Perceptions of Diplomacy with Japan in Joseon and Qing: Focusing on the Correspondence between Li Hongzhang and Yu Won-won

Sarangbang Class 24

I. Introduction

The defeat in the Opium War in 1860 brought about changes in China's traditional world order. The newly emerged Western maritime powers demanded the establishment of legations in Beijing and, furthermore, that Qing join the modern treaty system. Under this pressure, the Prince Gong, who was the de facto power holder at the time, established the Zongli Yamen, an institution dedicated to modern diplomacy. However, the Zongli Yamen, newly created alongside the existing Board of Rites and the Court of Reception, which handled negotiations according to traditional principles, experienced disputes over authority with other ministries. These issues further impacted the tributary relationship between Joseon and Qing, which was maintained through the tributary system.

As is well known, traditional international relations were not 'diplomacy' but rather 'Sadae-gyorin' (tribute and neighborly relations), and the principle of 'Insin-mu-oe-gyo' (a minister has no diplomacy) exerted a profound influence. However, traditional exchange relations solely through the Ministry of Rites were insufficient to keep pace with the rapidly changing times. As the Tsungli Yamen was established to manage the treaty system, cases of seeking practical solutions by loosely applying the principle of 'Insin-mu-oe-gyo' began to emerge. For instance, Ryu Hu-jo (柳厚祚), the envoy dispatched to Beijing, received a letter (short note) from the Minister of Rites, Man Qingli (萬靑藜), conveying information about France's military movements to the Joseon court.107)

The correspondence exchanged between Joseon's Yu Won and Qing's Li Hongzhang, conducted amidst these changes, serves as a good example illustrating the transitional nature of the early opening period. Numerous studies have already been conducted on the exchange of letters between the two. Starting with Song Byung-ki's paper, which evaluated the correspondence as the beginning of the process of concluding the Treaty of Amity, and including Kwon Hyuk-soo's empirical research on the dates of the exchanged letters,108) more recent studies have expanded to explore the exchange of poetry between Yu Ji-gae and Yu Won, who mediated the correspondence between Li Hongzhang and Yu Won.109) While considering these research achievements, this paper focuses on the fact that both Li Hongzhang and Yu Won were traditional Confucian scholars and also powerful figures who prepared countermeasures against the global changes of the opening period and modernity. By examining the causes of their correspondence from the perspective of the transformation of the East Asian order and analyzing the diplomatic incidents of each country reflected in their letters, this study aims to understand how political and diplomatic events of the early opening period were expressed within a transitional order. 107) Son Sung-wook. 2018, "Cracks and Explorations in 'Diplomacy': Qing-Joseon Relations in the 1860s-1870s." Journal of Historical Studies,

240, p. 537.

108) Kwon Hyuk-soo. (2003). A Secret Diplomatic Channel in the Modern Transition of Sino-Korean Relations - Focusing on the Correspondence between Li Hongzhang and Yu Won-. Journal of East Asian Cultural Studies, 37, pp. 215-239. 109) Li Bo, Noh Yo-han. (2018). [Translation] Exchange of Poetry between Joseon Scholar Yi Yu-won and You Zhi-kai. Journal of East Asian Studies,

Centered on the correspondence between Hong Jang and Lee Yu-won. Journal of East Asian Cultural Studies, 37, 215-239. 109) Lee, Bo, Noh, Yo-han. (2018). [Translation] Exchange of Poetry and Prose between Joseon Scholar Lee Yu-won and You Zhi Kai. Dong-A Hanmun Studies.

13, pp. 151-173.

II. The Political Context of the Correspondence

Li Hongzhang, who became the Governor-General of Zhili, perceived Japan's expansionist ambitions as the primary threat. This was not just Li Hongzhang's assessment but also the main opinion of the Zongli Yamen, which led foreign relations at the time.

“If Britain and France, etc., send troops to Joseon, their purpose

is merely to propagate Christianity and trade. These countries

are checking each other, so they would not occupy Joseon and

seize its land. However, Japan is not subject to such checks, so

it might covet its land. If Joseon is occupied by Japan, Japan

will become adjacent to China, posing a significant concern.

For Japan, propagation of religion and trade are not even considered.”110)

Therefore, in 1873, Qing included Article 1 of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity, which stipulated that both countries would not infringe upon each other's 'territory' (所屬邦土). Although Qing did not explicitly mention Joseon or other tributary states, from Qing's perspective, its vassal states, which were undeniably part of the Chinese world order, were included in the term 'territory.' Based on this, Qing believed it had succeeded in protecting its tributary states, particularly Joseon, which was close to the Zhili region.111) However, contrary to Qing's optimistic expectations, Japan dispatched troops in 1874 to Taiwan, one of China's outer territories.

Tongzhi Sixth Year, Second Month, Fifteenth Day, Zongli Yamen's Appendix, compiled by the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1972,

Japan's Annexation of Ryukyu and the Transformation of the East Asian Order. Journal of Northeast Asian History, 32. p. 69.

The Annexation of Ryukyu by Japan and the Transformation of the East Asian Order. Journal of Northeast Asian History, 32. p. 69.

111) Kim Jae-sun. 2012. A Study on Li Hongzhang's Foreign Policy. Dongguk Historical Review,

53, p. 447. In November 1871, Ryukyuan castaways were captured in Taiwan and killed by indigenous people, which served as the pretext for the expedition. Japan had been steadily proceeding with the process of converting Ryukyu into Okinawa through the abolition of domains and the establishment of prefectures, appointing the Ryukyu King as the King of Ryukyu in 1872, and launched the expedition in 1874 to exert Japanese influence over Ryukyu.

These Japanese actions came as a shock to Qing. At that time, Qing was facing pressure from various countries through its land borders, including Russia in the north, Britain in the Yunnan region, and France in Annam. Furthermore, Japan's interpretation that Qing was not a suzerain, as evidenced by Qing's receipt of tribute from Taiwan, was even more threatening to Li Hongzhang. Until this period, Li Hongzhang believed that relations between states were established by the Son of Heaven and tributary states fulfilling their respective duties and norms according to their titles.112) However, Japan justified its expedition to Taiwan by arguing that it, as the suzerain of Ryukyu, had exercised military force in response to the killing of Ryukyuan castaways in Taiwan, while Qing avoided responsibility by claiming that the 'raw savages' (生番) of Taiwan were beyond Qing's control, thus tacitly admitting it was not the suzerain.113)

The initial plan of Qing, which was to curb the security threat posed by Japan through the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity and use that time to focus on border diplomacy to check Western powers, was disrupted. Instead, the fear that Japan might invade Joseon, which bordered Beijing and the northeastern region, a strategically vital area, intensified. Consequently, Qing not only pursued a maritime defense policy by developing the Beiyang Fleet but also could not help but pay attention to Joseon's diplomatic movements. Moreover, the French naval admiral Giquel, even after the Taiwan expedition, informed Qing that 5,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Nagasaki, prompting inquiries into Japan's potential invasion of Joseon.112) Kim Jae-sun, 2012, p. 440.

