận Duật and “Vãng Tân nhật ký” by Nguyễn Thuật, 2008 191) Nguyễn Hoàng Yến, Tổng quan tình hình nghiên cứu về các tác

phẩm đi sứ Trung Quốc của Việt Nam ở nước ngoài, 2015

192) Hoàng Xuân Hãn, Vụ Bắc sứ năm Canh thìn đời Cảnh Hưng với Lê

Quý Đôn và bài trình bằng văn Nôm” (The Mission to China in

Gengchen Year under the Reign of Cảnh Hưng, with Lê Quý Đôn and

the Report in Nôm Script.) Sử địa (History and Geography Magazine).

Số 6, 3-5., 1967

193) Phạm Tuấn Khánh (1995). Chuyến đi sứ của Đặng Huy Trứ và một

tư liệu chưa được công bố (Đặng Huy Trứ mission Journey and a

Document not Made Public.) Thông tin Khoa học và Công nghệ

191) it was a Vietnamese scholar from the University of Hong Kong named Trần Kinh Hòa who first published research on Nguyễn Tường's Wangjin Ilgi in 1980 among foreign universities' studies on records of missions to China. Hoàng Yến notes that only 57 studies on Chinese envoy records were found, far fewer than the over 120 articles on Joseon envoy records, citing the lack of systematic organization of historical materials as a reason for the difficulty in accessing research. Additionally, separate studies exist on Lê Quý Đôn's envoy missions192), Đặng Huy Tứ's envoy missions193), and the mission to celebrate Emperor Qianlong's 80th birthday194), but these do not align with the timeframe of the present study.190) Phạm Hoàng Quân, Lược tả về sách “Vãng sứ Thiên Tân nhật ký”

Thus, the research on Sino-Vietnamese relations in the 1880s in Vietnamese academia is very limited compared to that of neighboring China. A brief paper from Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities, "Sino-Vietnamese Relations from the Perspective of the Tributary Investiture System" [195], offers a glimpse into the research tendencies of Vietnamese academia regarding diplomacy with the Qing. This paper emphasizes that since the Dinh and Le dynasties, which emerged after Vietnam's independence from the Song Dynasty in the 10th century, Vietnam has been a "sovereign state" and that "Vietnamese national consciousness" has been a constant in Vietnamese history since independence. The study retroactively applies "Vietnamese nationhood" to the period before the establishment of the first Vietnamese state and argues that "China never considered Vietnam a vassal at any point in its thousands of years of history," and that Vietnam engaged in "external kingship and internal emperorship" to clearly assert its status as an "independent sovereign state." Vu Duc Liem, vice dean of Hanoi National University of Education, also describes the tributary relationship during the Song Dynasty and claims that Vietnam's relationship with China was not subordinate, citing Vietnam's use of the term "邦交 (bangjiao)" during the Tây Sơn and Nguyễn dynasties. [196] Considering that the only Vietnamese domestic research he cites is a master's thesis and the rest are foreign studies, including a Korean paper (Yoo In-sun), it can be concluded that research on Qing-Vietnamese relations in the late Nguyễn Dynasty has not moved beyond a nascent nationalist historiography and has failed to construct a multi-layered discourse.

194) Nguyễn Duy Chính. Phái đoàn Đại Việt và lễ Bát tuần khánh thọ

của Thanh Cao Tông. (Đại Việt Delegation and the 80th Birthday

Ceremony of Emperor Qianlong.) TP. Hồ Chí Minh: Văn hóa - Văn

nghệ, 2016

195) Quan hệ Đại Việt – Trung Hoa nhìn từ vấn đề ‘sắc phong, triều

cống’. https://hcmussh.edu.vn/news/item/22584

196) Vũ Đức Liêm, Đừng để “triều cống” đánh lừa: Quan hệ Trung Hoa

và Đông Nam Á thời Tống, 2019 Thus, the preliminary research on Qing-Vietnamese relations during the transition from the 19th-century Sinocentric order to the modern international order has been reviewed by country: China, France, Vietnam, Korea, and the Anglo-American and Japanese academic communities. However, it was found that almost all studies examining this period through the paradigm of "the transformation of the international order" are concentrated in China. Therefore, comparing the research from the academic communities of the main parties involved appears difficult. Discussion and comparison in a debate require the ability to identify fault lines, but each country discusses the issue at different levels or develops its arguments based on different unproven premises. Above all, research on Sino-Vietnamese relations in Vietnamese academia is too general, and research on late 19th-century Sino-Vietnamese diplomacy is insufficient in both quality and quantity, making it impossible to construct a map of the discourse.

3. Historical Background

The relationship between the Nguyễn Dynasty, established in 1802, and the Qing Dynasty was somewhat distant compared to the relationship between Joseon and the Qing during the same period. This is clearly reflected in the frequency of tributary missions. Due to the Taiping Rebellion, the usual route for tributary missions from Annam was cut off, preventing them from paying tribute until 1868. Subsequently, tributary missions were sent five times: in 1870, 1872, 1876, 1880, and 1883. This can be explained by three factors. First is Annam's self-perception. Annam considered itself the Southern Court (南朝) and a Celestial Empire like the Qing. While it diligently observed the rituals of subservience to the Qing imperial court, it employed a typical policy of "external kingship and internal emperorship" (外王內帝) towards the three kingdoms of Laos, Cambodia, and the Hosa and Susa states [197].

The second reason is the vivid memory of wars between China and Annam. In 1787, the Tây Sơn rebellion broke out in Annam, and the deposed Emperor Lê Chiêu Thống fled to Guangxi Province, China. He appealed to the principle of "serving the great and being subservient to the great" (事大) and requested support from Emperor Qianlong to suppress the Tây Sơn dynasty rebels. The Qing dispatched approximately 20,000 troops between 1788 and 1789, but they were defeated at the Battle of Ngọc Hồi-Đống Đa. The Tây Sơn dynasty was overthrown less than twenty years later by Nguyễn Ánh (阮福暎) of the Nguyễn clan, who had controlled the southern region since the 16th century and whose rule had been ended by the Tây Sơn movement.

