The Thousand Buddhas, Also Bodhisattvas: Governance Techniques of a Multi-ethnic Empire Through the Qing-Dzungar Conflict: Understanding the Yonghegong Palace

Master's Candidate, Department of International Relations, Seoul National University

I. Introduction

From 1690 to 1697, Emperor Kangxi engaged in a fierce competition for hegemony in Central Asia with Galdan of the Dzungars. What is interesting about this conflict is that both sides used different ideological logics. Galdan justified his political actions based on the religious authority of Tibetan Buddhism, while Kangxi asserted his Confucian duty to protect order as the ruler of Tianxia. The Qing Dynasty began to utilize its religious identity as an incarnation of Manjushri, the Bodhisattva of Wisdom, during the reign of Emperor Yongzheng; prior to that, the identity of the protector of the Tianxia order was more prominently used.

This study does not view the Qing Dynasty as merely a 'Sinicized conquest dynasty.' As Rossabi argues, the Qing Dynasty was a multi-ethnic state encompassing Han, Manchu, Mongol, and other peoples, employing different governance logics suitable for each ethnic group and region. However, it is crucial not to overlook that the Qing also strategically utilized its identity as the protector of Tianxia, a Han identity. The conflict with the Dzungars serves as a concrete example of how the Qing's complex identity was utilized in the actual operation of its military policies.

This research holds significant implications, given that modern China continues to maintain a complex identity as both a 'multi-ethnic state' and the 'Chinese nation.' Understanding how the Qing Dynasty leveraged diverse ideological resources to legitimize its rule over a vast territory can contribute to predicting contemporary Chinese behavior and future strategies.

II. Theoretical Framework

In ancient China, the criterion for distinguishing between self and other was the difference in civilizational development. At this time, the standard of 'civilization' was the Han people. The notion of 'Tianxia,' which posited that a state founded by the Han people was at the center of the world, that culturally Han states were superior, and therefore surrounding states would be 'civilized' by the Han and voluntarily pay homage and become tributaries, was the fundamental framework through which China understood the external world from ancient to pre-modern times.

However, this framework was not static over more than 2,000 years and faced shocks or challenges from external or internal sources. Ge Zhaoguang describes three major transformations in China's Tianxia worldview before the 19th century. These include the influx of a Buddhist worldview during the Tang Dynasty, the contraction of the Han state during the Song Dynasty, and a quasi-universal perspective during the Yuan Dynasty. According to Ge Zhaoguang, the Buddhist worldview did not significantly impact the Tianxia concept and was assimilated. The intensified competition between the Han and non-Han peoples during the Song Dynasty led to internal changes, demanding a stricter distinction between 'Chinese' (Hua) and 'barbarian' (Yi). Ge Zhaoguang evaluates that the Yuan Dynasty, founded by the Mongols, attempted to introduce a 'world' perspective rather than a 'Tianxia' perspective, but it failed to fundamentally alter China's Tianxia concept due to its short duration.

The Qing Dynasty is considered the period when this Chinese Tianxia order completely ended. As the Qing Dynasty lost its central position in the Asian sphere, a modern concept based on 'military force' rather than 'ritual' was introduced into Asia.

However, there are divided opinions regarding how the Qing Dynasty actually managed the international order before its subjugation to the Western modern order. This stems from the fact that the Qing Dynasty was founded by the Manchu, a non-Han people. Scholars like Fairbank, who advocate for the Chinese world order, point out that although the Qing Dynasty began as a foreign dynasty, it became Sinicized to effectively govern the predominantly Han Central Plains. While it is true that conquest dynasties founded by non-Han peoples emphasized the distinction between Hua and Yi internally rather than their fusion, they adopted Han logic externally. The framework of the relationship between conquest dynasties and neighboring states remained a hierarchical relationship based on cultural differences (understood similarly to that between father and son or elder and younger brother), and the practice of subordinate states paying tribute to superior states and humbling themselves was the method of dealing with outsiders beyond the sphere of Zhonghua. (In other words, the foundation of the Tianxia order remained unchanged.)19) Fairbank and others primarily focus on East Asian regions such as Joseon and Annam.

19) 'China and the Ancient East Asian World,' Sadako Nishijima, p. 340 <Figure 1> Traditional Tianxia Order Governed by Influence, Not Military Force

In response, there is a strong counterargument that the Qing Dynasty was 'China among equals,' and thus cannot be understood in the same way as Han dynasties.20) The period that scholars like Rossabi focus on is mainly the transition between the Yuan and Ming dynasties, concentrating on the relationship between the nomadic peoples of the Northwest and the Han Chinese. Scholars, led by Rossabi, point to periods in Chinese history (primarily Han history) where relations with surrounding regions were dominated by military force and response rather than by cultural norms and rituals. Following Rossabi's line of argument, some scholars have argued that the Qing Dynasty cannot be understood as simply a 'Sinicized conquest dynasty' and that its Manchu characteristics should not be overlooked. The most representative example cited by proponents of the New Qing History is the conflict between the Qing Dynasty and the Dzungars (a Mongol people) in the late 17th and early 18th centuries.

20) 'China Among Equals,' Rossabi. 1983. According to the New Qing History, the Qing Dynasty is a prime example of a multi-ethnic empire, where the Qing emperor was not only a representative of the Han people who occupied most of the Central Plains but also a representative of the Manchus and Mongols. As a state that established diverse ethnic groups internally, the Qing Dynasty had to fulfill its obligations as a representative of the 'Tianxia' order by virtue of its geographical occupation of the Central Plains, while also claiming religious authority in Tibet as Manjushri, the Bodhisattva of Wisdom, and as a representative of the Manchu and Mongol peoples due to its blood ties (as the Manchus and Mongols were closely related through marriage at the time). These complex internal components of the Qing emperor led to the adoption of more realistic (realpolitik) political means in foreign relations, rather than a system of governance solely based on ritual.

Therefore, if we begin to understand the Qing Dynasty from the perspective of a multi-ethnic state, the conflict between the Qing Dynasty and the Dzungars becomes less about a struggle between a disturber of the Tianxia border and a protector of Tianxia, and more about a fight over 'who truly represents the Mongols.'

<Figure 2> The Qing Dynasty's Multiple Internal Perceptions

<Figure 3> The Qing-Dzungar Relationship as Perceived by Rossabi

So, how did the Qing Dynasty and the Dzungars actually perceive their rivalry? This question reveals how the Qing Dynasty defined its own identity and how this identity fluidly changed depending on the situation. The reason for focusing on the Qing Dynasty is that the perspective from which we understand modern China can differ depending on what kind of country the Qing Dynasty was. Modern China is a 'multi-ethnic state' composed of an overwhelming Han majority and 55 ethnic minorities. China attempts to unite these multi-ethnic groups under a single cultural identity of the 'Chinese nation' while simultaneously pursuing the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' as a national project. The memory that defines this 'Chinese nation' consists of two elements: first, the modern history of resistance against Japanese and Western imperialism; and second, a sense of superiority and nostalgia for the 'Tianxia order,' which is contrasted as flexible and peaceful against violent and barbaric imperialism. Therefore, examining how the Tianxia order was utilized by multi-ethnic states in the Central Plains in actual history is an essential step in evaluating China's current actions and predicting how China will wish to present itself in the future.