113) Okamoto, Hong Mihwa, 2011, p. 79. The Zongli Yamen, considering the seriousness of the incident, directly sent an inquiry to Joseon through the Board of Rites in June 1874.114) Li Hongzhang, in a situation where the security crisis was escalating, judged that conveying information to Joseon through the Board of Rites, following precedent, was not suitable for the speed of information transmission or the sensitivity of the content. He therefore sought a communication channel with Joseon. However, it is noteworthy that Yu Won, who was the Minister of the Left at the time, did not hide his displeasure with the inquiry from Qing.

“If the Zongli Yamen has something to inform our country about,

it should simply state that matter. Why do you speak of

trade and other matters as if you are threatening and

tempting us?”115)

Although Yu Won was politically opposing Heungseon Daewongun and assisting Gojong's personal rule, he cannot be seen as an individual who was enthusiastic about opening up or trade. Rather, Yu Won's correspondence with Li Hongzhang shows him seemingly adopting the arguments of the traditional pro-Western exclusionists. Therefore, it is important to examine Yu Won's political motivations for seeking to establish a secret connection with Li Hongzhang while expressing reluctance towards the trade proposals hinted at by Qing.

Lee Yu-won emerged as the envoy to Beijing one year after Japan's expedition to Taiwan, in 1875. At the time, Joseon had recently begun its direct rule after King Gojong, prompted by a memorial from Choi Ik-hyeon, removed Heungseon Daewongun from power. 114) Jeong Seon-mo. 2012. Lee Yu-won's Eulhae Yeonhaeng and the Ganghwa Island Treaty. East Asian Hanmun Literature, 52, 5. 115) Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty, Gojong Year 11, June 25. C. Gojong began to establish his authority by negating the achievements of the Daewongun period. In terms of diplomacy, representative actions included interrogating Hoon-do An Dong-jun, who handled Joseon-Japan affairs during the Daewongun period, for embezzlement and exiling Gyeongsang Province Governor Kim Se-ho and former Dongnae Magistrate Jeong Hyeon-deok. 116) These measures were intended to resolve the 'Seogye Problem,' a diplomatic rupture between Joseon and Japan that occurred because Japan, after the Meiji Restoration, used the character '皇 (Emperor)' in its diplomatic documents and positioned it one level higher than the term '貴國 (Your Esteemed Country)'. Simultaneously, Queen Min was dissatisfied with the situation where Princess Wanhwa, born earlier from a concubine, was favored by the Daewongun. Given that the Daewongun's faction could retaliate at any time even after his removal from power, it was paramount for Queen Min to secure political stability by having her son quickly appointed Crown Prince.

Amidst this situation, as the Zongli Yamen became responsible for information regarding Western powers and even sent inquiries to Joseon, the Joseon court felt the need to establish a connection with the Zongli Yamen to deal with negotiations with foreign countries. Furthermore, through the chief envoy Nam Jeong-sun (南廷順) of the congratulatory mission in 1876 and the chief envoy Lee Yong-suk (李容肅) of the New Year's mission in 1878, the fact that Li Hongzhang was the influential figure in the Zongli Yamen was reported to the Joseon court.117) Therefore, Gojong dispatched Yu Won, whom he had consistently kept as a high-ranking official and confidant despite frequent requests for resignation, to Qing under the pretext of being the chief envoy for the Crown Prince's investiture petition.

In other words, in an environment where the traditional principle of 'a minister has no diplomacy' was gradually eroding and personal contacts for practical matters were increasing within the diplomatic channels separated into the Board of Rites and the Zongli Yamen, Qing sought to establish a 'network' from a security perspective, while Joseon sought to adapt to internal and external political changes. This led to a shared motivation for seeking a network. Subsequently, Li Hongzhang and Yu Won began their correspondence when Yu Won sent a letter to Li Hongzhang through You Zhi-kai (游智開), the magistrate of Yongping Prefecture (永平府), which was on the route of the envoy's journey. Considering their political standing, the content of the letters can be seen as an exchange of national positions by those in charge of the practical affairs of their respective governments. In fact, Li Hongzhang reported the content of the letters to the Zongli Yamen or received instructions from it, and Kim Yun-sik testified that the letters received by Yu Won were shared with Gojong.118) In this sense, a context is formed where it can be called 'correspondence diplomacy' rather than mere letter exchange.

III. Content and Implications of the Correspondence

1. Correspondence as a Policy Towards Japan and the Treaty of Ganghwa Island

Yu Won's first letter was delivered to You Zhi-kai on January 9, 1876, and as it was the first letter, it contained expressions of concern for Li Hongzhang's health and praise for his achievements. Although it included the phrase "If you would impart instruction, it would be the greatest honor for me,"119) it did not specify the situation requiring instruction. As it was the first letter, it can be assessed that the focus was on the successful establishment of correspondence rather than on practical matters. Li Hongzhang replied the very next day after receiving the letter from You Zhi-kai. In his letter, he referred to Joseon as a "shield of China"120), which corresponds to China's security concerns regarding the Northeast Three Provinces mentioned earlier.118) Kwon Hyuk-soo, 2003, p. 227.

119) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "若下答敎, 與榮無比" Northeast Asian History Net. (Accessed March 15, 2025).

He then asked, "Since Japan and your country share a border, how about your exchanges and interactions?"121) This reveals that if Li Hongzhang were to offer 'instruction' on Joseon's affairs, it would be regarding relations with Japan. However, Li Hongzhang then stated, "Looking at the situation, it is no longer possible to close the borders and govern autonomously [自治]."122) This can be interpreted as an explanation of China's situation after beginning trade with the West following the Opium War, but it is actually an admission that Qing would be unable to actively dispatch troops to Joseon in the event of a war-like situation, unlike during the Ming dynasty. This is clearly demonstrated in the documents Li Hongzhang sent to the Zongli Yamen.

When the two countries resent and anger each other, war easily breaks

out. Joseon is poor and weak, and its strength is insufficient to

confront Japan. In the future, if Joseon requests assistance from

China, as it did during the Ming dynasty, how should we respond?123)

Specifically, when Li Hongzhang sent this letter, the Unyo-ho incident had occurred, and Japan had dispatched its envoy Hirotsu Hironobu (廣津弘信) to Busan in 1875, announcing the dispatch of a delegation to discuss the letter issue and the Unyo-ho incident.120) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "東方爲中華屛蔽", Northeast Asian History Net.

