The Translation of 'The Law of Nations' and the Clash of Orders: The Imperial Palace of Harmonious Ease

Hyun Lee · Ewha Womans University

I. Introduction

In the mid-to-late 19th century, China faced immense challenges from Western imperialist invasions and diplomatic pressures. During this period, the traditional worldview of 'Tianxia' (天下, all under heaven) was severely threatened, and China's perception of the world began to change rapidly amidst a sense of national crisis. In this context, the translation of Western International Law into Chinese was not merely a technical matter but held special significance as an intellectual and political act through which China sought to redefine its identity and its place in the world.

Specifically, Henry Wheaton's "Elements of International Law," translated by William A.P. Martin in 1864, was rendered into Chinese as 『萬國公法』 (Wanguo Gongfa). The choice of the term 'Wanguo' (萬國, ten thousand nations) carries a meaning beyond simple linguistic substitution. It provides crucial clues as to how Chinese intellectuals and translators understood and assimilated the Western concept of 'international' and what kind of worldview they imagined. Based on this critical perspective, this study centers on the fundamental question: why did the translators of that era choose the term 'Wanguo' to correspond to the concept of 'international'? This question arises from the objective of elucidating how China's worldview and concept of order interacted and adjusted with Western concepts through William Martin's translation efforts. Zhiguang Yin pointed out that this translation was "not merely the introduction of a foreign language, but a clash between two different orders: 'Tianxia' and 'international.'" (Zhiguang Yin, 2016) According to Yin, Martin's translation, by adopting the 'Wanguo' concept which presupposes equality among Western nations, served as an opportunity to introduce a different imaginative capacity for order into China, one distinct from the hierarchical and Sinocentric Tianxia order. (Zhiguang Yin, 2016) Through this problematization, this paper aims to reveal the various intellectual tensions and compromises that operated in the translation field at the time. Ultimately, this study will provide an in-depth examination of the political implications of Martin's translation choice and the conceptual confusion and compromises China experienced as it reconstructed its traditional worldview and integrated into the modern international community.

Existing research on 『萬國公法』 has primarily focused on the circumstances of its introduction, the role of the translator Martin, and the reception of Western legal systems like international law. These approaches have made significant contributions by examining, from an institutional history perspective, how late Qing China accepted the new order of international law amidst diplomatic conflicts with Western powers. For instance, Yin analyzed how William Martin re-framed Wheaton's international law within the framework of 'Christian universalism' to introduce it to China, thereby analyzing the way international law as a universal value became integrated with China's political order. (Zhiguang Yin, 2016)

However, while focusing on Martin's civilizational translation attempts, this research does not sufficiently delve into the conceptual perceptions of Chinese collaborators, the clash of order systems, or the specific phases of negotiation that actually occurred in the translation field. Rune Svarverud's work is similar. He emphasizes that the translation of Wheaton's international law was deeply connected to the restructuring of order and practical diplomatic responses in Late Qing China. (Rune Svarverud, 2007) He particularly highlights that Wheaton's translation was not merely a cultural import but part of a national project of adaptation to the Western order and self-strengthening. However, this too remains confined to an institutional history-centered analysis of 'the introduction of international law,' lacking sufficient analysis of the conceptual history tensions that led to the translation of 'international' as 'Wanguo' rather than 'Guoji' (國際, international), and the intellectual deadlock that necessitated the choice of the term 'Wanguo.'

Meanwhile, Han Sang-hee, in a comparative historical analysis of how international law terminology circulated and spread in East Asia, points out that while 'Guoji' (國際) became standardized in Japan, the term 'Wanguo' (萬國) took root in China. (Han Sang-hee, 2010) However, this also focuses only on the differences in superficial language policies, failing to provide a conceptual and intellectual history analysis of why such a translation choice was made within China. Furthermore, Ignacio de la Rasilla argued that Wheaton's translation provided an opportunity for late Qing China to be reorganized as part of the international normative order (Ignacio de la Rasilla & Cai Congyan, 2023), and Deborah Cao analyzed the cultural function of translation within the Chinese legal language system. (Deborah Cao, 2007)

However, these studies have not adequately captured the linguistic conflicts and political compromises arising from the choice of translation terms, nor have they attempted an internal reconstruction of how the term 'Wanguo' sought to mediate the perception of order between 'Tianxia' and 'international.' Lydia Liu's concept of 'translingual practice' offers a theoretical tool for explaining the cultural politics of translation, but research applying it to the actual case of the Wheaton-Martin translation is still rare. (Lydia Liu, 1995) In summary, while existing studies have shed light on the institutional history of the introduction of international law or Martin's intentions as a translator, they have not adequately answered the question, "Why 'Wanguo'?" The seemingly minor linguistic decision of choosing a translation term was, in fact, the result of profound intellectual negotiation and compromise at the point where the universality of the Western state system clashed with the hierarchical universalism of the Chinese Tianxia order. This paper seeks to bridge this gap by positioning the translation field as a space where intellectual tensions intersect and by reconstructing the structure of conceptual imaginative clashes between Martin and his Chinese collaborators.

To overcome the limitations of these existing studies, an approach is needed that goes beyond merely clarifying the circumstances of international law's introduction or the translator's personal intentions, and instead reconstructs the intellectual historical context and political tensions surrounding the act of translation. In particular, the choice to translate 'international' as 'Wanguo' (萬國) was not a simple substitution of vocabulary but a symbolic decision that demonstrated how contemporary Chinese intellectuals interpreted the Western international order and how they connected, clashed with, and adjusted it with their traditional perceptions of order.

Based on this critical perspective, this paper posits the late Qing translation field of international law in the mid-to-late 19th century as a 'site of clashing orders.' Specifically, it aims to reconstruct the process of meaning creation that occurred as the discussion structure at the time of translation, the interactions between Martin and Qing collaborators, and the traditional concepts of public law and perceptions of Tianxia held by Chinese intellectuals clashed with the discourse of Western international law. Throughout this process, the analysis will focus on how the translation term 'Wanguo' emerged as a product of political and intellectual compromise.

Concurrently, by noting that Japan translated 'international' as 'Guoji' (國際) during the same period and adopted the Western order, this study will illuminate the political nature of China's linguistic choices through a comparison of the divergent translations, 'Wanguo' and 'Guoji.' Through this, it will demonstrate that translation is not merely a tool for conveying foreign concepts but an intellectual and political act that creates new perceptions of the world and imaginations of order.

In this regard, Yin emphasizes that Chinese intellectuals were not merely passive recipients of Martin's translation but actively sought to construct their own unique concept of 'public law' within their thought processes. He viewed translation not simply as the adoption of foreign concepts but as an active negotiation process aimed at reconstructing the existing 'Tianxia' order. (Zhiguang Yin, 2016) Similarly, Mingqian Li analyzed that the choice of translation terms was not merely a linguistic issue but a practice through which China reconstructed its traditional institutions and concepts to adapt to the new international order. (Mingqian Li, 2021) Furthermore, J d’Aspremon points out that Chinese and English international law discourses are based on different semantic orders, and even the same event unfolds with different narratives. (J d’Aspremon, 2021) This demonstrates that translation is not just a conduit for conveying meaning but a complex site where cultural interpretation intervenes. Based on these critical perspectives and theoretical discussions, this paper aims to reconstruct the intellectual historical implications of the choice of translation term, centering on the question, "Why 'Wanguo'?" This will contribute to a new perspective on the history of international law reception in China within a linguistic-political context, while also elucidating the dynamics of order transition and linguistic choices in the East Asian region.