Subsequently, the Qing's subtle perception of Annam is evident in their treatment of the Annamese delegation in 1840. The Qing originally placed Annam in the same category as Joseon and Ryukyu, but they treated the delegation below Joseon, Ryukyu, Siam, and even Laos. Minh Mạng, sensitive to Annam's international status, became enraged and stated, "This is a mistake by the Qing Ministry of Rites. Goryeo is a culturally developed country, so it is natural to receive such treatment. However, Laos is a tributary state to us, and Siam and Ryukyu are barbarian states, so they cannot be treated this way. If such a thing happens again, you will be dismissed from your posts. It is better to be punished." Later, the Taiping Rebellion disrupted land routes, and the Qing issued an edict to suspend tribute, so the relationship did not improve.

(Information of Science and Technology). No 3.

ceremonial missions. These were the smallest of Annam's tributary states, and their existence

served as the basis for Annam's claim to be the Southern Court (南朝) and an empire. The frequency of exceptional missions decreased as Annam frequently requested the cessation of tributary missions, and Annam also kept the Qing at a distance, resulting in the value of the Nguyễn Dynasty's tribute goods being half that of the Lê Dynasty. The last reason is simply that Annam was farther from Beijing than Joseon. Moreover, the Nguyễn Dynasty's relocation of its capital from Hanoi, the former capital of the Lê Dynasty, to Huế, approximately 700 km south, further increased the distance to Yanjing. The Nguyễn Dynasty's diplomacy with the Qing was primarily conducted through the Governor-General of Liangguang (Guangdong and Guangxi), which increased the psychological distance of Qing court officials towards Annam. These three factors provide partial reasons for the Qing's much more lukewarm policy towards Annam than towards Joseon during the period of Western encroachment.

was reduced, and Annam also kept the Qing at a distance, resulting in the value of the Nguyễn Dynasty's tribute goods being half that of the Lê Dynasty. The last reason is simply that Annam was farther from Beijing than Joseon. Moreover, the Nguyễn Dynasty's relocation of its capital from Hanoi, the former capital of the Lê Dynasty, to Huế, approximately 700 km south, further increased the distance to Yanjing. The Nguyễn Dynasty's diplomacy with the Qing was primarily conducted through the Governor-General of Liangguang (Guangdong and Guangxi), which increased the psychological distance of Qing court officials towards Annam. These three factors provide partial reasons for the Qing's much more lukewarm policy towards Annam than towards Joseon during the period of Western encroachment.

Da Nam had been steadily attacked by France since 1858. Ultimately, Da Nam was forced to cede three southern provinces in 1862 and three southwestern provinces in 1867, thereby authorizing the establishment of French Cochinchina. The Da Nam court considered the ongoing rebellions a more pressing issue at the time and did not believe the loss of Cochinchina was irreversible. However, in 1873, a merchant named Dupuis, traveling up the Red River where navigation was prohibited, colluded with remnants of the Taiping Rebellion, the Yellow Flags, who were threatening Annam, and the French issue resurfaced. When the Annam government imprisoned Dupuis, Admiral Francis Garnier, in support of Dupuis, attacked the Hanoi Citadel and was killed by the Yellow Flags, who had allied with the Annam government.

Consequently, in 1874, France and Annam signed the Treaty of Saigon (also known as the Giap Tuat Treaty), but their understanding of the treaty differed. France perceived this treaty as a protectorate treaty, whereas Vietnam understood it merely as a means to conclude the unfortunate incident of Admiral Garnier's assassination and rebuild friendly relations. The officials of Cochinchina, who were parties to the treaty, were also concerned about facing repercussions from their home government if the situation escalated, as they had attacked Tonkin without their government's permission. Furthermore, the French forces were in retreat after Admiral Garnier was killed by the Yellow Flags stationed in Lang Son, a region bordering Tonkin and China, and they wished for a swift resolution to the incident. Therefore, upon examining the terms of the Giap Tuat Treaty, it is evident that the concessions made to the protected state were far more extensive compared to the Treaty of Protectorate of Cambodia (1863), the subsequent Treaty of Bardot (1881), the first and second Treaties of Hue (1883, 1884), and the Treaty of Protectorate of Madagascar (1885).

However, the Giap Tuat Treaty served as a catalyst, highlighting the contradictions between the existing, divergent East-West international orders from 1874 to 1883. The problematic clauses were Articles 2 and 3, concerning the protectorate status of Vietnam. To ensure Vietnam's independence from China, France stipulated in Article 2 that "The President of France recognizes the sovereignty of the King of Vietnam and his independence from all powers," and "promises to provide gratuitous assistance to protect Annam from all attacks, maintain order and stability in Annam, and destroy the bandits/pirates plundering parts of Annam's territory." In return for this assistance, Article 3 stated that "the King of Annam shall align his foreign policy with that of France." While "independence from all powers" and "protection from all powers" might appear contradictory to modern sensibilities, and even with the existence of the concept of a "protectorate," the notion of "protectorate rights as a guarantee of exclusive sovereignty" had not yet been established. Consequently, the parties involved did not raise objections at the time of the treaty's signing. Given that the treaty's terms largely favored Annam, it appears that France's primary objective was a swift conclusion, as strategic advantages were not yet secured. Regardless of the circumstances, the failure to clearly define the protectorate status at this juncture became a source of contamination in Sino-French-Vietnamese relations from 1874 to 1883.

Meanwhile, prior to 1880, Qing China did not actively intervene in the Vietnamese issue. Qing China only officially stated its position when France first proposed it. For instance, in 1875, when the French envoy to Qing China inquired about Qing's stance after notifying them of the 1874 treaty with Annam, Prince Gong (Yixin) offered only a general response, stating, "Annam is a tributary state of Qing, but it is autonomous in matters of diplomacy and trade, thus it can conclude treaties." Qing China's policy approach unfolded in two main directions. Firstly, it covertly supported the anti-French struggle led by Liu Yongfu and the Yellow Flags, while avoiding direct intervention against French forces. Tang Jingsong once remarked about Liu Yongfu:

The enemy was terrified, and the border officials recommended him.