III. The Political Relationship Between Tibetan Buddhism and the Dzungars

1. Galdan's Mission

The direct confrontations between the Dzungars and the Qing Dynasty can be broadly divided into two periods. The first was from 1696 to 1697, when Emperor Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty personally led three expeditions under the pretext of suppressing Galdan of the Dzungars. The second was in 1717, after Galdan's death, when his nephew Tsewang Rabtan, under the pretext of pacifying the turmoil in Tibet, attacked Hami in Tibet, prompting the Qing Dynasty to dispatch troops to prevent the Dzungar occupation of Tibet. The fact that military force was used to suppress the Dzungars indicates that a logic of international politics different from the 'ritualistic governance' that dominated East Asia in pre-modern times was being employed in China's northern frontier.

There are no primary sources that directly reveal the position the Dzungar state adopted for itself during this process. However, the surviving Tibetan sources and Galdan's letters to the 5th Dalai Lama of Tibet are sufficient to infer the external mission the Dzungars held at the time. The Dzungars and Galdan believed that the role of protector of Tibetan Buddhism, specifically the Gelug school (Yellow Hat sect), had been entrusted to them.

The title of protector of the Gelug school was not merely religious. At that time, for the Mongols outside the Qing, religious authority and political authority were in a reciprocal relationship. This alliance system, which existed since the Yuan Dynasty, is called the cho-yon system. Simply put, it refers to a relationship where a respected figure in Tibetan Buddhism becomes the 'teacher' of a secular ruler, granting legitimacy, and the secular ruler becomes his 'disciple,' providing practical protection to the religious leader.21) This master-disciple relationship was more actively utilized as power was consolidated by collateral branches of the Kublai Khan family. The unique Tibetan Buddhist concept of 'reincarnation' was useful in creating a spiritual support base to unite all Mongols, even for those who were not from traditional royal families or nomadic clans (i.e., not direct descendants of Kublai Khan).

Around the time the Khalkha-Oirat Code was enacted in 1640, close cooperation between Tibetan Buddhism and the Mongol nomadic states became widespread. It became a customary practice for tribal leaders to raise one son as a religious leader and another as the next tribal chief.22) Oyrat monk Zaya Pandita and Khoshut chief Ochirtu became sworn brothers, and the brother of Jebtsundamba Khutughtu I of Khalkha was the king of the Left Wing of Khalkha, Tüsiyetü Khan. The Dzungars were no different. Galdan Batur Khong Tayiji, the leader of the increasingly expanding Dzungars, designated his sons born to the daughter of Gushi Khan (the de facto ruler of Tibet at the time) as his successors, with his elder brother Sengge as the next tribal chief and his younger brother Galdan sent to study under the 5th Dalai Lama as a monk.

Qing Empire and the Adaptation of Qing Ideology in the

mid-18th century. 2021.

22) Di Cosmo, “From alliance to tutelage: A historical analysis of

Manchu-Mongol relations before the Qing conquest.” 2012. Galdan was also a khan. The leader of the Dzungars, who were also expanding their power, Batu Khan, designated his sons born to the daughter of Güshi Khan (who was the de facto ruler of Tibet at the time) as his successors, making his elder brother Sengge the next tribal chief and his younger brother Galdan a monk under the Fifth Dalai Lama.

The fact that the relationship between Tibetan Buddhism and the Dzungars was highly religious and simultaneously served as a basis for political power for both parties can be observed in Galdan's succession process. When Sengge was assassinated in 1670 due to internal power struggles within the Dzungars, Galdan was nominated as the next leader of the Dzungars. This was partly because Sengge's sons were too young at the time, but more importantly, Galdan, with his religious charisma, was perceived as the person who could unite the fragmented Dzungars.23) On the other hand, for Tibet, led by the 5th Dalai Lama, Galdan's ascension to the throne was beneficial both religiously and politically. The 5th Dalai Lama, who had sent Gelug monks to alleviate internal divisions within the Dzungars during Sengge's lifetime, had persuaded Sengge that it would be better to release Chödbayr Batür, who was causing divisions, as a representative of the Dzungar Left Wing. However, Sengge was assassinated by this very Chödbayr Batür. This placed Tibet in a difficult situation where it had to share some political responsibility for the death of the Dzungar leader. The Gelug school had no choice but to declare its intention not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Dzungars.24) If Galdan, whose influence in the Dzungars was bound to decrease, became the leader of the Dzungars, it meant that personal channels for intervention in the political affairs of the Dzungars, even without direct intervention, remained strong.

Qing Empire and the Adaptation of Qing Ideology in the

mid-18thcentury.”2021.

24) Yoon, Sung-je, “Politics of the Dzungars in the Mid-to-Late 17th Century – Centered on the Reign of Sengge (1653-1670)” 2014.

Indeed, before Galdan's appointment in the Dzungars, the 5th Dalai Lama summoned his disciple Galdan and conveyed his 'secret' intentions, which Galdan 'received' and vowed to faithfully carry out. The 5th Dalai Lama bestowed upon Galdan the title of Böshögtu Khan, meaning 'monarch with a mission.'25) Galdan interpreted this as a directive to strive for the revival and safety of the Gelug school. In practice, Galdan undertook even reluctant military campaigns when requested by the 5th Dalai Lama of Tibet or his regent, Sangye Gyatso. In 1689, when a dispute arose between the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu I of Khalkha and the 5th Dalai Lama, Galdan, despite internal power struggles with his nephew Tsewang Rabtan (Sengge's son, whom Galdan later perceived as a political threat and attempted to eliminate), relentlessly demanded that the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu I be handed over to the Dzungar side. This ultimately led to a battle between the Dzungars and the Qing Dynasty in Liaoning Province. While Galdan was focused on the conflict with the Khalkha and the Qing, his nephew Tsewang Rabtan seized the opportunity to return to the Dzungars and consolidate his power. Later, after being defeated by the Qing Dynasty, Galdan was unable to return to the Dzungars and died while wandering.

It is important to note that Galdan did not merely accept the support of Tibetan Buddhism for political reasons; he also genuinely believed in it. The only surviving document written by Galdan that we can currently access is one of the 14 letters he intended to send to the 5th Dalai Lama on November 23, 1696, while fleeing after his defeat by Emperor Kangxi.26) A total of four of these letters have been translated into Korean. Galdan's letters reveal a desperate plea akin to prayer. '...I, small and humble, am well here, relying on the Lama's compassion. I especially wish to convey that all matters have been kept secret and written separately in clear documents. Please illuminate everything with your wisdom. May the Lama's body be eternal, may I quickly meet the Lama's wisdom, and may your love and protection be constant from this generation to all future generations.'27)

25) Ibid., p. 1

26) Cho, Byung-hak, 'A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of the Manchu and Korean Translations of Galdan's Letters to Tibet - Focusing on Letters to the Dalai Lama, Diba, Lamo Naitshung, and Barai-bung Naitshung,' 2013. 27) 'Kangxi Zhujie' Vol. 8, Document 120, pp. 532, lines 6-534, lines 3 (Reprinted in Cho, Byung-hak, 'A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of the Manchu and Korean Translations of Galdan's Letters to Tibet - Focusing on Letters to the Dalai Lama, Diba, Lamo Naitshung, and Barai-bung Naitshung,' 2013, pp. 50-51).