Specifically, when Li Hongzhang delivered the letter, the Unyo Incident had occurred, and Japan had dispatched the envoy Hirotsu Hironobu (廣津弘信) to Busan in 1875, announcing the dispatch of envoys to address the Seogye Problem and the Unyo Incident.120) Lee Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "Dongbang-eui Junghwa Pyeongbi" (The East serves as a screen for China), Northeast Asian History Network.

121) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "日本與貴國, 畺宇相望, 通來交際如何", Northeast Asian History Net. 122) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "揆厥形勢, 旣未能閉關自治", Northeast Asian History Net.

123) Li Wenzhong Gong Quan Shu, Yi Shu Han Gao, Vol. 4, "On Japan Sending Envoys to Joseon (Tongzhi 6th Year, 12th Month, 13th Day)",

“When the two sides resent and anger each other, war easily breaks out. Considering Joseon's poverty and weakness, its strength is insufficient to confront Japan. In the future, if Joseon requests assistance from the great power China, as it did during the former Ming dynasty, how should we respond?“, quoted in: Jung Sun-mo. (2012). Yu Won's Eulhae Envoy Mission and the Treaty of Ganghwa Island. Dongbang Hanmunhak, 52, p. 15.

Furthermore, before Yu Won's reply regarding the Japanese issue arrived, on January 24, 1876, Li Hongzhang met with Mori Arinori (森有禮) in Baoding, Zhili, and held a conference on Joseon affairs. At this meeting, Mori Arinori raised the issue of Joseon's tributary status, arguing that Joseon was an independent nation, not a tributary state, and attempted to exclude Qing's interference. Li Hongzhang attempted to counter Mori Arinori's argument with the traditional principle of 'Joseon is a tributary state of China' and the 'territory' clause of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity. However, Mori Arinori countered with international law, arguing that a country that does not interfere in the internal affairs of another country or collect taxes cannot be considered a tributary state.125) As the Baoding Conference only confirmed the differences in the positions of the two countries, Li Hongzhang's focus was inevitably on preventing actual warfare from breaking out in Joseon and Japan.

Ganghwa Island Treaty. Dongbang Hanmunhak, 52, p. 15. It was a situation where Japan was already foreshadowing the dispatch of envoys.124) Furthermore, even before Lee Yu-won's reply regarding the issue of Japan arrived, on January 24, 1876, Li Hongzhang and Mori Arinori (森有禮) met in Zhili Baoding (直隷保定) and held a conference on the issue of Joseon. At this meeting, Mori Arinori referred to Joseon's tributary status, arguing that Joseon was an independent nation, not a tributary state, and attempted to exclude Qing's interference. Li Hongzhang attempted to counter Mori Arinori's logic with the traditional argument of 'Joseon is a tributary state of China' and the 'so-sok-bang-to' (tributary state) treaty of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Friendship. However, Mori Arinori countered Li Hongzhang with international legal logic, stating that a country that does not interfere in the internal affairs or collect taxes from another country cannot be considered its tributary.125) With the Baoding Conference only confirming the differences in the positions of the two countries, Li Hongzhang's focus was inevitably on preventing the outbreak of actual war in Joseon and Japan.

Joseon signed the Treaty of Amity between Korea and Japan in 1876, also known as the Ganghwa Island Treaty. However, from Joseon's perspective, the Ganghwa Island Treaty was not so much a watershed moment entering the modern international legal system as it was understood to have restored the relationship with Japan, which had been severed due to the Seogye Problem, a relationship that had been maintained through the Waegwan (trading post). "Jaju-jibang" (autonomous state) in Article 1 of the treaty was understood as a concept inheriting the traditional notion that diplomacy and foreign relations were Joseon's rights.126) This was also because Japan, in order to resolve the domestic political turmoil stemming from the Seikanron (argument for conquering Korea), intended to conclude the treaty by accepting Joseon's demands regarding the draft they had proposed.127)

124) Kim Jong-hak. 2016. Was the Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan a Product of the Policy of Exclusion?. History Criticism, 114,

p. 42.

125) Kim Jae-sun, 2012, p. 444.

126) Yoo Ba-da. (2016). The Conclusion of the Joseon-Japan Treaty of Amity in 1876 and Joseon's International Legal Status. Korean Modern and Contemporary History Studies, 78, p. 33.

Journal of Modern and Contemporary Korean History, 78, p. 33.

127) Kim Jong-hak, 2016, p. 44. This can also be seen in Yi Yu-won's letter dated June 6, 1876, written after the Amity Conference and the Treaty of Ganghwa, which states, "Recently, we met at Ganghwa, received envoys, and sent envoys, and their friendship is as before, and will be sound and moderate in the future. Furthermore, future matters depend solely on you [Li Hongzhang] from beginning to end."128) The phrase "[Li Hongzhang] sent another advisory letter, informing us of methods for strict border control and subsequently resolving disputes"129) shows the perception at the time that China could suppress Japan by designating Joseon as a tributary state through the Amity Conference. This is also supported by the fact that Kang Wi (姜瑋), who was dispatched as an envoy to Yanxing in 1874, knew that Joseon was under China's protection as a 'subordinate territory.'130) The fact that the Treaty of Ganghwa was perceived not as an incorporation into a modern treaty system but as a resolution of the issue of diplomatic correspondence and a resumption of existing customs, and that China helped resolve the dispute arising from the Unyoho Incident in this process, helps us understand how Joseon and China viewed their bilateral relations at the time. Joseon and China perceived that they had resolved the issues of 1876 within the framework of the existing tributary and friendly relations system, without touching upon the issue of entering a treaty system.

Subsequently, in 1877, Hanabusa Yoshimoto was appointed as the first Minister to Joseon, and trade with Japan officially resumed with the opening of ports. However, Yi Yu-won was displeased with Japan's conduct after the opening of the ports. As mentioned earlier, Yi Yu-won was a typical figure of the 'wise defense and rejection of the heterodox' school, who opposed the opening of ports based on the principle that trade inevitably led to the influx of Western learning. In December 1878, Yi Yu-won 128) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "Recently, we met at Ganghwa, received envoys, and sent envoys, and their friendship is as before, and will be sound and moderate in the future. Furthermore, future matters depend solely on you [Li Hongzhang] from beginning to end."

"territory of the Northeast," Northeast Asian History Net.

129) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "Informed of methods for strict border control and subsequently resolved disputes," Northeast Asian History Net.