Liu Yongfu's subordinates were all brave and skilled in combat. Grant them

official positions or temporary titles to win their hearts. Send

people to inform them directly and secretly devise strategies to repel the enemy.

Furthermore, guide the king and ministers of that country (Vietnam) to dispel

their suspicions and provide them with provisions. The Yellow Flags are not only

the claws of Vietnam but also a crucial bulwark of our border.

Secondly, Qing China aimed to prevent French merchants from crossing the border by strengthening border defenses in the Yunnan region, thereby avoiding any pretext for conflict. Cen Yuying, the Governor-General of Yunnan and Guizhou, stated that it was necessary to prevent Qing and French forces from creating conflict at the Sino-Vietnamese border and to prevent foreign powers from entering Yunnan Province under the guise of trade.

198) The enemy was terrified, and the border officials recommended him...

Grant them official positions or temporary titles to win their hearts. Send

people to inform them directly and secretly devise strategies to repel the enemy. Furthermore, guide the king and ministers of that country (Vietnam) to dispel

their suspicions and provide them with provisions. The Yellow Flags are not only the claws of Vietnam but also a crucial bulwark of our border.

199) Please issue an imperial edict to the Zongli Yamen to instruct the consuls in Vietnam to order the troops to suppress the Vietnamese bandits at the border and

not interfere with the French troops, so as to avoid suspicion. Regarding trade, the previous treaty did not include the Yunnan region, and Yunnan has no trade goods, so there is no need to discuss it.

suppress the bandits at the border and

not interfere with the French troops, so as to avoid suspicion. Regarding trade, the previous treaty did not include

Yunnan. Yunnan has no trade goods, so there is no need to discuss it.

II. Main Body

1. Protest by Zeng Jize, Qing Envoy to France: The Right of a Tributary State to Conclude Treaties?

As previously discussed, Qing China had consistently reiterated its general position to France and had not lodged a formal protest. Why, then, did Qing China's policy toward Vietnam change? There are two main hypotheses for this. First, in 1880, French Minister of the Navy Jean-Bernard Jauréguiberry and Minister of Foreign Affairs William Henry Waddington submitted a war budget to the National Assembly under the pretext of punishing Annam for not implementing the 1874 treaty. Second, in 1881, Qing China, led by Zeng Jize, revised the treaty that ceded a large part of Xinjiang to Russia and concluded the Treaty of Livadia, thereby gaining a certain degree of confidence in diplomatic negotiations with Western powers. This confidence was not merely an improvement in the application of international law but rather a conviction that the Xinjiang region, initially incorporated through the tributary system, could be transformed into a fully sovereign territory under modern "sovereignty." This interpretation is thoroughly explored in Yang Zixiang's article,200) where the author considers this hypothesis to be more convincing.

there is no need to discuss it.

The two key figures who led Qing China's policy toward Vietnam after 1880 were Zeng Jize and Li Hongzhang. Both were rare officials in the Qing dynasty who were well-versed in Western international law. Zeng Jize, a diplomat who served as envoy to Russia, Britain, and France, was widely renowned as an international law expert in China. The hardliners, represented by Zeng Jize, did not recognize Annam's right to conclude treaties independently. In contrast, Li Hongzhang, the Governor-General of Zhili, envisioned a plan to preserve Annam's neutrality by balancing external powers, using Korea as a model. However, Li Hongzhang's "Annam Balance Plan" was thwarted by the rejection of Western powers such as the United States, Britain, and Germany. Consequently, he ultimately stood by and watched as Annam was incorporated under French influence, as he had not placed much emphasis on Annam's independence in the first place. Meanwhile, Zeng Jize's understanding of the concept of tributary states underwent a significant shift between the early 1880s and after the Sino-French War in 1885. Initially, he did not consider tributary states as exclusive spheres of influence, but after the war, he advocated for the transformation of tributary states into sovereign territories.

In 1880, Zeng Jize expressed concerns about France's move to subordinate Vietnam and conveyed a memorandum to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating his intention not to tolerate it. Although his hardline stance failed to alter France's policy direction, it garnered sympathy from local officials within the Qing court, such as Ye Wencai, the Prefect of Henan, and Zhang Shusheng, the Governor-General of Liangguang. What, then, are the implications of Zeng Jize's series of protest letters regarding the Vietnamese issue? In a memorandum submitted to the Zongli Yamen, Zeng Jize raised seven main points, and in the second point, he declared that Vietnam, being a tributary state, could not independently conclude treaties. This can be seen as an attempt to argue for the legal invalidity of the Giap Tuat Treaty alone, but it actually implied an intention to block Vietnam's treaty-making authority altogether. Discussing the 1874 treaty between France and Vietnam, Zeng Jize stated:

——Center on the Sino-French Negotiation Over Vietnam, 2014

Vietnam is a tributary state, and therefore cannot independently conclude treaties. This can be seen as an attempt to argue for the legal invalidity of the Giap Tuat Treaty alone, but it actually implied an intention to block Vietnam's treaty-making authority altogether. Discussing the 1874 treaty between France and Vietnam, Zeng Jize stated:

I am very concerned that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not provided a clear answer. Between France

and the King of Vietnam, Article 2 of the treaty states that France recognizes the King of Vietnam as an independent

king and promises to assist in his defense.

However, Vietnam was still part of China 300 years ago. Since then, Vietnam has

been a tributary state, managing its internal affairs independently.201) Although France has concluded a treaty with Vietnam,

China's rights still remain. France wished to protect Vietnam, and this was done with good intentions.

China maintains good relations with France and faces no danger.

Secondly, Vietnam did not report this matter to China, and China can only intervene if Vietnam requests it. (...). Thirdly, Vietnam and China share a long border.

Even if Vietnam were not a tributary state of China, China would inevitably be concerned about Vietnam's border.

However, the letter only mentions handling the matter according to the treaty, without any mention of dispatching troops or occupation.

There is no mention of dispatching troops or occupation, only that it will be handled according to the treaty.

There is no mention of dispatching troops or occupation, only that it will be handled according to the treaty. If your country intends to occupy China, how can I remain silent?