The letter to Lamo Naitshung provides slightly more detail.

'...Whatever happens to me, I revere, worship, and think of the Dalai Lama, and pray for the accomplishment of this great task so that I may soon meet the Dalai Lama. Please grant me the auspicious date, month, year, and time for this to be fulfilled, with clear and auspicious words! ... I wish to accomplish the great task I have conceived.'28)

Considering that Galdan was fleeing after a major defeat by Emperor Kangxi at this time, these letters could be interpreted simply as requests for salvation. However, they seem too dependent to be viewed solely as such. Galdan even made efforts to align the auspicious dates for initiating military actions with the intentions of the 5th Dalai Lama. This fully demonstrates that his dual status as the leader of the Dzungars and a disciple of the 5th Dalai Lama were complementary.

28) 'Kangxi Zhujie' Vol. 8, Document 120 (pp. 546-550, line 4) (Reprinted in Cho, Byung-hak, 'A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of the Manchu and Korean Translations of Galdan's Letters to Tibet - Focusing on Letters to the Dalai Lama, Diba, Lamo Naitshung, and Barai-bung Naitshung,' 2013, pp. 60-61). 2. The Dzungars as Protectors of the Gelug School

A Comparative Analysis of the Manchu and Chinese Translations of Letters Sent by Galdan: A Preliminary Study Focusing on Letters Sent to the Dalai Lama, Diba, Lamo Naichung, and Barai-bung.

Naichung,” 2013, pp. 50-51 (reprinted).

28) <Gang Huiju Jeophil> Volume 8, Document 120 (pages 546-550, line 4) (Quoted in Cho Byeong-hak, “A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of the Man-Han Translations of Galdan’s Letter to Tibet - Focusing on Letters Sent to the Dalai Lama, Diva, Lamo Nayichung, and Baraybung Nayichung,” 2013, pp. 60-61) 2. Jungar as a Protector of the Gelugpa School

A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of the Man-Han Translations of Galdan’s Letter to Tibet - Focusing on Letters Sent to the Dalai Lama, Diva, Lamo Nayichung, and Baraybung Nayichung

2. Jungar as a Protector of the Gelugpa School

Galdan did not clearly distinguish between religious mission and political objectives. This was not limited to Galdan personally. The identity of the Dzungars as protectors of the Gelug school continued even after Galdan's death, and the Dzungars' prioritization of the Gelug school was so strong that it provoked resentment and shock within Tibetan Buddhism. Tibetan scholar Tsering Batsang points to the Dzungars' Gelug-first policy as a primary reason for the loss of popular support in Tibet when the Dzungars entered Tibet with troops in 1717 to 'resolve' the internal Tibetan divisions surrounding the 6th Dalai Lama.

On December 3, 1717, Tsewang Rabtan and the Dzungars entered Lhasa, claiming to depose the false 6th Dalai Lama and bring order to Tibet. They destroyed non-Gelug temples and desecrated the major religious sites of other factions, including the Nyingma school.30) The historical records of Sum pa mkhan po Ye shes dpal ‘byor, who was born in 1704 and documented the history of Tibetan Buddhism in the 18th century, provide more detailed accounts of the Dzungars' actions at that time.

'The Dzungar army invaded Lhasa, defeated Lhazang [Khan], and showed him the impermanence of life. The regent mTsho skyes rdo, ruler of Stag rtse, 29) Tsering Batsang, T. “Reflection on the Dzungar Persecution of the

rNying ma School of Tibetan Buddhism in the 18th Century, Focusing

on Its Cause and the Scale of the Destruction.” Revue d’Etudes

Tibetaines, no. 68, 2024 January, pp.206-248

30) Desideri, “Mission to Tibet: The Extraordinary Eighteenth-century

Account of Father Ippolito Desieri,” 2014, pp. 249 (Tsering Batsang, T.

“Reflection on the Dzungar Persecution of the rNying ma School of

Tibetan Buddhism in the 18th Century, Focusing on Its Causes and

was designated as such. Subsequently, under the orders of the Dzungars… high-ranking figures of the Nyingma bla ma rDorje brag sprul sku and others were all purged in 1718 and 1719. Monasteries [list of monastery names] were also all destroyed.

Sum pa mkhan po also clearly stated, “The Dzungars ‘purified’ the teachings of the Buddha… and elevated the teachings of Tsong kha pa [the ideological foundation of the Gelug school].”31)

However, the pro-Gelug sectarian stance did not gain significant traction in Tibet. From the 5th Dalai Lama, who was outwardly the representative of the Gelug school but inwardly favored the Nyingma school, to Sanggye Gyatso, Lhasa was more tolerant of other sects than the Dzungars. Therefore, the nationwide regulation of Nyingma teachings and the large-scale vandalism carried out by the Dzungars in December 1717 instilled fear in all but a few pro-Gelug proponents. The records of mDo mkhar Tshe ring dbang rgyal, an official at the time, also focus on the negative consequences of the vandalism perpetrated by the Gelug school.

“In the land of Tibet, the Dzungar soldiers harmed the teachings [of the Buddha] and killed many high monks. They also took the lives of many innocent people on the grounds that they were descendants of dBus and gTsang. Their food and water were also [taken.] In short, they took their horses and good grass, and much more. 31) Ye shes dpal ‘byor (1704-1788), “History of the Gelug Monasteris of

Tibet and the Annals of Kokonor”, 1982. (Reprinted in Tsering Batsang, T.

“Reflection on the Dzungar Persecution of the rNying ma School of

Tibetan Buddhism in the 18th Century, Focusing on Its Causes and

the Scale of the Destruction” (Reprinted from P.230) They levied new taxes; they harassed the public and did not allow them to enjoy even a moment of happiness.”32)

IV. The Qing Dynasty in the Central Asian Hegemonic Competition

2. The Rhetorical Meaning of ‘Manjushri’

In contrast, the Qing Dynasty did not perceive itself as the protector of Tibetan Buddhism until at least 1679, when it fought against Galdan. This was because the status of the Qing Emperor within Tibetan Buddhism was largely rhetorical and had little connection to real politics.

In Tibetan Buddhism, the ruler of the Central Plains was substituted with ‘Manjushri.’ This was due to the legend that Manjushri resided on Mount Wutai in China. Thus, the ruler of China, who governed the territory including Mount Wutai, was decided to be revered in parallel with the Dalai Lama, an incarnation of Avalokitesvara, and the Panchen Lama, an incarnation of Amitabha. However, this status as Manjushri originated solely from a geographical basis and was unrelated to the ethnicity of the emperor. Kublai Khan of the Yuan Dynasty was an incarnation of Manjushri. 32) mDo mkhar Tshe ring dbang rgyal, “Mid bang rtogs brjod,” 1981, pp.