II. The Starting Point of International Law Translation: From Institutional Introduction to a Shift in Perceptions of Order

1. Conflict with Western Powers and the Need for Institutionalized Diplomacy After the Opium Wars (1) The Shock of the Opium Wars and the Unequal Treaty System

The Opium War of 1840 was a shocking event that forced the Qing dynasty to confront the reality that its hierarchical, Tianxia-centric diplomatic order was no longer viable. Through the Treaty of Nanjing (1842) and the Treaty of Beijing (1860), China suffered severe blows to its sovereignty, territory, and economic autonomy. Diplomacy transformed from a matter of traditional etiquette into a practical challenge that could no longer be addressed through such means.

This transformation spurred the emergence of a new diplomatic strategy within China known as 'treaty-observing diplomacy' (信守外交, Xìnshǒu Wàijiāo). This signified a paradigm shift from diplomacy centered on hierarchy and etiquette to one based on international treaties and norms—a legal and institutional diplomacy. The previous self-perception of diplomacy, which categorized the West as 'barbarian' and China as 'civilized,' was no longer sustainable, and diplomatic pragmatism and institutionalization became urgent tasks.

Rune Svarverud describes this shift as "an epistemological and institutional transition from a moral hierarchical order to treaty-based diplomacy."48) Deng and Fairbank also point out that after the Treaty of Nanjing, the Qing dynasty accepted the Western principle of 'sovereign equality' within the unequal treaty system, analyzing this as a fundamental change in China's diplomatic identity.49) Han Sang-hee considers this period a crucial turning point in Chinese legal history, arguing that under Western pressure, China began to perceive law not as a means of coercion and submission but as a structure for negotiation, thus triggering the need to translate and understand concepts such as treaties, sovereignty, and law.50)

48) Rune Svarverud, International Law as World Order in Late Imperial

49) Deng Siyu & John K. Fairbank, Research Guide for China's Response

to the West, Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 51. It was recognized that this necessity spurred the need to translate and understand concepts such as treaties, sovereignty, and law.50)

These external shocks simultaneously necessitated internal institutional reforms. The traditional diplomatic correspondence, etiquette, and tributary system were inadequate for practical diplomatic engagement with modern states. Consequently, in 1861, the Qing court established the Zongli Yamen (總理衙門), a more practical diplomatic response organ, and the translation of international law emerged as part of the construction of this new diplomatic institution.

Ultimately, the Opium War was more than just an armed conflict; it was an event that prompted China to re-examine the fundamental framework of the world order in which it was situated. The translation of 'Wanguo Gongfa' was a product of this transformation, initiated within the Qing court's attempt to forge new relationships with Western powers through legal language and diplomatic norms. As Ignacio de la Rasilla and Congyan Cai point out, the Opium War was "an event that fractured the epistemological and ontological foundations of the Sinocentric worldview."51) Therefore, the translation was not merely an introduction of institutions but also a shift in modes of thought.

(2) The Establishment and Significance of the Zongli Yamen (總理衙門)

Established in March 1861 under the initiative of Prince Gong (恭親王), the Zongli Yamen (總理衙門, Zongli Yamen) was an institutional event symbolizing a historical turning point in the Qing dynasty's diplomatic system. Its official name, 'Office for the General Management of Affairs with Foreign Countries' (總理各國事務衙門), implied the 'general management of affairs with all countries,' heralding a new diplomatic perception that envisioned multilateral diplomatic relations, moving away from the previous tributary-centered diplomatic order. This was the most significant institutional innovation in the Qing central bureaucracy since the establishment of the Grand Council (軍機處) under the Yongzheng Emperor in 1729, holding profound implications not only for diplomacy but also for administrative thought.52)

Asia, p. 4.

51) Ignacio de la Rasilla & Cai Congyan, The Cambridge Handbook of

China and International Law, 2024, Ch. 1. This implied an office in charge of affairs related to the state, heralding a new shift in diplomatic perception that envisioned multilateral diplomatic relations, moving away from the existing tribute-centered diplomatic order. This was the most significant institutional innovation within the Qing central bureaucracy since the establishment of the Grand Council in 1729, holding important implications not only for diplomacy but also for administrative thought.52)

Unlike previous ad hoc diplomatic response bodies, the Zongli Yamen was a permanent institution responsible for ongoing diplomatic relations with foreign powers. Through this, the Qing court began to perceive Western powers not merely as entities 'beyond the pale of civilization' but as sovereign states with whom negotiation was possible, reaching an internal realization of the need for a specialized governmental body to handle actual diplomatic affairs. The term 'all countries' (各國) can be interpreted as a linguistic turning point, suggesting a multinational order and a horizontal diplomatic structure that were unimaginable within the previous 'Tianxia' linguistic framework. Ignacio de la Rasilla and Cai Congyan, focusing on this name, analyze that "the paradigm shift from the Sinocentric order to international diplomatic thinking was already reflected in the very name of the Zongli Yamen."53)

The Zongli Yamen served as more than just a diplomatic response organ; it became the core institutional foundation for the subsequent 'Self-Strengthening Movement' (自強運動) and 'Tongzhi Restoration' (同治中興) of the Qing dynasty. Under the leadership of Prince Gong and Wenxiang (文祥), the Zongli Yamen handled negotiations with foreign envoys, treaty interpretation, and translation services, as well as research and translation projects on Western institutions and laws. This, in turn, opened the door for the institutional acceptance of the unfamiliar concept of international law, and the translation project of 'Wanguo Gongfa' was initiated under the leadership of this institution. Svarverud evaluates this by stating, "The translation of Wheaton's international law was a systematic response initiated by the Zongli Yamen," demonstrating the Qing court's efforts at the institutional level to genuinely integrate into the international order.54)

University Press, 1964, p. 87.

53) Ignacio de la Rasilla & Cai Congyan, op. cit.

The political legitimacy of the Zongli Yamen's establishment is also evident in Martin's own retrospective account. In "A Cycle of Cathay," Martin states, "Prince Gong himself directly told me of the need to understand the laws by which Western nations conduct their relations and requested the translation."55) This suggests that the translation of 『萬國公法』 was not a spontaneous missionary activity or an academic curiosity but an institutionally planned endeavor as part of the Qing dynasty's diplomatic strategy.

Thus, the Zongli Yamen emerged as an institution to 'directly confront' the pressure from Western powers, but it also served as an indicator of the fundamental shift occurring in the Qing court's perception of order. Within the traditional structure that separated foreign affairs from domestic affairs, the emergence of the Zongli Yamen, which began to handle 'foreign affairs' professionally and institutionally, provided the foundation for the concrete task of translating Wheaton and is closely linked to the subsequent choice of the term 'Wanguo.' It is in this respect that the Zongli Yamen can be interpreted not merely as a bureaucratic organization but as a site that institutionally embodied a shift in the sense of order. The Zongli Yamen was not just a diplomatic body but institutionalized China's linguistic sense of perceiving the world as shifting from 'Tianxia' to 'all countries,' thereby providing the structural basis for the subsequent conceptual choice of 'Wanguo.'