In this letter, Zeng Jize presents two reasons why he cannot stand by and watch Annam being incorporated into France's sphere of influence. First, Annam has traditionally been located within China's sphere of influence (版圖) and was a tributary state. Second, Annam shares a border with China, making it impossible to ignore the presence of French troops. In this context, he mentions that "it is not a problem for France to protect Vietnam," not because Zeng Jize was ignorant of international law, but because the legal institution of protectorate had not yet been established in practical politics. Three years earlier, on September 30, 1877, the French envoy to Qing, Montmorand, expressed his surprise that Qing China did not intervene despite France having signed a protectorate treaty with Annam, and suggested two possibilities.

First, Qing China acquiesced due to fear of France and a desire to maintain friendly relations, thus avoiding unnecessary conflict. Second, Qing China did not fully understand the implications of the international legal concept of a protectorate.202) At that time, "protection" for Qing China also held meaning within the traditional diplomatic order. The protection of a smaller state by a larger one was not only a moral obligation assigned to the larger state in international relations, which extended the family relationship, but also a practical obligation to defend China from invasions by "uncivilized peoples." However, such acts of protection could only be justified with the formal request of the tributary state's ruler, and thus protection was far from implying exclusive control over diplomatic rights. Furthermore, the term "protectorate" was not explicitly mentioned in the Giap Tuat Treaty, and it was stated that "traditional relations shall not be changed," so Qing China had little reason to strongly resist it.

In early 1880, Zeng Jize adopted a somewhat moderate stance and tone in discussions with French Foreign Minister Charles de Freycinet and French Consul in St. Petersburg, Chanzy. However, his opposition gradually intensified, reaching a passionate level by the time of his debates with de Saint-Hilaire and Jules Ferry. He assessed that "the loss of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan had damaged China's standing" and resisted France's establishment of a protectorate over Annam within the framework of the traditional tributary system. Zeng Jize's position resonated to some extent within the Qing court, but it ultimately did not represent the mainstream view among policymakers. Li Hongzhang was relatively moderate, and according to de Saint-Hilaire's letter, Prince Gong even instructed the French side to "disregard Zeng Jize's assertions as they do not represent the Qing court's position at all."

du Tonkin, 1874-December 1882, No. 25, Letter from Montmorand to

Decazes showed a moderate stance and tone. However, his opposition gradually intensified, reaching a passionate level by the time of discussions with Saint-Hilaire and Jules Ferry. He assessed that "the loss of Ryukyu to Japan damaged China's standing" and resisted France's establishment of a protectorate over Annam within the framework of traditional Sino-centric notions and the tributary system. While Zeng Jize's stance resonated to some extent within the Qing court, it was ultimately not the mainstream position among policymakers. Li Hongzhang was relatively moderate, and according to Saint-Hilaire's letter, Prince Gong even advised the French side to "disregard Zeng Jize's assertions as they do not represent the Qing court's position at all."

From 1880 to 1885, Zeng Jize consistently exchanged correspondence with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and continuously urged the Zongli Yamen to adopt a stronger policy. He likened the concept of "tributary state" to that of a "protectorate," criticizing that although the existing tributary relationship was akin to a protectorate, China had managed it so poorly that it failed to gain recognition from Western powers. Furthermore, he urged the transformation of all "tributary states" within China's sphere of influence into regions under modern "sovereignty" and their assimilation. This also reflected the shift in Qing China's policy toward Korea after the Imo Incident in 1882, which increasingly took on modern imperialist characteristics. From this point onward, Qing China began to retroactively apply the concept of protectorate to traditional tributary relationships, attempting to equate the two. Zeng Jize's memorial submitted around the end of the Sino-French War concisely summarizes this understanding and position.203)

203) I believe that the major Western powers have recently been engaged in invading and occupying China's tributary states, using the excuse that they are not true tributary states. China

does not concern itself with the internal politics of its tributary states, nor with their foreign relations, which is vastly different from how Western countries treat their tributary states. Tibet and Mongolia are both tributary territories of China, not tributary states. However, my administration of Tibet is even more lenient than the restrictions imposed by Western countries on their tributary states. Western countries only refer to them as China's tributary states, and they are already considered distinct from inland provinces. If I do not seize this opportunity to assume overall authority and make it clear to the world, then those who claim tributary territories as tributary states in the future will further claim tributary states as not truly tributary.

are distinct from inland provinces. If I do not seize this opportunity to assume overall authority and make it clear to the world, then those who claim tributary territories as tributary states in the future will further claim tributary states as not truly tributary. Western major powers have recently focused on invading and occupying China's tributary states, using the excuse that they are not true tributary states.

are focusing on invading and occupying China's tributary states, using the excuse that they are not true tributary states.

China is not concerned with the internal politics of its tributary states, nor with their foreign relations.

is not concerned with the internal politics of its tributary states, nor with their foreign relations. This is very different from how Western countries treat their tributary states.

is not concerned with the internal politics of its tributary states, nor with their foreign relations. This is very different from how Western countries treat their tributary states. Tibet and Mongolia are both tributary territories (屬地) of China, not tributary states.

It is not a tributary state (屬國). However, our jurisdiction over Tibet is far more lenient than the Western approach to tributary states. Thus, the West only refers to Tibet as a tributary state of China, distinguishing it from inland provinces. If we do not establish our complete sovereign authority and make it clear to the world, those who refer to our territory as a tributary state in the future will claim that our tributary states are not true tributary states, and there will be a risk of invasion and occupation... Only by establishing our sovereignty, clarifying our borders, enriching our customs revenue, and permanently securing our national defense can we finally enjoy prosperity and eliminate threats. 2. Diplomatic Exchange between Tang Ting-ken and Nguyễn Văn Tường: Đại Nam's Pursuit of Independent Balance and Independence for Balance

as a tributary state of China, and is viewed differently from inland provinces. If we do not establish our complete sovereign authority and make it clear to the world, those who refer to our territory as a tributary state in the future will claim that our tributary states are not true tributary states, and there will be a risk of invasion and occupation... Only by establishing our sovereignty, clarifying our borders, enriching our customs revenue, and permanently securing our national defense can we finally enjoy prosperity and eliminate threats. 2. Diplomatic Exchange between Tang Ting-ken and Nguyễn Văn Tường: Đại Nam's Pursuit of Independent Balance and Independence for Balance