379 (Reprinted in Tsering Batsang, T., “Reflection on the Dzungar Persecution of

the rNying ma School of Tibetan Buddhism in the 18th Century,

Focusing on Its Causes and the Scale of the Destruction.” P.237) and Emperor Chengzu of the Ming Dynasty was also an incarnation of Manjushri. In 1641, Gushi Khan, who was the de facto ruler of Tibetan Buddhism at the time, referred to the last emperor of the Ming Dynasty as an ‘incarnation of Manjushri,’ and in 1646, when Shunzhi Emperor successfully ascended to the Qing throne, he was immediately recognized as an incarnation of Manjushri.

and the Manchu emperor Hong Taiji was also an incarnation of Manjushri. In 1641, Gushri Khan, the de facto ruler of Tibetan Buddhism at the time, referred to the last Ming emperor as an 'incarnation of Manjushri,' and in 1646, after Shunzhi's successful succession to the Qing dynasty, he was immediately recognized as an incarnation of Manjushri.

"The most victorious incarnation of Manjushri seized power in the Ming dynasty and conquered China, and the great and compassionate Avalokitesvara incarnated as a chakravartin to enlighten Tibet, which our Khan conquered."

Therefore, the status of Manjushri remained merely rhetorical and did not provide practical support in the political struggles of the Central Plains. Conversely, the rulers of the Central Plains did not gain recognition of their effective rule over Central Asia through the status of being an incarnation of Manjushri. In 1635, the Qing dynasty received the surrender of the 'Great Khan of all Mongols,' thereby gaining legitimacy as the successor to the legacy of the Yuan Empire, but this merely signified the ability to rule the Mongol people. It did not effectively transfer all the lands governed by the Mongol Empire to the Qing dynasty. In other words, while the Tibetan Buddhist status of Manjushri could prevent the already subjugated Mongol people from rebelling against the Qing emperor, it was insufficient to provide a rational basis for controlling the emerging Mongol Empire.

2. The Surrender of the Khalkha Mongols and the Application of the ‘Son of Heaven’ Logic

Therefore, in the competition for hegemony in Central Asia, the Qing Dynasty had to emphasize its commitment to the moral duty of maintaining stability on the Central Asian steppes, rather than relying on authority derived from Tibetan Buddhism, to gain the support of the Mongol people. The conflict between the Khalkha and Dzungars in 1688, and the subsequent surrender of the Khalkha Mongols to the Qing Dynasty, provided an opportunity for the Qing Emperor’s status as ‘Son of Heaven’ to extend to Central Asia.

Earlier, it was mentioned that the Dzungars, who originated from a collateral line of Kublai, actively utilized religion to compensate for their lack of legitimacy in terms of lineage. In terms of lineage, the Khalkha were superior to the Dzungars, considered the ‘main lineage’ of the Mongol people. In 1662, the Khalkha were internally divided (much like Sengge, who ruled the left wing of the Dzungars, was killed by his half-brother of the right wing in 1670), and particularly, the right wing of the Khalkha fell into extreme chaos over power. Under the pretext of resolving this, the left wing of the Khalkha effectively came to rule, and a peace conference was convened under the pretext of rectifying this situation. The 1686 peace conference was attended by representatives of the Khalkha right wing (Sira), the abbot of Ganden Monastery in Lhasa representing the 5th Dalai Lama, representatives of the Khalkha left wing (Jaqun Dorji and Jebtsundamba Khutughtu I), and the Manchu official Arani, who represented Emperor Kangxi.33)

At this peace conference, an agreement was reached whereby Jaqun Dorji of the Khalkha left wing would return the people of the Khalkha right wing (Jasagtu Khan) and no longer encroach upon the rule of Jasagtu Khan. However, when Jaqun Dorji failed to honor this agreement and annihilated Jasagtu Khan, Galdan of the Dzungars annihilated the Khalkha in 1688. An interesting religious dynamic is also apparent between the Khalkha and the Dzungars. Galdan was recognized as the reincarnation of the teacher of Jebtsundamba Khutughtu I. The 5th Dalai Lama and Sanggye Gyatso were reportedly angered by Jebtsundamba Khutughtu I acting as an equal to the abbot of Ganden Monastery, who represented his teacher.33) Kangxi Emperor’s Letter, translated by Nam Sang-geun, edited by Okada Hidehiro. 2014. It is said that this was perceived as an insult to the gods and caused further indignation.

It is uncertain to what extent this anecdote is factual or how decisive it was for Galdan's military decisions. However, the fact that Tibet was wary at the time of the possibility of the Khalkha Mongols allying with sects other than the Gelug school, that Jebtsundamba Khutuktu I possessed a spiritual charisma different from the 5th Dalai Lama, and that Sangye Gyatso, the regent of the 5th Dalai Lama, later welcomed the downfall of Jebtsundamba Khutuktu I, all indicate that there were religious conflicts in addition to hereditary rivalries between the Dzungars and the Khalkhas during this period.

Defeated by the Dzungars, the Khalkha (Jebtsundamba Khutuktu I and Ja Khun Dorji) fled to the Qing dynasty and requested allegiance from Emperor Kangxi. The Khalkha's submission later became a crucial justification for the Qing dynasty to 'punish' the Dzungars. Emperor Kangxi now became the 'elder brother,' 'father,' and 'Son of Heaven' of the Khalkha Mongols, legitimately caring for the welfare of the people who formerly inhabited Khalkha and justly suppressing the disputes in the region.

The Dolonnor Assembly in 1691 was an event orchestrated by Emperor Kangxi to solidify this position. The Dolonnor Assembly took place immediately after the Dzungars achieved a decisive victory at the Battle of Ulan Butung against the Qing dynasty, and it brought together all the Inner Mongolian tribes and the surrendered Khalkha chieftains. Dolon Nor was also where Kublai Khan of the Yuan dynasty established his summer capital.34) Jebtsundamba Khutuktu I offered his respects, stating, "The Buddha saves all sentient beings with profound compassion and spreads benefits widely, but we gods have received Your Majesty's grace and have been especially saved. This is indeed encountering the living Buddha. We pray for Your Majesty's eternal life." When the three Khans of Khalkha performed the ritual of the three kowtows and nine prostrations, Emperor Kangxi incorporated the Khalkha chieftains into the Eight Banners and granted them Qing titles. This officially made Emperor Kangxi the ruler of Khalkha.