130) Yu Ba-da, 2016, p. 23. He submitted a memorial arguing that the port of Deokwon was too close to Sukneung, where the ancestors of King Taejo Yi Seong-gye were buried, and demanded the cessation of Deokwon's opening. He later argued that Incheon should not be opened because it was too close to Seoul.131) This indicates that the core diplomatic issue as perceived by Yi Yu-won was to resolve the new problem of opening ports brought about by the Treaty of Amity and Trade between Joseon and Japan, which was seen as a resumption of existing friendly relations.

In a letter sent in 1878, Yi Yu-won stated, "Yeongheung in the northern region is the homeland [枌楡] of our dynasty, and among them, Hamheung, Munsan, and Anbyeon are where the tombs of our former kings are located. Deokwon and Wonsan are only a night's journey from Munsan, so [the port] cannot be permitted. Nevertheless, they [Japan] are watching for an opportunity and are in a standoff, which is extremely worrying."132) He thus advised on adjusting the location of the port opening. Meanwhile, regarding the protest from Minister Hanabusa concerning trade in Busan, he said, "When they [Hanabusa] returned, their document was disrespectful, and they also spoke of compensation for trade losses. I do not know what will happen next spring."133) He requested assistance in negotiations with Japan.

Thus, from his first letter in 1875 until 1878, Yi Yu-won consistently used correspondence with Li Hongzhang to request adjustments to matters related to Japan. However, Li Hongzhang's correspondence began to change significantly from 1878, stating, "Japan not only harbors no ill will towards your country [Joseon] but also wishes to form a relationship of mutual support, like teeth and lips. They worry that your country may not be willing to treat them as such."134) While expressing hope for a peaceful relationship with Japan, he also began to raise Russia as a new topic, saying, "Among the Western countries, the United States and Great Britain are far away and only interested in trade, so they have no plans to invade territory. However, Russia's territory spans three provinces and borders our northeastern region. Furthermore, they occasionally engage in acts of territorial encroachment, and have sent warships to Joseon and Japan, which are located along the coast of the eastern sea, to secretly observe the situation. There is no escape from [Russia's threat]."135) Therefore, it is necessary to examine the reasons why Li Hongzhang, who aimed to prepare for Japan's invasion of Joseon, mentioned the threat of Russia and whether he proposed an alliance with Japan as part of this effort.

pp. 312-316.

132) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "Yeongheung in the northern region is the homeland of our small country, and among them, Hamheung, Munsan, and Anbyeon are where the tombs of our former kings are located,

Deokwon and Wonsan are only a night's journey from Munsan, so this cannot be permitted. Nevertheless, they must be observing, and we are in a standoff, which is extremely worrying,

Northeast Asian History Net.

133) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "When their envoy returned, his document was disrespectful, and he also spoke of compensation for trade losses. I do not know what incident will occur next spring," Northeast Asian History Net. He expressed hope for a peaceful relationship with Japan, and at the same time, began to discuss Russia as a new topic, stating, "Among the Western countries, the United States and Great Britain are far away and only interested in trade, so they have no plans to invade territory. However, Russia's territory spans three provinces and borders our northeastern region. Furthermore, they occasionally engage in acts of territorial encroachment, and have sent warships to Joseon and Japan, which are located along the coast of the eastern sea, to secretly observe the situation. There is no escape from [Russia's threat]."135) Therefore, it is necessary to examine the reasons why Li Hongzhang, who aimed to prepare for Japan's invasion of Joseon, mentioned the threat of Russia and whether he proposed an alliance with Japan as part of this effort.

incident, Northeast Asian History Net. Not only is there no ill will, but they wish to form a relationship of mutual dependence, and are concerned that your country will not treat them as equals.134) With these words, while hoping to establish peaceful relations with Japan, he simultaneously stated, "Among Western countries, the United States and Britain are far away and only interested in trade, so they have no intention of encroaching on territory. However, Russia's territory spans three provinces and borders our northeastern region. Moreover, it sometimes engages in acts of territorial encroachment, and has dispatched warships to the coasts of Joseon and Japan facing the eastern sea to secretly observe the situation. There is no way to escape [Russia's threat]."135) Thus, he began to bring up Russia as a new topic. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the context in which Li Hongzhang, who aimed to prepare for Japan's invasion of Joseon, mentioned the threat of Russia, and whether he proposed an alliance with Japan as part of this strategy.

2. The Ili Dispute and the Balance Strategy following the Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands

Russia failed to secure an ice-free port in Eastern Europe and the Balkans due to the Crimean War in 1854. Consequently, Russia turned its attention eastward and, through the Treaty of Aigun in 1858, gained recognition of the Amur River region as Russian territory. However, as Western powers established ports in the Primorye region or near Joseon after the Opium Wars, creating a potential connection to the Pacific, Russia sought to strengthen its influence in the Primorye region to prevent this.136) Russia achieved its objective by extending its border to the Tumen River through the Convention of Peking in November 1860, shortly after the end of the Second Opium War. Meanwhile, in November 1871, a Muslim uprising occurred in the Ili region near Xinjiang, which was formerly part of the Dzungar Khanate. After suppressing the uprising, Russia began to exercise effective control over the Ili region. The issue of managing the Ili dispute, until it was finally settled by the Treaty of Ili in February 1881, evolved from a simple bilateral border dispute into an international issue requiring anticipation of the actions of various countries with vested interests in the event of war. In particular, since Russia and Joseon shared a border through the Convention of Peking, Li Hongzhang needed to prepare for Russia's southward advance through the connection with Japan. Li Hongzhang's letter stating, "The peace treaty between Russia and Turkey has been concluded, and the western front is settled, and they are now planning to advance eastward."137) reveals the diplomatic stance of Qing at the time.

Sincerely treat each other, Northeast Asian History Net.

135) Letter from Li Yu Yuan to Li Hongzhang, Western powers such as Britain and the United States are too far apart, their aim is trade, and they have no intention of infringing on territory. Russia spans the border of three continents, and is actually adjacent to our northeastern region.

It sometimes engages in acts of territorial encroachment. Russian warships near the coast of the eastern sea bordering Joseon and Japan,

are cruising and observing, but ultimately cannot escape, Northeast Asian History Net. He sought to prevent this.136) Russia achieved its intended objective shortly after the end of the Second Opium War, by expanding its border to the Tumen River through the Treaty of Peking in November 1860. Meanwhile, in November 1871, a Muslim rebellion broke out in the Ili region near Xinjiang, which was formerly part of the Dzungar Khanate. After suppressing the rebellion, Russia began to effectively govern the Ili region. The issue of managing the Ili conflict, until it was settled by the Treaty of Ili in February 1881, evolved beyond a simple bilateral border dispute into an international matter requiring anticipation of the movements of various countries with stakes in the event of war. Given that Russia and Joseon shared a border following the Treaty of Peking, Li Hongzhang recognized the need to prepare for Russia's southward advance through the intermediary of Japan. "The treaty of peace between Russia and Turkey has been concluded, settling matters in the west and now aiming to pursue matters in the east."137) This passage from Li Hongzhang's letter reveals the Qing dynasty's diplomatic stance at the time.