2. Selection of the Subject for International Law Translation and Background of Introduction (1) Recognition of the Need for International Law Knowledge

The most significant background for the Qing government's decision to undertake the translation of international law was the realistic recognition that not merely a lack of diplomatic skills, but ignorance of the rules of the international diplomatic order itself, constituted a diplomatic weakness. Prince Gong, in particular, concluded that without understanding the legal logic and institutions inherent in the unequal treaty system established after the Opium Wars, securing negotiating power on the diplomatic stage would be virtually impossible. Accordingly, following the advice of Robert Hart, he formally commissioned William A.P. Martin to translate Henry Wheaton's "Elements of International Law," which systematized the core norms of Western international law.56)

55) William A. P. Martin, A Cycle of Cathay, 1900, p. 276. This was a recognition of the reality that not merely a lack of diplomatic skill, but the very ignorance of the rules of the international diplomatic order, constituted a diplomatic weakness. Prince Gong, in particular, concluded that after the Opium Wars, it would be virtually impossible to secure negotiating power on the diplomatic stage without understanding the legal logic and systems inherent in the unequal treaty regime. Consequently, following the advice of Robert Hart, he formally commissioned William A. P. Martin to translate Henry Wheaton's Elements of International Law, which systematized the core norms of Western international law.56)

This translation project was not simply about importing Western legal theory. The fact that the Zongli Yamen strategically selected texts actually used by practitioners in the field and translated 24 chapters indicates that the Qing government viewed international law not as mere 'knowledge' but as a survival tool for practical diplomacy. Notably, the edition used by Martin was the 6th edition of Wheaton's original work, published in 1855 with annotations by American diplomat William Beach Lawrence. This edition focused on content applicable in real-world international disputes and negotiations, such as diplomacy, treaties, war, and the rights of envoys, and reinforced the value system where 'international law = diplomatic norms of civilized nations.'57)

This strategic translation decision was also an urgent task given the practical conditions faced by Chinese diplomats at the time. During negotiations with Western diplomats, arguments based on Wheaton's logic were repeatedly presented, and the Qing government lacked even the basic legal language to understand and respond to these arguments. Martin described this in his memoir: "China's ignorance of international law was one of the clearest proofs of her isolation."58) He interpreted the translation of Wheaton not as a mere linguistic exercise but as a practice to fill the gaps that prevented China from moving beyond 'isolation' towards 'civilization.'

3

58) William A. P. Martin, The Awakening of China, p. 285. 59) William A. P. Martin, op. cit., p. 287.

In reality, Martin did not view the translation of Wheaton as a passive undertaking at the request of the Zongli Yamen. He clearly stated, "I had constantly urged the necessity of translating Wheaton's International Law into Chinese,"59) indicating that he undertook this translation based on his own active judgment and conviction. This goes beyond a one-sided account of 'the Zongli Yamen instructing Martin to translate' and shows that the translation field at the time was a place where the translator's civilizational beliefs intersected with the Qing government's diplomatic strategy. At the same time, the content of the translation itself is evaluated as partially reflecting Martin's theological and civilizational perspectives. Zhiguang Yin explains this by stating, "International law was not simply adopted as Western knowledge but was reconstructed during the translation process to be integrated with China's traditional order."60)

Ultimately, the selection of Wheaton's international law text was an attempt by the Qing government to arm its diplomatic capabilities with legal language, and simultaneously, it was a political translation project that merged with Martin's understanding of 'international law = universal norms of civilized nations.' Within this dual dynamic, the event of 'international law translation' functioned not as a simple transplantation but as an intellectual historical space where knowledge and order were readjusted.

60) Zhiguang Yin, op. cit., pp. 7-8. (2) The Prussia-Denmark Ship Seizure Incident and the Practical Value of International Law

60) Zhiguang Yin, op. cit., pp. 7-8. (2) The Prussia-Denmark Ship Case and the Demonstration of the Practical Value of International Law

In 1864, the incident of Prussian and Danish ships being seized in Chinese waters near Dagu (大沽) Port became a decisive moment that prompted the Qing dynasty to undertake the translation of international law and served as a diplomatic case that validated the effectiveness of Martin's translation. At the time, Prussia, engaged in war with Denmark in Europe, had seized three Danish ships near the Chinese coast. Prince Gong strongly protested this, arguing that military actions within Chinese jurisdictional waters violated China's sovereignty and neutrality principles.61)

Prince Gong invoked the rights of neutral states during wartime as presented in Wheaton's book, along with the concept of Territorial Sea stipulated in treaties between nations, to protest the violation of treaties by the Prussian side. He specifically argued in a letter that "the peace treaty signed between China and your country (Prussia) explicitly mentions 'Chinese maritime waters' (中國海洋), which is a common principle applicable to all treaties with foreign countries and an indication of jurisdiction."62) In this instance, Prince Gong directly applied the principle of prohibiting armed actions in neutral waters as stipulated by Wheaton, thereby demonstrating that international law could function as a means of resolving real diplomatic disputes.

The incident did not escalate into armed conflict between the two nations and was peacefully resolved with China's protest being accepted. Subsequently, the Qing government recognized the diplomatic utility of Wheaton's translation and approved budgetary support and official publication of Martin's translation. Martin recalled this experience, stating, "I received a grateful memorial from the Chinese Foreign Office, and the translation was praised for its practical assistance to their diplomats."63) This incident clearly shows that the translation of Wheaton was not merely a work driven by academic curiosity or civilizational aspirations but a 'practical translation' undertaken as part of national diplomatic strategy. Furthermore, it reveals that the translation was an attempt at intellectual conjunction, as Prince Gong connected the traditional Chinese concept of 'inland sea' (內海) with Wheaton's concept of 'territorial sea' to interpret and legitimize China's order in Western international legal terms. Han Sang-hee evaluates this incident as an example of the "localization of international law categories," analyzing that the concept of 'territorial sea' began to acquire concrete meaning in the East Asian context from this point onward.64)

Ultimately, the Dagu incident of 1864 served as a diplomatic field that demonstrated the 'effectiveness of translation' and a case showing that 'Wanguo Gongfa' was actively used in China's diplomatic strategy even before its publication. Carrai evaluates this incident as "a turning point that proved the universality and practical applicability of international law, not only because it was translated but also because it was applied to actual diplomatic disputes."65)

Thus, the process by which Wheaton's international law was institutionally introduced into the Qing diplomatic system was not simply the adoption of foreign knowledge but a turning point that foreshadowed conflict with the traditional order. While the establishment of the Zongli Yamen, the approval of Wheaton's translation, and the organization of translation personnel might appear as institutional adaptation to the Western order on the surface, a more fundamental shift in the 'language of order' was inherently involved. Qing officials and translators at the time were not merely introducing new institutions; they were confronting a transformation in their worldview that enabled these institutions—a shift in the structure of thought regarding 'what is a state and what is law?'

65) Maria Adele Carrai, The Politics of History in the Late Qing Era,

2020, pp. 12-13. They were facing a shift in the structure of thought, asking 'What is law?'

Therefore, the intensification of Wheaton's translation was not merely a technical task but led to the conceptual historical challenge of how to position Western terms within China's intellectual tradition and how to mediate conflicts. The discussion will now move beyond the institutional historical context to examine the negotiations of thought surrounding 'international' between translator Martin and Qing officials, and the compromises reached through the expression 'Wanguo.'