If we do not establish our complete sovereign authority and make it clear to the world, those who refer to our territory as a tributary state in the future will claim that our tributary states are not true tributary states, and there will be a risk of invasion and occupation... Only by establishing our sovereignty, clarifying our borders, enriching our customs revenue, and permanently securing our national defense can we finally enjoy prosperity and eliminate threats. 2. Diplomatic Exchange between Tang Ting-ken and Nguyễn Văn Tường: Đại Nam's Pursuit of Independent Balance and Independence for Balance

will claim that our tributary states are not true tributary states, and there will be a risk of invasion and occupation... Only by establishing our sovereignty, clarifying our borders, enriching our customs revenue, and permanently securing our national defense can we finally enjoy prosperity and eliminate threats. 2. Diplomatic Exchange between Tang Ting-ken and Nguyễn Văn Tường: Đại Nam's Pursuit of Independent Balance and Independence for Balance

and there will be a risk of invasion and occupation... Only by establishing our sovereignty, clarifying our borders, enriching our customs revenue, and permanently securing our national defense can we finally enjoy prosperity and eliminate threats. 2. Diplomatic Exchange between Tang Ting-ken and Nguyễn Văn Tường: Đại Nam's Pursuit of Independent Balance and Independence for Balance

Only by establishing our sovereignty, clarifying our borders, enriching our customs revenue, and permanently securing our national defense can we finally enjoy prosperity and eliminate threats. 2. Diplomatic Exchange between Tang Ting-ken and Nguyễn Văn Tường: Đại Nam's Pursuit of Independent Balance and Independence for Balance

2. Diplomatic Exchange between Tang Ting-ken and Nguyễn Văn Tường: Đại Nam's Pursuit of Independent Balance and Independence for Balance

Li Hongzhang, the Governor-General of Zhili, dispatches Tang Ting-ken to Annam through the Governor-General of Liangguang. Tang Ting-ken held the position of Deputy General in the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company (輪船招商局), a Qing enterprise, and concurrently held a third-rank official position. Since the Self-Strengthening Movement, the Steam Navigation Company had been driving Qing's maritime and self-strengthening initiatives and maintained close relationships with influential politicians, including the Governor-General of Liangguang. Tang Ting-ken was assigned two missions: first, to investigate the actual situation in Annam; and second, to establish a secret channel for direct communication with the Annamese Emperor, bypassing the inconvenience in the border region between Tonkin and Guangxi caused by the Huangqi Army and Li Yangzai rebellions and the French troops stationed in the Red River. While Li Hongzhang's exchange of letters with the Prime Minister of the tributary state is reminiscent of the correspondence between Li Hongzhang and Yi Yu-won of Joseon, the two cases differed in practice. Li Hongzhang actively engaged in multiple exchanges of letters with Yi Yu-won, attempting to persuade Joseon to establish diplomatic relations with Western countries.

The nation, and there is a risk of usurpation. ... With my sovereignty established, borders clarified, customs revenue increased daily, and defenses permanently strengthened,

to promote prosperity and eliminate harm.

204) Đại Nam Thực Lục, Vol. 8, p. 535. Amidst the inconvenience in travel between the Tonkin-Guangxi border region due to the Huangqi Army and Li Yangzai rebellions, and the French troops stationed in the Red River, the mission was to establish a secret channel for direct communication with the Annamese Emperor, bypassing these difficulties. While the exchange of letters between Li Hongzhang and the Prime Minister of the tributary state is reminiscent of the correspondence between Li Hongzhang and Yi Yu-won of Joseon, the two cases differed in practice. Li Hongzhang actively engaged in multiple exchanges of letters with Yi Yu-won, attempting to persuade Joseon to establish diplomatic relations with Western countries.

In contrast, the exchange with Nguyễn Văn Tường was a one-time event. Furthermore, Nguyễn Văn Tường was not the intended recipient; he was an intermediary who responded to Tang Ting-ken's request for direct dialogue with the Emperor. According to the Đại Nam Thực Lục, a Qing official came to offer condolences to the Annamese Emperor, but fearing suspicion from French officials, requested Nguyễn Văn Tường to respond on his behalf. Nguyễn Văn Tường was one of the four Grand Academicians of the Secret Council (機密院) and a key political figure who, after the death of Emperor Tự Đức, emerged as a powerful politician who, along with Tôn Thất Thuyết (尊室說), would act as regent for the young emperor. He hosted Tang Ting-ken at the Ministry of Rites, offering a banquet and gifts. After their private discussions, he provided ivory and rhinoceros horns as gifts for Governor-General Zhang Zhidong and Li Hongzhang. Tang Ting-ken sent these letters to the Governor-General of Liangguang, who then reported their contents to Li Hongzhang.

In this correspondence, Nguyễn Văn Tường emphasized that Annam's tributary status to the Celestial Dynasty (天朝) was a universally known fact. He requested three things from the Qing court: First, that Annam maintain a resident official in Yanjing so that the Zongli Yamen could respond promptly if France violated the treaty. Second, similar to how various consuls resided in Guangdong Province, Annam should be allowed to dispatch a consul to Guangdong with the approval of the Governor-General of Liangguang to facilitate trade and information exchange. Third, Annam should send students to study in Britain, Russia, Prussia, the United States, Austria, and Japan to broaden their horizons and strengthen the nation, as Qing ships sailed overseas more frequently than Annamese ships, making it easier to observe Western affairs.

These proposals were accepted in part by Li Hongzhang. He transferred the jurisdiction of Annam affairs from the Ministry of Rites to the Zongli Yamen, facilitating smoother and more prompt communication. The second proposal did not progress due to time constraints, but Li Hongzhang discussed the possibility of Annam dispatching a consul to Guangdong with the Governor-General of Liangguang. Regarding the third proposal, he did not object to the idea of sending students abroad by chartering Qing vessels. Of course, Annam's protectorate status progressed faster than anticipated, and despite Li Hongzhang's approval, Annam was unable to implement these policies. However, regardless of whether the policies were realized, the important point is that while the diplomats of Qing and Annam at the time adhered to the framework of tributary relations, they did not resist the changing tides of the times. Recognizing the gravity and urgency of the situation, they immediately understood that communication through existing official channels was impossible and showed a flexible attitude in communicating through new channels.