However, in his reply, Yi Yu-won avoided direct mention of the Russian issue. As mentioned earlier, while partially accepting Li Hongzhang's argument that maintaining relations with Japan was necessary to defend against Russia, citing historical examples from China, he focused the main content of his letter on denouncing the behavior of Japanese officials after the opening of the ports, thereby excluding the Russian issue from the discussion.

However, from 1878 to 1881, the Ili dispute with Russia intensified, and resources were invested in the import and production of naval guns, weakening Joseon's influence. Furthermore, although Li Hongzhang faced challenges such as the expedition to Taiwan and 136) Han Dong-hoon. 2021, "Mutual Perceptions and Diplomatic Policies of Joseon and Russia in the Late 19th Century." Doctoral dissertation, Korea University Graduate School, Seoul, p. 47.

the deprivation of Ryukyu's foreign affairs rights, he believed that since the Unyoho Incident had been resolved with the Treaty of Ganghwa as a 'renewal of amity,' Japan's invasion of Joseon had been prevented. However, Qing faced a double predicament. With resources being deployed to the northwest due to the Ili dispute, Japan began to show an aggressive stance once again. In 1879, Japan annexed Ryukyu, a tributary state of Qing, and Qing was forced to effectively approve this through an imperial edict.

137) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "I recently heard that the peace treaty between Russia and Turkey has been concluded, and the western front is settled, and they are now planning to advance eastward," Northeast Asian History Net.

This was an extreme manifestation of the differing interpretations of 'subordinate territory' between Japan and Qing. While the Treaty of Ganghwa left room for interpretation that the system of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity and Trade was maintained, the annexation of Ryukyu revealed Qing's interpretation to be complacent. Li Hongzhang's reply to the Japanese Minister to China regarding the Ryukyu issue clearly shows Li Hongzhang's misjudgment.

Even if they do not listen, if we speak once more, Japan will realize its mistake and will not immediately proceed to abolish the prefectures and establish the counties.

Ryukyu can also preserve its territory, and it will not become a situation of entrusting the fish to the cat. Although it may seem like a lesser strategy, it is actually the best method at present. [...] Article 1 of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity states, 'The subordinate territories of both countries shall mutually respect each other with courtesy and not invade.' [...] This may also serve to deter Japanese aggression to some extent.138)

will realize its mistake and will not immediately proceed to abolish the prefectures and establish the counties.

Ryukyu can also preserve its territory, and it will not become a situation of entrusting the fish to the cat. Although it may seem like a lesser strategy, it is actually the best method at present. [...] Article 1 of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity states, 'The subordinate territories of both countries shall mutually respect each other with courtesy and not invade.' [...] This may also serve to deter Japanese aggression to some extent.138)

it will not become a situation of entrusting the fish to the cat. Although it may seem like a lesser strategy, it is actually the best method at present. [...] Article 1 of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity states, 'The subordinate territories of both countries shall mutually respect each other with courtesy and not invade.' [...] This may also serve to deter Japanese aggression to some extent.138)

this is the best method at present. [...] Article 1 of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity states, 'The subordinate territories of both countries shall mutually respect each other with courtesy and not invade.' [...] This may also serve to deter Japanese aggression to some extent.138)

'The subordinate territories of both countries shall mutually respect each other with courtesy and not invade.' [...] This may also serve to deter Japanese aggression to some extent.138)

This may also serve to deter Japanese aggression to some extent.138)

138) Guangxu 4th Year, 5th Month, 9th Day, "Secret Discussion on Japan's Dispute over Ryukyu," compiled by Wu Rulun, 1965, "Complete Works of Li Wenzhong," Vol. 8, Wenhai Publishing House, pp. 1-2. Cited in: Okamoto Takashi, Hong Mihwa. (2011). The annexation of Ryukyu by Japan and the transformation of the East Asian order. Northeast Asian History Quarterly, 32. p. 91. As a result of this assessment of the situation, Qing, which had to acknowledge the loss of Ryukyu through an imperial edict, proposed a 'balance' strategy whereby Joseon would sign trade treaties with various Western countries to defend against the unremoved threat of Japan and the newly emerged threat of Russia. Jeong Yeochang's memorial regarding the disposition of Ryukyu clearly shows this change in Qing's court's position.

Since Joseon had no choice but to sign a treaty with Japan, it would have no choice but to sign treaties with various Western countries. This is because Japan harbors ambitions to annex Joseon, whereas Western countries have no precedent of destroying other nations. If, in the future, Japan and Joseon were to trigger a war, all the countries with treaties would oppose it, and Japan would not be able to act arbitrarily.139)

Okamoto Takashi, Hong Mihwa. (2011). The annexation of Ryukyu by Japan and the transformation of the East Asian order. Northeast Asian History Quarterly, 32. p. 91. As a result of this assessment of the situation, Qing, which had to acknowledge the loss of Ryukyu through an imperial edict, proposed a 'balance' strategy whereby Joseon would sign trade treaties with various Western countries to defend against the unremoved threat of Japan and the newly emerged threat of Russia. Jeong Yeochang's memorial regarding the disposition of Ryukyu clearly shows this change in Qing's court's position.

Since Joseon had no choice but to sign a treaty with Japan, it would have no choice but to sign treaties with various Western countries. This is because Japan harbors ambitions to annex Joseon, whereas Western countries have no precedent of destroying other nations. If, in the future, Japan and Joseon were to trigger a war, all the countries with treaties would oppose it, and Japan would not be able to act arbitrarily.139)

Since Joseon had no choice but to sign a treaty with Japan, it would have no choice but to sign treaties with various Western countries. This is because Japan harbors ambitions to annex Joseon, whereas Western countries have no precedent of destroying other nations. If, in the future, Japan and Joseon were to trigger a war, all the countries with treaties would oppose it, and Japan would not be able to act arbitrarily.139)

This is because Japan harbors ambitions to annex Joseon, whereas Western countries have no precedent of destroying other nations. If, in the future, Japan and Joseon were to trigger a war, all the countries with treaties would oppose it, and Japan would not be able to act arbitrarily.139)

whereas Western countries have no precedent of destroying other nations. If, in the future, Japan and Joseon were to trigger a war, all the countries with treaties would oppose it, and Japan would not be able to act arbitrarily.139)

If, in the future, Japan and Joseon were to trigger a war, all the countries with treaties would oppose it, and Japan would not be able to act arbitrarily.139)

all the countries with treaties would oppose it, and Japan would not be able to act arbitrarily.139)

139) Guangxu 5th Year, 4th Month, 25th Day, "Memorial by Ding Richang, Former Governor of Fujian," compiled by the Chinese Historical Society, 1961, "The Westernization Movement" Vol. 2, China Modern History Materials Series, Shanghai People's Publishing House, pp. 394-395. Cited in: Okamoto Takashi, Hong Mihwa. (2011). The annexation of Ryukyu by Japan and the transformation of the East Asian order. Northeast Asian History Quarterly, 32. p. 96.