III. How was the Choice of 'Wanguo' Made?: Clashes and Compromises in the Translation Field

1. Martin's Interpretation of 'International' and His Civilizational Intentions

(1) Translation as a Strategy of Universalism: Martin's Civilizational Mission and Natural Law Interpretation

Martin's translation of "Elements of International Law" was deeply intertwined with his identity as a missionary and his belief in the universal applicability of Western civilization and natural law. He viewed the introduction of international law not just as a diplomatic necessity for China but as a means to guide China towards 'civilization' by instilling universal principles of natural law. This perspective is evident in his own writings, where he often framed international law within a framework of Christian morality and universal reason. For Martin, translating international law was an act of civilizational evangelism, aiming to reform China's worldview and integrate it into the 'family of nations' based on Western standards.

For Martin, the translation of international law was not merely a technical task to supplement the practical deficiencies of Qing diplomacy. In his view, Wheaton's international law was a legal system that expressed the ethical superiority and order of the Western civilized world, and the act of translating and transplanting it to China was an extension of missionary work aimed at "universalizing Christian justice." Through translation, he sought to incorporate China into the order of "God and His eternal justice," recognizing this as part of his civilizing mission.66)

This strategy was not merely derived from a pragmatic approach to enhance diplomatic negotiation power. Martin planned the translation in a way that aligned the natural law of Whitten with the Confucian concept of order. According to Zhiguang Yin's analysis, he translated 'natural law' as '性法' and connected it to Confucian theories of human nature, while substituting the term for the 'universal legitimacy' of international law with '天理', thereby attempting to place it naturally within the cognitive framework of Chinese intellectuals. This translation strategy functioned as a political rationalization device borrowing from Confucian ethics and also served as a means to conceal Martin's civilizational intentions.

Furthermore, he adopted an archaicization strategy that positioned China's Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods as the origin of Western international law. Maria Adele Carrai points out that Martin reinterpreted the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods as a time of 'proto-international law' and attempted to equate the order among the feudal states of that era with the modern sovereign state system of Europe.68) Through this, Martin made the introduction of international law appear as an act of restoration rooted in China's own traditions, intending for Chinese intellectuals to perceive it not as an 'import of Western order' but as a 'reaffirmation of their own order.'

This universalization strategy is clearly evident in Martin's own recollections. He stated that his ultimate goal was "to enable China to stand alongside civilized nations in moral and diplomatic terms." In his view, international law was 'civilization' before it was 'law,' and translation was an intellectual project of designing a moral world order.

However, this translation strategy fundamentally conflicted with the concept of public law (公法) as understood by Qing intellectuals, which was an order based on the distinction between internal and external affairs and the tributary system. Although the language of "morality" and "heavenly principle" might have seemed the same on the surface, the underlying premises of the order—such as the equal division of Western-style sovereign states and contractual relationships—were incompatible with a hierarchical international view based on the concept of 'Tianxia' (天下, all under heaven). Consequently, Martin's translation served not merely as a translation for late Qing intellectuals and collaborators but as an intellectual shock, triggering the compromise strategy of "the invention of ancient Chinese public law," which will be analyzed in Section 1.2.

(2) The 'Archaization' Strategy for Chinese Reception: The Invention of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods

William Martin did not merely introduce Wheaton's international law as foreign knowledge; he sought to reduce cultural resistance to the translated concepts by emphasizing that similar normative systems already existed within China's traditions. He particularly presented the diplomatic practices among feudal states during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods as the archetype of Western international law, employing an 'archaization strategy' to construct a Chinese origin for international law. This strategy was a historical reconstruction that presented international law as an 'order that originally existed in China,' thereby finding the legitimacy of the foreign order within its indigenous tradition.

In A Cycle of Cathay, Martin stated, "To introduce international law into China, I have traced its origin to the intercourse of ancient feudal states," positing the 'rudiments' of international law through the examples of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods.69) He sought to construct a formal equivalence of moral universality by equating the concept of 'public law' (春秋公法) found in Confucius's 'Chun Qiu' (Spring and Autumn Annals) with Western natural law. Zhiguang Yin points out that this process was not a simple juxtaposition of concepts but a strategic substitution of meaning that emphasized the ethical legitimacy of international law through the connection between natural law and heavenly principle (天理).70)

Maria Adele Carrai also analyzes that Martin sought to increase the acceptability of international law through this strategy. According to her, "By rooting international law in ancient China, Martin sought to foster cultural affinity and minimize resistance."71) This implies that Martin's translation was not merely a translation of diplomatic documents but a design for cultural reception.

While this archaicization strategy superficially appeared to respect Chinese tradition, it was, in reality, a civilizing strategy aimed at justifying the introduction of Western order. Martin utilized the framework of 'China also had public law' to obscure the fact that international law was a foreign order, constructing an ideology of translation that would not offend 'cultural pride.' This succeeded in making late Qing intellectuals perceive international law as a form of 'rediscovery of their own order,' thereby weakening psychological resistance to the transformation of the legal order.

However, the 'Spring and Autumn Public Law' he presented was, in reality, a principle of moral governance for internal affairs and a device for justifying the monarch's authority, a concept fundamentally at odds with international law as an order of equal contracts among European sovereign states. Thus, Martin's archaicization strategy created a point of conflict between the traditional order and the foreign order, and this conceptual clash subsequently became linked to the politics of translation terminology.

(1) Conceptual Clash: Structural Differences Between the 'Tianxia' Order and the International System

The process of translating and adopting 'international law' was not merely a matter of linguistic conversion but a clash of different imaginations of order. The international law that late Qing China faced was a system predicated on a contractual order among equal sovereign states; however, China's diplomatic order at the time was still rooted in a hierarchical spatial structure centered on 'Tianxia' (天下, all under heaven). These two systems fundamentally clashed in core aspects such as the method of constructing order, the basis for legal legitimacy, and the perception of civilization.

The Tianxia order was based on a cultural hierarchy that positioned China as the center of civilization and the surrounding regions as barbarian. The expression "There is no land under heaven that is not the king's land" (普天之下莫非王土) found in the 'Book of Documents' (Shujing) presupposes a possibility of boundless expansion, which fundamentally contrasted with the Western territorial order predicated on clear borders and sovereignty. Wang Hui points out that 'Tianxia' is not merely a political order but a cosmology of inclusion without boundary, explaining that the contemporary translated term 'Wanguo' (萬國, all nations) was situated on the extension of this expansive imagination.72)

In contrast, Western international law, since the Peace of Westphalia, has been a system built around legal equality, territorial sovereignty, and mutual norms based on contracts. This system emphasizes formal equality over cultural superiority and regulates diplomacy, war, neutrality, and intervention all according to treaties and international norms. It was a highly coherent system that allowed little room for compromise with the Tianxia order, which was predicated on hierarchy and cultural superiority.

Such inter-systemic conflicts were visibly manifested in the field of translation. For instance, the term 'interference' in international law, according to Mingqian Li's analysis, was translated into seven different expressions (interference, obstruction, insertion, involvement, invasion, etc.) in Qing dynasty literature, which served as evidence that the concept of international law did not properly align with the linguistic structure of the existing order. Additionally, the expression 'public law' was interpreted not merely as a legal norm but through the Confucian concepts of 理 and 義, and was not understood as equivalent to Western legal definitions. Thus, the translation process was not merely a task of transferring terms but a reconstruction of political philosophical legitimacy.