The day after the grand ceremony of the Khalkha, Emperor Kangxi held a military review. The Qing army's battle formations, the sound of bugles, the shouts of commencing battle, and the sound of muskets proceeded with many Khalkha people in attendance. This series of rituals demonstrated to the Mongols belonging to the Eight Banners and the newly incorporated Khalkha Mongols that the Qing was not militarily inferior to the Dzungars and was in fact superior.35)

Despite Jebtsundamba Khutuktu I's use of the term 'living Buddha,' Emperor Kangxi's primary focus when setting out to subjugate Galdan was his duty as Son of Heaven. In his first personal expedition in 1696 to punish Galdan, Emperor Kangxi delivered the following speech:

"Because Galdan has plundered the wealth of the Khalkha and the Outer Mongols and caused them suffering... [I] have declared to Heaven, Earth, the imperial ancestors, and the state altars, and set out to surely exterminate Galdan. ... Our ancestors Emperor Taizu Gao and Emperor Taizong Wen personally wielded swords and established the state. How can I, following in the footsteps of my ancestors, not act accordingly?... If we break our promise now and return as we are, our armies will face unpredictable circumstances. What shall we do? What shall we report to Heaven, Earth, the imperial temple, and the state altars upon returning to Beijing?"36)

35) Ibid., p. 86

36) Veritable Records of the Qing Shengzu Emperor, Vol. 172, Kangxi 35th Year, 4th Month; Strategy for the Pacification and Conquest of the Personal Expedition, Vol. 22, Kangxi 35th Year

Record of the 4th month, recorded as Yiwei (reprinted from Okada Hidehiro and Nam Sang-geun's translation of Emperor Kangxi's Letters, pp. 107-8)

Emperor Kangxi explains his inability to call off the expedition, citing three reasons. First, Galdan harassed the Khalkha, thus it was imperative for him, as the spokesperson or ruler of the Khalkha, to punish Galdan. Second, as a descendant of the Manchu emperors, he could not refrain from wielding his sword. Finally, the current generation of the Coalition Army could not afford to let Galdan go unchecked. The reasons for attacking Galdan do not include any mention of Tibetan Buddhism. Rather, they emphasize his moral obligation to care for the Khalkha who had submitted to him.

His imperialistic vision did not stop there. Around May 14 (lunar calendar) of 1696, Emperor Kangxi saw an inscription carved on a rock at Mount Jinhushan commemorating Emperor Yongle's expedition to Outer Mongolia during the Ming dynasty. The inscription on the Mount Jinhushan rock read, "The Great Ming Emperor has subjugated the barbarians and passed through here with his army. I have passed through here on the 14th of the 4th month; I will eliminate the barbarians until the Gobi becomes a blade and the Tianshan mountains a sword's edge, purifying the desert forever." On May 15, in a letter to Crown Prince Yunreng, Emperor Kangxi wrote in Chinese on a separate piece of paper, "I am passing through here on the 14th of the 4th month."37) This clearly indicates that the Sinocentric ideology of 'eliminating barbarians and purifying the desert forever' was used as the basis for his logic in subjugating Galdan.

Emperor Kangxi's first personal expedition was highly successful. Upon hearing of Emperor Kangxi's arrival, Galdan fled. However, while fleeing, he encountered the Qing Coalition Army at Zomod. In the Battle of Zomod, Galdan's main force was annihilated. Galdan's nephew, Tsewang Rabtan, held real power in the Dzungar heartland, and at this time, Tsewang Rabtan and the Qing dynasty were still cooperating, preventing him from regaining strength. Many Oirat tribesmen and Dzungar people surrendered to the Qing dynasty. Among them was Damba Khashikha, a subordinate of Galdan. In a letter dated June 17 to Crown Prince Yunreng, Emperor Kangxi wrote that Damba Khashikha said the following:

"I consider that my master (Galdan) broke his oath and committed a sin against Your Majesty, thus incurring divine punishment and leading to ruin. We ourselves have lived by killing people and separating their families, and now this disaster has befallen us. ... We conquered many nations and had no enemies wherever we went, but there is no one in the world who opposes the Manchus, so our Oirats are bound to perish."

Whether Damba Khashikha actually said these words is uncertain. The letters Emperor Kangxi sent to Crown Prince Yunreng were meant to be shared with the Qing court officials and the Empress Dowager, and Emperor Kangxi did not reveal difficult situations even when he was in them. However, the crucial point is that Emperor Kangxi himself wished to officially create the perception within the Mongol tribes that 'there is no one in the world who opposes the Manchus.' Galdan's followers, who were disrupting the world, were destined to perish. This served as a powerful justification for Emperor Kangxi's personal expedition.

It is uncertain whether Damba Khashik actually made such a statement. Kangxi's letters to Crown Prince Yinreng were intended to be shared with Qing court officials and the Empress Dowager, and Kangxi did not reveal his difficulties in these letters to his son. However, the crucial point is that Kangxi himself wished to officially convey to the Qing dynasty the perception that 'there are no enemies of the Manchus in the world' among the Mongolian people. The followers of Galdan, who were disrupting the empire, were destined for destruction. This served as a powerful justification for Kangxi's personal rule.

The moral obligation of the Son of Heaven to intervene in the chaos of Central Asia continued even after Galdan's death.39) Emperor Kangxi used similar logic to subdue Tsewang Rabtan, Galdan's political rival and nephew. In 1705 (Kangxi 44th year), Emperor Kangxi issued the following warning to Tsewang Rabtan:

38) Manchu-Mongol documents 53, pp. 244-254, Memorial to the Crown Prince (June 17) (reprinted from Okada Hidehiro and Nam Sang-geun's translation of Emperor Kangxi's Letters, p. 147)

(reprinted from Okada Hidehiro and Nam Sang-geun's translation of Emperor Kangxi's Letters, p. 147)

39) Cho, Byeong-hak, "A Study on the Sino-Mongolian Relations in the Early 18th Century - Focusing on Articles Related to Tsewang Rabtan in the 'Qing Nei Ge Meng Gu Dang Dang'", 2011. "According to the words of Burghutai, who fled from your territory this winter, Tsewang Rabtan is preparing troops and intends to plunder and subjugate the Khalkha and others. ... If you return all the women and children of our Danjin Rabtan's subordinates whom you have plundered, and our fugitives, without hiding any of them, then we will later send your retainers such as Abdullah Jaizang and resume official trade as before. If you do not send them, we will not send Abdullah Jaizang and others, nor will we engage in your official trade."40)

Centered on articles related to Tsewang Rabtan-”, 2011. “According to the Burqutai who fled from your domain this past winter, Tsewang Rabtan is preparing his troops to capture and suppress the Khalkha and others. ... If you return all of our Danjin Rabtan subordinates' women and children, whom you plundered, and our fugitives without hiding any of them, then we will later send your Aisiyag Gungs like Abdullah and permit envoy trade as before. If you do not send them, there will be no sending of Abdullah Gungs and your envoy trade will not be permitted either.”40)

Four years later, in 1709 (Kangxi 48th year), the Dangdang became more explicit.