After the process of disposing of Ryukyu, Li Hongzhang began to more actively encourage Joseon to sign trade treaties with Western countries, following his earlier letter stating that Japan had friendly intentions towards Joseon. First, Li Hongzhang stated, "Since ancient times, the way of dealing with neighbors is such that if the response is appropriate, even an enemy can become an ally, and if the response is inappropriate, even an ally can become an enemy."140) He argued that relations with Japan should be positioned as 'strategic partners.' He further supported this by explaining, "If Japan were to conspire with Western countries such as Britain, France, and the United States to lure them with the benefits of opening ports, or if it were to collude with Russia in the north and pursue territorial expansion, Joseon's situation would become precarious, and its worries would greatly increase."141) As a solution, he proposed creating a situation where various countries would check each other through treaties.

Okamoto Takashi, Hong Mihwa. (2011). The annexation of Ryukyu by Japan and the transformation of the East Asian order. Northeast Asian History Quarterly, 32. p. 96.

Okamoto Takashi, Hong Mihwa. (2011). The annexation of Ryukyu by Japan and the transformation of the East Asian order. Northeast Asian History Quarterly, 32. p. 96.

140) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "Since ancient times, the way of dealing with neighbors is such that if the response is appropriate, even an enemy can become an ally, and if the response is inappropriate, even an ally can become an enemy," Northeast Asian History Net.

to lure the West with the benefits of opening ports, or if it were to collude with Russia in the north and pursue territorial expansion, Joseon's situation would become precarious, and its worries would greatly increase."141) He further supported this by explaining, "If Japan were to conspire with Western countries such as Britain, France, and the United States to lure them with the benefits of opening ports, or if it were to collude with Russia in the north and pursue territorial expansion, Joseon's situation would become precarious, and its worries would greatly increase."141) As a solution, he proposed creating a situation where various countries would check each other through treaties.

to lure the West with the benefits of opening ports, or if it were to collude with Russia in the north and pursue territorial expansion, Joseon's situation would become precarious, and its worries would greatly increase."141) As a solution, he proposed creating a situation where various countries would check each other through treaties.

For now, it is appropriate to use the method of 'using poison to counteract poison' to control the enemy's schemes and take advantage of this opportunity to sign treaties with various Western countries to check Japan.142)

to control the enemy's schemes and take advantage of this opportunity to sign treaties with various Western countries to check Japan.142)

It is appropriate to use the method of 'using poison to counteract poison' to control the enemy's schemes and take advantage of this opportunity to sign treaties with various Western countries to check Japan.142)

Furthermore, Li Hongzhang stated that this strategy is effective and guaranteed by international law (公法). However, Yi Yu-won strongly expressed his opinion against the strategy of 'using poison to counteract poison' to check Japan through treaties with Western powers, which was different from his previous letters. In fact, this reaction could be observed even before Yi Yu-won's recommendation of the balance strategy, as he responded to Li Hongzhang's mention of the Russian threat by saying,

The situation with Russia and Japan is like being in a dark room without the information provided by [Qing]. Regardless of how, by whom, or what is done, it is as if one is rushing to resolve a grievance. We only hope for the favor of [Qing] to suppress the enemy, and this is not merely the opinion of one person but the opinion of the entire nation.143)

Regardless of how, by whom, or what is done, it is as if one is rushing to resolve a grievance. We only hope for the favor of [Qing] to suppress the enemy, and this is not merely the opinion of one person but the opinion of the entire nation.143)

Regardless of how, by whom, or what is done, it is as if one is rushing to resolve a grievance. We only hope for the favor of [Qing] to suppress the enemy, and this is not merely the opinion of one person but the opinion of the entire nation.143)

141) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "If Japan were to conspire with Britain, France, and the United States to lure them with the benefits of opening ports, or if it were to collude with Russia in the north and pursue territorial expansion, Joseon's situation would become precarious, and its worries would greatly increase," Northeast Asian History Net.

to lure the West with the benefits of opening ports, or if it were to collude with Russia in the north and pursue territorial expansion, Joseon's situation would become precarious, and its worries would greatly increase."141) As a solution, he proposed creating a situation where various countries would check each other through treaties.

142) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "For now, it is appropriate to use the method of 'using poison to counteract poison' to control the enemy's schemes and take advantage of this opportunity to sign treaties with various Western countries to check Japan," Northeast Asian History Net.

to check Japan," Northeast Asian History Net. We only hope for the favor of [Qing] to suppress the enemy, and this is not merely the opinion of one person but the opinion of the entire nation.143)

143) Yi Yu-won-Li Hongzhang Correspondence, "The situation with Russia and Japan is like being in a dark room without the information provided by [Qing]. Regardless of how, by whom, or what is done, it is as if one is rushing to resolve a grievance. We only hope for the favor of [Qing] to suppress the enemy, and this is not merely the opinion of one person but the opinion of the entire nation," Northeast Asian History Net.

In other words, the principle was that Joseon, as a tributary state, would not trade with other countries, and that substantive affairs with Japan would be resolved through Qing mediation. This also aligned with the strategy Qing sought to implement through the Treaty of Amity between Japan and China.

Our Minister Li Hongzhang, whose reputation extends far and wide, and whose plans are appropriate for the nation...

...there is no need to worry about the Japanese targeting Taiwan, and since the court has long benefited from its nurturing grace...

...it should always be trusted and not feared.144)

...it should always be trusted and not feared.144)

These remarks were also part of Qing's initial strategy, and for Joseon, the Ganghwa Treaty served as an example of Qing's capabilities. Therefore, from Joseon's perspective, there was no change in the fact that Western powers and Japan were vying for influence in Joseon, and Joseon needed to understand why Qing was advising it to revise its diplomatic strategy. However, out of consideration for its status as a suzerain state, Qing could not explain the situation further than the aforementioned expression that "autonomy is impossible."