73) Mingqian Li, A Linguistic Approach to Late Qing China's Encounter

with International Law, pp. 5-6. The Prussian-Danish ship incident of 1864 is a representative case where the clash between these orders manifested in actual diplomatic practice. In this incident, Prince Gong argued that the Gulf of Bohai was an 'inner sea' (內海) of China, thus protesting that foreign military conflicts had violated China's neutrality. However, the concept of 'inner sea' at that time differed in its conceptual scope and legal basis from the 'territorial sea' defined by Wheaton's international law, and ultimately, the Chinese concept of 'inner sea' was accepted by being redefined within the framework of universal international law through Wheaton's logical interpretation.74) This illustrates a crucial scene where the Tianxia-centric order and the international law order did not merely coexist but were mutually adjusted within a specific authority structure.

In summary, 'Tianxia' and 'international' are not merely differences in expression but fundamentally different ways of legitimizing order and structuring the world. One is a hierarchical expansionary system centered on civilization, while the other is a bounded order of sovereign equality. This conceptual clash is not a simple matter of word choice but leads to the question of what kind of world the translators and recipients imagined as an order. Therefore, the choice to translate 'international' as 'Wanguo' (萬國) was not a linguistic decision but the result of a political and intellectual compromise.

In summary, '天下' and 'international' represent not merely differences in expression but fundamentally different ways of justifying order and structuring the world. One is a civilization-centered hierarchical expansion system, while the other is a boundary order of sovereign equality. The conflict between these concepts is not simply a matter of term selection but leads to the question of what kind of world the translator and the recipient imagined as order. Therefore, the choice to translate 'international' as '万国' was the result of a political and ideological compromise rather than a linguistic decision.

(2) Diplomatic Manifestation of the Clash: The Prussian-Danish Ship Incident and Terminological Confusion

The clash between the 'Tianxia' order and the international law order did not remain confined to the realm of conceptual thought. This abstract confrontation surfaced in the concrete diplomatic dispute of the 1864 Prussian-Danish ship seizure incident. This incident was the first instance where Wheaton's international law was practically applied as a tool in Qing diplomacy and a decisive scene demonstrating the clash of thought structures in the adoption of Western concepts.74) Rune Svarverud, the same book, pp. 45-46

In the spring of 1864, amidst the ongoing European war between Prussia and Denmark, Prussia seized three Danish ships in the port of Dagu, near Tianjin, China. In response, Prince Gong (恭親王), representing the Qing court, immediately protested, asserting that the waters in question constituted China's 'inner sea' (內洋, inner ocean), and therefore, foreign wartime activities were impermissible within this territorial sea. This was not a mere diplomatic dispute but an event where the Western international law concept of 'territorial sea' and the Chinese concept of 'inner sea' directly clashed.

In his protest letter to Prussian minister von Rehfues, Prince Gong argued that Chinese waters corresponded to the 'Chinese Sea' (中國海) specified in treaties, which was a 'zone whose jurisdiction is guaranteed by peace treaties with foreign countries.' He based this argument on Wheaton's international law, particularly the provisions concerning 'rights of neutrals' and 'maritime jurisdiction,' thereby asserting, in international legal terms, that China's neutrality had been violated.75)

However, the term 'inner sea' at this time lacked a clear definition in international law and did not perfectly align with 'territorial sea.' In other words, although the Chinese side attempted to equate Wheaton's international law concepts with those of their traditional order, the conceptual foundations of the two were fundamentally different. This revealed that the choice of terminology was not merely a matter of translation but an issue requiring the appropriation and adjustment of the entire conceptual order.

Mingqian Li also identifies a similar conceptual confusion in the translation of 'interference.' According to Li, 'interference' was translated into more than seven expressions in Qing literature (e.g., 干涉, 侵擾, 窺伺, 插手), reflecting the invisibility of the concept and cultural resistance.76) The discrepancy between 'territorial sea' and 'inner ocean' similarly led to legal ambiguity and conflict in diplomatic practice due to conceptual incompatibility.

Despite this, the incident is regarded as the first practical application of Wheaton's international law in Chinese diplomacy. The dispute was resolved peacefully, and Prince Gong immediately proposed the official publication of Martin's translation. He requested budget allocation based on the practical utility the translated work would provide to Chinese diplomats, which led to the widespread circulation of 'Wanguo Gongfa' (萬國公法, Universal Public Law).77) This symbolizes that translation was not merely an introduction of ideas but the starting point for political practice and institutionalization.

In conclusion, this incident was a clash between the inherent concepts of the Tianxia order, 'inclusion and centrality,' and the core principles of international law, 'boundaries and separation of rights.' It also demonstrates how conceptual incompatibility and terminological ambiguity constrained or, conversely, creatively adjusted diplomatic responses. Martin's translation served not just as an import of Western legal knowledge at this point but as a tool for order transformation, thereby elevating 'Wanguo Gongfa' to the status of a politically validated practical work in diplomatic practice.

(3) The Polysemy of 'Interference' Translation and Cultural Resistance

The term 'interference' functions as a crucial norm in international law, such as the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states or the prohibition of armed intervention. However, 76) Mingqian Li, the same book, pp. 5–6.

77) William A.P. Martin, the same book, p. 288. The process of translating this concept into Chinese in the late 19th century was not merely a matter of word choice but a practical scene embodying the clash between the conceptual order of Western international law and traditional Confucian political culture. At that time, 'interference' was not settled as a single consistent translation; it was translated into more than seven different expressions—干涉, 插手, 介入, 壓力, 控制, 攪擾, 調停—78) This fragmentation of translation reflects that the concept of 'interference' did not have a clear counterpart within the thought system of Chinese intellectuals.

Thus, the translation of 'interference' should be understood not merely as linguistic instability but as a result of conceptual opacity and cultural resistance. In the Confucian political order, 'interference' was often regarded as an act of intervention by a superior in a hierarchical relationship, tending to be interpreted as an extension of moral cultivation rather than an infringement of autonomy. In contrast, Western international law, with its core principle of 'sovereign inviolability' of individual states, viewed interference as a legal violation and a hostile act in itself. Because the imagined order corresponding to a single term was entirely different, 'interference' was a concept that was politically and culturally unfamiliar to translators, which in turn resulted in multifaceted translations.

This instability of terminology also led to confusion in concrete diplomatic situations. Particularly, concepts related to 'interference' needed to exert precise legal efficacy in situations such as diplomatic protests, prohibitions of internal interference, or requests for mediation. However, as the relevant terms were translated inconsistently, this affected the reliability and consistency of practical diplomacy. Svarverud points out that this multiplicity and uncertainty of terms acted as a structural obstacle to China's full incorporation into the international legal order, emphasizing that translation was both a front line for conceptual acceptance and a space for negotiation between orders.79)

Ultimately, the division in translation surrounding the term 'interference' demonstrates that the translation of international law in the late Qing was not merely a linguistic act of transferring foreign concepts but a conceptual struggle that could not avoid conflict with the Western order. This provides insight into why the Qing dynasty had no choice but to adopt the term '万国', which is more comprehensive and carries less coherence burden, rather than '国际', which presupposes legal and contractual reciprocity.