"Previously, Tsewang Rabtan, you sincerely reported all the matters in which you were at odds with Galdan, and for your actions, I was pleased and allowed your official trade, bestowing numerous benevolent imperial edicts and dispatching envoys. Later, when Danjin Rabtan came to seek you, you, Tsewang Rabtan, dispatched troops, invaded Karun, and sent pursuers to seize (people and goods). ... Furthermore, it is said that while all kings, ministers, and all living beings in the world are united in harmony, only Tsewang Rabtan remains isolated like this. As I naturally favor living according to one's true nature, I have generously forgiven all your wrongdoings. ... If you, Tsewang Rabtan, wish to engage in official trade as in the past, come to the assembly held in Altai, Khangai, Khovd, Ulan Gum, etc. If you wish to meet elsewhere, then set a place for the assembly and report it quickly. I still wish to discuss with you at the assembly according to the previous imperial decree."41)

40) 'Qing Nei Ge Meng Gu Dang Dang', Vol. 11, No. 250, record of the 30th day of the 10th month of the 44th year of Kangxi. (Cho, Byeong-hak, "A Study on the Sino-Mongolian Relations in the Early 18th Century - Focusing on Articles Related to Tsewang Rabtan in the 'Qing Nei Ge Meng Gu Dang Dang'", 2011, p. 235, re-cited)

Early 18th Century Sino-Mongolian Relations - Focusing on Articles Related to Tsewang Rabtan in the 'Qing Nei Ge Meng Gu Dang Dang'

Related articles - centered on Tsewang Rabtan, 2011, p. 235, re-cited)

41) 'Qing Nei Ge Meng Gu Dang Dang', Vol. 11, No. 255, record of the 13th day of the 11th month of the 48th year of Kangxi. (Cho, Byeong-hak, "A Study on the Sino-Mongolian Relations in the Early 18th Century - Focusing on Articles Related to Tsewang Rabtan in the 'Qing Nei Ge Meng Gu Dang Dang'

As the Son of Heaven responsible for maintaining peace in the world, Emperor Kangxi could no longer tolerate Tsewang Rabtan's uncooperative attitude and repeatedly urged him to attend the assembly led by the Qing dynasty as soon as possible. Emperor Kangxi did not view his relationship with Tsewang Rabtan as equal. This is similar to his declaration of 'punishment' when he personally led an expedition against Galdan. The reasons why Emperor Kangxi persistently tried to pacify the Dzungars through assemblies, rather than direct rule, can be broadly categorized into two. First, after three personal expeditions, especially to the distant Central Asia, the Qing dynasty lacked the capacity for another large-scale expedition. Furthermore, unlike the case of Galdan's expedition, the fact that Tsewang Rabtan could fight within the Dzungar territory worked against the Qing dynasty. Second, unlike the relationship between Galdan and Emperor Kangxi, Tsewang Rabtan and Emperor Kangxi were still ostensibly cooperating. Unless an explicit event occurred to break this relationship, the logic of 'punitive expedition,' which was convincing in Galdan's case, could be undermined. This is because it could appear as if the Son of Heaven himself was disrupting the peace of the world.

As Rosavii understood, the Qing dynasty clearly possessed a multi-faceted self-perception at the time. Although they were Manchus, their intermarriage with Mongols made them close to Mongolia, and the military strength and power of the Mongols provided a crucial basis for being recognized as emperors, surpassing the Han majority. Therefore, the rise of Dzungar Mongolia as the representative of the Mongol people was not merely a border instability for the Qing dynasty but a tangible threat that shook the foundation of the state. However, it must be noted that the Qing dynasty did not abandon its position as the Son of Heaven representing the Han world to focus solely on Mongol unification. The Qing dynasty did not rashly challenge the identity of Tibetan Buddhism occupied by Galdan or the Dzungars. During Emperor Kangxi's reign, the Qing dynasty respected Tibetan Buddhism but did not refer to itself as a living Buddha. The command to capture the 'false Dalai Lama' (i.e., the 6th Dalai Lama) to stabilize Tibet after the death of the 5th Dalai Lama revealed how the Qing dynasty understood Tibetan Buddhism at the time.

Related articles - centered on Tsewang Rabtan, 2011, p. 239, re-cited) "My intention is that the hearts of the Mongol masses are all inclined towards the Dalai Lama, and even if he is a false Dalai Lama, the Mongol masses will all obey him under the name of Dalai Lama. If the court does not send people to capture him and Tsewang Rabtan goes to welcome him, all the Western Mongols will turn to Tsewang Rabtan."42)

In other words, whether the Dalai Lama was a genuine individual was not particularly important to the Qing dynasty. This is consistent with the Qing dynasty's changing stance towards the 7th Dalai Lama, Kelsang Gyatso, depending on the political situation. In the 44th year of Kangxi (1705), the Qing dynasty recognized the status of a new 6th Dalai Lama, enthroned by Lhazang Khan, a powerful figure in Tibet supported by the Qing court, instead of the previously designated 6th Dalai Lama. However, in the 56th year of Kangxi (1717), Tsewang Rabtan of Dzungaria, claiming him to be the reincarnation of the deposed 6th Dalai Lama, put forth 'Kelsang Gyatso' and marched into Lhasa. Three years later, in the 59th year of Kangxi (1720), the Qing dynasty officially recognized Kelsang Gyatso as the 7th Dalai Lama and advanced into Lhasa to launch a large-scale military operation against the Dzungar forces.43)

Therefore, whether the Dalai Lama was a truthful person was not a significant concern for the Qing dynasty. This is consistent with the fluctuation in the Qing's stance toward the 7th Dalai Lama, Kelzang Gyatso, depending on the political situation. In the 44th year of Kangxi (1705), the Qing dynasty recognized the status of a new 6th Dalai Lama, enthroned by the Tibetan power broker Lagsang Khan, whom the Qing court was supporting, instead of the initially designated 6th Dalai Lama. However, in the 56th year of Kangxi (1717), Tsewang Rabtan of the Dzungars advanced into Lhasa, putting forward 'Kelzang Gyatso' as the reincarnation of the 6th Dalai Lama, whom the Qing court had deposed. Three years later, in the 59th year of Kangxi (1720), the Qing dynasty officially recognized Kelzang Gyatso as the 7th Dalai Lama, marched into Lhasa, and launched a large-scale military operation against the Dzungar forces.43)

This political maneuver shows that Emperor Kangxi placed much greater importance on the potential political influence of Tibetan Buddhism than on its religious aspects. This contrasts sharply with the Dzungar Mongols, who, despite advocating for Gelugpa supremacy, gradually lost popular support within Tibet.

century."

43) Ryu, Jeong-a, "The Reality of Qing Rule over Tibet During the Dzungar Invasion." 2009.

During Emperor Kangxi's reign, the Qing dynasty viewed Tibetan Buddhism solely as a means to influence public opinion in Central Asia and bestow political authority. However, it did not attempt to expand its own identity within it. As seen above, when dealing with Galdan or Tsewang Rabtan, Emperor Kangxi persistently utilized his position as Son of Heaven. Emperor Kangxi knew that the Dalai Lama was a decisive factor in the hearts of the Mongol masses, but he also knew that if he fought with the same legitimacy as the Dzungar Mongols, who had already gained religious authority from the Dalai Lama, he would be at a disadvantage. Furthermore, at a time when the Han people had not yet fully established trust in the Manchus (Emperor Kangxi suffered from the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories from 1673 to 1681), he could not afford to rashly declare an identity as a follower of a foreign religion.