Subsequently, Li Hongzhang contacted the British, German, and American ministers to encourage them to sign trade treaties and establish diplomatic relations with Annam, but all these attempts failed. In December 1881, Thomas Wade, the British Minister to Qing, replied that French influence in Vietnam was already firmly established, making diplomatic relations meaningless. In June 1883, he made the same proposal to the German Minister, but Germany expressed sympathy towards Li Hongzhang but showed no intention of signing a treaty with Annam. The American Minister, John Russell Young, also indirectly refused, suggesting further discussion once the situation in Vietnam stabilized. Ultimately, Đại Nam signed trade treaties and dispatched ministers to Thailand, Spain, and Cochinchina. Among these, Spain was effectively a partner of France and a co-signatory of the Tianjin Treaty; the right to dispatch a minister was explicitly stated in the treaty. Therefore, Spain could not function as a force to balance French influence. The fundamental reason for the failure of Annam's balancing strategy was that the pursuit of balance by Qing and Annam was too late. Li Hongzhang began actively searching for countries willing to sign treaties with Annam in 1881, only two years before the protectorate treaty. There were also issues with Li Hongzhang's personal attitude. He adopted a somewhat passive and reactive observation policy towards Annam compared to the issues concerning Joseon. This attitude can be explained by Li Hongzhang's failure to accurately gauge French ambitions. Let us examine a letter he wrote in 1881.

Vietnam is already very weak and has requested assistance from France in all aspects.

Since France has signed a treaty, it seems unlikely that China can dissuade them.

However, judging by the intentions of the French envoy, they do not seem to intend to annex Vietnam immediately.

It seems we must maintain a distance and be prepared to mediate at any time.

205)

The plan conceived by Li Hongzhang can be reconstructed from the meeting between Minister Bourée and Li Hongzhang on November 27, 1882, as recorded in the French diplomatic archives. He stated that he had no objection to France trading in the Yunnan region, only wishing to avoid situations similar to the Margary Affair (where a Chinese national murdered a British national). Second, he expressed concern that if Annam were taken by France, it would cause significant domestic backlash due to the long-standing traditional relationship between Annam and China. 205) 越南孱弱已甚，事事求助于法人，既立有约据，恐非中国所能劝阻，然窥法

使之意，尚非即思吞并者，似只可不即不离，随时设法调停. He then proposed, as one solution, the joint protectorate of Annam. Bourée stated that he was not challenging Qing's authority in Annam at all, but only wished to discuss Tonkin. Li Hongzhang suggested that there was no need to delve into the specific differences between a protectorate and a tributary relationship. He proposed a plan for Tonkin to be permanently neutralized, with the area north of the Red River protected by Qing and the area south of it by France. In this neutralization plan, Li Hongzhang's approach to Đại Nam can be seen as seeking a solution within the modern treaty system. Li Hongzhang was skeptical about Annam's possibility of survival as an independent nation and sought to create a buffer zone through the simultaneous stationing of Qing and French troops. 3. Envoy Delegation of Phạm Thận Duật and Nguyễn Thuật: The Obligation to Notify the Suzerain of Treaties and the Frustration of Trilateral Talks

Envoy Delegation of Phạm Thận Duật and Nguyễn Thuật: The Obligation to Notify the Suzerain of Treaties and the Frustration of Trilateral Talks

Originally, the 1882 delegation aimed to travel to Yanjing with Tang Jingsong (唐景崧), an envoy and general from Guangdong Province who had come to Qing China. However, upon hearing the news that Admiral Henri Rivière had captured Hanoi, Li Hongzhang invited two or three officials to Tianjin and shifted the focus to bringing a royal letter from the Annamese Emperor. The delegation selected at this time consisted of the same individuals who had been dispatched in 1880 to observe Qing China and had engaged in poetic exchanges with famous Chinese figures, becoming a subject of extensive literary research. The 1883 delegation was no exception; Phạm Thận Duật and Nguyễn Thuật not only exchanged poems and books with prominent Chinese figures but also met with Japanese naval officer Sone Shuntora (曽根俊虎) and discussed the necessity of creating an "East Asian Cooperative Body." 206) Đại Nam Thực Lục, Vol. 8, p. 643. At this time, he received a copy of "A Record of Sino-French Hostilities" (法越交兵記) from Sone Shuntora, which summarized the unofficial Sino-French conflict, and corrected some of the rumors contained within it.

At that time, Li Hongzhang was engaged in negotiations with Albert Bourée, the French Minister to Qing, regarding Annam. As mentioned earlier, Annam had officially concealed the existence of the treaty from Qing, and Qing was learning about Annam's situation through French and British media. Therefore, Li Hongzhang needed information about Annam to proceed smoothly with the negotiations. He proposed a trilateral meeting with the Annamese representative, but the French side refused. Most Chinese scholars, including Wang Zhikang, interpret this as Qing, as a benevolent suzerain, granting Vietnam the right to speak. However, the conversation between Li Hongzhang and Phạm Thận Duật reveals Li Hongzhang's denial of Vietnam's right to conclude treaties. When Li Hongzhang asked Phạm Thận Duật how many treaties he had concluded, Duật replied that there were only the First Treaty of Saigon in 1862 and the Second Treaty of Saigon in 1874. Li Hongzhang responded as follows:

Treaties between a tributary state and other countries (e.g., the treaty between Joseon and Japan) must be reported to the Celestial Dynasty (天朝).

The draft will be submitted to the Ministry of Rites, and treaties with the United States, Britain,

and Germany will be reviewed by the Qing court. I (...) would have determined whether the treaty was reciprocal or harmful and ensured that Annam concluded the treaty under the best terms.

and ensured that Annam concluded the treaty under the best terms. The great power cares for the small power with benevolence (恩德) and maintains distant relations (柔遠).

and maintains distant relations (柔遠). However, Annam concluded a treaty with France without the consent of the Celestial Dynasty and only later sent an envoy to inform them. This is contrary to the etiquette of a tributary state (藩屬國).