3. Negotiation Process Between Translators and Recipients

(1) Formation of a Cooperative Structure: Institutionalization of Translation and Personnel Deployment

The translation of 『萬國公法』 [Universal Principles of International Law] was not merely Martin's individual endeavor but the result of a collaborative translation undertaken jointly by late Qing state institutions and intellectual groups. When Martin first proposed the translation, he requested the support of only "one capable official," but the Qing court, considering it an "element of diplomatic strategy," responded with a much more organized effort. The Zongli Yamen (Office for Foreign Affairs) initially dispatched four literary scholars (He Shimeng, Li Dawen, Zhang Wei, Cao Jingrong) to assist Martin in drafting; subsequently, recognizing the difficulty of translation and issues of meaning conveyance, they dispatched an additional four personnel (Chen Qin, Li Changhua, Fang Junshi, Mao Hongtu) over six months to refine the literary style and adjust concepts. This systematic deployment of personnel suggests that the translation work was not simply linguistic reception but part of an institutional plan to enhance the Qing court's diplomatic response capabilities.80)

Such cooperation may superficially appear as translation support, but in reality, it was a process in which Qing officials and scholars substantially intervened in the selection of concepts and the composition of style in translation. For example, the conceptual term 'sovereignty' was adjusted by combining it with the semantic network of '主人' derived from Confucian tradition, and in the case of 'public law', it was summarized not as a singular international norm but rather as a somewhat fluid definition of 'public principles that must be observed for inter-state exchanges'. This shows that the concepts of Western international law were not simply transferred but were reconstructed by the translators.

This collaborative structure is also repeatedly mentioned in Martin's own recollections. He stated that he and Chinese scholars "repeatedly discussed the meanings of each term and jointly participated in refining the literary style," emphasizing that the translation was the product of multi-layered consultation and adjustment.82) Furthermore, the fact that Martin's initiation of the translation was based on the requests of high-ranking Qing officials such as Prince Gong and Wenxiang, and that the Qing court directly organized and provided a "group of Chinese assistants" for the translation, unequivocally reveals that this was a systematic endeavor carried out under the planning of the late Qing state power.83)

Ultimately, the translation of 『萬國公法』 was not the result of a single intellectual but a coordinated outcome in a negotiation space where political interests and intellectual conflicts intersected. This goes beyond the mere meaning of joint labor and demonstrates a structure where translators and recipients jointly negotiated and adjusted a new order. With this cooperative structure as a premise, the question 'Why 'Ten Thousand Nations'?' becomes understandable not as a matter of linguistic choice but as the result of multiple actors coordinating disparate senses of order.

81) C. L. Tsinghua China Law Review, p. 10. 82) William A.P. Martin, op. cit., p. 280. 83) William A.P. Martin, op. cit., p. 287. (2) Collision of Thought: Concrete Cases of Linguistic and Cultural Negotiation.

Martin's translation of '萬國公法' [Ch'ing Pao-ch'uan Shu: universal public laws] was considered not merely a linguistic transmission but a threat that could shake the diplomatic landscape. French diplomat Kleczkowski fumed, calling for it to be "choke him off" and arguing that "if China accepts this, we will be plagued by endless trouble" (Carrai, 2020: 12).

This demonstrates that translation itself was regarded as a political event capable of creating fissures in the colonial unequal order. American missionary S. W. Williams also acknowledged that Wheaton's translation of international law could challenge the entire treaty system, suggesting that the impact of translation could extend beyond 'translated knowledge' to operate as 'strategic rearmament.'

Within China, Martin was also suspected like a 'Trojan horse.' While imperial approval was delayed, the usefulness of "The Law of Nations" was proven by the Prussia-Denmark incident in 1864, and only then was official publication permitted. This process shows that the act of translation was a site of negotiation for political tensions and a space for the recontextualization of imperial knowledge.

The translation of "The Law of Nations" was not merely an operation of replacing vocabulary or transforming sentences; it was an arena of intellectual negotiation where Western order systems and traditional Chinese thought systems clashed, and the boundaries of meaning were newly redrawn. Martin, Qing officials, and the translation collective, based on their distinct cultural backgrounds and political stances, repeatedly experienced tensions and conflicts in the process of translating and coordinating key concepts such as 'public law,' 'sovereignty,' 'interference,' and 'ratification.'

Such clashes are even more clearly revealed through specific examples. In a representative anecdote, when Martin emphasized the scientific superiority of Western civilization by demonstrating the principles of the telegraph, a Hanlin academician responded by saying, 'China was a great empire for four thousand years without a telegraph.' 84) This remark was not a mere joke, but a self-respecting manifestation of the Chinese worldview that the progress of technological civilization could not serve as the sole basis for political legitimacy. This kind of backlash against the Western narrative of civilization was repeatedly echoed in subsequent translation processes.

For example, the conflict surrounding the translation of the concept 'ratification' is a case that clearly illustrates such tension. During the negotiation of the Treaty of Tianjin, this concept was translated as '批准 (pīzhǔn),' but in the translation of "The Law of Nations," the same concept was rendered with a different expression. 85) This was not simply a lack of consistency in translation, but stemmed from a difference in the interpretation of the political meaning of the act of diplomatic approval. In Western international law, 'ratification' functions as an act of confirming legal obligations between states, whereas in the Qing worldview, it had a direct connection to the manifestation and authority of the monarch's power.

Moreover, the interpretation surrounding the concept of 'public law' also became a site of intense ideological negotiation. Martin expressed an intention to connect public law with the Christian natural law or the concept of 'universal good', but Qing collaborators presented the interpretation that '公者，非一國所得私也', emphasizing that 'public law' is based on the Confucian notion that it cannot be monopolized by any specific state. In this process, the Woolsey translation shows that Martin's definition of 'public law' was utilized to package it in the grammar of Confucian legitimacy, serving as a document that testifies to the ideological incorporation and coordination surrounding a single word.

These examples all prove that translation was not an automatic or neutral process, but a process of interpretative struggle concerning political order. Each term, 84) Yan, Tsz-ting, op. cit., pp. 35-37. 85) Yan, Tsz-ting, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 86) Yan, Tsz-ting, op. cit., pp. 40. 87) Rune Svarverud, ibid., pp. 122-125. went beyond the mere search for linguistic equivalents and was directly linked to the more fundamental political question of how to reconstruct and imagine order. Therefore, the translation of "The Law of Nations" should be understood not by 'what was translated and how,' but through 'what clashed and how it was adjusted.'

(3) Negotiation of Concept Selection: How Was Meaning Adjusted?

The translation process of "The Law of Nations" was not merely an act of substituting foreign concepts with Chinese words. It was a process of negotiating meaning regarding how to accept Western concepts that conflicted with the existing thought system, in other words, a site of political translation. The translators of the late Qing did not just transfer words; they adjusted order. The most prominent aspect of this adjustment was the creation and compromise of meaning surrounding concepts such as 'sovereignty (主權),' 'public law (公法),' and 'ratification.'

First, the concept of 'sovereignty (主權)' fundamentally clashed with the Confucian political order. In the Confucian context, the monarch's authority was a product of virtuous governance (德治) delegated by Heaven (天), and was based on different grounds than the Western concept of sovereignty, which is based on a contract between ruler and ruled. Nevertheless, the translators did not simply reject this concept; instead, they expanded the linguistic assets of the existing concept of 'wise ruler (聖君)' to construct the term 'sovereignty (主權).' 88) This can be seen as a case where a new concept was internally created within the framework of translation.