In this situation, the surrender of the Khalkha Mongols to Emperor Kangxi provided a turning point, granting him the legitimacy to compete for dominance in Central Asia. Prior to the surrender, the Dzungars held a moral high ground in the Mongol world based on the religious legitimacy of being the "protectors of the Gelugpa." Opposing Galdan's title of 'Boshoktu Khan' could mean not only making an enemy of Galdan himself but also of the Dalai Lama of Tibet, who bestowed such a status, and by extension, all Mongols. However, with the surrender of the Khalkha Mongols to the Qing dynasty, the nature of the competition fundamentally changed. The Dzungars now became 'invaders and oppressors of (some) Mongols,' while the Qing dynasty secured new legitimacy as the 'protectors of the Mongol people.'

Furthermore, the surrender of the Khalkha provided a decisive opportunity for the Qing dynasty to extend its logic of the Son of Heaven to Central Asia. Emperor Kangxi's statement that he decided to personally lead an expedition against Galdan after 'declaring to Heaven, Earth, the imperial ancestors, and the state altars' was intended to frame it not as personal ambition or a regional dispute, but as a sacred duty of the Son of Heaven. Moreover, this logic of the Son of Heaven was compatible with the existing political order of the Mongol world. The concept of the Son of Heaven was not alien to the Mongols. Since the Yuan dynasty, the Mongol Khans had also served as the Sons of Heaven of the Central Plains, and during the Ming dynasty, the Mongols maintained a tributary relationship with the Central Plains dynasties. Therefore, the Qing dynasty's argument of protecting the Mongols as the Son of Heaven was not a religiously incompatible concept but rather one based on a familiar tradition. This provided a foundation for subsequent smooth support from Tibet for China.

Figure 4. Power Dynamics in Central Asian Hegemonic Competition After the Surrender of the Khalkha (1691)

3. Replacement of the Tibetan Buddhist Protector. The Dzungar conquest of Hami in 1717 and their subsequent policy of favoring the Gelug school led to the flight or escape of non-Gelug monks from Tibet. This background naturally lent political legitimacy to the Qing's "Son of Heaven's duty." From 1723, when Kangxi died and Yongzheng ascended the throne, the Qing began to actively replace the religious authority that the Dzungars had lost.

In the first year of Yongzheng's reign (1723), the Qing established a new cabinet centered around the Tibetan politician Kanchenne, who was hostile to the Dzungars. After Kanchenne was assassinated four years later, the Qing court used this as a pretext to dispatch troops to Lhasa, purge the faction responsible for his assassination, and establish its own permanent presence there. At this time, Emperor Yongzheng ordered the construction of a monastery for the Dalai Lama and the investiture of the 7th Dalai Lama. The Qing court bore all the expenses for the monastery, its maintenance, and the retinue of the 7th Dalai Lama. The following is a memorial submitted by Ak Zhongji, a Qing official, to the court regarding the Qing's provision of expenses for the 7th Dalai Lama's establishment.

"Upon the Dalai Lama's arrival in Lithang, not all supplies from Lhasa will immediately reach him. I believe it is necessary to prepare the necessary supplies for immediate distribution upon his arrival. This will align with Your Majesty's benevolent virtue in promoting the Gelug school."

In response to this memorial, Emperor Yongzheng issued the order: "Extremely well. ... Ensure that all necessary supplies for the Lama are provided in full."

44) Memorial submitted on the 7th day of the 12th lunar month of the 6th year of Yongzheng, p. 5 (reprinted in Liu Jeong-ah, "The Reality of Qing Rule in Tibet During the Dzungar Invasion Period," 2009, p. 287). In 1731 (the 9th year of Yongzheng), the Dzungars and the Qing temporarily ceased military confrontation and entered a period of normalization of relations through peace negotiations. At this time, it was not the Dzungars, but the Qing, who guaranteed the safety of the 7th Dalai Lama. The Qing dispatched Prince Guo to meet with the 7th Dalai Lama and ordered him to return, intending this to be a proxy meeting for the 7th Dalai Lama and Emperor Yongzheng. Prince Guo, after returning from the meeting, reported that the 7th Dalai Lama had praised the Emperor's benevolence, stating:

"In my youth, thanks to the great benevolence of Emperor Shengzu [Kangxi], a general was dispatched to lead troops to the temple of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa. Again, I have received imperial favor, which is immeasurable. Although I wished to meet Your Majesty soon as instructed, I had not yet contracted smallpox... At present... I have received further grace and will only state that I will promote the teachings and celebrate the long-lasting happiness of the sage king."

Tibetan historical records, such as the biography of the 7th Dalai Lama, record a similar sentiment: "The Dalai Lama stated that he would act according to the Emperor's instructions, as he believed it was a time to accomplish great deeds for the benefit of sentient beings in the Do-mey region [including the Amdo and Kham regions]."

It is significant that not only Chinese sources but also Tibetan records themselves state that the 7th Dalai Lama voluntarily accepted the relocation directed by the Qing Emperor. This appears to be a process of replacing religious authority that originated from Kangxi's cautious approach. Without outright denying religion itself, the duty of protection, which had been confined to the Khalkha Mongols, was extended to the protection of the Dalai Lama and Tibet by exploiting the vacuum in religious authority left by the Dzungars.

Thus, the emperor's duty of protection began to gradually merge with religious authority. The "Archives of the Yongzheng and Qianlong Periods of the Qing Dynasty" show that during the 12th and 13th years of Yongzheng's reign, imperial edicts were issued to rebuild Tibetan Buddhist temples within the princely estates. After the Yongzheng era, during the Qianlong reign, Qianlong himself actively promoted the construction of vast Gelug monasteries. This was an attempt to attract the attention of Tibetan Buddhists to Beijing and significantly weaken the alliance between the Dzungars and the Gelug factions in Tibet.47)

45) Annals of Emperor Shizong, Vol. 155, 4th Month, Jiawu Day, 13th Year of Yongzheng. (Reprinted in Liu Jeong-ah, "The Reality of Qing Rule in Tibet During the Dzungar Invasion Period," 2009, p. 291)

46) Lcang skya rol pa’I rdo rje'i dpag bsam rin po ch'i snye ma, p. 233

(Reprinted in Liu Jeong-ah, "The Reality of Qing Rule in Tibet During the Dzungar Invasion Period," 2009, pp.

291-2). This effort, embodied by the construction of the Yonghe Temple, perfectly fulfilled Qianlong's intentions. As the largest Gelug monastery in Beijing, the Yonghe Temple became a destination for the spiritual leaders of Tibetan Buddhism, including the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, and the Changkya Khutuktu, playing a crucial role in transforming Beijing into a "holy site" for Tibetan Buddhism. The Yonghe Temple was also Qianlong's birthplace, and its conversion into a Tibetan Buddhist monastery indirectly, yet effectively, enhanced Qianlong's personal religious authority.