143) Exchange of letters with Li Yu-yuan, "Generally, regarding the situation with Russia and the West, and the conditions in Japan, unless there is detailed information, it remains in darkness. No matter who, where, or what matter, if there is any report, we hope for your grace in suppressing it. This is not just the humble hope of one person, but the collective wish of the entire nation.", Northeast Asian History Network.

plans are appropriate for the nation... [Li Hongzhang] whose reputation extends far and wide, and whose plans are appropriate for the nation... If there is any report, we hope for your grace in suppressing it. This is not just the humble hope of one person, but the collective wish of the entire nation.

nation.", Northeast Asian History Network.

144) Compiled by Jang In-seong et al., "Materials on Modern Korean International Relations: Vol. 1, Opening of Ports and the Korean Empire Period", (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2012), p. 49. This stance of Qing serves as the basis for Li Yu-yuan's pointing out the contradictions in Li Hongzhang's letter.

Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2012), p. 49. This stance of Qing serves as the basis for Li Yu-yuan's pointing out the contradictions in Li Hongzhang's letter.

The Western public law does not permit the seizure or destruction of another country without any reason, [...] when rescuing Turkey, which was on the verge of ruin, one could rely on public law, but is it difficult for public law to be implemented in the revival of the already ruined Ryukyu? [...] Japan is familiar with trade and excels at manufacturing, having grasped all the techniques for wealth and strength, yet its coffers are empty and national debt has accumulated, [...] why would one deplete national finances and accumulate national debt, following in Japan's footsteps?

almost to the point of ruin because it was not allowed to be destroyed […]

When it comes to saving Turkey, public law can be relied upon, but for the revival of the already destroyed Ryukyu

Is it difficult for public law to be implemented? […] Japan

is familiar with trade and excels at manufacturing, having grasped all the techniques for national prosperity

yet its treasury is empty and national debt is accumulating, […] why

should we deplete the national treasury and accumulate national debt, following Japan's past mistakes?

The contrasting cases of Turkey and Japan, and Japan, which is said to be gaining economic benefits through trade but is accumulating national debt, were all points that Li Hongzhang included in his letters to persuade Li Yu-yuan. For Li Hongzhang, it was necessary to lower Joseon's animosity towards Japan, leading to a strategic alliance, while simultaneously making Joseon aware of the threats from Russia and Japan, so that China could act as a protective fence. However, because the root cause of all these objectives, namely China's weakness, was not revealed, Joseon could only perceive these words as contradictory. In other words, given that Li Yu-yuan's rebuttal was not merely a statement of Joseon's position but was based on Li Hongzhang's previous discussions, Li Hongzhang's strategy of balancing powers, regardless of its effectiveness, led to missteps in his approach to Japan and a decline in Qing's own national strength, inevitably causing diplomatic confusion and undermining the validity of Qing's claims. Furthermore, the idea that Qing's diplomatic confusion or changes negatively impacted the *wijong choksa* faction's opposition to opening ports can also be explained through the difference in content between Li Hongzhang's letters and Huang Tsun-hsien's *Joseon Chaeryak*. When Kim Hong-jip was dispatched to Japan as a envoy to bring back *Joseon Chaeryak*, Huang Tsun-hsien was the counselor at the Qing legation in Japan. At that time, his superior was Li Hongzhang, and considering the relationship between Li Hongzhang and Huang Tsun-hsien, it can be inferred that Huang Tsun-hsien also acted in concert with Li Hongzhang. However, as is well known, the main point of *Joseon Chaeryak* is to 'ally with China, connect with Japan, and unite with the United States' to counter Russia, and the book is largely structured to anticipate and refute internal Joseon discussions that would be suspicious of Japan. This also suggests that Li Hongzhang and Huang Tsun-hsien, that is, Qing, did not maintain a consistent stance towards Japan, and it would have been difficult to gain the trust of Joseon's rulers, who were concerned about the issues arising from opening ports with Japan at the time.

After confirming Li Yu-yuan's memorial opposing his balancing strategy, Qing began to doubt the value of exchanging correspondence through Li Yu-yuan. Li Hongzhang reported on the correspondence exchange to the Tsungli Yamen, stating, "[Li Yu-yuan] acknowledges that opening to Japan was out of necessity, and regarding trade with Western countries, there is no mention of it."145) He further expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the correspondence, saying, "I believe Li Yu-yuan is not in a position to make decisions alone."146) Subsequently, Li Hongzhang reported, "I sent a reply to Li Yu-yuan, but it was merely a formal inquiry about his well-being."147) This acknowledged that it had become practically impossible to change Joseon's foreign policy through Li Yu-yuan. Indeed, Li Yu-yuan

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146) Report on Correspondence with Li Yu-yuan. Northeast Asian History Network.

147) Report on Correspondence with Li Yu-yuan. Northeast Asian History Network. In subsequent letters, he primarily conveyed his dissatisfaction with the opening of Incheon and mentioned returning the French national letter delivered via Japan. Later, Li Yu-yuan sought Li Hongzhang's favor by sending an unprecedentedly large quantity of gifts in connection with the dispatch of Joseon students to Qing, and Li Hongzhang continued to provide only formal replies. The exchange of letters gradually ceased after Li Hongzhang's final letter in 1881, advising him to refer to Huang Tsun-hsien's *Joseon Chaeryak*. The establishment of the Office of the Progressive Affairs in 1880 and Li Yu-yuan's subsequent dismissal, which he used as an excuse for exchanging letters with Li Hongzhang, had an impact. Crucially, with the conclusion of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Joseon and the United States in 1882, Joseon began to enter a modern treaty system, reducing the need for communication through private channels like correspondence.

Furthermore, Qing concluded that it could no longer persuade Joseon with mere traditional justifications and began to actively intervene in Joseon's foreign policy. Li Hongzhang believed that Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt, known to be close to former U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant, with whom he had once negotiated the Ryukyu issue, could well represent China's position on Joseon. He therefore transformed the argument, previously referred to as "Western (泰西)" trade, into the "Alliance with America Theory (聯美論)".148) This active intervention paved the way for intervention akin to controlling the state, which developed during the Imo Incident that occurred in Seoul after the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Joseon and the United States in 1882.

148) Choi Ran-young, 2024, "Li Hongzhang's Recommendation for Joseon's 'Opening' (Part 2) - Development of the 'Theory of Opening to America' -", Journal of Human Sciences, Faculty of Human Sciences, Tokiwa University 41(2), p. 66.

Kai–”, Journal of Human Sciences, Faculty of Human Sciences, Joban University, 41(2), p. 66.