The concept of 'public law (公法)' was also a product of similar compromise. Martin understood it in accordance with the Western natural law tradition as law for the 'universal public good,' but the Qing collaborators adjusted its meaning based on the Confucian concepts of 'yi (義)' and 'li (理).' 88) Yan, Tsz-ting, op. cit., pp. 45-46. This process was directly reflected in the Woolsey translation, which defined public law as '邦國所持以交際者，謂之法... 公者，非一國所得私也' [That which states use for interaction is called law... That which is public is not privately possessed by one country]. 89) The concept of 'public' was assimilated into a Confucian universalism that presupposes a multi-party order rather than the interests of a specific country, establishing a kind of connection with the ideals of Western international law.

Such adjustments are also evident in the translation of 'ratification.' While this concept was translated as '批准 (pīzhǔn)' in the Treaty of Tianjin, a different expression was adopted in the translation of "The Law of Nations." This is because Qing officials regarded the act of treaty ratification not merely as a procedure of approval, but as a political act that directly conflicted with the emperor's absolute authority. 90) Consequently, to circumvent this tension, the translators attempted to minimize the cultural conflict surrounding the concept by adopting a more neutral and abstract expression.

These examples all demonstrate that translation was not merely a matter of language, but a political and cultural task of harmonizing worldviews. The translator was not simply selecting words but was an agent who harmonized meanings as a result of clashes between ideas. This reaffirms the proposition that translation was indeed a negotiation of conceptual conflict. 4. Reasons for Choosing 'Many Nations' Instead of 'International'

(1) Traces of Spatial Imagination: 'Many Nations' and the Continuity of a 'Tianxia'-Based Order

In translating the concept of 'international' in late Qing China, the adoption of the expression '万国' instead of '国际' was not merely a lexical substitution. This choice of term was a spatial and political compromise made amid the tension between the modern international order faced by Qing intellectuals and the traditional '天下' order. Thus, it was both a result of the conflict between orders and a scene of coordination in world perception.

Above all, the expression '万国' is closely intertwined with the spatial order of the traditional Confucian worldview. '万国' appears in the context of a hierarchical worldview that emerges from China, positioned at the center of 天下, gradually encompassing its surroundings, and is based on a borderless spatial imagination aimed at 'universal civilization'. In this context, '万国' was an expression that acknowledged contact with the external world while maintaining the perception that China serves as the center and standard of the world. In contrast, '国际' presupposes a modern Western political order composed of equal sovereign entities with boundaries. This difference reveals a divergence in the way of thinking about how the structure of the world is imagined, beyond mere word choice.

The choice of 'many nations' was not only a reflection of spatial tradition but also a result of political compromise. Qing officials and translators, rather than fully accepting Western international law, sought to adapt it into the language of their own order. In this process, Martin actively promoted the discourse of inventing 'ancient Chinese international law,' suggesting that similar legal traditions existed in ancient China, not merely presenting "The Law of Nations" as a simple translation. This was ingeniously combined with the attempts by Qing intellectuals to preserve their cultural self-esteem and political prestige. 93) Ultimately, 'many nations' became a linguistic form of compromise, seeking to accept the Western system while not dismantling existing rhetorical traditions.

Furthermore, this choice of term was a product of the constraints and creativity of the linguistic structure of the time. In mid-19th century Chinese, there was no expression that could precisely refer to what we now call 'international.' 91) Wang Hui, ibid., pp. 78-82.

92) Rune Svarverud, op. cit., pp. 145-147. 93) Rune Svarverud, op. cit., pp. 147. The concept of 'inter-state' did not exist. Therefore, translators sought to encompass its meaning through the more comprehensive and flexible term 'Wan Guo' (all nations) rather than coining the term 'Guo Ji' (international). This strategy can be interpreted as a creative practice of re-deploying the resources of the Confucian linguistic system to translate new concepts.94)

This choice is even more pronounced when compared to the Japanese case. In 1873, Japan created the neologism 'Guo Ji Fa' (international law) through Mitsukuri Rinsho (箕作麟祥), which was the result of explicitly accepting an international order based on a modern state system. In contrast, China adopted a strategy of internalization of foreign concepts through the expression 'Wan Guo' (all nations) while avoiding the dismantling of its traditional order.95)

In summary, the choice of the term 'Wan Guo' (all nations) was not merely a matter of translation convenience, but an eclectic product resulting from the intersection of thought structures, political compromises, and linguistic limitations. This term functioned as a strategic term for cultural reception, preserving the spatial legacy of the 'Tian Xia' (all under heaven) order while embracing the new external order. This suggests that translation was not a simple conceptual correspondence but an act of intellectual history that constituted world order.

(2) Language of Compromise: Rhetorical Negotiation between Martin and Qing Officials

The process by which the concept 'international' was translated as 'Wan Guo' (all nations) was not a simple lexical choice but a rhetorical negotiation where discourse on civilization and perceptions of order clashed and were adjusted. While the Qing dynasty did not completely reject Western institutions and theories, it simultaneously pursued a rhetorical strategy of preserving its own traditional order without directly dismantling it.94) Yan, Tsz-ting, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

95) Han Sang-hee, op. cit., pp. 200–204. On the other hand, Martin, with his civilizing mission to introduce the universality of Christian natural law to China, found it necessary to provide a certain cultural packaging for it to be accepted within the scope of Qing officials' receptivity.

In this process, Martin translated the core concepts of 'Wan Guo Gong Fa' (Laws of All Nations) not merely in Western legal terms, but by appealing to China's indigenous thought traditions. A prime example is the establishment of the concept of 'Gong Fa' (public law). Martin translated 'public law' as 'Gong Fa' and then interpreted it not just as legal rules but as a concept encompassing moral order and publicness, explaining it as follows: "Public law is the law that nations follow when they interact, and 'Gong' (public) means that it cannot be monopolized by any single nation."96) This was a strategy to actively utilize the moral and non-monopolistic connotations of 'Gong' in the Confucian tradition to interpret the Western concept of international law in the language of its own order.

Martin himself admitted in 'A Cycle of Cathay' that he had reconfigured the terms so that Qing officials could understand them.97) He recalled, "I translated 'public law' as 'Gong Fa' and explained it in a way that aligned with traditional Chinese concepts." This demonstrates that he was not merely a linguistic conveyor but a practical translator engaged in negotiating cultural meanings. Indeed, he sought to appeal to the cultural self-esteem of the Qing elite through the discourse of inventing 'ancient Chinese international law,' suggesting that a similar international order had already existed in China during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods.98)

Meanwhile, Qing officials did not passively engage in this translation process. They demanded rhetorical adjustments at points where Martin's civilizing narrative conflicted with their political positions. Some collaborators, in the translation process, reduced the meaning of terms or modified them into traditional vocabulary, 96) Woolsey edition, op. cit., pp. 12-14.