This is contrary to the etiquette of a tributary state (藩屬國). Ten years have passed, and what is the use of sending a copy of the treaty now?

Ten years have passed, and what is the use of sending a copy of the treaty now? Li Hongzhang cites Joseon's conclusion of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States as a "model case" and reprimands Annam for concluding treaties in secret. This is in stark contrast to the response of Prince Gong (恭親王) Yixin (奕訢), who stated that "Annam is autonomous in its political and religious prohibitions, so China has no need to know." Should this be considered Li Hongzhang's consistent opinion, or should it be viewed as part of the changes in Qing's foreign policy towards its tributaries after the Imo Incident? In light of the traditional Qing-Annam relationship, there was no obligation to inform Qing when concluding treaties with third countries. However, Qing diplomats responsible for Annam affairs felt considerable pressure due to the potential repercussions within the court if they lost tributary status. It can be inferred that the argument that they had no means to intervene because Annam failed to fulfill its obligations as a tributary state was a common rhetoric used by Qing officials in charge of Annam policy to evade responsibility. Let us examine the following text by Zhang Zhidong, Governor-General of Liangguang. 207)

Since the Xianfeng (咸豐) and Tongzhi (同治) reigns, that country (Đại Nam) has experienced several internal rebellions, all of which were suppressed by the Celestial Dynasty's (天朝) armies. Therefore, our nation has never forgotten its desire to rescue Đại Nam from crisis and restore order.

all of which were suppressed by the Celestial Dynasty's (天朝) armies. Therefore, our nation has never forgotten its desire to rescue Đại Nam from crisis and restore order.

Therefore, our nation has never forgotten its desire to rescue Đại Nam from crisis and restore order.

However, the King of Đại Nam has neglected the principles of governing and preserving the nation.

However, the King of Đại Nam has neglected the principles of governing and preserving the nation. 207) 咸丰同治以来，该国数有寇乱，均赖王师进讨，次第削平，扶危定倾之

衷，我国家未尝一日忘也。乃该国王昧于制治保邦之义，历年与法人叠次私立

盟约，渐撤藩萬，冒境丧师，自赔祸患。前年滇桂出师，本部堂遵旨力筹规

越之计，征兵转饷，百道经营，该国并不遣一使备一文来辕陈请商定，并举

夹攻之策。迨大兵破敌南关，克复谅山长庆之际，复不能纠集义旅，协助官军

乘机却敌。朝廷不忍生灵久罹锋镝，俯从法人款议，今成局久定，该国自顾

归法人保护，近来势愈不振，乃始来文想乞援。览其情词，极为可悯，而事

机已失，补救无从，盟约昭然，也能更生他议。 and repeatedly concluded private treaties with the French over many years,

gradually abandoning its obligations as a tributary state. Đại Nam's loss of territory and military forces was self-inflicted. When troops were dispatched from Yunnan and Guangxi last year, this ministry (本部堂, the Qing court) followed imperial orders to devise a plan for Vietnam's recovery, mobilizing troops, transporting provisions, and making extensive arrangements. However, Đại Nam did not send a single envoy or a single letter to the camp to request consultation or discuss a joint attack.

When the great army defeated the enemy at Nanguan and recaptured Liangshan and Changqing, this ministry (本部堂, the Qing court) followed imperial orders to devise a plan for Vietnam's recovery, mobilizing troops, transporting provisions, and making extensive arrangements. However, Đại Nam did not send a single envoy or a single letter to the camp to request consultation or discuss a joint attack.

However, Đại Nam did not send a single envoy or a single letter to the camp to request consultation or discuss a joint attack.

discuss a joint attack. Even when the great army defeated the enemy at Nanguan and recaptured Liangshan and Changqing, they were unable to rally righteous troops to assist the official army and repel the enemy.

When the great army defeated the enemy at Nanguan and recaptured Liangshan and Changqing, they were unable to rally righteous troops to assist the official army and repel the enemy. The court could not bear to see the populace suffer from the ravages of war for an extended period and agreed to the French peace terms. The situation is now settled, and Đại Nam has voluntarily sought French protection.

and repel the enemy. The court could not bear to see the populace suffer from the ravages of war for an extended period and agreed to the French peace terms. The situation is now settled, and Đại Nam has voluntarily sought French protection.

The court could not bear to see the populace suffer from the ravages of war for an extended period and agreed to the French peace terms. The situation is now settled, and Đại Nam has voluntarily sought French protection.

The situation is now settled, and Đại Nam has voluntarily sought French protection. Recently, its situation has weakened further, and only now has it sent a letter seeking aid. Reading its plea, it is most pitiable, but the opportunity has been lost, and there is no way to remedy it. The treaty is clear, and no other discussion can be made.

and recently, the situation has further deteriorated, leading to an urgent request for reinforcements.

The circumstances and the written plea are extremely pitiable, but the opportunity to save the nation

has already been lost, there is no way to remedy it, and the covenant is clear, so we cannot

discuss it further.

There are three possible reasons why Li Hongzhang proposed a tripartite meeting to Pham Thận Duật. First, Li Hongzhang may have judged that a tripartite meeting format would be advantageous for obtaining information from Vietnam. Li Hongzhang was about to negotiate with the French envoy but had very little understanding of the internal situation in Vietnam. Second, he may have sought to include Vietnam in the negotiation table to make the international community recognize Vietnam as an independent diplomatic entity, effectively denying the protectorate treaty with France. Ultimately, since the tripartite meeting was ultimately thwarted by the French refusal, Li Hongzhang's true intentions cannot be definitively determined. A third possibility is that, within Li Hongzhang's conception of international order, imagined international relations as an extension of family, and he may have sought to act as an elder brother mediating between his younger brother Vietnam and the external party France.