IV. Conclusion

This paper examined the correspondence between Li Hongzhang and Li Yu-yuan around the Treaty of Ganghwa, a transitional period, to understand the changes in Joseon's foreign policy during the opening of its ports. Notably, it focused on the fact that secret correspondence, virtually recognized by both governments, emerged as a major channel of communication, given the disruptions in diplomatic communication through traditional inter-institutional exchanges. In terms of content, it concentrated on the fact that Qing's diplomatic advice was not solely for Joseon's benefit but stemmed from the international crisis Qing faced. Initially, Qing, having experienced events such as the dispatch of troops to Taiwan, was wary of Japan's advance into Joseon. However, with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship between Qing and Japan and the Treaty of Ganghwa, Qing judged that Japan could be somewhat restrained. Nevertheless, with the emergence of Russia as a new power through the Iri dispute and Japan's annexation of Ryukyu, changes and confusion were inevitable in Joseon policy.

These considerations allow us to gauge the direction of Korean diplomatic history that unfolded thereafter. As mentioned earlier, Li Yu-yuan maintained a *wijong choksa* stance from the beginning to the end of the correspondence. However, considering that Li Yu-yuan had been dispatched as an envoy to China, it cannot be said that his worldview was exceptionally closed. Yet, through poems like "Yi Yeok Juk Ji Sa," while he described various countries appearing in *Hae Guk Do Ji*, he merely indulged in exotic interests149), and when seeing off a friend who left for Yeha-sa to console the Opium War, he showed an attitude of recalling the memory of the Byeongja Horan (Manchu invasion of Joseon)150). What he sought through correspondence with Li Hongzhang was to prevent Japan's opening of ports, or to mediate disputes after the opening. The confusion in Li Hongzhang's advice was also a reason why Li Yu-yuan adhered to his own position.

253.

150) Li Yu-yuan, 2022, p. 463. Given that King Gojong was behind Li Yu-yuan's correspondence, it cannot be definitively concluded that the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Joseon and the United States originated from the strategy of using the West to control the East, conveyed by Li Hongzhang, or from the strategy in Huang Tsun-hsien's *Joseon Chaeryak*. As clearly demonstrated in Imanson's memorial, Qing's logic could be refuted solely by its own internal reasoning, regardless of the actual state of the world. This is also why the argument that the treaty was concluded to bolster the national treasury, which was struggling with deficits at the time, under the guise of Qing's discourse, gains traction.151) However, the Imo Incident, which occurred in the same year as the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Joseon and the United States, revealed the limitations of opening ports and integrating into modern treaties, as they failed to gain domestic support.

Furthermore, considering that King Gojong was behind Li Yu-yuan's correspondence, it cannot be definitively concluded that the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Joseon and the United States originated from the strategy of using the West to control the East, conveyed by Li Hongzhang, or from the strategy in Huang Tsun-hsien's *Joseon Chaeryak*. As clearly demonstrated in Imanson's memorial, Qing's logic could be refuted solely by its own internal reasoning, regardless of the actual state of the world. This is also why the argument that the treaty was concluded to bolster the national treasury, which was struggling with deficits at the time, under the guise of Qing's discourse, gains traction.151) However, the Imo Incident, which occurred in the same year as the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Joseon and the United States, revealed the limitations of opening ports and integrating into modern treaties, as they failed to gain domestic support.

Moreover, seeking advice on and deciding a nation's foreign policy through correspondence is not limited to the case of Li Yu-yuan and Li Hongzhang. In countries where the system fails to keep pace with reality and where there is little possibility of systemic change, some individuals have attempted to achieve their foreign policy objectives through such secret correspondence. The cases of Oh Kyung-seok (吳慶錫), who sought out the British Minister to Qing and Japanese warships during the Treaty of Ganghwa, and Kim Ok-gyun (金玉均), who actively engaged with Japan for diplomatic autonomy from Qing152), can be understood within the context of Joseon politics of the time, rather than simply through the lens of the enlightenment faction versus traitors.

151) Kim Jong-hak, 2021, p. 163.

152) Kim Jong-hak, 2017, *The Origin and Secret Diplomacy of the Kaewha Party*, Seoul: Iljosa, pp. 27-64. <References> 1. Primary Sources *Annals of the Joseon Dynasty*, Correspondence between Li Yu-yuan and Li Hongzhang 2. Monographs Kim Jong-hak, 2017, *The Origin and Secret Diplomacy of the Kaewha Party*, Seoul: Iljosa. Kim Jong-hak, 2021, *A Biography of Heungseon Daewongun*, Seoul: Seonin.

Li Yu-yuan, 2023, *Gao Ge Lue 4*, translated by Lee Sang-ah, Seoul: Academy of East Asian Studies, Sungkyunkwan University,

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Jang In-seong et al. (eds.), 2012, *Collection of Materials on Modern Korean International Politics: Volume 1, Opening of Ports and the Korean Empire*, Seoul: Seoul National University Press.

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3. Thesis Kwon Hyuk-soo. 2003. Secret Diplomatic Bonds Emerging in the Modern Transition of Korea-China Relations.

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Kim Jae-sun. 2012. A Study on Li Hongzhang's Foreign Policy. Dongguk Journal of History, 53(0), 437-472. Kim Jong-hak. (2016). Was the Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan a Product of Gunboat Diplomacy? History Critique, 114, 25-56.

Lee Bo, Noh Yo-han. 2018. [Translation] Correspondence between Joseon Scholar Li Yu-yuan and You Zhi Kai. Journal of East Asian Studies, 13, 151-173.

Son Sung-wook. 2018. "Cracks and Explorations in 'Diplomacy': Qing-Joseon Relations in the 1860s-1870s." Journal of Korean History, 240, 525-570.

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Choi Ran-young, 2024, "Li Hongzhang's Recommendation for Joseon's 'Opening' (Part 2) - Development of the 'Theory of Opening to America' -", Journal of Human Sciences, Faculty of Human Sciences, Tokiwa University 41(2). Han Dong-hoon, 2021, Perceptions and Foreign Policy of Joseon and Russia in the Late 19th Century, Korea University

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Okamoto Takashi. 2011. Japan's Annexation of Ryukyu and the Transformation of the East Asian Order – Centered on the Treaty of Shimonoseki between China and Japan –. Journal of Northeast Asian History, 32, 63-103.

Yu Bada. 2016. The Conclusion of the 1876 Treaty of Amity between Joseon and Japan and Joseon's International Legal Status. Journal of Korean Modern and Contemporary History, 78, 7-4

Jeong Seon-mo. 2012. Yi Yu-won's Eulhae Yeonhang and the Ganghwa Island Treaty. Journal of Eastern Classical Literature, 52, 85-124.

Choi Ran-young, 2024, "Li Hongzhang's Recommendation to Joseon for 'Opening the Country' (Part 2) – The Development of 'Open Country Policy towards America' –", Journal of Human Sciences, Faculty of Human Sciences, Joban University, 41(2).

Han Dong-hoon, 2021, Mutual Perceptions and Diplomatic Policies between Joseon and Russia in the Late 19th Century, Korean