97) William A. P. Martin, A Cycle of Cathay, p. 283. 98) Maria Adele Carrai, op. cit., pp. 217-222. thereby engaging in both resistance and compromise.99) Rather than uncritically accepting the Christian natural law worldview proposed by Martin, they reinterpreted it through Confucian terms such as 'Gong' (public) and 'Yi' (righteousness), and sought to construct a new semantic system within the translated language.100)

The translation adopted as a result of this coordination was 'Wan Guo' (all nations). 'Wan Guo' was a symbolic linguistic space constructed through mutual concessions between the universal civilization discourse that Martin pursued and the traditional order that Qing officials sought to protect. This demonstrates that 'Wan Guo' was not merely used as a spatial equivalent for 'international' but was a rhetorical crystallization of compromise between discourses on civilization and political realities. (3) Creative Translation and Imaginings of Order

The expression 'Wan Guo' (all nations) was not a simple lexical borrowing. It was the product of creative translation that sought to reorganize the system of thought within the lexical void of contemporary Chinese. In the mid-19th century, Chinese lacked a word that could accurately encompass the concept of 'international.' The term 'Guo Ji' (international) had not yet been coined and first appeared in 1873 when Mitsukuri Rinsho (箕作麟祥) of Japan created the translation 'Guo Ji Fa' (international law).101) Chinese translators, on the other hand, chose a creative strategy to fill the gaps in thought within existing lexical resources.

While 'Wan Guo' (all nations) was an existing expression, it was re-signified in a new context during the translation of 'Wan Guo Gong Fa' (Laws of All Nations). Translators constructed 'Wan Guo' not merely as a rhetorical device but as a result of re-deploying the traditional term into a form acceptable for Western concepts. This was not "choosing a word" but creating a new word to contain meaning. As Svarverud points out, this was an attempt at 'semantic innovation' by embedding new concepts within existing vocabulary,102) and in the process, neologisms such as 'Zhu Quan' (sovereignty), 'Gong Fa' (public law), and 'Gan She' (interference) were also born simultaneously.103)

This creative translation was more than mere linguistic skill; it was the product of an imagination of order. By re-contextualizing Confucian terms ('Yi' (righteousness), 'Li' (reason), 'Gong' (public), etc.), translators attempted to juxtapose the existing 'Tian Xia' (all under heaven) spatiality with the Western state system. 'Wan Guo' was thus a hybrid concept expressing both the boundless moral world of 'Tian Xia' and the legal order of multiple states (international system). As Zhiguang Yin states, such translation was not a simple transposition but a result of negotiation in a conceptual space where political and philosophical struggles took place.104)

In essence, in the absence of the term 'Guo Ji' (international), translators attempted a creative translation to reconstruct the Western international order into the language of the 'Tian Xia' (all under heaven) order through the expression 'Wan Guo' (all nations). This was not a matter of word choice but a result of rhetorical imagination aimed at constructing a new political order, suggesting that the translators of the time were not mere intermediaries but agents of conceptual production.

V. Conclusion

This paper analyzes why 'international' in 'Wan Guo Gong Fa' was translated as 'Wan Guo' (all nations) instead of 'Guo Ji' (international), not as a simple matter of word choice, but within the framework of colliding and negotiated perceptions of order and the intellectual adjustments made by the translators. This process was a continuum of intellectual-historical and political tensions, leading from the clash between the Confucian universal order of 'Tian Xia' (all under heaven) and the equal state system of Western international law, to the negotiations between Martin and Qing officials, the coordination of linguistic alternatives, and the final selection of the term 'Wan Guo' (all nations).

First, the adoption of 'Wan Guo' (all nations) instead of 'Guo Ji' (international) stemmed not from a simple linguistic issue but from a clash between different imaginations of world order. Late Qing China responded to the boundary-centric worldview presupposed by the Western state system with a boundless, 'Tian Xia'-centric spatiality. In this regard, 'Wan Guo' was an expression situated on the expansive continuum of the 'Tian Xia' order and a result of re-signifying meaning within a new international context.

Second, the translation site was not a mere transmission of meaning but a space for cultural and political negotiation. Martin sought to transplant Christianity's natural law as a universal order into China, but Qing officials readjusted it through traditional vocabulary and thought structures. As Maria Adele Carrai points out, Martin's translation was "a political act that attempted to bridge Chinese tradition and Western international law," and the result was compromise, not conflict.105)

Third, the adoption of the translation 'Wan Guo' (all nations) was an eclectic attempt to accept a new order while preserving Confucian language, rather than abandoning the existing order. Cases such as explaining 'Gong Fa' (public law) as 'a non-monopolistic law followed by all nations' or re-contextualizing 'Zhu Quan' (sovereignty) as a collective order rather than monarchical authority demonstrate that translation was not a simple equivalent correspondence but a field of conceptual creation. As Zhiguang Yin puts it, translation is the "construction of universality" and a space where Chinese and Western orders negotiated.106)

105) Maria Adele Carrai, op. cit., p. 219. 106) Zhiguang Yin, op. cit., pp. 11–13. In conclusion, the word 'Wan Guo' (all nations) is not a mere linguistic convenience but a product of ordered imagination that emerged at a turning point in East Asian thought. Unlike the modern nation-state-centricity of the term 'Guo Ji' (international), this term functioned as a political language that could preserve Chinese tradition while accommodating a new order. Therefore, this study moves beyond the external institutional history of the reception of 'international law' to restore the inner workings of order construction through translation, making a significant contribution to the study of modern Chinese history and the history of East Asian concepts.

This study analyzed the event of translating the concept 'international' as 'Wan Guo' (all nations) in 'Wan Guo Gong Fa' not as a simple choice of words, but as a pivotal moment in an intellectual-historical transition. It was an attempt to reconstruct the existing 'Tian Xia' (all under heaven) order and conceptualize a new conceptual order, moving beyond the framework of the external institutional history of the reception of the modern international order.

The expression 'Wan Guo' (all nations) originated from a different spatial imagination than 'Guo Ji' (international), which denotes the order among modern states. It is an extended expression of the 'Tian Xia' (all under heaven) worldview, which presupposes a boundless universality, and was a strategic lexical choice by the Qing dynasty to simultaneously preserve its hierarchical and civilizational order while accepting the Western egalitarian international order. As Wang Hui points out, 'Wan Guo' functioned as a language of East Asian universalism within a continuous spatial order extending from 'Tian Xia' to 'Wan Fang' (all directions) to 'Wan Guo' (all nations) (Wang, 2023, p. 81).

Furthermore, the translated concepts of international law were not merely a technical process of finding equivalents but a process of reconstructing political and moral order through the re-contextualization of concepts. For example, 'Gong Fa' (public law) was translated into the language of Confucian publicness and moral order, not Christian natural law universality, through the expression "Gong zhe, fei yi guo suo de si ye" (That which is public is not something one country can monopolize). This exemplifies how the concept of 'Gong Fa' itself was meaningfully reorganized within the context of China's traditional 'Gong' (public), 'Yi' (righteousness), and 'Li' (reason). These acts of translation ultimately constituted a complex intellectual movement of digesting, resisting, and simultaneously transforming the Western international legal system within the framework of Chinese language and concepts. Mingqian Li describes this as "an attempt to accept, adjust, and reconstruct the Western legal order within the Chinese framework of thought," emphasizing that it was a site of meaning production that went beyond mere "pre-linguistic" equivalence (Li, 2023, pp. 115–117).

Consequently, this study empirically demonstrates that the translation scene in the late Qing was not a mere introduction but a political space where the reorganization of the East Asian order took place. This provides a historical continuum for how China accepts and reinterprets international law today and offers theoretical clues for explaining the cultural origins of modern discourse such as the "community of shared future for mankind." Translation, both in the past and present, is a mechanism for constructing order and a practice of constructing identity. <References> Banno, Masataka. 1964. “China and the West, 1858–1861: The

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