Pham Thận Duật later explains the meeting with Li Hongzhang to the Governor-General of Shaanxi and Gansu, stating the following: Joseon is adjacent to Beijing and convenient for communication, but our country is far away, unlike Joseon, and I was unaware that it was customary to notify treaties. As it is widely known that our country has also abided by the laws of the Celestial Dynasty, it was not an intentional omission. Upon receiving this notification, Li Hongzhang was enraged and described Vietnam as 'shoushu liangduan' (首鼠兩端, literally 'a rat's head and two tails,' meaning indecisive or two-faced) regarding Vietnam. However, Vietnam wanted China to act as a mediator with France and hoped that China would dispatch warships to protect Vietnam during wartime. Pham Thận Duật, while staying in Tianjin, was enraged upon hearing the news that Fort Tuan Chau had been captured by Admiral Courbet. He and Nguyễn Thúc Thuyết judged that they could no longer rely on China and immediately returned to their country.208) Pham Thận Duật recorded the following in his 'Wang Jin Diary':

We were all indignant. The Qing court promised to mediate the relationship between our country and France.

China summoned us to Tianjin, but has not yet begun discussions,

and is hesitant to send support warships. (...) How can the Qing court

boast to the world without protecting its vassal state?

208)

https://archivesonline.mh.sinica.edu.tw/detail/243392a7a130eee9f8e0565

55438ee31/?seq=5 Pham Thận Duật's rhetoric initially focused on emphasizing the traditional relationship between suzerain and vassal states, but gradually shifted to highlighting Vietnam's contribution to China's security. Realizing that Li Hongzhang did not respond to the traditional rhetoric, he exposed the true nature of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship masked by the suzerain-vassal relationship and began to use rhetoric based on a more realistic international relations. Pham Thận Duật attempted to stimulate Li Hongzhang's imagination and sense of security by stating, "If Vietnam falls to France, China will not be safe," but ultimately failed to elicit support from China. Ironically, the logic of realistic international relations invoked by Pham Thận Duật was also the fundamental reason for the failure of the tripartite meeting. Contrary to the interpretations of previous Chinese academia, Qing officials, including Li Hongzhang, did not feel a moral obligation or duty to protect small states, nor was Vietnam moved by China's benevolence. The essence of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship was purely a realistic one centered on security and economic interests, and the rhetoric of vassalage and 'Celestial Dynasty' (天朝上國) served merely as a justification and lubricant to ensure the smooth continuation of this relationship. Consequently, the tripartite meeting failed because Li Hongzhang had no intention of pursuing it in the first place. He sought to prevent situations that posed a real threat to China's security and, considering the risk of dispersing troops due to the confrontation with Japan, which became evident during the Imo Incident, had already strategically abandoned Vietnam.

III. Conclusion

This study analyzed the turning point in Sino-Vietnamese relations through three events. After maintaining a passive stance from 1874 onwards, China shifted to an interventionist policy in the 1880s. This shift was driven by the efforts of mid-level officials, including the Governors-General of Liangguang and the French envoy to China, and did not receive the support of key policymakers, including Li Hongzhang. Li Hongzhang's policy was primarily aimed at enabling Vietnam to conclude treaties with European powers to achieve a balance of power, thereby preventing unilateral French aggression. This was, in fact, closer to a policy of observation rather than intervention. Although Li Hongzhang attempted to contact the Vietnamese court through informants like Tang Jingsong, there was little he could do as he had already abandoned the war. For him, Vietnam had a lower strategic priority than Joseon, and he aimed for a peaceful resolution, recognizing the difficulty of confronting France's powerful navy without the completion of China's four modern fleets.

On the other hand, Nguyễn Văn Tường proposed a policy of internal self-strengthening and external balance of power in his meeting with Tang Jingsong. He sought to neutralize Vietnam by establishing a Vietnamese legation near the Zongli Yamen in Beijing and engaging in exchanges with Western countries. This can be seen as Vietnam accurately reading the strategic intentions of the northern great power. The tripartite meeting in March 1883 was doomed to fail from the outset due to Li Hongzhang's uncooperative attitude and France's preemptive obstruction. Li Hongzhang's refusal to provide military aid clearly demonstrated China's policy towards Vietnam. Ultimately, on May 12, 1884, he met with Fournier and signed the Li-Fournier Convention, effectively abandoning Vietnam. The agreement stipulated that France would protect territories in southern China, including Tonkin, and that Chinese troops would be stationed at the border of northern Tonkin. In exchange for making Vietnam a protectorate under international law, China received a promise not to encroach upon Chinese territories, including Yunnan and Guangdong provinces.

This study illuminated the perceptions of Zeng Jize, Li Hongzhang, and Nguyễn Văn Tường regarding "the autonomy of vassal states in diplomacy." While Li Hongzhang pursued a balance of power by allowing Vietnam to conclude treaties with third countries, Zeng Jize maintained the argument that treaties concluded by Vietnam with France were fundamentally invalid because Vietnam was a vassal state of China. However, rather than distinguishing them by the presence or absence of diplomatic rights, viewing them on the spectrum of "traditional tributary order versus international law order" reveals that both converged towards a realistic international perspective. In the later period, Zeng Jize recognized that the logic of vassalage was not accepted by Western powers and argued that remaining vassal states (like Joseon) should be redefined as Western protectorates or sovereign territories to prevent their invasion by great powers. This can be seen as an attitude of abandoning the traditional East Asian international order and adopting Western international norms in consideration of realistic security.

Li Hongzhang also considered the option of making Vietnam a permanently neutral country during the Li-Fournier Convention and proposed dividing the area north and south of the Red River for joint protection to secure a buffer zone. This was also to prevent the influx of French people into Chinese border areas, which could cause instability. Finally, the Vietnamese delegation that visited Li Hongzhang also appealed for China's protection by self-identifying as a "vassal state," and when that protection was not realized as intended, they attempted to elicit support by emphasizing the threat to China's security if Vietnam collapsed. Ironically, they used traditional rhetoric such as "vassal state" and "Celestial Dynasty" as tools to project their policy ideals. While no one believed the rhetoric of the Celestial Dynasty in the 1880s, it was a useful and open pretense, a form of "organized hypocrisy," to legitimize their political objectives. References 1. Korean

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*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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