Therefore, the Qing's identity construction during this period as a multi-ethnic empire was not monolithic. However, this was accompanied by international political considerations alongside the multifaceted identity within the Qing. Kangxi could have actively promoted his identity as Manjusri, which was merely rhetorical. He could have declared that the Qing emperor, like the Bo'shogtu Khan, was a recognized leader in Tibetan Buddhism, framing the conflict with Galdan as an equal struggle between Bo'shogtu Khan and Manjusri. However, Kangxi understood that the personal master-disciple relationship between Galdan and the 5th Dalai Lama was much closer and more persuasive when approached from a religious perspective. Therefore, he focused on his position as Son of Heaven and transformed the surrender of the Khalkha Mongols not into a religious event but into an expansion of the Son of Heaven's purview. This not only provided a strong justification for the war against Galdan but also appeased the opposition from the Han Chinese within the Qing empire.

The identity of "Manjusri" only truly shone after Galdan's death, when the popularity of the Dzungars, who had a clear religious objective, began to wane. Even then, the Qing did not explicitly declare a religious status but rather fully utilized the fact that the 7th Dalai Lama was granted the moral duty to protect the peace of Tibet while acknowledging his authority. This intersected with the originally existing but nominal religious authority as Manjusri, proving useful in filling the role of protector of Tibetan Buddhism that the Dzungars had lost.

Thus, the identity construction of the Qing dynasty as a multi-ethnic empire was not singular during this period. However, this was accompanied by international political considerations alongside the multifaceted identity within the Qing. Kangxi could have actively promoted his identity as Manjusri, which was merely rhetorical. He could have declared that the Qing emperor, like the Bo'shogtu Khan, was a recognized leader in Tibetan Buddhism, framing the conflict with Galdan as an equal struggle between Bo'shogtu Khan and Manjusri. However, Kangxi understood that the personal master-disciple relationship between Galdan and the 5th Dalai Lama was much closer and more persuasive when approached from a religious perspective. Therefore, he focused on his position as Son of Heaven and transformed the surrender of the Khalkha Mongols not into a religious event but into an expansion of the Son of Heaven's purview. This not only provided a strong justification for the war against Galdan but also appeased the opposition from the Han Chinese within the Qing empire.

The identity of "Manjusri" only truly shone after Galdan's death, when the popularity of the Dzungars, who had a clear religious objective, began to wane. Even then, the Qing did not explicitly declare a religious status but rather fully utilized the fact that the 7th Dalai Lama was granted the moral duty to protect the peace of Tibet while acknowledging his authority. This intersected with the originally existing but nominal religious authority as Manjusri, proving useful in filling the role of protector of Tibetan Buddhism that the Dzungars had lost.

The identity of "Manjusri" only truly shone after Galdan's death, when the popularity of the Dzungars, who had a clear religious objective, began to wane. Even then, the Qing did not explicitly declare a religious status but rather fully utilized the fact that the 7th Dalai Lama was granted the moral duty to protect the peace of Tibet while acknowledging his authority. This intersected with the originally existing but nominal religious authority as Manjusri, proving useful in filling the role of protector of Tibetan Buddhism that the Dzungars had lost.

V. Conclusion

The "Sinicized Conquest Dynasty" theory, represented by Fairbank, viewed the Qing dynasty as ultimately inheriting the traditional Sino-centric world order, but this fails to consider the strategic complexity of the Qing's identity utilization. Conversely, the concept of "China among equals" proposed by Rosavii and the subsequent New Qing History scholarship, while acknowledging the Qing's multi-ethnic characteristics, does not fully explain the Qing's active use of the Son of Heaven logic. The Qing depicted in this study synthesizes these two interpretations while adding a new dimension: the Qing managed its identity according to circumstances. Kangxi's focus on his secular identity (Son of Heaven) and disregard for religious identity in his competition with Galdan, or between Kangxi and Tsewang Rabtan, thoroughly conveyed the idea that a morally superior nation was "punishing" or "conquering" subordinate nations. In contrast, after the Yongzheng era, when a vacuum in religious authority emerged, the Qing actively promoted its role as a patron of Tibetan Buddhism. This exemplifies strategic identity management.

In other words, the traditional Sino-centric order seen in Qing relations with Joseon and Annam, which Fairbank highlighted, and the realpolitik relations with the northwestern nomadic peoples emphasized by Rosavii, were in fact different expressions of the same strategic thinking within the Qing. The Qing selectively utilized the most effective identity by comprehensively considering the nature of the counterpart, its own capabilities, and the international political timing.

The hegemonic competition for Central Asia between the Qing and the Dzungars transcended a mere territorial dispute, becoming a competition of different identity strategies. While the Dzungars presented a singular and pure religious identity as the protector of the Gelug, the Qing employed a strategy of sequentially utilizing a composite identity of Son of Heaven and Bodhisattva in accordance with international political circumstances. Notably, the surrender of the Khalkha Mongols served as a catalyst to extend the duty of protection as Son of Heaven to Central Asia, while the religious identity as Manjusri was only actively utilized at the optimal timing, after the Dzungars' extremism generated backlash within Tibet. This suggests that the Qing maintained a pragmatic approach to religion, whereas the Dzungars became overly engrossed in their religious mission and lost their advantage in realpolitik.

Conversely, the Qing's composite identity demonstrated a strength where its legitimacy was not easily undermined. The moral obligation as Son of Heaven subsequently justified religious patronage, and religious patronage validated the virtuous governance of the Son of Heaven. The protection of the Khalkha demonstrated the status of Son of Heaven, and the protection of the 7th Dalai Lama for the stability of Tibet was an example of compassion as a Bodhisattva. This mutually reinforcing structure was a key factor that enabled the Qing to establish sustainable hegemony in Central Asia.

The question of how to utilize this composite identity resonates strongly with contemporary China. Contemporary China, under the slogan of the "great Chinese nation," seeks to build a modern state that integrates ethnic minorities without compromising national unity. However, the current approach, which excludes minority languages from national examinations and gradually weakens ethnic distinctiveness for the sake of unified national goals, differs significantly from the Qing's strategy.

The lesson from the Qing experience for contemporary China is that the strategic utilization of composite identities can be far more effective than simple assimilation or oppression. The Qing adjusted its complex internal diversity to align with the interests of the nation as a whole, and by flexibly transforming its identity according to circumstances, it secured long-term stability. For contemporary China's pursuit of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" to succeed, the composite self-perception presented externally must also be accepted internally by ethnic minorities. That is, the flexibility shown in presenting itself as a representative of South-South cooperation to developing countries and a responsible great power among other major powers must also be applied to its engagement with the cultural identities of ethnic minorities.

The primary reason why the Qing, rather than the Dzungars, succeeded in gaining the support of Tibetan Buddhism and ultimately destroying the Dzungars lay in its utilization of diversity not as an enemy of unity, but as an asset. This provides a still-relevant insight for the governance of multi-ethnic states in the 21st century. <Bibliography> Books

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